World Terrorism: News, History and Research Of A Changing World #7 Security Watch

Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich ^ | 23 February 2007 | Sam Logan for ISN Security Watch

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CRS Report for Congress - Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation (back)



January 24, 2007

by Larry Niksch

From January 2002 until July 31, 2002, the United States committed nearly 1,300 troops to the Philippines and $93 million in military aid to assist Philippine armed forces (AFP) in operations against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the southern Philippines , on the island of Basilan southwest of Mindanao . The U.S. action, dubbed Operation Balikatan, partly was in response to Philippine President Arroyo’s strong support of the United States following the September 11 Al Qaeda attack on the United States . A historic Muslim resistance to non-Muslim rulers broke out into massive rebellion in the 1970s. Two large resistance groups, a Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fought the Philippine government into the 1990s and entered into tenuous truces in 1996 and 2001 respectively. Abu Sayyaf emerged in 1990 as a splinter group composed of former MNLF fighters and Filipinos who had fought in Afghanistan .

Abu Sayyaf resorted to terrorist tactics, including executions of civilians, bombings, and increasingly kidnapings for ransom. Abu Sayyaf had links with Osamu bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization in the early 1990s, but these links reportedly dwindled in the late 1990s. After the 2002 Balikatan operation, the remaining Abu Sayyaf leadership established links with Jeemah Islamiah (JI), an Al Qaeda-affiliated group in Southeast Asia that had begun to use Mindanao for training and organizing terrorist strikes. Abu Sayyaf also established links with Rajah Solaiman, a radical Muslim group made up of Filipinos from the northern Philippines who had converted to Islam. Together, these groups carried out major bombings after 2003, including bombings in metropolitan Manila .

Philippine government policy has been to apply military pressure on Abu Sayyaf. Operations have been constrained by several factors including difficult terrain, inadequate Philippine military equipment, avoiding clashing with the MILF and MNLF, and reportedly high level of corruption in the Philippine military. U.S. military support, however, did achieve successes. AFP operations against Abu Sayyaf became more aggressive and effective against Abu Sayyaf on Basilan in 2002 and on Jolo island in 2006; Abu Sayyaf strength was seriously eroded to an estimated 200 and key commanders have been killed. AFP commanders praised U.S. equipment, U.S. intelligence gathering, and U.S. assistance in planning AFP operations. The U.S. military’s civic action project on Basilan appeared to weaken support for Abu Sayyaf on the island and received general praise in the Philippines .

In 2005, U.S. forces began direct support missions for the Philippine military in western Mindanao against Abu Sayyaf, and U.S. military personnel began noncombat missions on the Abu Sayyaf redoubt of Jolo Island . U.S. officials expressed growing concern over the presence of JI on Mindanao and links between JI and the ILF. The Bush Administration supported the ongoing peace talks between the Philippine government and the MILF as the best means of eroding the MILF-JI linkage. However, coordination among Abu Sayyaf, JI, and elements of the MILF present the threat of a wider terrorist war in the Philippines and could confront the Bush Administration with decisions for greater U.S. involvement.

Contents

The Philippine Response to September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Historic Muslim Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Abu Sayyaf: Origins, Strength, and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Connections to Al Qaeda and Jeemah Islamiah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Links to the MILF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Philippine Government and AFP Policies and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The 2002 Balikatan Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

U.S. Support Role on Jolo Island and in Western Mindanao . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Implications of U.S. Military Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14



Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-

Terrorism CooperationThe Philippine Response to September 11

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo voiced strong support for the United States in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. The Philippines , she said, is prepared to 'go every step of the way' with the United States . President Arroyo allowed U.S. military forces to use Filipino ports and airfields to support military operations in Afghanistan . She cited morality and Philippine national interests as reasons for her pro-U.S. stand. She defined the national interest as linking a struggle against international terrorism with the struggle against terrorism within the Philippines.1 She supported the U.S. war against Iraq in March 2003, offering the U.S. military air space and refueling facilities and sent about 100 Filipino military personnel to Iraq for postwar assistance.2 However, in 2004, she withdraw the Filipino contingent from Iraq after Iraqi insurgents kidnaped a Filipino contract worker and threatened to kill him.

Philippine terrorism has been multifaceted for at least three decades and has been carried out by different groups with different agendas. A significant communist insurgency, the New Peoples Army (NPA) in the 1970s and 1980s engaged in bombings, assassinations, and kidnapings. The communists today still have an estimated armed strength of over 10,000; and the Bush Administration designated the NPA as a terrorist group in August 2002. Criminal syndicates have practiced widespread kidnapings for ransom. The target of President Arroyo’s policy, however, is Muslim insurgency and terrorism.

This report provides an overview and policy analysis of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the Philippines and the Philippine-U.S. program of military cooperation against it. It examines the origins and operations of Abu Sayyaf, the efforts of the Philippine government and military to eliminate it, the implications of a greater U.S. military role in attempts to suppress it, and the implications for dealing with the broader problem of Muslim insurgency and terrorism in the Philippines . The report will be updated periodically.

Historic Muslim Insurgency

Located on the big southern island of Mindanao and the Sulu island chain southwest of Mindanao, Filipino Muslims, called Moros, since the time of Spanish rule, revolted against Spanish colonizers of the Philippines from the 17th century on, the American rulers of the early 20th century, and Philippine governments since independence in 1946. From 1899 to 1914, the U.S. military conducted a number of campaigns to suppress Muslim insurgents in the southern Philippines — campaigns which were controversial because of heavy civilian casualties. Muslim grievances after 1946 focused on the growing settlement of Catholic Filipinos on Mindanao , which reduced the geographical area of a Muslim majority (there are about 7 million Filipino Muslims). Muslims revolted in the 1970s under a Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which demanded an independent Muslim state. An estimated 120,000 people were killed in the 1970s in heavy fighting between the MNLF and the Philippine armed forces (AFP).3

Since the late 1970s, there have been two trends in the Muslim problem. The first has been negotiations between the Philippine government and the MNLF. As a result, the MNLF abandoned its goal of an independent Muslim state. An agreement was reached in 1996 that created an autonomous Muslim region. This apparent positive trend was countered by the fragmentation of the Muslim ovement. A segment of the MNLF broke away in 1978 and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF demanded independence for Muslim populated regions and proclaimed that a Muslim state would be based on 'Koranic principles.' The MILF gained strength into the 1990s. By 1995-96, U.S. estimates placed armed MILF strength at 35,000-45,000 in seven provinces on Mindanao . The MILF had large base camps and functional governmental operations. Its operations included attacks on the AFP and planting bombs in Mindanao cities. A Bangsamoro Peoples Consultative Assembly of approximately 200,000 people was held in 1996 in MILF-held territory and called for an independent Muslim state.4

Stepped-up MILF military operations in 1998-99 prompted Philippine President Joseph Estrada to order an all-out military offensive against MILF base camps. The AFP captured the MILF’s main base on Mindanao and damaged the MILF militarily.

