Stryker Strikes Out

The United States Army’s Stryker program is misguided because Desert Storm demonstrates that threats still exist to which Stryker’s protection and firepower are insufficient.[1] In addition, it does not pass basic mobility and deployability requirements.

The measure of success for a combat vehicle is determined by its level of crew protection and its firepower. Many modern vehicles in various stages of testing and development attempt to make maximum use of technological sensors and diagnostics to augment the vehicle’s protection. Modern variants also use technology to augment their fire capabilities by attempting to digitally link them to other modern weapons platforms on the battlefield. But what happens if the vehicle temporarily loses power, or the computer “locks up?” The answer is that those technological systems are no longer available, and the vehicle instantly becomes extremely vulnerable. Such circumstances are not a matter of speculation, they will and do happen all the time. Combat vehicle designers must therefore design the vehicles so that they can fight – and win – in such a “degraded mode.” A vehicle that cannot fight in degraded mode should get a grade of “F” for survivability.

This paper will show why the Stryker concept is misguided, by comparing the Stryker to the M2/M3 Bradley. The Bradley is the most comparable modern fighting vehicle, and as such the Stryker should be markedly better if the Army is to adopt it for its Interim Brigade Combat Teams. This paper will compare the two systems in the areas of Protection, Firepower, Mobility and Deployability.

The most obvious area to measure from a protection standpoint is the vehicle’s armor. The Bradley provides 65mm of protection on the sides compared to the Stryker’s 14.5mm.[2] These figures are provided by the respective manufacturers. Bradley armor is supposed to offer protection against everything short of direct hits by artillery or tank main gun rounds. However, this writer (an Armor officer with 15 years of experience, to include combat in Desert Storm) personally witnessed the effects of .50 caliber, 25 millimeter (both American), and 12.7 mm (Soviet) machine gun fire against a Bradley. All calibers easily penetrated the front, sides and rear of the Bradley, killing the crew.[3]

As stated above, the Stryker protection level should be better than the Bradley’s; but is it? It appears that the Stryker’s armor is no better than the Bradley’s, and may be worse. During a rigorous field test of the Stryker (Millenium Challenge 2002) conducted in August 2002, “thirteen of fourteen Strykers were destroyed by small arms fire, grenades and guns mounted on enemy vehicles, during ambushes and other encounters on one of the exercise’s missions.”[4] Such performance does not outshine the Bradley’s; but perhaps the Stryker is more lethal?

A reasonable criterion to measure success is whether the vehicle can shoot while on-the-move. Stabilized gun platforms have been used on various American and Soviet weapons systems for over two decades; therefore it is well within the limits of technology that such systems be incorporated into future designs due to the decided advantage they provide. In fact, not having a stabilized platform has become a serious disadvantage.

The Bradley’s main weapon systems are a 25 millimeter chain gun, and a TOW missile launcher. One of the vehicle’s offensive limitations is that it cannot fire its TOW while on-the-move. The Bradley must first stop, raise the TOW launcher, arm the missile, then fire. This entire process takes approximately 30 seconds. Therefore, the TOW is usually employed while the vehicle is in a defensive position offering as much protection as possible (hull defilade), but its 4000 meter range gives it exceptional stand-off distance.[5]

The Bradley’s 25mm chain gun can be effectively fired while moving, and has an effective range of 2000 meters.[6] It is a very lethal weapon, capable of penetrating all infantry fighting vehicles on the modern battlefield. This writer has also seen the effects of the 25mm chain gun against older Soviet tanks (T-54/55 and T-62). When able to get a shot at the tank’s thinly armored engine compartment in the rear, the Bradley caused enough damage to disable the tank and engulf it in flames from its own fuel.

In contrast, the Stryker’s main weapons are a 105mm gun (on the Mobile Gun System variant) and a grenade launcher; but neither variant can fire on-the-move. Furthermore, the entire target acquisition process takes approximately two minutes.[7] An evaluation by the Army’s Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) noted that soldiers had trouble using the vehicle’s remote weapon station periscope, and instead were forced to engage the enemy by climbing on top of the vehicle and using Javelin missiles (not part of the vehicle’s weapons system).[8]

Once again, the Stryker cannot compete against the Bradley. Stryker loses the lethality battle.

The Bradley is capable of maximum speeds of 45 miles per hour, and has a range of 300 miles. It was specifically designed to be able to keep up with the M1 series tank on the modern battlefield, over any terrain. In fact, over extremely broken terrain, the Bradley can actually travel slightly faster than the M1. The reason for the Bradley’s cross-country success is that is has a set of wide tracks, powered by a 600 horsepower engine.

