Venezuela and the U.S. War on Al Qaeda

Venezuela and the U.S. War on Al Qaeda
22 April 2002

Summary

The failure of a coup in Venezuela has significant ripple effects for U.S. foreign policy. The widespread perception that Bush administration officials backed or participated in the failed ouster of President Hugo Chavez raises disturbing questions about the blowback for the war on terrorism. If Chavez, a reasonably minor foe with significant domestic opposition, can survive the wrath of Washington, how seriously should the rest of the world take the Bush administration's "with us or against us" rhetoric?

Analysis

What began so simply on Sept. 11 has become extraordinarily complex. On Sept. 11, the United States announced a single, elegant goal: the utter destruction of al Qaeda -- no matter how long it takes, no matter how difficult the course. Only seven months into the war, the country remains united in the effort, but the effort is becoming increasingly murky. In part, this is the nature of the beast: Fighting al Qaeda is unconventional warfare at its most extreme; it is difficult to see, to measure, to assess. At the same time, there is no question that the United States is being buffeted by events that have little to do with al Qaeda but certainly cut into Washington's ability to focus on the core issue.

The recent un-coup in Venezuela is a case in point. It is doubtful that a coup ever came as less of a surprise to everyone concerned or had an outcome that came as more of a surprise. For months, Venezuela was filled with rumors of very real plots to bring down President Hugo Chavez and his Bolivarian Revolution. A coalition ranging from generals to trade unionists had formed, and Chavez's support from Venezuela's barrios was clearly slipping. But the coup failed -- not so much because of anything Chavez did, but because the coupsters started trying to outmaneuver each other before they had actually taken power.

Venezuela is a huge problem for the United States. It produces about 4 percent of the world's crude oil and provides 16 percent of all oil consumed by the United States, which for Washington essentially makes it as important as Saudi Arabia.

That should be big enough, but Venezuela's impact on U.S. oil markets is even more substantial. State-owned Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) owns 100 percent of CITGO, which in turn controls about 10 percent of the U.S. retail market. In addition, PDVSA and other Venezuelan interests own 18.6 percent of all U.S. refining capacity. What happens in Venezuela has an intimate effect on the United States. And since Venezuela exports nearly two-thirds of its oil to the United States, what Washington does is of critical importance to Venezuelans. Interdependence was a word designed to describe the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship.

The U.S. government had relatively few concerns about Chavez when he was elected. Although he had been imprisoned after leading a failed coup as a colonel in the early 1990s -- a fact that made him unappetizing to human rights bureaucrats in former President Bill Clinton's State Department -- he had been democratically elected, and there was a feeling that he would stay within acceptable bounds. Truth be known, the consensus in Washington was that he was a windbag and a bit of a crackpot, but that he could be managed and made fairly harmless. He could make all the anti-globalist speeches he wanted and harbor dreams of a new Bolivarian revolution sweeping Latin America, but the expectation was that he would not affect anything important to the United States.

In some ways, this view was correct. The problem was that Chavez turned out to be more effective than expected. First of all, he became a driving force in reviving OPEC and raising oil prices, something that was critical to his domestic agenda. U.S. leaders have always had mixed feelings about oil prices, since they hits U.S. trading partners harder than the United States itself. However, the problem with Chavez was that, in order to move OPEC forward, he had to work with representatives of countries that Washington didn't particularly like, such as Iraq, Iran and Libya. U.S. leaders had been aware that Chavez had contact with agents of these countries prior to his election, and there had even been some rumors that these countries had funneled money to him for his election campaign. But as uneasy as Washington was, it remained a subcritical issue.

The same could be said about his relationship with Cuba and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). There was no question that Chavez had close relations with Cuban leader Fidel Castro -- indeed, he had provided Castro with discount oil critical to keeping his regime afloat. However, absent the Soviet Union, Cuba did not propose a strategic challenge to the United States, and the relationship therefore appeared of little importance. Similarly, the FARC guerrillas in Colombia seemed to be a contained problem and Chavez's relationships with them, thought distasteful to the United States, were no cause for alarm.

Two things intervened to change this evaluation. The first was a U.S. decision to increase the tempo of operations against both the FARC and its narcotics-dealing allies in Colombia. As U.S. involvement against the FARC grew, the guerrillas' ability to use Venezuelan territory as sanctuary from Colombian Army attacks became important. Similarly, if the attempt to choke off the flow of coca out of Colombia was important, then sealing off the Venezuelan route through the Orinoco River became important, as did Chavez's collaboration with the FARC and Cuba.

