Russia’s Repeat Failures. Moscow’s New Strategy in Ukraine Is Just as Bad as the Old One

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the Kremlin inadvertently put its military forces in an unsustainable position, ordering them to take on more operations than they could bear. It had nearly all its soldiers surge simultaneously and rapidly into Ukraine to fight along multiple fronts. It did so without taking necessary protective measures, such as clearing routes of explosives. It had its forces advance at an unsustainable pace. As a result, Russian troops were vulnerable to ambushes, counterattacks, and severe logistical problems that cost the military enormous numbers of soldiers and equipment.

That initial error was caused by the Kremlin’s prewar delusions. Moscow was overconfident in its intelligence, in the ability of its agents to influence events and politics inside Ukraine, and in its own armed forces. It underestimated Ukraine’s capabilities and will to fight. And it failed to account for a massive expansion of Western support to Kyiv.

But although Russia has had six months to learn from these mistakes, it appears poised to once again commit its depleted forces to an untenable mission: annexing and holding Ukraine’s Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia provinces, or oblasts. Holding this territory will require substantial amounts of manpower and armored equipment—particularly given that the regions have contested frontlines and that Russian forces in each experience organized partisan attacks. And Moscow has lost its most advanced equipment, for which it does not have equivalent replacements. The Russian armed forces have also suffered tens of thousands of casualties, including well-trained personnel, and its current strategy for replenishment—recruiting new soldiers from a motley mix of communities and armed groups—will not create a combat effective force. There remains, in short, a mismatch between the Kremlin’s goals for Ukraine and the forces it has to deliver them.

The USA and the UK both announced new aid packages last week that include more ammo for the HIMARS. Numbers are classified, but it seems like an increase in the rate of fire is in the pipeline, maybe something like 1,000 to 3,000 of the regular GMLRS rounds per month.

It may be (seems) that the larger (500lb warhead) longer range, and more expensive ATACMS are in that mix, which would make the number lower, but make very significant deeper targets vulnerable.

I watched some video of a recent HIMARS strike on the Antonivsky Bridge in Kherson (I think it was the night of the 12th). After a couple of previous HIMARS strikes, the Russians had committed more Air Defense assets to protecting it. Lots of interceptors went up, but about a six pack of missiles hit the bridge anyway.

They may saturate the Air Defense with a bunch of sacrificed missiles, and then get their shot in before they can reload, or they may be evading the defenses by some technical means.

But the bottom line is that the Ukrainians are now able to strike fixed targets at will, very deep behind Russian lines.

Javelins made it unsafe for Russians to move around widely in the Ukraine. HIMARS is making it unsafe for them to stand still.

They are taking apart Russian supply depots and supply lines in the SouthWest of the occupied area (which are very dependent on rail throughout the whole theater of operations) very deliberately and pretty quickly. It is a professional job, that seems to be following a professionally developed (NATO) Operational Plan.

Russians say they have been taking out HIMARS launchers, Americans say no. Bottom line: Missiles continue impacting Russian targets, and there are more launchers in inventory throughout NATO, if needed. Both the UK and Germany have already provided tracked versions, that fire the same standard missiles (including ATACMS). They got about 20 launchers.

If we estimate about 4 full loads per night (on average) - 48 regular GMLRS rounds, or 8 ATACMS, or some combination - would be about the average rate of fire, if they get around 1,500 rounds of GMLRS (or ATACMS equivalent) per month going forward (my SWAG). So 20 launchers is probably enough to play whack-a-mole with Russian counter battery fire. Missile supply is probably the constraint - they are expensive (but work like a champ).

Earlier in the war (for many months) Russia kept up a daily/nightly barrage of deep strikes across the Ukraine, all the way to the Polish border; with Iskanders, Tochkas, and Kalibrs; including air, land and sea-launched missiles; from Kiev to Lviv to Odessa, and all points in between. There was concern that Ukrainian supply depots and critical transportation nodes would be destroyed, preventing Ukrainian resupply to the front.

Those Russian deep strikes have dried up to a trickle in August, either because (as long predicted) they are running out of those munitions, or new Ukrainian Air Defense capability (which they have received) is defeating them, or both. Instead, that supply and transportation interdiction is being inflicted on Russian forces. The tables have totally reversed in the deep strike battle, and the Western weapons are much more accurate than the Russian ones were.

Not only are Russian supply and transportation getting hit real hard in the SouthWest, but their Air Defense and Aviation assets have been hit very hard as well - as you would expect in an Operational Plan, before sending maneuver forces forward. I don’t expect to massed formations of Ukrainian armor sweeping across the Steppe, but every little convoy would be vulnerable if the Russian close air support aircraft were operating with impunity. Their two airbases in Crimea, from which they operate, have both been hit real hard - the second just yesterday or earlier today (their time).

It is quite possible that the Ukrainians might achieve the upper hand in the air down there around Kherson, the way things are now rapidly progressing. Russian forces might retreat when the casualty or equipment loss numbers hit their thresholds, as they did in the North; or we might see collapses, surrenders or mutinies; which would be politically problematic for Putin. The Russian positions in Kherson and on the Western (right) bank of the Dniper seem doomed, the way things are going.

It is definitely a new phase of the war, and it seems very unfavorable to the Russian forces at the end of those very long and vulnerable supply lines, among a hostile population in the South.

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