The Army properly charged Lakin under Article 92 via Article 90. See below.
Article 90, Element d - Lesser included offenses, Part 3 - Willfully disobeying lawful order of superior commissioned officer, Section a - Article 92: failure to obey lawful order.
Note that Lakin’s charges we’re written using the sample specifications outlined in Article 90, Element f.
Lakin’s orders were general orders according to the definition of such in Article 92.
We’re = were
If they were general orders under Article 92, then the “lawfulness” section from Article 90 still applies. Lind only referred to i, but not to ii, iii, or iv.
The one that applies is ii:
(ii) Authority of issuing officer. The commissioned
officer issuing the order must have authority
to give such an order. Authorization may be based
on law, regulation, or custom of the service.
How can Lind say that authorization by a valid President is IRRELEVANT, when Congress specifically authorized only “the President” to use force in the war on terrorism? It’s right there in the elements for “lawfulness” that the order has to meet the Constitutional requirement as well as the elements of lawfulness for Article 90 - which includes that the issuing officer being properly authorized to make “such an order” (deployment order for combat forces, in this case).