Before TMI operator training was much different than now. Besides training ergometrics where also investigated. All operating nukes were required to make changes after TMI. One was the construction of a simulator for training. The simulator was an exact replica of the control room down to the furnishings and the color of telephones.
Unless a trainee or operator requalifying looked behind him to see the windows into the trainers room, they could not see a difference between the control room and the simulator.
I forget how accurate the S/W had to emulate the actual plant. At that time they all used Gould minicomputers. All of the alarms, meters, etc. in the simulator responded the same as the actual plant would as the controls were moved.
There was a cacophony going on in the TMI control room during that incident. A large part of the problem went back to the plant design including the control room. From what I’ve read and seen afterwards and while at TMI following the incident, I don’t believe it’s sabotage.
People were challenged by an unusual happening and their equipment and training didn’t provide the tools they needed.
TMI was a case of lack of training. Most operators think a Power Plant as a bunch of things rather than a system.
I trained my operators to think: If I do this, push a button, how does that affect all of the other parts of the system and if I get strange results why?
Look at it, you have people on the floor for that reason.
But you should read the article. He makes points that had not been brought out in any writing about the accident before to my knowledge.
I have been in the industry since 1981 and I never knew about the hose connecting water and air systems that caused the feed water valves to close.
When viewed as a whole all of these mispositioned components seem to be just too many to happen all at once with out some person or persons setting it up.