Since then, MILF armed strength has fallen to an estimated 13,000;5 but it remains the largest Muslim armed force. In 2001, Philippine government-MILF negotiations resulted in a cease-fire. The cease-fire had held, and there have been periodic peace negotiations between the government and the MILF. However, the MILF also had increased cooperation with Jeemah Islamiah, an Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group that emerged in Malaysia , Singapore , and Indonesia after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States .

Abu Sayyaf: Origins, Strength, and Operations

Abubakar Janjalani, the son of a fisherman on Basilan island, formed Abu Sayyaf in 1990. Janjalani had become connected with a Muslim fundamentalist movement, Al Islamic Tabligh, in the 1980s. That organization received financial support from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan , including funds to send young Muslim men to schools in the Middle East . Janjalani studied in Saudi Arabia and Libya and became radicalized. When he returned to Basilan, he recruited two groups into Abu Sayyaf (meaning 'sword bearer' in Arabic): dissidents from the MNLF and Filipinos who had fought with the Afghan mujaheddin rebels against the Soviet Union.6

Over the next five years, Abu Sayyaf staged ambushes, bombings, kidnapings, and executions, mainly against Filipino Christians on Basilan and the west coast of Mindanao . Its strength grew only slowly to an estimated 600 by 1995.7 Abu Sayyaf operations declined for four years after 1995, partly as a result of the 1996 settlement between the Philippine government and the MNLF. In 1998, AFP troops killed Abubakar Janjalani. His brother, Khadaffy, and Ghalib Andang took command.

Then in 2000, Abu Sayyaf began kidnaping operations aimed at foreigners, with a principle aim of extracting ransom payments. In April 2000, Abu Sayyaf forces commanded by Andang, aboard fast speed boats, attacked a tourist resort in the Malaysian state of Sabah and kidnaped 21 foreigners, including Malaysians, Frenchmen, Germans, Finns, and South Africans. In July 2000, Abu Sayyaf seized three French journalists. It released the hostages later in the year after it received ransom payments, including money reportedly from European governments funneled through the Libyan government. Estimates of the amount of this ransom range from $10 to $25 million.8

According to Philippine government officials, Abu Sayyaf used the 2000 ransom to recruit new members, raising its strength to an estimated 1,000 or more, and acquire new equipment, including communications equipment and more fast speedboats. Abu Sayyaf used speedboats again on May 27, 2000, in venturing 300 miles across the Sulu Sea to attack a tourist resort on Palawan, the Philippines ’ large, westernmost island. Khadaffy Janjalani commanded the operation. Abu Sayyaf kidnaped 20 people, including three Americans. It took them to Basilan where they were held by a faction of Abu Sayyaf headed by a volatile individual, Abu Sabaya.

Abu Sayyaf announced in June 2001 that it had beheaded one of the Americans, Guillermo Sobero, of Corono , California . It continued to hold Martin and Gracia Burnham, Christian missionaries of Wichita , Kansas , and Deborah Yap, a Filipino nurse. Most of the other abductees from Palawan were freed after more ransom was paid, reportedly as much as $1 million per person. Throughout 2000 and 2001, Abu Sayyaf kidnaped numerous Filipinos on Basilan and Mindanao , releasing some after ransom payments and executing others. Ex-hostages claimed Abu Sayyaf was demanding $2 million for the Burnhams.9

Philippine military operations since 2001, supported by the United States , have weakened Abu Sayyaf on Basilan and in the Sulu islands. Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength is estimated to have fallen from 1,000 in 2002 to 200-400 in 2006 (200 estimated by Philippine National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales).10 However, under the leadership of Khadaffy Janjalanai, Abu Sayyaf reoriented its strategy and appears to have gained new effectiveness as a terrorist organization. Janjalani deemphasized kidnapings for ransom and instead emphasized developing capabilities for urban bombings. He improved ties with key military factions of the MILF and established cooperation with JI. He also re-emphasized the Islamic nature of Abu Sayyaf. Khadaffy moved some of Abu Sayyaf’s operations and leadership from the Sulu islands to the mainland of western Mindanao .

In March and April 2003, Abu Sayyaf, JI, and MILF cadre carried out bombings in Davao on Mindanao , which killed 48. Since March 2004, the Philippine government has announced that it uncovered several Abu Sayyaf plots to conduct bombings in Manila , including the discovery of explosives. One reported target was the U.S. Embassy. In April 2004, police officials reportedly determined that a February 2004 bombing of a Manila-based ferry, in which 194 people died, was the work of Abu Sayyaf and the Rajah Solaiman Movement, a group of radical Filipino Muslim converts from the Manila area. In February 2005, Abu Sayyaf carried out three simultaneous bombings in three cities, which indicated a higher level of technical and operational capabilities.

Connections to Al Qaeda and Jeemah Islamiah

The Wall Street Journal of December 3, 2001, quoted Admiral Denis Blair, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, that 'we’re seeing increasing evidence that there are potential current links' between Abu Sayyaf and Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda terrorist organization. It is accepted that Abu Sayyaf received funding and support from Al Qaeda in the early 1990s. Money came from Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, a Saudi and brother-in-law of bin Laden, who operated number of Islamic charities in the southern Philippines . Ramzi Yoesef, an Al Qaeda operative, came to the Philippines in 1994. He and other Al Qaeda operatives reportedly trained Abu Sayyaf fighters.11 Yoesef established an Al Qaeda cell in Manila . Yoesuf used the cell to plan an assassination of Pope John Paul II, the planting of bombs aboard 12 U.S. airliners flying trans-Pacific routes, and the crashing of an airplane into the Central Intelligence Agency’s headquarters in Langley , Virginia . Filipino police uncovered the cell in 1995 and provided information on the plot to the C.I.A. and F.B.I.. Yoesef later was arrested in Pakistan and extradited to the United States for trial over his complicity in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.12

Filipino officials close to President Arroyo contended that the relationship declined after 1995 when the Ramzi Yoesuf plot was uncovered and Khalifa left the Philippines , and other experts concurred with this assessment. They cited the decline in foreign financial support as a key reason for Abu Sayyaf’s expanded kidnapings for ransom. However, ties strengthened beginning in 2000-2001 apparently for several reasons. First, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States , Al Qaeda apparently decided to reconsider Abu Sayyaf as an ally against the United States . Second, in the late 1990s, Jeemah Islamiah and Al Qaeda cadre began to use MILF bases on Mindanao for training and planning operations, which brought JI into direct contact with Abu Sayyaf.13 Third, as stated previously, Khaddafy Janjalani reoriented Abu Sayyaf towards operations that were more in line with Al Qaeda-JI operations and thus established a stronger basis for cooperation.

