Emergency: California’s Oroville Dam Spillway Near Failure, Evacuations Ordered

Breitbart ^ | Feb 12, 2017 | Joel B. Pollak1

[janetjanet998]

The California Department of Water Resources issued a sudden evacuation order shortly before 5 p.m. Sunday for residents near the Oroville Dam in northern California, warning that the dam’s emergency spillway would fail in the next 60 minutes.

The Oroville Dam is the highest in the nation.

[mad_as_he$$]

This:

What are we calling the newly-formed canyon made by the broken Main Spillway?

Thanks to KC.

[The Westerner]

Thank you, ER, for taking the time to clarify intellectual property rights to your thought and work. This is a big deal for ownership of one’s work is the stimulus of innovation.

[EarthResearcher333]

Here's the "side-by-side" images from my computer originals (EarthResearcher333) verses the attributed "other forum" in Robert Bea's updated Report.

btw- I cross referenced a number of the "Source" notes in Bea's report to the "other forum". I couldn't find any of these exact images in the "other forum" (except discussion & pic of postcard - see note1 below).

note: All of my original images are in upthread posts (if anyone wants to confirm this independently).

Note1: On the last image, I had researched data to come to the conclusion that there was a natural "percolation seam" in a pre-pour gravel/aggregate bed in the spillway. Although other forums turned out to be discussing this item, I came to the conclusion of a natural percolation seam issue from special image processing to filter the "texture dots" out of the postcard image. (my image stated note: "Diagonal subsurface percolation "seam" (waterflow left to right, per grade elevation slope)". Bea's report has "Water percolation across spillway subgrade"). This image, from Bea's report is the only one not directly lifted. However, the very important critical conclusions of a gravel/aggregate bed (before the slab pours) & a water percolation seam was concluded in Bea's image note & also a critical reference of an erodible gravel bed underneath the spillway slabs (first pages of report). I have not seen this conclusion anywhere except in Bea's report. I also noted that Bea's report was unable to note the other Natural water table percolation from the hillside originating close to the upper spillway. To show this long downhill flow, image processing and filtering would have been required - OR - directly lifting my image.

Compare these images: EarthResearcher333 originals to left vs Robert Bea's report on the right.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3676605-Robert-Bea-Oroville-Spillway-Failure-Root-Cause.html

[EarthResearcher333]

You are very kind in words.

I was ok with being anonymous to the information in the original report, as there was a greater desire to "get information out there". There has been a significant gap to critical information that the public (& press) are being informally "kept in the dark".

I feel many FReepers have contributed, not just myself, in this effort. Robert Bea has done a great public service in getting the information out there. His analysis is correct and thorough. His expertise in human factors, engineering, and tremendous experience was critical to the swift acceptance of the report. The "forums" just provided an accelerated approach to present "overwhelming" evidence to make his correct conclusions public.

If the report was left "as is" where it identified "publicly available information" as sources, this would have been fine. However, when a decision was made to include "attributions" this is where the problem arose. Whoever was assembling these cross-references and attributions, had to have known that great error was going to be inserted into this report. Now, instead of this report's findings being the focus of attention, this notable mistake in attribution could cause negative outcomes to CCRM & upon Robert.

That would be unfortunate as the public is the customer.

I really don't need the attention... I just enjoy discussion with other FReepers. I also have family in Sacramento that I originally became involved just to update them on what is really going on. I couldn't get any answers so I took to my background abilities to find answers.

[Jim W N]

I’m from California, love it, and visit it at least once a year. I’m just disgusted it has fallen so fully into the wrong hands. But I hope that too will change.

In the meantime with you, I hope those innocent people below the dam are kept safe despite the ongoing errors, much apparently politically motivated, of these government agencies.

Maybe it’s time to seriously think about “In God We Trust” instead of “In Man We Trust.” (We do things, but ultimately our trust is in God and His Divine Protection and Providence, not in man and his government.)