The most important transformation, however, occurred on Sept. 11 -- or more precisely, in October, when the United States started its bombing campaign in Afghanistan. For the United States, Afghanistan was merely the appetizer in a global war against terrorism, and the Bush administration expected all allies -- friendly or otherwise -- to back the attack. Chavez not only didn't back the United States but went on to condemn the bombing of Afghanistan.

This happened at a time when U.S. leaders lacked a great sense of humor on the subject. The fact that rumors in Venezuela claimed that Chavez had conversations with the ghost of Simon Bolivar did not override the fact that he had criticized a visceral interest of the United States. Chavez's challenge clearly triggered a bottoms-up review of his regime and its potential threat to the United States.

Prior to Sept. 11, Chavez's flirtations with Iraq, Libya, Iran and the occasional Hezbollah agent were irritating but tolerable. After Sept. 11 it became a direct threat to the United States. A frightening scenario could be generated: U.S.-backed Colombian forces were pressing FARC guerrillas; the war could spill over into western Venezuela; Chavez was not likely to permit U.S.-backed operations in his territory, and at the same time, his relationships with radical Arabs and Islamic fundamentalists could give them a base of operations in the Western Hemisphere secure against U.S. attacks. Given the importance of Venezuelan oil to the United States and the deep interdependence of the two countries, the Bush administration saw Chavez's Venezuela evolving in a way that could directly threaten U.S. interests.

Now, it was unlikely that Chavez would want to disrupt the flow of oil exports -- he needed the cash as much as the United States needed the oil. However, given the people that Chavez was playing with and the general feeling that Chavez was not likely to be able to control these relationships, U.S. leaders concluded that the survival of the Chavez regime represented a direct threat.

Fortunately, from the U.S. point of view, plenty of Venezuelans of many political persuasions had reached the same conclusion. Officials in Washington have claimed that the U.S. government did not engineer the coup, although its agents had extensive discussions with some of the participants. Put differently, the United States knew the coup was coming and, if we are to believe the government, did nothing to stop it. For example, U.S. leaders didn't tell Chavez that a coup was coming. Now, if a coup were being planned against the government of Mexico or Poland, officials probably would tell someone about it. Therefore, the fact is that the United States knew about the coup and didn't tell Chavez because leaders wanted it to happen.

It is hard to believe that U.S. officials confined themselves to pleasant chats with the would-be coupsters. Given Washington's activist mode after Sept. 11, given the way Chavez challenged the United States on Afghanistan, and given real concerns about the relationships Chavez had developed, it would go completely against the grain of the Bush administration not to have participated more actively. But perhaps officials are telling the truth: Venezuelans seemed to have the situation in hand, and U.S. participation in the coup was not needed.

To be perfectly frank, however, it really doesn't matter what the truth is. Whatever the facts are (and even the United States has admitted to prior knowledge of the coup), the universal perception is that the United States staged the coup -- or more important, that the United States staged the coup and completely bungled it. That is a critically important perception.

The United States is involved in a global struggle using relatively few forces. One of the reasons that countries cooperate with the United States is a sense of American omnipotence -- that standing in Washington's way when it is utterly determined about something is dangerous and probably to be avoided. Given this perception of ferocious determination and devastating effectiveness, countries around the world have bent over backward to accommodate the United States. Green Berets are being deployed and Air Force bases established around the world right now because governments thought it wise not to say no to the United States.

The Venezuelan fiasco has been a profound blow to the perception of U.S. power. Venezuela is in the United States' back yard. Its economy is intimately bound up with that of the United States. Its political, social and economic terrain is well known to Americans who come to Venezuela in droves to do business. Compared to Yemen or Kazakhstan, Venezuela is a next-door neighbor -- yet the United States is seen as incapable of bringing Chavez down. Despite months of planning, a simple coup turned into a circus, and Chavez did the laughing.

Chavez is a problem for the United States, but the deeper problem is the lingering perception about U.S. power and competence. Given that no one will believe that the United States did not plan the coup -- regardless of the truth, which is itself murky -- the failure of the coup is a direct blow to the credibility of U.S. ferocity, which might resonate around the world. If Hugo Chavez can survive American wrath, how seriously should the world take American wrath?