A secret AFP intelligence report of early 2000 reportedly asserted that Abu Sayyaf received training, arms, and other support from Al Qaeda and other Middle East terrorist groups.14 AFP officers subsequently reported that 'foreign Muslims' were training Abu Sayyaf on Mindanao to conduct urban terrorism and that Osamu bin Laden had ordered stepped-up aid to Abu Sayyaf, including possibly $3 million in 2000.15 Hostages who escaped Abu Sayyaf captivity and Abu Sayyaf defectors gave similar accounts of Middle Easterners and Afghans conducting training in Abu Sayyaf camps in 2000 and 2001.16 In 2001, Khadaffy Janjalani reportedly approached Zulkifli, a key JI operative and requested that JI train Abu Sayyaf members. Zulkifli agreed and dispatched JI cadre to Abu Sayyaf camps.17 By mid- 2005, Jeemah Islamiah personnel reportedly had trained about 60 Abu Sayyaf cadre in bomb assembling and detonation.18 On October 2, 2002, Abu Sayyaf operatives and two Indonesian members of JI conducted a bombing in Zamboanga on Mindanao that killed three people, including a U.S. Special Forces soldier. Several joint bombing operations followed. Abu Sayyaf-JI collaboration also resulted in another important development in Abu Sayyaf’s emergence after 2000 as a bona fide member of the Al Qaeda-backed Southeast Asian terrorist network: Abu Sayyaf gained access to MILF camps where JI-MILF training was ongoing, and MILF commands began to support Abu Sayyaf-JI bombings.19 More evidence of JI-Abu Sayyaf collaboration came with the reports that two Indonesian JI cadre (Umar Patek and Dulmatin), accused of the 2002 Bali bombing, were with Abu Sayyaf forces on Jolo island.

Links to the MILF

Leaders of the MILF and MNLF have denied any supportive links with Abu Sayyaf. They have criticized Abu Sayyaf’s terrorist attacks against civilians. The MILF rejected the Afghan Taliban’s call for a jihad against the United States and condemned the September 11 attack.20 There have been many reports of links between the MILF and Al Qaeda and JI. One example is the findings of the Singapore government following the uncovering of a JI plot in December 2001 to stage multiple bombings in Singapore . Singapore officials reported in January 2002 that an MILF trainer and bomb specialist assisted the group of 13 members of Jeemah Islamiah arrested in Singapore in December 2001 for plotting to bomb U.S. and other foreign targets in Singapore.21 Subsequent reports in 2002, particularly of Singapore’s investigation of Jeemah Islamiah, substantiated that the MILF provided key training and other assistance in recent years to members of Jeemah Islamiah.22 Jeemah Islamiah also was believed responsible for the bombing in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002.

One of the first pieces of hard evidence of MILF cooperation with Abu Sayyaf was the bombings in Davao on Mindanao in March and April 2003, which killed .23 Zachary Abuza, U.S. expert on Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia, has identified four of eight MILF base commands as sites of active MILF cooperation with Abu Sayyaf and JI. He also has identified the MILF’s Special Operations Group as facilitating joint training and joint operations with Abu Sayyaf. Khadaffy Janjalani and other Abu Sayyaf leaders reportedly have received sanctuary in at least one MILF base camp.24

Another element in Abu Sayyaf-MILF collaboration reportedly is their relationship with the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM). Unlike Muslims of the southern Philippines , the RSM appears to be composed primarily of Filipinos from the northern Philippines , including the Manila area. It has emerged from the estimated 200,000 Filipinos who have converted to Islam since the 1970s; many of these are Filipinos who worked in the Middle East where they converted. The RSM’s manpower strength is unknown, but Philippine intelligence reports indicate that it has cells throughout the main island of Luzon , including metropolitan Manila.25 Abu Sayyaf apparently moved to collaborate with the RSM in order to extend its reach to Manila and other parts of the northern Philippines . A Manila bombing plot uncovered in March 2005 involved the RSM and Abu Sayyaf, according to Philippine intelligence officials. The RSM has cooperated with Abu Sayyaf in several bomb plots including the February 2004 Manila ferry bombing.

The RSM also has received financial support and training from elements within the MILF. The RSM leader, Ahmed Islam Santos, underwent training in bombing in the MILF’s Camp Bushra on Mindanao in December 2001.26

This collaboration also suggests that key MILF commanders may not support any agreement between the MILF and the Philippine government, coming out of the post-cease-fire negotiations, that would not include outright independence for the Muslim areas of the southern Philippines . In that scenario, the MILF could split with hardline elements joining even more closely with JI and Abu Sayyaf, which would maintain a high level of terrorist operations despite a settlement agreement.

Philippine Government and AFP Policies and Operations

The basic Philippine government policy since August 2000 has been constant military pressure on Abu Sayyaf. In September 2000, President Estrada ordered the AFP to commit over 1,500 troops into Jolo (pronounced 'Holo') to conduct operations against Abu Sayyaf units that had taken the foreign hostages in Malaysia .

President Arroyo in 2001 ordered 4,500 AFP troops into Basilan island after Abu Sayyaf’s hostage-taking on Palawan . In mid-2002, after the completion of the U.S.- supported AFP operation on Basilan, President Arroyo ordered more troops to Jolo Island with the aim of wiping out Abu Sayyaf in its stronghold. Since then, there has been frequent, heavy fighting on Jolo.

AFP operations have been limited by several factors. One is the mountainous, jungle terrain of the two islands pockmarked by underground caves. A second is the support civilians on Jolo and Basilan reportedly give Abu Sayyaf, although surveys of Muslims on Basilan suggested that many are disillusioned by Abu Sayyaf’s violence. A third has been the limited military equipment of the AFP, including an absence of night vision and other surveillance equipment and shortages of helicopters, mortars, naval patrol craft, surveillance aircraft, and even basic necessities like military boots.27 U.S. military aid has made up for some of these shortfalls of equipment. In January 2007, a major success came when the AFP killed Abu Sayyaf leader, Abu Solaiman, and identified the body of Kadaffy Janjalani, the top Abu Sayyaf leader, whom the AFP apparently killed in a battle on Jolo in September 2006.28

