When heard, the professorette stooped to explain to us:
"The signs give a feeling of being unwelcome and being excluded," Charles said.
There is an even worse instance in this account: the lawyer "testified" as follows:
Paul M. Hummer, an attorney for the commission, testified earlier that the sign is not about political speech, but about "intimidation," and that it suggested business from certain individuals was not wanted.
We are not told what qualifies a lawyer to testify. Perhaps the reporter was so ignorant that he did not recognize the distinction between argument and testimony or perhaps the lawyer was actually sworn in and his opinion was received. I shouldn't be surprised if it were the latter.
At least the article gives us some idea of the law:
After extensive publicity in 2006, the commission began investigating whether Vento violated a city ordinance that prohibits discrimination in employment, public accommodation and housing on the basis of race, ethnicity or sexual orientation.
Well, let's settle what we can because it is simple. Obviously this is a place of public accommodation. But does the sign have anything to do with "race ethnicity or sexual orientation?" On its face to does not. The ability to speak English as opposed to some other language, to my knowledge, does not come as a result of skin pigmentation, tribal affiliation, or hormone arrangement. The ability to speak the English language is a learned skill having nothing to do with race, ethnicity or sexual orientation.
Let's turn it around and see if by discriminating against people who do not possess this particular language skill, one masks a discrimination against protected classes because the discrimination is actually against "race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation." Again, obviously not. Virtually all American Indians, for example, speak English. Whole swaths of black Africa today speak English. Many whites in Canada do not, while most whites in America do. Clearly, the ability to speak English is no reliable predictor of race. Perhaps a more refined question would be, does the ability to speak English, or more accurately the absence of the ability to speak English, mask a discrimination in the Philadelphia area? If I wanted to discriminate against ethnic Latin Americans, for example, could I effectively do so in the Philadelphia area by discriminating against people who do not speak English? This is an unmeasurable question. On its face it is not a question of speaking English well but only well enough to order from a printed menu. As one who has made his way in many foreign countries, where I do not speak the language, I have always been able to negotiate the menus, order a beer in almost any language, and later find the toilet. One look at me and you will be convinced that I have not starved as a result of my linguistic inadequacies.
The ability to speak English might be said to be a slightly more accurate predictor of ethnicity but it certainly cannot be held to be reliable. Finally, to try to discriminate against homosexuals on the basis of the language they speak is a hopeless undertaking and assertions to the contrary can be simply dismissed out of hand.
Therefore, the charge should be dismissed out of hand. But the commission did not do so, to the contrary, it found probable cause to continue the investigation:
for discrimination, alleging that the policy at the shop discourages customers of certain backgrounds from eating there.
The article does not favor us with explaining what "backgrounds" are discouraged from eating at the establishment. The article does tell us that the prohibition is against "discrimination," yet the commission found probable cause because customers of certain backgrounds are "discouraged" from eating there. "Discrimination" on its face would require some sort of affirmative act by the restauranteur but the commission here has reversed the focus and put it onto the customer whose subjective reaction-whose "discouragement" - is now determinative of whether someone else has committed a violation of law.
To camouflage the subjectivity of all this, the commission trots in its witnesses, a professorette and the lawyer. The professorette, sworn in as an expert no less, opined that,
"The signs give a feeling of being unwelcome and being excluded," (emphasis supplied)
We all know that any old sociology professorette is an expert on feelings.
The final judgment of the commission no doubt will be that Mr. Vento who started "his steak shop in 1966 with just $6 and developing it into a multimillion-dollar business," should be stripped of his property and sentenced to two years in a reeducation camp.
