I maintain that the language of weirdness is all predicated on an attempt to retain a classical concept of objects. The correct view is that objects are emergent constructs of multiple quantum events. I don’t see why people can’t just accept this, as Feynman advocated.
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That could be. But accepting it is one thing and understanding it is quite another. But then again, even as a child, we all learned that rocks fall down not up. Now that makes sense to us despite the fact that we really don’t understand gravity much better than we do quarks.
In his DE RERUM NATURA Lucretius accepts the immediate subjective experience of downwardness as a universal principle, and expounds on it at length, ridiculing the notion of a spherical earth as a patent impossibility.
It is true that "falling down" still makes sense to us, even though most of us are ready to admit that the idea is based on particular circumstances, and has been supplanted by central force gravitation in a more general understanding.
So I'm saying that the "weirdness" talk is analogous to Lucretius' POV, in that it refuses to abandon the classical object as a universal principle.