[Jim W N]

Honestly, this report looks like a compilation of the daily analysis we’ve been getting from EarthResearcher333 for the last few months.

Can’t say enough abut the interesting and compelling work you’ve done here EarthResearcher333. I hope one way or the other it can aid the corrective action needed for this whole dam(n) thing.

[Jim W N]

Well, I wrote Post# 3286 before I saw all this about attribution but it seems to confirm how compelling your analysis has been.

Again, thanks ER for your excellent work here.

[KC Burke]

As others have said, your assembly of analytical photographic analysis and mark-ups of plans has be head and shoulders above insight and speculation that many of us have chimed in with from time to time. It is somewhat a shame that proper attribution appears to have be avoided by some involved in more public investigations.

When people sell a work product for financial gain, they should be awfully careful of such failures.

[rgb251]

your observations of my citation ‘errors of omission’ are correct. i have produced an updated document (Revision 3) that has proper citations to the graphics you developed. please send me an email address to which i can send a Google Document link to the revised report. please accept my apology for my errors of omission..trying to do to much on a late Sunday afternoon. your contributions to my understanding of what and why this happened are very much appreciated. Bob Bea

[rgb251]

i tried to send a response to you earlier today. i have not seen it posted, so i will try again.

you are correct in my observations of my ‘errors of commission’ regarding the citations of sources to photographs included in my report. i attributed them to Metabunk, and not to Free Republic.

please accept my apology for my attribution errors. i was hurrying too much on Sunday afternoon when i was trying to finish the revisions.

i have corrected the attribution errors. if you can provide directions, i can provide a Google Document link to the revised report - revision 3.

bob bea

[janetjanet998]

outflow now 37,000

and this

BREAKING: CA Dept. Of Water Resources releasing all three independent Oroville Spillway reports (Redacted) #CBS13

another tweet says it will be on their website this afternoon

[abb]

My, my. The sun shines in...

[abb]

http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/04/24/editorial-oroville-is-a-model-of-how-not-to-deal-with-a-flood-emergency/

Editorial: Oroville is a model of how NOT to deal with a flood emergency

4/24/17

Transparency should always be a public agency’s default position, because problems always arise when it isn’t.

A case in point is how the state Department of Water Resources has handled Lake Oroville for years. It continues despite considerable public and political pressure since the spillway collapse.

Two developments last week perfectly illustrate the point.

One involves awarding a nine-figure bid to a company to fix the spillway without any detail about what the company is actually doing. The other involves an independent review of what went wrong, which takes on added weight because the promised review by the government is nonexistent so far.

The independent analysis was released this week by Robert Bea, a founder of UC Berkeley’s Center for Catastrophic Risk Management and a nationally recognized expert, who reviewed what went wrong in high-profile disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the BP oil spill.

snip

[abb]

http://www.capitalpress.com/California/20170424/water-agency-to-hold-community-meetings-on-oroville-dam-project

Water agency to hold community meetings on Oroville Dam project

Tim Hearden
Capital Press
Published on April 24, 2017 11:09AM

OROVILLE, Calif. — State officials are set to answer questions from the public about the Oroville Dam spillway repair project during a series of community meetings.

Leaders from the California Department of Water Resources and other experts will also take comments about the recovery process during the meetings, the first of which was to be April 27 at the Butte County Fairgrounds in Gridley.

The meetings are part of an outreach effort that has also included communications with local leaders and interest groups, said Bill Croyle, the DWR’s acting director.

“We are committed to pushing as much information as we can out,” Croyle said in a recent news conference at the project’s command center in Oroville.

The meetings will have a similar agenda and format, beginning at 5:30 p.m. starting with presentations of information and continuing with questions and answers. In addition to the Butte fairgrounds meeting, other gatherings will be held on the following dates:

• May 2 at the Oroville Municipal Auditorium, 1200 Myers St., Oroville.