A fourth limitation appears to have been the unevenness in the quality of the AFP. The apparent attrition of Abu Sayyaf strength in 2002 and afterwards reflected AFP successes. However, the fighting on Jolo from 2002 through 2005 appears to have been a stalemate. There also have been reports of corruption within the AFP which have produced failed operations. The most controversial was the failed encirclement of the Abu Sayyaf unit holding the Burnhams and Filipino hostages in a church in the town of Lamitan in June 2001. Several AFP units pulled out of their positions without explanation, allowing the Abu Sayyaf unit to break out of the encirclement. A Catholic priest and other witnesses charged that Abu Sayyaf had bribed AFP commanders to pull units from their positions, and Filipino Catholic bishops called for an inquiry.29 A Philippine Senate Committee prepared a report in August 2002 citing 'strong circumstantial evidence' that AFP commanders at Lamitan had colluded with Abu Sayyaf. In her book about her captivity, Gracia Burnham described Abu Sayaf bribery of Filipino military officials and Abu Sayyaf payoffs to AFP personnel in return for military supplies.30

A fifth limitation was the hostage situations. In 2000, European governments reportedly pressured the Philippine government to refrain from 'excessive' military operations while Abu Sayyaf held the European hostages. In 2002, there reportedly was similar U.S. pressure regarding the Burnhams. Arroyo Administration officials and AFP commanders said they were restrained from air bombing and using artillery and mortars out of concern for the safety of the hostages. A sixth limitation was the AFP deployment of most of its forces in the southern Philippines in the broader areas of Mindanao dominated by the MILF and MNLF. Only a small percentage of Filipino troops was committed against Abu Sayyaf. A final constraint was the danger of AFP operations producing a large numbers of civilian casualties or displaced civilians. The Estrada Administration came under criticism in 2000 over reports that the AFP offensive on Jolo caused civilian casualties and displacement among the island’s 600,000 residents.

The collaboration of Abu Sayyaf with the MILF and JI also appears to be placing limitations on Philippine operations against Abu Sayyaf. Abu Sayyaf undoubtedly has taken advantage of the truce between the MILF and the Philippine government to establish links with the MILF and JI and gain access to MILF base camps for training and sanctuary. The cease-fire has resulted in a substantial reduction in violence and armed clashes. However, the truce apparently has not reduced the movement of JI terrorist personnel and materials between Mindanao and the Indonesian island of Sulawesi under the direction of JI, nor has it prevented JI’s growing collaboration with Abu Sayyaf.

Negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF have been protracted and inconclusive. Government predictions of an agreement in 2006 were not realized. Substantial issues and disagreements between the two sides remain to be resolved. One is the issue of 'ancestral domain,' the size and geographical configuration of an autonomous Muslim entity. The MILF has proposed a unified area geographically, including some non-Muslim locales. The government has proposed a smaller, 'leopard spot' configuration with no geographical unity. The MILF has rejected a government proposal for a census and plebiscite in locales to determine whether they would be included in the Muslim autonomous entity.

Another issue is the constitutional-political system in an autonomous Muslim entity: whether an electoral democracy or a traditional system led by Muslim religious and tribal leaders. The nature of security forces remain to be resolved, including the jurisdiction of the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) in the Muslim entity. The MILF also seeks agreement on a referendum to be held at some point to determine the final political status of the Muslim entity; such a plebiscite could include an option for full independence. The future role of the MNLF and other non- MILF groups also is a point in dispute between the MILF and the MNLF.31

The 2002 Balikatan Operation

Beginning in October 2001, the United States sent groups of military observers to Mindanao to assess AFP operations against Abu Sayyaf, render advice, and examine AFP equipment needs. President Bush extended $93 million in military aid to the Philippines when President Arroyo visited Washington in November 2001, and he offered a direct U.S. military role in combating Abu Sayyaf. President Arroyo insisted that the U.S. military role should be advisory and that the AFP would retain full operational responsibility. By late December 2001, the AFP on Mindanao began to receive quantities of U.S. military equipment. Moreover, AFP commanders suggested that they would support President Arroyo if she sought a more direct U.S. military role.32

The early proposals of the Bush Administration envisaged a large, direct, and assertive role for U.S. forces: a direct combat role for U.S. military personnel, the commitment of the elite Delta Force to lead operations to rescue the Burnhams,33 and assistance to the AFP against Abu Sayyaf.34 However, negotiations with the Philippines over the rules of engagement for the Balikatan exercise resulted in a more limited U.S. role, as Filipino officials insisted on a non-combat role for the Americans, operations against only Abu Sayyaf, and a geographical limitation of U.S. operations to only Basilan island and the Zamboanga peninsula.

In February 2002, the United States dispatched 1,300 U.S. troops to provide training, advice, and other non-combat assistance to 1,200 Filipino troops against Abu Sayyaf on Basilan island in an operation dubbed 'Balikatan' (shoulder-toshoulder). The U.S. troops included 160 Special Operations personnel and over 300 troops, primarily Navy engineers, to undertake 'civic action' projects such as roadbuilding on Basilan.

Philippine-U.S. rules of engagement provided that two-man U.S. Special Forces teams could accompany AFP companies in the field on Basilan island. U.S. military officials in the Philippines reportedly favored an early implementation of this plan; but some Bush Administration officials in Washington , including Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, developed second thoughts about this U.S. role.35 Rumsfeld did not detail these misgivings, but several have been reported and/or seem apparent.

Command arrangements were a difficult issue in Philippine-U.S. negotiations over rules of engagement. The Americans refused to place U.S. personnel under Filipino command but agreed that U.S. personnel would take 'operational instructions from Filipino commanders' in the field. Rumsfeld and other officials, however, may have had continued doubts about this kind of arrangement. Relatedly, the uneven and sometimes poor quality of AFP units may have added to these doubts.

In mid-June 2002, the Filipinos and Americans finalized arrangements for U.S. Special Forces in the field. U.S. Special Forces personnel would accompany only selected AFP companies that had reached certain specified combat skills and on only closely defined missions. Moreover, this arrangement would end on July 31, 2002, the official termination date of the Balikatan operation. Any extension would have to be re-negotiated.36 In reality, the arrangements were not implemented before the July 31 deadline.

U.S. policy toward the Burnhams, the American missionary couple held hostage, contained several shifts. After the U.S. offer of the Delta Force was ruled out, American officials reportedly advised their Filipino counterparts to exercise military restraint in order to limit the danger to the Burnhams.37 The Bush Administration made a decision, probably in March 2002, to support the payment of ransom to Abu Sayyaf. The payment of $300,000 reportedly was made by private parties, probably through intermediaries that had contacts with Abu Sayyaf. U.S. FBI officials reportedly helped to deliver the money in April 2002. Abu Sayyaf did not release the Burnhams. The money reportedly did not go to the Abu Sayyaf group under Abu Sabaya which held the hostages. Instead, it went to the Jolo-based Abu Sayyaf faction under Khaddafy Janjalani, who reportedly refused to turn it over to Abu Sabaya.38 The Bush Administration has not disclosed what went wrong with the ransom attempt.