It is important to note that General Shinseki and his supporters (during the vehicle selection phase of Stryker’s development) attempted to seed disinformation by claiming that wheeled vehicles are more mobile than tracks, in a blatant attempt to effect vehicle selection. There are also many allegations of rigged tests in favor of the wheeled vehicle, and Shinseki has stated that his ultimate goal is to rid the Army of tracked vehicles. But despite Shinseki’s disinformation attempts, armor experts know very well that wheeled vehicles cannot compete against tracked vehicles for mobility.[9]

In addition to the Bradley’s superior off-road mobility, it is fully amphibious. Different variants have either a pontoon or a skirt, which take between 15 and 30 minutes to deploy, respectively. Once ready, the Bradley can swim by using its tracks to propel it through the water at a top speed of four miles per hour.[10]

The Stryker also has a maximum range of 300 miles, but can travel at a top speed of 62 miles per hour while on roads. During its Millennium Challenge field testing, the Stryker impressed some dismounted soldiers by its speed at getting them to the fight. But the vehicle had its problems when operating off-road; “a total of 13 tires on the 16 Strykers needed to be replaced during the 96-hour war game."[11]

Wheeled vehicles in Desert Storm, to include the much-vaunted HMMWV, had significant problems operating in the desert sands; and the rocky portions of the desert wreaked havoc on tires. Every wheeled vehicle in this writer’s unit had tire problems. The situation became so bad that the brigade leadership issued a directive requiring all wheeled vehicles to remain on paved (or improved) surfaces whenever possible.

The Bradley weighs approximately 25 tons. It can be transported by any mean, to include transport aircraft, but must utilize aircraft larger than the C-130 which is only capable of transporting 13 tons when it is fully fueled and outfitted for combat operations.[12]

The original requirement for an interim armored vehicle stated that it must be easily transportable by C-130. At 19 tons the basic version of the Stryker is lighter than the Bradley, yet it is still too heavy and too tall to be deployed by C-130.[13] The Stryker is not yet certified for C-130 transport. While Strykers were transported by C-130 for their field test during Millenium Challenge 2002, they required a special one-time waiver from the Air Force. In addition, the C-130s lightened their load by using as little fuel as possible, and by discarding additional armor protection normally required for combat operations.[14]

The Strykers do not meet the “easily transportable” test because they must be modified for flight. The crew must disassemble and remove the remote weapon station (40mm grenade launcher, or .50 caliber machine gun), as well as externally mounted ammunition and racks, so that the Stryker can fit into a C-130.[15]

In conclusion, the Stryker cannot surpass the Bradley in lethality or survivability, as demonstrated by the Bradley’s successes during Desert Storm and Stryker field-testing. The Stryker is, in fact, inferior to the Bradley in these areas. Mobility and deployability are two additional fields in which the Stryker demonstrates its inferiority. Stryker is not a leap ahead in technology or innovation, but merely an inadequate weapons system championed by senior Army leadership who have wed themselves to a wheeled vehicle, at any cost. Ultimately, Stryker will fail before it reaches full production, and where it counts the most – on the battlefield. This failure will have a significantly adverse effect on Army Transformation, and will cause the new Army leadership to cancel (or drastically change) the entire transformation process.

[1] Preliminary data coming back from units in the more recent Operation Iraqi Freedom confirm the same.

[2] “M2A3 Bradley,”[data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/banzaidyne/heavygear/M2A3.html; accessed 11 August 2003; and “Stryker Family of Vehicles,” General Dynamics Land Systems [data on-line] www.gdls.com; accessed 11 August 2003. The Stryker’s 14.5mm armor is applique (bolt-on) that must be added to the vehicle once it reaches its destination. No data is available concerning the Stryker’s actual armor thickness, although it is rumored to be only ½ inch aluminum.

[3] This incident occurred on 26 February 1991 in southern Iraq, during an engagement between a Bradley from Task Force 4-32 Armor (3rd Armored Division) and an Iraqi Republican Guard T-72 tank. A partial account is given in Brigadier General Robert H. Scales Certain Victory (Washington: Brassey’s, 1994), 274. Staff Sergeant Christopher Stephens and Private First Class Adrian Stokes were both killed in action.

[4] Frank Tiboni, “Stryker Falls Short in First Major Field Test,” Defense News, September 16, 2002: 2.

[5] “M2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” in Military Analysis Network, May 5, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.fas.org.man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

[8] Don Loughlin, “Army Leadership and the Stryker Armored Car Program Have Failed ‘Army Transformation,’” 9 October 2002 [data on-line] http://www.combatreform.com/gg021006a.htm; accessed 11 August 2003. Loughlin uses quotes from the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s (ATEC) 6 August 2002 report entitled “Stryker Findings.” The report was originally presented as a vugraph presentation, and was formerly available at http://www.geocities.com/lavdanger/strykerfindings.htm. Several authors reference this ATEC report, yet I have been unable to locate a working link the actual document.

