“Converstation?”
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Pierre Sprey Weapons Analyst and Participant in
F-16 A-10 Design Reversing the Decay of
American Air Power
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Roots of the Air Power Rot
Wrong Missions Dominance of Strategic Bombing
and Douhet
Wrong Aircraft Too Few, Too Ineffective, Too
Expensive
Wrong Incentive Maximize Budget
BUSINESS-AS-USUAL WILL LEAD TO TINY, ANTIQUATED,
IRRELEVANT FORCES THAT FAIL IN COMBAT.
LACK OF MONEY IS NOT THE PROBLEM!
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CURING THE ROT
In depth, examine combat results and money spent
over last seventy years
Distill what works in combat
Design austere aircraft and forces around what
works in combat
RESULT
THE COMBAT HISTORY-BASED FORCE IS ASTONISHINGLY
LARGE, EFFECTIVE AND AFFORDABLE
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Combat Results and Costs WWII in Europe
Douhet and strategic bombing shaped the WWII Air
Force
80 spent on bombers, 20 on fighters. Half of
war effort spent on air
8 of 9 strategic bombing campaigns failed
(Strategic Bombing Survey)
Allied bombing lost 150,000 airmen (10x the
fighter losses)
Unescorted bombers failed German fighters won
(Fall 1943)
Reversed in Spring 1944 1100 P-51s gained air
superiority (essential for D-Day landings)
Gen. Quesadas 1200 P-47s in close support saved
the Normandy Beach head
Same P-47s proved crucial for St. Lo breakout and
Pattons plunge across France (600 miles/2 weeks)
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Combat Summary WWII in Europe
Overall, strategic bombing stiffened German
resolve and strengthened the regime (just like
German bombing did to UK)
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Combat Results and CostsWWII to Korea
USAF bomber generals slashed fighters down to
1000(265 P-47s left out of 16,000 produced) and
forced Quesada out
Korea 1949 US Army Task Force overwhelmed. USAF
sent 90 B-29s yielding 13 close support
sorties/day
USAF deployed a token 150 P-150s Too vulnerable,
huge losses. Gen. Vandenberg refused to replace
with survivable P-47s
USMC/USN prop-driven Corsairs and A-1 Skyraiders
provided brilliant close support. Saved Marine
division trapped by 7 Chinese divisions at Chosin
1000 Mig-15s cripple B-29 bombing. 90 F-86s gain
air superiority with 10 exchange ratio
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Combat SummaryWWII to Korea
Strategic Bombing Results
Laid waste to every large North Korean City (with
huge bomber losses)
Completely failed to prevent resupply
Never forced North Koreans to the peace table
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Combat Results and CostsKorea to Vietnam
1950-1960 USAF built 3000 bombers and nuclear
interceptors but slashed fighters to 1000
Vietnam air war starts (1964) USAF deployed 227
old F-100s and 110 F-105s as strategic bombers.
Highly vulnerable to AAA and MiGs Lost 243
F-100s and 397 F-105s
No USAF fighter in production SECDEF imposed
Navys F-4 nuclear interceptor on USAF. Equally
vulnerable deployed 285, lost 445
Token close support effort in the south (100
sorties/day) but 55 prop-driven A-1s achieved
spectacular successes due to pinpoint accuracy of
20mm. 3-4 hr loiter time, invulnerability and
slow speed maneuverability. Troops loved the A-1.
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Combat SummaryKorea to Vietnam
6 years of strategic bombing failed
Did not stop resupply of South
Never forced North Vietnam to negotiating table
Stiffened civilian resistance and strengthened Ho
Chi Minh regime
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Combat Costs and ResultsGulf War
Gulf War I USAF planned 39 day strategic bombing
campaign. Predicted surrender in 6 days (DOUHET!)
Targeting blunder, killing 300 women/children,
ended Baghdad bombing in 20 days. No effect on
Iraqi army in Kuwait
132 A-10s killed more tactical targets than all
the 2000 high speed jets (F-16, F-111,
F-15,F-117, etc)
2 A-10s destroyed the spearhead of Iraqi armored
invasion of Saudi Arabia. In 2 days, 100s of A-10
sorties mauled the whole division 2 force
After war, USAF bomber generals rewarded A-10s by
mothballing half simultaneously funding huge
over runs for the B-1, B-2 and F-22
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Combat Costs and ResultsKosovo
In Kosovo, USAF planned strategic bombing
campaign with 720 NATO planes. Predicted
surrender in 2 days
78 days and 38,000 sorties later, only destroyed
3/80 SAM Sites, 14 armored vehicles and 387
military casualties
After 78 days, Serbs, undefeated, accepted better
NATO terms than Serbia wanted before war.
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Combat Costs and ResultsSummary
Strategic bombing failed in WW II, Korea,
Vietnam, Gulf War I and Kosovo (and in subsequent
wars)
Close air support has succeeded, wherever tried,
in moving battles in WW II, Korea, Vietnam, Gulf
War I and Afghanistan
Air crew and aircraft losses in strategic bombing
are huge, typically 10x the losses in close
support. Costs are equally huge No US air war
has spent even 10 on close support
Ever since 1949, US airpower has had decreasing
effects on the outcome of each war, applying
smaller and smaller forces at higher and higher
costs
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Business-as-usual in Procurement
Air Force presents an impossibly expensive wish
list of programs (currently 1 Trillion over next
20 years)
SECDEF (and Congress) haggle this down, year by
year, to around 12 Billion/year in RD
Procurement
That will buy 50 or less planes per years
mostly for nuclear or non-nuclear strategic
bombing
Todays Air Force 4,000 aircraft, on average 20
years old
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The Business-as-usual Air Force in 20 years
2000 aircraft, average 25-30 years old, and no
air power option except strategic bombing
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An Alternative The Effectiveness-based Air
Force
Replace Wish List with four austere designs
based on what works in combat
New Close Support A/C 55 the size of the A-10
and significantly more lethal/maneuverable/surviva
ble
Forward Controller Plane Lands right next to
troops but far more survivable/maneuverable/long-l
oitering than helicopter
Dirt Strip Airlifter 5-10 ton emergency resupply
to beleaguered battalions in boonies
New Super-agile Dogfighter 30 smaller than
F-16 Far higher acceleration and turn
all-passive electronics/weapons for real, not
pretend stealth out-fights any fighter in the
world, including F-22
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An Alternative The Effectiveness-based Air
Force (cont)
Keep spending same over next 20 years 12
Billion/year
Program and cost out a complete, balanced force
Fighters, airlift, close support, forward
control, tankers
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The Effectiveness-Base Force Delivers
10,000 new aircraft
Devastating close support
Overwhelming air superiority
All available right at the beginning of a war a
first in US air power history!