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Hitchens has a point of view, which I think I'm summarizing fairly, that Britain exhausted itself needlessly in WWI (and then out of necessity in WWII), trying to prevent German hegemony on the continent, and he lays out his case thoughtfully and with considerable merit.

The problem with this view is that it runs counter to Britain's foreign policy on the continent since Tudor times, which was that Britain would resist the creation of a Continental hegemon, because a hegemon in Europe would be in a position to thwart Britain's mastery of the seas on which her colonial empire was founded.

It's true, as Hitchens states, that Britain stayed out of the wars of German unification. But the chauvinistic and bellicose Germany of 1914 was seen in many circles as an aggressive power (which it was) that had become unmoored from Bismark's judicious realpolitik. Germany had come to be viewed as the most serious challenge since Napoleonic France.

With support from the US, Britain prevailed (sort of), but Hitchens asks whether it was worth the tremendous cost. Which is a question forth asking, even thought it can never be answered.

In the first war, Britain had to challenge the Germans (ie. the German Navy) or else lose its colonies. It became an arms race that was the granddaddy of them all and which did NOT exclude Japan, the US, Italy, etc., though THEY modernized on a little smaller scale (at first).

A strong (stronger than Britain's) German Navy meant a German challenge to English control of the seas. The British needed to trade, administer colonies, communicate, and to maintain a standing in world politics despite its small land mass. They couldn't do that without a world class navy.

The Kaiser kept on enlarging and modernizing his navy and was a threat to Britain the whole time. The British HAD to respond or lose it all. No effort against Germany in WWI could be needless for the Brits.