Following the failed ransom attempt, U.S. officials reportedly shifted from their pro-restraint position and advised the AFP to adopt more aggressive tactics to rescue the Burnhams. The U.S. military provided the AFP with intelligence information that Abu Sayyaf moved the Burnhams from Basilan to the Zamboanga peninsula in April 2002 and with key intelligence in the AFP’s assault on the Abu Sayyaf team holding the hostages on June 7, 2002. Martin Burnham and Filipino hostage, Deborah Yap, were killed during the fighting; Gracia Burnham was rescued.

Despite these changes in the U.S. military role and in U.S. policies and the less than successful attempt to rescue the Burnhams, the Balikatan exercise appears to have accomplished several U.S. goals. Philippine-U.S. security cooperation was advanced. AFP commanders viewed the U.S. role in Balikatan positively, and President Arroyo continued to advocate this kind of cooperation. Most reports indicate that U.S. support enhanced the capabilities of AFP units on Basilan. The period after February 2002 saw more assertive AFP patrolling on Basilan, more encounters with Abu Sayyaf, and an erosion of Abu Sayyaf strength, which apparently led to the Abu Sayyaf decision to leave Basilan with the Burnhams. In March 2003, Philippine officials estimated Abu Sayyaf strength at about 470 with about 380 on Jolo Island . As stated previously, later estimates placed Abu Sayyaf strength between 200 and 400 fighters. Filipino officials voiced praise for the modern equipment U.S. forces provided the AFP, U.S. intelligence information provided by U.S. aircraft and sophisticated communications and tracking equipment, and American assistance in planning operations.39 U.S. equipment and surveillance were important in the AFP’s successful operation later in June 2002 in intercepting Abu Sabaya and other Abu Sayyaf leaders at sea in which Abu Sabaya was killed.40

The Bush Administration’s initiative in offering 350 U.S. personnel to conduct civic action projects on Basilan reportedly proved popular with the people on the island and probably helped to neutralize public support for Abu Sayyaf on the island.41 The civic action projects (road building, medical care, and well-digging) may have influenced a less negative reaction of Filipino Muslims elsewhere to the U.S. military role, and the favorable Filipino media coverage appears to have helped President Arroyo contain the critics of the United States within the Manila political elite.

U.S. Support Role on Jolo Island and in Western Mindanao

A key decision for post-July 31 cooperation was whether to extend the U.S. support and assistance role southward from Basilan to Jolo and other islands in the Sulu group where Abu Sayyaf continued to operate. There was evidence of tough Philippine-U.S. negotiations on this issue and possible division within the American side. President Arroyo and Secretary of Defense Angelo Reyes voiced support for a U.S. assistance role in the Sulus.42

The continued Abu Sayyaf bombings in autumn 2002 led the U.S. Defense Department to give increased attention to Jolo. U.S. officials also cited stronger evidence of connections between Abu Sayyaf and international terrorist groups. Planning and discussions with the Philippine government were underway by December 2002. In February 2003, Pentagon officials described a plan under which the United States would commit 350 Special Operations Forces (SOF) to Jolo to operate with AFP Army and Marine units down to the platoon level of 20-30 troops.

Another 400 U.S. support troops would be at Zamboanga on the Mindanao mainland. Positioned offshore of Jolo would be a navy task force of 1,000 U.S. Marines and 1,300 Navy personnel equipped with Cobra attack helicopters and Harrier jets.43

According to the Pentagon description of the plan, U.S. troops would be in a combat role. This and subsequent statements indicated that the SOF on Jolo would participate in AFP offensive operations against Abu Sayyaf and that the SOF would not be limited to using their weapons for self-defense. The U.S. Marines were described as a 'quick reaction' force, undoubtedly meaning that they could be sent on to Jolo to reinforce AFP units. The Cobra helicopters and Harrier jets would give AFP commanders the option of requesting U.S. air strikes in support of AFP operations.

These rules of engagement went beyond the U.S. role on Basilan in 2002. President Arroyo and AFP commanders reportedly had agreed to the plan in a meeting of February 4, 2003.44 The announcement of the plan caused immediate controversy in the Philippines . Filipino politicians and media organs criticized the plan as violating the constitutional prohibition of foreign troops engaging in combat on Philippine soil.45 Filipino Muslim leaders warned of a Muslim backlash on Mindanao . Filipino experts and civic leaders on Jolo warned that the people of Jolo would not support a U.S. combat role, partly because of the history of U.S. military involvement on the island. During the Philippine wars following the U.S. annexation of the Philippines in 1898, U.S. forces commanded by Generals Leonard Wood and John J. Pershing conducted extensive combat operations against Muslim forces on Jolo, inflicting thousands of civilian casualties. President Arroyo reacted to these criticisms and warnings by asserting that the U.S. role on Jolo would be to train and advise under AFP jurisdiction but would not involve combat. The Bush and Arroyo administrations decided to put the plan on hold and re-negotiate the rules of engagement of U.S. forces. It was reported that President Arroyo decided to postpone implementation of any plan until after the U.S. war with Iraq.46

However, after 2002, the United States and the Philippines implemented another phase of U.S. training and support of the AFP, the training of AFP light infantry companies for use against both Muslim insurgents and the communist New People’s Army. In 2004, the two sides began to negotiate alternative schemes for military cooperation against Abu Sayyaf. The result was two operations that began in 2005 and continue to the present. One has focused on Abu Sayyaf on western Mindanao, undoubtedly in response to Khadaffy Janjalani’s shift of Abu Sayyaf operations to the Mindanao mainland. The second focused on Jolo but with a reduced U.S. military role as compared to the plan of 2003.

