Temperatures for the next launch date were predicted to be in the low 20°s. This prompted Alan McDonald to ask his engineers at Thiokol to prepare a presentation on the effects of cold temperatureon booster performance. A teleconference was scheduled the evening before the re-scheduled launch in order to discuss the low temperature performance of the boosters. This teleconference was held between engineers and management from Kennedy Space Center, Marshall SpaceFlight Center in Alabama, and Morton-Thiokol in Utah. Boisjolyand another engineer, Arnie Thompson, knew this would be an other opportunity to express their concerns about the boosters, but they had only a short time to prepare their data for the presentation. Thiokol's engineers gave an hour-long presentation, presenting a convincing argument that the cold weather would exaggerate the problems of joint rotation and delayed O-ring seating. The lowest temperature experienced by the O-rings in any previous missionwas 53°F, the January 24, 1985 flight. With a predicted ambient temperature of 26°F at launch, the O-rings were estimated to be at 29°F. After the technical presentation, Thiokol's Engineering Vice President Bob Lund presented the conclusionsand recommendations. His main conclusion was that 53°F was the only low temperature data Thiokol had for the effects of cold on the operational boosters. The boosters had experienced O-ring erosion at this temperature. Since his engineers had no low temperaturedata below 53°F, they could not prove that it was unsafe to launch at lower temperatures. He read his recommendations and commented that the predicted temperatures for the morning's launch was outside the data base and NASA should delay the launch, so the ambient temperature could rise until the O-ring temperaturewas at least 53°F. This confused NASA managers because the booster design specifications called for booster operation as low as 31°F. (It later came out in the investigation that Thiokol understood that the 31°F limit temperature was forstorage of the booster, and that the launch temperature limit was 40°F. Because of this, dynamic tests of the boosters had never been performed below 40°F.)Marshall's Solid RocketBooster Project Manager, Larry Mulloy, commented that the datawas inconclusive and challenged the engineers' logic. A heated debate went on for several minutes before Mulloy bypassed Lundand asked Joe Kilminster for his opinion. Kilminster was in management, although he had an extensive engineering background. By by passing the engineers, Mulloy was calling for a middle-management decision, but Kilminster stood by his engineers. Several other managersat Marshall expressed their doubts about the recommendations,and finally Kilminster asked for a meeting off of the net, so Thiokol could review its data. Boisjoly and Thompson tried to convince their senior managers to stay with their original decision not to launch. A senior executive at Thiokol, Jerald Mason, commented that a management decision was required. The managers seemed to believe the Orings could be eroded up to one third of their diameter and still seat properly, regardless of the temperature. The data presented to them showed no correlation between temperature and the blowby gasses which eroded the O-rings in previous missions. According to testimony by Kilminster and Boisjoly, Mason finally turned to Bob Lund and said, "Take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat." Joe Kilminster wrote out the new recommendation and went back on line with the teleconference. The new recommendation stated that the cold was still a safety concern, but their people had found that the original data was indeed inconclusive and their "engineering assessment" was that launch was recommended, even though the engineers had no part in writing the new recommendation and refused to sign it. Alan McDonald, who was present with NASA management in Florida, was surprised to see the recommendation to launch and appealed to NASA management not to launch. NASA managers decided to approve the boosters for launch despite the fact that the predicted launchtemperature was outside of their operational specifications.
Both Boisjoly and McDonald testified before the presidential panel regarding their opposition to the launch and the decision of their managers (who were also engineers) to override their recommendation. Both Boisjoly and McDonald also testified that following their expressed opposition to the launch and their willingness to come forward, they had been isolated from NASA and subsequently demoted. Since testifying, McDonald has been assigned to "special projects." Boisjoly, who took medical leave for post-traumatic stress disorder, has left Thiokol, but he does receive disability pay from the company. Currently, Mr. Boisjoly operates a consulting firm in Mesa, Arizona. He speaks frequently on business ethics to professional organizations and companies.
In May 1986, then-CEO Locke stated, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, "This shuttle thing will cost us this year 10 cents a share." Locke later protested that his statement had been taken out of context.
In 1989, Morton Norwich separated from Thiokol Chemical Corporation. The two companies had previously merged to become Morton Thiokol. Following the separation, Thiokol Chemical became Thiokol Corporation. Morton returned to the salt business, and Thiokol, which will remain under contract with NASA through 1999, redesigned its space shuttle rocket motor to correct the deficiencies. No one at Thiokol was fired following the Challenger accident. Because of this incident and defense contractor indictments, the Government Accountability Project was established in Washington, D. C. The office provides a staff, legal assistance, and pamphlets to help whistle-blowers working on government projects.