Nor all Northerners. From the book, "Economic History of the South" by Emory Q. Hawk (1934):
After 1816, the South seemed to realize its mistake [rustbucket: of supporting protectionism early in the nation's history], and the section soon became a unit against protectionism.
Here is a map showing how states voted in the House on April 22, 1828 on the 1828 Tariff of Abominations bill: [Link]. Notice the stark difference in Southern and Northern votes.
You mentioned Jackson and Calhoun. Perhaps you don't understand their objectives concerning the 1828 Tariff of Abominations. From Hawk's book again:
According to Professor F. W. Taussig: "The Southern members openly said they meant to make the tariff so bitter a pill that no New England member would be able to swallow it." As conceived by the Jackson men, the plan was to draw a tariff bill which would satisfy the protective demands of the West and which, at the same time, would be so obnoxious to New England on account of the high duties on raw materials that this section, in combination with the South, would defeat the bill and thereby allow the followers of Andrew Jackson, without having offended the South, to pose as the friends of infant industries. ... Although the bill met with strong opposition from the South, New England, after modifications in the Senate, supported it in the final vote ..."
That political strategy did not work. The House vote was something like 105 for to 94 against.
In 1833, after South Carolina had voted for nullification over the tariff issue, a bill was passed in 1833, the so called "Compromise Tariff of 1833" that gradually reduced tariffs over a period of ten years.
Then came the Tariff of 1842, championed by Whig President Tyler, a Virginian. The Tariff of 1842 brought the tariff rates back up to the level of the 1833 tariff before all the gradual reductions that had occurred after 1833. Tyler had previously vetoed two high tariff bills and a bill establishing a national bank. Whigs were in favor of protectionist tariffs and the national bank. After Tyler vetoed the national bank bill, Whigs expelled him from their party. After one of Tyler's vetoes of a high tariff bill, Whigs introduced an impeachment resolution in the House, the first against a president. The impeachment resolution didn't pass. Tyler would later vote for Virginia's secession in 1861.
The 1846 Tariff was sponsored by Democrats and significantly lowered tariff rates. It was later followed by the Tariff of 1857, that lowered Tariff rates even more.
Even in 1859, that Morrill tariff over which such a fuss was raised, only passed the House (but not the Senate) because 55 Democrats & others friendly to the South abstained.
So why would they abstain, if so passionately opposed?
Here is a breakdown of the 1860 House vote that passed the Morrill Tariff [Link]:
The vote was on May 10, 1860; the bill passed by a vote of 105 to 64.
The vote was largely but not entirely sectional. Republicans, all from the northern states, voted 89–2 for the bill. They were joined by 7 northern Democrats from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Five of these were "anti-Lecompton Democrats" (dissident Democrats who opposed the pro-slavery Lecompton constitution for Kansas).
14 northern Democrats voted against the bill.
In the Border States, 4 "Opposition" Representatives from Kentucky voted for it, as did its co-sponsor Winter of Maryland, a Maryland "Unionist", and a Democrat from Delaware. 8 Border state Democrats and an "American" from Missouri voted no.
35 southern Democrats and 3 Oppositionists voted against it; one Oppositionist from Tennessee voted for it. Thus the sectional breakdown was 96–15 in the north, 7–9 in the Border, and 1–39 in the south.
There were 55 abstentions, including 13 Republicans, 12 northern Democrats, 13 southern Democrats, and 8 southern "Oppositionists" and "Americans". (The remaining Representatives were mostly "paired" with opposing Representatives who could not be present.
The link's regional and party breakdowns total to 103 or 104 yes votes to 63 no votes. The actual total final vote they provided was 105 to 64. However, their breakdown figures are close enough to disprove your statement above.