The operations apparently have had three objectives: (1) neutralize Abu Sayyaf- Jeemah Islamiah training; (2) kill or capture Khaddafy Janjalani and other Abu Sayyaf leaders (partially successful with the deaths of Janjalani and Solaiman); and (3) root out the Abu Sayyaf forces and organization on Jolo in a similar fashion to the success on Basilan in 2002. The U.S. military role in western Mindanao reportedly has involved intelligence and communications support of the AFP, including the employment of U.S. P-3 surveillance aircraft; deployment of Navy Seal and Special Operations personnel with AFP ground units; and rules of engagement restricting U.S. personnel to a non-combat role (although such rules normally would allow U.S. personnel to defend themselves if attacked).47 In November 2005, U.S. troops were deployed into Jolo to assist the AFP in mine clearing,48 and the AFP announced a joint Philippine-U.S. military exercise in the Sulu islands scheduled for February 20- March 5, 2006. In this exercise, dubbed Balikatan Shoulder-to-Shoulder 2006, about 5,500 U.S. military personnel participated. Of these, 250 conducted non-combat exercises on Jolo with emphasis on civic action projects such as medical services, repairing roads and bridges, and repairing school buildings.49 The exercise carried over into a longer-term U.S. support operation in Jolo and reportedly has expanded to include assistance to the AFP in planning operations and intelligence collection and surveillance.50

Implications of U.S. Military Involvement

Philippine-U.S. military cooperation against Abu Sayyaf has rebuilt a Philippine-U.S. alliance that had weakened considerably after the Philippines ended U.S. rights to military bases in the Philippines in 1993. During President Arroyo’s state visit to Washington in May 2003, the Bush Administration designated the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO ally, a status that could make the Philippines eligible to receive more sophisticated U.S. arms and military training. The joint operations and exercises appear to have strong support from the Filipino populace.

They served to limit the potential rift between Manila and Washington in 2004 when President Arroyo withdrew the small AFP contingent from Iraq in response to the taking of a Filipino contract worker hostage by insurgents in Iraq . However, the enlarged U.S. military role also carries the risk of political backlashes. Influential Filipino 'nationalist' and leftist groups criticized the U.S. military role in Basilan, even though polls indicated overwhelming Filipino public support for it and the influential Catholic Bishops Conference endorsed it. They charged that the U.S. military role violated the Philippine constitution and that the United States was plotting to secure permanent military bases again. This kind of controversy likely will emerge again if the new U.S. military role on Jolo is prolonged and/or expands in scope.

Moreover, incidents involving U.S. military personnel and Filipino civilians have the potential to turn Filipino opinion negative toward the United States . At the end of 2005, four U.S. Marines, stationed on Okinawa, were charged formally with raping a Filipino woman while they were in the Philippines for a military exercises.

Their case is pending and is drawing much publicity in the Philippines , particularly over the application of the 1998 Philippine-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement to the case and especially to the issue of who will hold custody of the Marines until their trial is held.

The U.S. military undoubtedly will be influenced by the increasingly complex Muslim terrorist and insurgency situation that has developed since 2002. As stated previously, Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength has dwindled to an estimated 200-400. The cease-fire between the MILF and the Philippine government has held, and negotiations for a settlement are ongoing in Malaysia . However, there are other developments of a negative nature that could worsen the overall situation in the southern Philippines and even the Philippines as a whole. One is the growing cooperation among Abu Sayyaf, several major MILF commands, and elements of Jeemah Islamiah on Mindanao . JI appears to use Mindanao as a primary base for building up its cadre of terrorists. This cooperation among the three groups appears to be transforming Mindanao into a significant base of operations rather than just a site for training; and these operations appear to target increasingly the Philippines for terrorist attacks rather than just neighboring countries. This, too, is related to the emergence of the Rajah Solaiman Movement and its cooperation with Abu Sayyaf and JI. The result has been an increase in terrorist bombings since 2002 both in number and destructiveness and an increase in the number of bombings and bomb plots in the northern Philippines , including Manila .

The Bush Administration has expressed growing concern over MILF links with JI and Abu Sayyaf and JI’s use of the Mindanao-Sulawesi corridor to move terrorists and bombing materials between the Philippines and Indonesia . In April 2005, the U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Manila , Joseph Mussomeli, caused an uproar among Filipino officials when he stated that parts of Muslim Mindanao, with its poverty, lawlessness, porous borders, and links to JI could development into an 'Afghanistanstyle' situation. In May 2005, U.S. Ambassador Francis Ricciardone announced the cancellation of a U.S.-aided road project in Cotabato province in southern Mindanao, describing Cotabato as a 'doormat' for Muslim terrorists.51 These statements indicated U.S. dissatisfaction with the situation on Mindanao and doubts about the Philippine government’s ability to end Muslim terrorism.

The Bush Administration has considered placing the MILF on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. However, the Arroyo Administration has opposed such a move as potentially jeopardizing the peace negotiations.52 As of the beginning of 2006, the Bush Administration has voiced support for the Philippine-MILF peace negotiations as the best means of de-linking the MILF from JI and Abu Sayyaf.53

This support boosts the Arroyo Administration against the AFP’s advocacy of a militarily-aggressive strategy toward the MILF. Nevertheless, the new U.S. military role in western Mindanao increases the risk of a clash involving U.S. military personnel with the MILF. In January 2006, 60 U.S. military personnel conducted training for several hundred AFP personnel near Cotobato City in the heart of MILF territory. The U.S. contingent also was to carry out civic action projects (medical, dental, and veterinary services) in nearby Muslim villages. The U.S. military presence drew a protest march by Muslim civilian groups allied with the MILF and a warning from an MILF central committee official over the increasing presence of U.S. military forces in the Muslim areas of Mindanao.54

Moreover, a breakdown of the negotiations and the cease-fire likely would confront the Bush Administration with policy decisions regarding a U.S. role in a wider war. The AFP could be expected to propose increased supplies of U.S. arms and military equipment; and it likely would argue for a more direct U.S. military role.

The Philippine government might change its previous policy of opposition to a U.S. military role against the MILF and encourage U.S. actions against the MILF at least in a role similar to that in the joint operations against Abu Sayyaf.

If significant elements of the MILF opposed a peace agreement and moved closer to JI and Abu Sayyaf, and if they were able to continue or expand terrorist operations, the Bush Administration would be faced with a different kind of challenge but one that could include similar pressures for greater U.S. military involvement. That, too, would be the case if a peace agreement were not followed by effective measures against JI on Mindanao . There also would be the challenge of proceeding with implementing projects financed by $260 million in U.S. aid to Mindanao since 2001 (including $25 million in FY2006). This commitment, too, could confront the Administration with a policy decision of whether or not to employ U.S. pressure on the Philippine government to implement faithfully its obligations under a peace agreement. This scenario is plausible, given the reputed poor performance of Philippine governments in implementing the 1977 and 1996 agreements with the MNLF.

REFERENCES

1 Landler, Mark. Philippines Offers U.S. Its Troops and Bases. New York Times, October 2, 2001. P. 5.

2 Pazzibugan, Dona Z. RP to Open Air Space, Refueling Facilities to US. Philippine Daily Inquirer (Internet version), March 22, 2003. Garcia, Danilo. 700 Soldiers to be Sent to Iraq . Pilipino Star Ngayon (Internet version), March 29, 2003.

3 Sales, Peter M. War in Mindanao . Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, October-November 2000, p. 8, 10.