• May 3 in the Sierra Nevada Room of the state Department of Transportation District 3 office, 703 B St., Marysville.

• May 4 at the Oroville Church of the Nazarene’s fellowship hall, 2238 Monte Vista Ave., Oroville.

• May 9 in Franklin Hall at the Yuba-Sutter Fairgrounds, 442 Franklin Ave., Yuba City.

• May 11 at the Chico Masonic Family Center, 1110 W. East Ave., Chico.

In addition, a similar meeting will be held at 1:30 p.m. May 15 at the Tsakopoulos Library Galleria, 828 I St., Sacramento.

The meetings come as the DWR on April 17 awarded a $275.4 million contract to the Omaha, Neb.-based Kiewit Infrastructure West Co. for permanent repair work on the Oroville Dam’s spillways, which is expected to continue through the summer.

snip

[EarthResearcher333]

Dear Prof Bea, I apologize for the delay in noticing your posts..

If it is convenient, you may post the new link on FreeRepublic in straight text.

Thank you for your efforts & CCRM in bringing the information to the forefront.

Side question: What facets of the Shuttle Columbia analysis were you involved with?

My interest stems from my involvement in mesospheric ionosphere TEC analysis levels at the time of re-entry. There was the unusual event of the "corkscrew" blue lightning strike to the left wing as photographed from an observer near San Francisco.

Sincere Regards,

EarthResearcher333

[meyer]

Thanks, as always, for keeping the information flowing. I’ve just returned home from a week vacation so I will be reading more closely again.

[abb]

http://www.water.ca.gov/oroville-spillway/pdf/2017/BOC%20Memo%202_031717.pdf

http://www.water.ca.gov/oroville-spillway/pdf/2017/BOC%20Memo%203_033117.pdf

[abb]

http://www.water.ca.gov/oroville-spillway/pdf/2017/BOC%20Memo%202_031717.pdf

Three photos of very low flow on the upper chute taken after the chute failure, clearly show a hole on the left side of the spillway approximately at or near the construction joint near station 29+00. The second photo shows flow occurring at very small depths (probably due only to gate leakage).

At this very low flow, what appear to be role waves, or possibly disturbances due to flow over construction joints or cracks are clear. The third photo shows the hole that developed shortly after initial failure. In this photo, the damage to the chute is totally downstream of the construction joint. Later photos show the damage has taken place on the upper side of the construction joint and has migrated to approximately station 29+00.

These photos show that failure was initiated at the hole at the left side of the chute near station 33+00. The failure, likely occurred as a result of high velocity flow (in the range of 85 to 90 feet per second), penetrating under the slab, causing a strong uplift force and causing the slab to lift, eventually causing all or part of the slab to break away.

Subs equent erosion of foundation material caused progressive failure both upstream and downstream. Repairs had been made to the spillway slab several times since its completion in 1968. The most recent documented repair took place in 2009. Locations of numerous existing cracks and spalls were shown in the report. The spalls were probably caused and enlarged by freeze-thaw damage. Some of these holes were quite large and extended as deep as the reinforcing steel. The hole that triggered the failure was probably of the latter type.

[abb]

http://www.water.ca.gov/oroville-spillway/pdf/2017/BOC%20Memo%203_033117.pdf

Water stops between slabs were apparently not included in the design of the original spillway and the lack of them was no doubt an important factor in the February failure of the slab on the FCO Chute. It will be very important to have constant construction inspection when slab concrete is poured to assure proper imbedding of the water stops.

Although many cracks developed in the original slabs, the new slab will be thicker, panel dimensions will be much smaller, and will be more heavily reinforced. These provisions will make the slab much less prone to developing such shrinkage or temperature cracks.

[mrsmith]

Would like to see those photos!

“The BOC recommends that the chute paving and training walls of this upper chute section be completely rebuilt on properly cleaned and prepared bedrock foundation during the 2017 May to November construction season”
Is that a realistic schedule?