Using the figures the link provided, if all of the abstaining Democrats and Southern Oppositionists and Americans had voted against the bill, that would make a total of 96 or 97 against the bill (the sources figures don't add up exactly to the final vote, as I said). That was not enough to defeat it. In the cases where Northern Democrats voted, one-third of them were for the bill, so assuming all of them would vote against the bill, like I assumed to get to the total of 96 or 97 above, means there would probably have been less than 96 or 97 against the bill.
To get a no vote that exceeds the yes vote, you would have to assume all abstaining Democrats and Southern Oppositionists and Americans would vote "no" and about 13 of the 15 abstaining Republicans would vote no. The 13 of 15 is approximate because the source's vote breakdowns don't match the final 105 to 64 total exactly.
This should put an end to your claim that "only passed the House (but not the Senate) because 55 Democrats & others friendly to the South abstained.
You are assuming that the 15 abstaining Republicans were "friendly" to the South. I sometimes feel like I am debating with someone from a high school history class.
Oh, but I do.
I also understand there were a lot of mixed feelings and political cross-dressers, so to speak, on this issue.
Both Calhoun & Jackson supported the bill, though seemingly for too-clever political reasons.
And a majority of New Englanders opposed it, because of it's high tariffs on their raw materials, especially wool.
After passage, and Jackson's election as President, he took no immediate action to rescind it, launching the nullification crisis with South Carolina.
Again, the Tariff of Abominations illustrates that there were people for, and others against, in every region of the country.
It was not strictly "North vs. South", far from it.
rustbucket: "In 1833, after South Carolina had voted for nullification over the tariff issue, a bill was passed in 1833, the so called 'Compromise Tariff of 1833' that gradually reduced tariffs over a period of ten years."
Sure, and simultaneously, President Jackson signed a "Force Bill" "...explicitly authorizing the use of military force to enforce the tariff."
Note that term, "at pleasure" again.
rustbucket referring to the 1860 Morrill tariff House vote: "To get a no vote that exceeds the yes vote, you would have to assume all abstaining Democrats and Southern Oppositionists and Americans would vote 'no' and about 13 of the 15 abstaining Republicans would vote no.
The 13 of 15 is approximate because the source's vote breakdowns don't match the final 105 to 64 total exactly. "
Possibly they taught math a little different when I went to school?
My numbers show something different:
There were 7 Northern Democrats and 5 Southern Opposition party who voted for Morrill, who might also have seen the light, had they felt more political heat.
So, eight more required from a pool of 25 seems to me not necessarily impossible to do, if the anti-Morrill people had been more determined to do it.
Or, just as important: had the vote looked closer, they could have negotiated for better terms.
Finally, it's important to note that in 1859 (18%) and 1860 (10%) the US ran huge balance of trade deficits, meaning we imported $86 million more in those years than exported.
Remember, it's imports, not exports, which paid US duties and so provided most of Federal revenues.
So, huge balance of trade deficits meant Federal revenues were actually coming from money borrowed to pay for imports, and that was, in turn, eventually paid for by large specie transfers.
My point is: in the end, Europeans' massive purchases of US Southern cotton were paid-for by US purchases of European manufactured goods.
If the US reduced its imports of European goods, we could expect them to purchase less US cotton.
Trade is a two-way street and must, ultimately, balance out.
rustbucket: "This should put an end to your claim that "only passed the House (but not the Senate) because 55 Democrats & others friendly to the South abstained.
You are assuming that the 15 abstaining Republicans were "friendly" to the South."
In fact, two Republicans did vote against Morrill, and we have to assume the 15 who abstained did so rather than join their two colleagues, for fear of party discipline.
So flipping some of those votes was just a matter of addressing their concerns, which a more determined anti-Morrill group would have done.
Point is: in a matter of allegedly "deep concern" to the Deep South, it does not appear to me they tried all that hard for victory in the House.
Possibly they understood the Senate would block it anyway, and therefore defeat in the House was not so important after all?
Regardless, those who later touted Morrill as the great "reason for secession" a la the 1828 "Tariff of Abominations", are just reading back into that time emotions which were not then actually felt.