4 Tiglao, Rigoberto. Hidden Strength; Crescent Moon Rising. Far Eastern Economic Review, February 23, 1995. P. 22-28. Tiglao, Rigoberto. Moro Reprise. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 26, 1996-January 2, 1997. P. 22.

5 Gomez, Jim. Philippine Muslim guerrillas agree to return to Malaysian-brokered peace talks. Associated Press, November 29, 2006.

6 In Mindanao , the Islamic Fundamentalist Movement Appears to be Spearheaded by the Tabligh and Abu Sayyaf. Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 29, 1994. P. 1.

7 Richburg, Keith. Spoilers of the Peace. Washington Post, May 25, 1995. P. A33.

8 Fisk, Robert. The Double-Edged Sword of Gaddafi’s Links with the Philippines . London

Independent (internet version), August 22, 2000. Tan, Abby. Kidnappings a Blow to Philippine Image. Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 2001. P. 7.

9 Romero, Paolo. Abus Attempting a Robin Hood. Philippine Star (internet version), July 27, 2001. What Ransom? Philippine Daily Inquirer (internet version), June 18, 2001.

Quezon City GMA 7 television broadcast, December 7, 2001.

10 Abuza, Jachary. Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf. Carlisle , U.S. War College , 2005. P. 27. Mogato, Manny. Fighting in the Philippine south rages, soldier killed. Reuters News, November 24, 2005. Cagoco, Josefa. Kay Mindanao areas placed on high terror alert level. Business World ( Manila , internet), September 9, 2006.

11 Police Hunt for Sudanese Terrorist in Mindanao . Manila Chronicle, December 15, 1995. P. 3. Pomonti, Jean-Claude. Al Qaeda’s Invisible Presence in Southeast Asia . Le Monde, November 4-5, 2001, p. 12.

12 For a detailed account of the Ramzi Yousef bomb plot, see Brzezinski, Matthew. Bust and Boom. Washington Post Magazine, December 31, 2001. P. 15-17, 27-28.

13 Abuza, Zachary. Militant Islam in Southeast Asia . Boulder and London , Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. P. 96-99, 113, 136-138.

14 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Terrorism War’s New Front. Washington Post, December 22, 2001. P. A1. Kurlantzick, Joshua. Muslim Separatists in Global Network of Terrorist Groups. Washington Times, May 2, 2000. P. A13.

15 Arquiza, Ray. Interpol Alerts RP on Bin Laden’s Men. Philippine Star (internet version), July 10, 2001. Gomez, Jim. Philippine Rebels, bin Laden Linked. Agence France Presse report, June 20, 2000.

16 Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia , p. 113.

17 Abuza, Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, p. 22.

18 Mogato, Manny. Philippine rebels linking up with foreign jihadists. Reuters News, August 21, 2005. Del Puerto, Luige A. PNP [Philippine National Police]: alliance of JI, RP terrorists strong. Philippine Daily Inquirer (internet version), November 20, 2005.

19 Ibid., p. 22-24.

20 Mendez, Christina. MILF Rejects ‘Holy War’ vs US. Philippine Star (internet version), September 17, 2001.

21 Mydans, Seth. Suspects in Singapore Are Linked to Al Qaeda and Plans for Anti-U.S. Attacks. New York Times, January 12, 2002. P. A8. Marinay, Manny B. Philippine Military Bares MILF’s Foreign Sources of Funds. Manila Times (internet version), March 27, 2002.

22 Wain, Barry and McBeth, John. A Perilous Choice for the Presidents. Far Eastern Economic Review, October 3, 2002. p. 17-20.

23 Abuza, Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, p. 10, 15.

24 Ibid., p. 14-19-22-24.

25 Top terrorism suspect falls. Philippine Daily Inquirer (internet version), October 27, 2005. Montlake, Simon. In Philippines , watchful eye on converts. Christian Science Monitor, November 28, 2995. P. 7.

26 Ibid. Abuza, Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, p. 35-37. 48

27 Mogato, Manny. Philippine military ill-equipped to fight — report. Reuters News, October 31, 2003. Mogato, Manny. Fuel costs, lack of bullets hurt Manila terror war. Reuters News, November 14, 2005.

28 Hookway, James. Terrorist cells band together in Philippines . Wall Street Journal Asia , January 22, 2007. p. 11. DNA test confirms death of Philippine separatist leader. New York Times, January 21, 2007. p. 3.

29 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Rebels’ Escape Draws Scrutiny. Washington Post, September 1, 2001, p. A 18.

30 Mogato, Manny. Former U.S. hostage testifies in Philippines . Reuters News, July 29, 2004.

31 Abuza, Zachary. Status of the GRP-MILF talks. January 14, 2007. 5 pages. Arguillas, Carolyn O. Will new proposal break the impasse? MindaNews (internet), November 15, 2006.

32 More US ‘Advisors’ to Help Fight Sayyaf. Manila Times, January 4, 2002. P. 1. Ng-Gadil, Mirasol. AFP Admitted that Operation Against Abu Sayyuf Bandits is Difficult. Manila Kabayan (internet version), December 30, 2001.

33 Bonner, Raymond. Philippines Terror Group Seeks Money for Couple. New York Times, March 9, 2002. p. A10.

34 Struck, Doug. Some Filipinos Cite Threats Beyond Abu Sayyaf. Washington Post, March 4, 2002. p. A13.

35 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. U.S. Troops Have yet to Join Patrols in Philippines . Washington Post, May 1, 2002. p. A16.

36 Schmitt, Eric. American Troops Will Begin Tighter Operations with Filipinos. New York Times, June 20 , 2002. p. A13.

37 Ricks, Thomas E. and Sipress, Alan. Spy Planes Seek out Philippine guerrillas. Washington Post, February 21, 2002. p. A1.

38 Lerner, Mark. Hostage’s Father Says Abu Sayyaf Broke Deal. Washington Times, April 26, 2002. p. A15. Bonner, Raymond and Schmitt, Eric. Philippine Officials Detail the Trap, Set With U.S. Help, that Snared a Rebel Leader. New York Times, September 22, 2002, p.16.

39 Gloria, Glenda M. Training Days. Manila Newsbreak (internet version), July 8, 2002.

40 Bonner and Schmitt, Philippine Officials Detail the Trap, Set With U.S. Help, that Snared a Rebel Leader, New York Times, September 22, 2002, 16.

41 Schmitt, Eric. By Aiding Needy Filipinos, G.I.’s Could Help Rout the Rebels. New York Times, June 15, 2002. p. A6.

42 Vuillanueva, Mirichu and Pareno, Roel. Arroyo Scolds US General. Philippine Star (internet version), July 11, 2002. New US-Philippine Exercises Against Rebels Planned. Reuters News Agency, July 20, 2002.