This puts the United States in an uncomfortable position indeed. At a time when it is less than clear what the government has in mind about al Qaeda, doubts about U.S. power are the last thing the Bush administration needs. That should make Chavez feel fairly uncomfortable himself. He has survived, but his survival has raised the stakes. The United States looks pretty ridiculous at a time when it can least afford to look ridiculous. If the government can't bring Chavez down, how can it reach out and touch some of the really dangerous regimes it will have to deal with?

If the CIA can't bring down a colonel who himself screwed up a coup, the question being asked is simple: just how dangerous is the United States? Even if Washington didn't set out to bring Chavez down, it now may have to give it a try.

Howdy

Interesting thesis. To place so much emphasis on the fluffy and insubstantial "perception" of American competence, power, and influence in Venezuela, however, robs this narrative of any impact whatsoever.

Yes, bill clinton destroyed the CIA. If he had not, September 11th could not have happened, and if he had not, chavez would be out of power.

Not to worry, George W. Bush is rebuilding the competence, power, and influence of the USA so blythely misspent by the billowing buffoon who preceeded him.

Another stupid analysis by Stratfor. Washington obviously did not engineer the coup, and we could have interfered to make it permanent if we had so chosen.

Nobody is now wondering whether America is no longer a superpower or whether we have any clout. Just look at what we did today to the head of the Chemical Weapons Commission.

The very fact that we chose not to do anything about Venezuela is proof of our supreme confidence that we can do whatever we need to if it's important enough. Right now, Chavez is an irritant. Nothing more than that.

...First of all, he became a driving force in reviving OPEC and raising oil prices, something that was critical to his domestic agenda. U.S. leaders have always had mixed feelings about oil prices, since they hits U.S. trading partners harder than the United States itself. However, the problem with Chavez was that, in order to move OPEC forward, he had to work with representatives of countries that Washington didn't particularly like, such as Iraq, Iran and Libya... ...Now, it was unlikely that Chavez would want to disrupt the flow of oil exports -- he needed the cash as much as the United States needed the oil...

Interesting analysis, but based on a faulty presumption that it's in Venezuela's best interests to maintain OPEC export levels. The PVDSA economists determined that they should go for market share, that is, Venezuela would make more money opening up the pumps than restricting them. (Like Russia has been saying they will do.) There was an article (can't find) during the coup where a PVDSA leader said he would open the pumps and "no more oil for Cuba."

Who would be hurt by Venezuela's success? Why Iran, etc. They seem to have spent much effort propping up and encouraging Chavez. In return for chavez hurting his country he gets Cuban assistance, and Cuba and Iran are very cozy right now. Ali Rodriguez was a big pusher for OPEC restrictions. And now he's being appointed as the head of the PVDSA with the avowed purpose of keeping to limited exports. I would guess that this was Chavez' purpose in trying to upset the PVDSA board with "communist" appointees, which the PVDSA objected to some months ago, and Chavez relented. Now Chavez/Iran have the solution of appointing Rodriguez as head of the PVDSA, taking him out of his OPEC presidency. The cover story is that he is "experienced." So what, many are. The true purpose is to stop Venezuela from participating in a market share strategy - a strategy that would benefit it, but harm Iran and other OPEC states. Vicente Fox is probably happy about this too.

It's about money - who gets it, who doesn't - though playing up to Chavez' ego about being a world figure, etc. plays into it.

Yellow flag alert. Notice how the article doesn't react very much to the fact that Hezbollah is meeting with Venezuela (maybe lack of info). Why on earth would Hezb do so? Probably as agents of Iran, supplying population control and terrorism assitance, maybe helping the drug lords, I mean "Marxist", guerillas in Colombia, who, by the way, take great efforts to make sure oil production facilities in Colombia are blown up. Who makes money on that? Iran. Venezuela. Every oil producer.

Interesting marketing strategy.

Actually the CIA probably had nothing to do with this so called coup.

These phoney coups are one of the oldest tricks that the commies like Castro have used for decades. A phoney coup gets your opponents involved in the streets and thus setting themselves up for identification, arrest and death.

Your arrest or death is falsely proclaimed. Your opponents come out to celebrate and to make speeches. 48 hours later, you escape from the evil and dumb CIA! Then your army and secret police round up every opponent who reveal his/herself during the phoney coup!

This phoney coup came right out of Havana's Phoney Coups Inc..

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