[9] Loughlin, 16-19; and David T. Payne Esq. “Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Designate Donald Rumsfeld: A Feasibility Study on the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Transformation Plan” December 7, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/tanklessarmy.htm; accessed 17 August 2003, 2.

Clancy, Tom and General Franks, Fred, Jr., Into the Storm – On the Ground in Iraq. New York: Berkley Books, 1998.

Kraus, Theresa L. and Schubert, Frank N. General Editors, The Whirlwind War – The United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Scales, Brigadier General Robert H. Certain Victory – The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Washington: Brassey’s, 1994.

Cox, Matthew. “Airborne Units Land Fast, Hit Hard, Remain Relevant,” Army Times, August 14, 2000.

Svitak, Amy and Tiboni, Frank. “DoD May Scale Back Stryker to Fund FCS,” Defense News, October 7, 2002.

Tiboni, Frank. “Stryker Falls Short in First Major Field Test,” Defense News, September 16, 2002.

Loughlin, Don. “Army Leadership and the Stryker Armored Car Program Have Failed ‘Army Transformation,’” October 9, 2002 [data on-line] http://www.combatreform.com/gg021006a.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

Payne, David T. Esq. “Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Designate Donald Rumsfeld: A Feasibility Study on the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Transformation Plan” December 7, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/tanklessarmy.htm; accessed 17 August 2003.

“Future Combat Systems: Badly Reinventing the M113 or ‘Cash Cows’ That Will ‘Morph’ into the ‘LAV-4’ Armored Car?” [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/wheeledfcscashcow.htm; accessed 12 August 2003.

“M2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” in Military Analysis Network, May 5, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

“M2A3 Bradley,” [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/banzaidyne/heavygear/M2A3.html; accessed 11 August 2003.

“M2/M3 Series Bradley Fighting Vehicle,” United States Army Center for Military History, June 11, 2001 [data on-line] http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/www/256.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

“Stryker Family of Vehicles,” General Dynamics Land Systems, available from www.gdls.com; Internet, accessed 11 August 2003.

Your link just restates my point (with a lot of over the top emphasis and excess exclamation poiints). There is a legitimate need for a cavalry platform, and we don't have either a vehicle nor a program to create a vehicle to fulfill that need. Re: the tracer pics, I believe those prototpye pictures were released because the Brits also cancelled their program after the US pulled out....thus the prototype pics are no longer worth keeping confidential.

Have you ever seen an Air Force pronouncement that they will dedicate enough airlift to transport a Stryker brigade overseas in the even of an emergency? I've never seen it.

In the "event of an emergency" the Civil Reserve Air Fleet would be mustered into service as it has in GWI and GWII:

Our strategic airliftcapability is comprised of a combination of civilian and military airlift. During a major conflict, 28 percent of the cargo and 95 percent of the passengers airlifted would be flown on commercial aircraft. The commercial augmentation is provided by airlines participating in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Airlines voluntarily participate and, as a result, are eligible DOD civilian airlift contracts. CRAF doc

The dirty little secret is: both the USAF and USN don't have nearly the airlift or sealift capabilities to get things where they need to be "in house" becuase that's not anywhere as sexy as bombers and aircraft carriers. But try to sell logistics support to Congress...

"Several Abrams were lost in Iraq from RPG's....not that the unit was holed thru..but several caught fire via engine compartment."

Do you have a link for this? I don't think that you are lying, but I did not hear about this. I do know that 2 Abrams were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire (direct lay method of engagement). Could it be that the crew of a disabled Abrams tossed some thermite grenades inside, to destroy the Abrams and someone misinterpreted this?

Here is your data link..click on the 1-5 ..info follows with pics.

M1A1 Lessons learned
Strategypage.com...gallery..M1A1 Lessons learned if the link fails.

My comment ..LOST TO RPG is accurate..as several events occured with the M1A1 after hits.
not they were holed thru..to convey that the tanks basic integrity held..but other things happened which generated fires.
some damage photo's show U.S. ordinance fired to destroy the M1A1..some after they were stripped of valuable parts.

It will be some time before more clear data appears ..and what ordinance hit M1A1/A2'S.

Strategy page seems to be conveying the hits as RPG.no Koronet if I read right.
That would be a marker..for sure..as IDF Merkavas and Magach 6,7's definitley are getting hit by ATGMS....have not come accross any write off info as per IDF tanks.

If it turns out that RPG's are the primary source for the secondary fires on M1A1/A2..then the Balkans theatre was more leathel to U.S. Mech assets than Iraq as firepower with *punch.
Russia did give the Serbs alotments of Depleted Uranium tank rounds...I guess some research on the net may provide damage data.

