[Oatka]

In contrast, the US did a far better job of matching military needs to industrial resources and to carrying out a strategy that coordinated its output of material with its war fighting.
Read "Freedom's Forge" for a first-rate narrative on how we ramped up production even before Pearl Harbor, and the mind-boggling amount of material we turned out. Also check YouTube "WWII American production" for some great vids. We really had our act together in those days. What got me was Henry Kaiser building shipyards on the Richmond, CA mud flats in six months. Take six years today just to get past the EPA.

On being shown US weapons production figures and the projected increases, Hitler angrily rejected them as propaganda
I read that at the end of the war, with German prisoners streaming back to the camps, one of 'em looked up and saw the hundreds of aircraft flying overhead and sneered "propaganda".

[Rockingham]

I have the book on my wish list. The late historian John Keegan, in Fields of Battle: The Wars for North America, described his astonishment in finding the US strategic bombing strategy for WW II laid out in student class assignments from the late 1920s at the Army Air War College archives at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama.

At a time when open cockpits were still common, the young officers who later became WW II Air Force generals laid out the design and performance parameters for the heavy bombers needed to subdue Japan, the islands on which they should be based, and the Japanese cities and industries to target.

As it was, the bomber assigned that task -- the B-29 -- was beset with production problems and taxed the abilities of Air Force crews. Yet the US Army Air Corps (as it was called at the time) not only mastered the aircraft but radically changed their bombing tactics when the initial approach of high altitude bombing proved ineffective.

In contrast, the Axis never produced a reliable four engine heavy bomber. Germany and Japan both lapsed into unreality in too long assuming in their war plans that they would not need such an aircraft. Then, when the need became apparent, they found designs lacking and the production capacity inadequate or otherwise committed.

Against our worst fears, democracies in general and America in particular have proved able to fight and win against dictatorships -- with superior war production a large part of the equation.