Israel developed several turret configs which appear as refit on Merkava 2/3..4 is said to have a turret designed to defeat..or withstand top attack ATGM's.
Knowing IDF.they would test Merkava with their ordinance..my guess is they found a good design in the modular composite bolt ons.

The modules are designed to interupt the cut jet of certain munitions..and to diffuse the kinnetic energy longitudally thru the module..which would probably see its anchor system rupture.
this keeps the kinnetic energy from shock loading the glacia below the modules.

Am not sure how kinnetic energy is dissapated in Abrams composite armor..maybe some other poster here at FR ..or one having served on a M1A1/A2 might know.

I don't know who you think you are to tick off the "usual suspects" but let me give you my background and you tell everyone where I stand to gain from the Stryker being dumped in favor of a safer vehicle.

*******

The author is a multiple Purple Heart veteran of an 18 month combat tour in Vietnam as a paratrooper with the 101st Airborne Division and a Green Beret with the 5th Special Forces Group. When he returned home, he entered police work and rose through the ranks from uniformed patrol officer with the City of Birmingham to finally serve as a Special Agent with the U.S. Treasury Department. He holds a BS in Accounting and Finance, an MA in Military History, and has completed his postgraduate academic work toward his doctorate at the University of Alabama and The George Washington University in Washington, DC. He now resides on the Alabama Gulf Coast in Foley, AL, and can be reached at: lshoultz@gulftel.com.

*******

Now bang away you moron...

My apologies for the delay in posting a reply, but I have been out of the country and unable to keep up with the discourse.

I am aware of your background, and find it to be admirable from the perspective of service to country, education, and place of residence. However, your credentials are not impressive in the context of this debate. Oliver Stone is also a combat veteran, but I don't seek out his opinion on matters military. Many of the Freepers (Archy, Cannoneer No. 4, for example) engaged in this debate are experts: by virtue of experience, technical knowledge, and recent combat development experience. I listen to them. You are quite clearly not in their league - perhaps we would be better served if you could enlighten us on issues of counterfeiting, embezzlement, or some such like.

Your case is also hurt by the site on which you chose to publish your views. The credibility of your opinion suffers when posted amongst the trash and drivel that characterizes this gem of the internet.

Now, you are perfectly entitled to your opinion that I am a moron. But, pardon me if I do not give it much attention, considering the source.

For the record, your background compared with mine:

Military veteran -- Ditto (25 years)

18 months combat -- 12 months,LRRP plt ldr, rifle co cdr

Multiple Purple Hearts -- 1 Purple Heart (enough)

Police Officer, Treasury, etc -- Continued military career
w/ svc in mech infantry units, command through bn level, cbt development, doctrine development. Currently in
defense industry working on future force, OIF support, etc.

BS, MA, Doctorate work -- BA, MA. Taught at West Point
Graduate U. S. Army War College Senior Analyst, Institue for
Defense Analyses

I was forced to learn agreat deal about armor and armored tactics when my Special Forces camp A-108 became to nearest one to the 2nd Armored Division and had to provide their infantry screens when they operated in Minh Long Province. So, I'm not guessing at this stuff as are some of the individuals you mentioned, I've been there.

I called you a moron only because you presumed that anyone who could disagree with the Stryker program must be a shill for United Defense or some other neer do well. Look at your news tonight. The first two Strykers rolled over. I have been writing for over a year that any vehicle so top heavy that it rolled on any angle more severe than 30 degrees should be kept on the post with its level roads. On their first combat patrol, the Stryker Brigade suffered its first three deaths from an inherently vehicle.

Maybe he means they are more maneuverable on paved surfaces and cause less road damage and get better mileage?
I think the Stryker has its place, but not as a replacement for the Abrams and the Bradley. I am reminded of some professors in collage who would only recognize one theory of social interaction. Only B.F.Skinner had it right, or only Radcliffe-Brown or some other well published and recognized expert had it right. There was no room for a mix of ideas, no room for compromise. It seems to be the same with the Stryker. It has to be all or nothing, no room for a mix.

It has it's place, but they could have done an honest development process for it, and been honest about it's place rather than, as Shinseki said it was, a one on one tank replacement.
That is extremely and grossly neglegent on the part of the brass, but I doubt anyone will seriously pay for it.

I doubt they meant paved surfaces, as the Stryker isn't being used on them alone despite it's restriction to such surfaces.
And it's inability to go cross country safely is a majorly negative point.
Not every country we will operate in has improved road surfaces.
But teh US has a huge network of them.
As a police vehicle to keep lightly armed civilians cowed, the Stryker would be great.

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