43 Graham, Bradley. U.S. Bolsters Philippine Force. Washington Post, February 21, 2003. p. A1.

44 Nakashima, Ellen and Graham, Bradley. Missed Signals Forced Suspension of U.S.- Philippine Mission . Washington Post, March 3, 2003. p. A12.

45 Nakashima, Ellen. Philippines Debates U.S. Combat Role Against Rebels. Washington Post, February 23, 2003. p. A30.

46 Pareno, Roel and Mendez, Christina. Reyes: RP-US Balikatan Deal Done in One Month. Philippine Star (Internet version), March 28, 2003. Villanueva, Marichu. More Conservative Terms for Balikatan 03-1 Sought. Philippine Star (Internet version), March 23, 2003.

47 Bonner, Raymond and Conde, Carlos H. U.S. and Philippines join forces to pursue terrorist leader. New York Times, July 23, 2005. P. A4.

48 U.S. troops remove landmines in Philippine south. Reuters News, December 1, 2005.

49 U.S. plans Philippine war games in Muslim south. Reuters News, January 10, 2006. Asia Security Monitor No. 151, January 9, 2006.

50 U.S. troops fighting in Philippines ? Associated Press, January 16, 2007.



51 Conde, Carlos H. Corruption troubles Philippine military. International Herald Tribune, May 26, 2005.

52 Abuza, Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, p. 42. Gloria’s powers of persuasion. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 12, 2002. P. 10.

53 Asia Security Monitor No. 147, November 2005. U.S. says peace deal in Manila may pressure JI. Reuters News, October 22, 2005.

54 Mogato, Manny. Philippine army on alert as US forces begin drills. Reuters News, January 16, 2006. Mogato, Manny. Interview — Philippine rebels see peace talks as done deal. Reuters News, January 16, 2006. Mogato, Manny. Protest greets U.S. troops training in Philippines . Reuters News, January 17, 2006.






Source: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31265.pdf

[nw_arizona_granny]

Ex-city Man Indicted in Islamic Case - Money Allegedly Sent Overseas to Jihadists (back)



March 14, 2007

by Kevin Keenan

A third man was indicted Monday in a federal criminal case brought in 2005 against two former officers of Care International Inc., a defunct Islamic charity. They are accused of lying to the IRS about sending money to overseas jihadists.

A superseding indictment, filed Monday in federal District Court in Worcester, charged Samir Al-Monla, 50, of Boston, and formerly of Worcester, with a scheme to conceal material facts, conspiracy, making false statements, and obstructing and impeding the Internal Revenue Service. He pleaded not guilty to the charges yesterday and was released with conditions.

Emadeddin Z. Muntasser of Braintree and Muhammed Mubayyid of Shrewsbury are accused of misleading the government about the nature of Care International Inc., a charity the government claims sent money to overseas jihadist and mujahedeen organizations. They, now along with Mr. Al-Monla, are awaiting trial in U.S. District Court.

Mr. Al-Monla, president of Care from 1996 to ’98, is accused of lying to federal authorities about the nature of the charity, specifically that it solicited money for jihadists involved in armed conflict overseas. Had the charity disclosed its activities to the Internal Revenue Service, it would not have been granted nonprofit status, according to the indictment. Mr. Al-Monla once lived at 45 Williamsburg Drive in Worcester , according to corporate documents filed with the state Secretary of the Commonwealth’s office.

Mr. Al-Monla is also accused of lying to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force in 2001 and 2003, about his relationship with Bassam Kanj, a Lebanese man who lived in Boston for about 15 years and died while apparently attacking Lebanese military forces in 2000. Mr. Al-Monla allegedly told the FBI that one of his duties was to ensure that Care funds were not being diverted to terrorists and that he did not know anyone associated with terrorism. Authorities say both of those statements were false, according to the March 8 indictment.

Mr. Kanj, who drove a taxi in Boston , was a “Boston-based Sunni extremist,” according to testimony given by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III to the Senate Intelligence Committee on Feb. 16, 2005.

The FBI’s Joint Terrorism Taskforce interviewed Mr. Al-Monla and Mr. Mubayyid multiple times in 2001 and 2003, according to court records.

U.S. District Court Judge F. Dennis Saylor moved the case from Worcester to Boston , by an order filed last Thursday. Defense lawyers moved to have the case heard in Boston , rather than Worcester , saying unfair media coverage and other factors precluded their clients from getting a fair case in Worcester . The defense team argued that the former charity was based in Boston , and that federal prosecutors “forum shopped” by filing the charges in Worcester .

Judge Saylor, in a memo, said the prosecutors filed the case in Worcester because some of the alleged criminal activity occurred in Worcester County . Evidence in the case was seized from a Westboro storage facility, and the charity was briefly managed from a Worcester location, according to the memo. But Judge Saylor said the court could reasonably determine that the “most significant criminal conduct” occurred in the Eastern Division of the Massachusetts federal court district, and therefore he granted the defendants’ motion to move the case from Worcester to Boston . Judge Saylor will continue to hear the case, and a jury will be selected from eastern Massachusetts .

In another memo, Judge Saylor denied Mr. Muntasser and Mr. Mubayyid’s request to dismiss the case.

The two men, through their lawyers, argued that the charges violated their First Amendment rights, and that their former charity was accused of activity previously sanctioned by the U.S. government — sending money to jihadists engaged in armed conflict in Afghanistan and other places. Judge Saylor rejected those arguments, saying they were without merit because Care did not apply for nonprofit status as a church or religious organization. The defendants’ request to dismiss the case mischaracterizes the indictment, he ruled.

“They are not being prosecuted for engaging in those activities; they are being prosecuted for concealing those activities,” he said in the ruling.

The March 8 indictment charges Mr. Mubayyid with concealing material facts, conspiracy, three counts of filing false tax returns, and one count of obstructing and impeding the IRS. Mr. Muntasser was charged with concealing material facts, conspiracy, making false statements and obstructing and impeding the IRS.



Source: http://www.telegram.com/ apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/ 20070314/NEWS/703140714/1101

[nw_arizona_granny]

Ten Years for Terrorist Trainers (back)



March 06, 2007

Instructors at a terrorist training camp must be subject to a maximum of 10 years in prison if convicted. Justice Minister Ernst Hirsch Ballin provides for this in a bill published on Tuesday that he has submitted for advice. It was already announced on Budget Day last year that participation at a terrorist training camp would become a crime. Hirsch Ballin says it must be possible to take legal actions against such training camps if they are situated abroad and the training is aimed at committing a terrorist attack in the Netherlands .

The Dutch government said Tuesday it plans to adopt a law making it a crime to attend a 'terrorist training camp' to learn skills that could be used to carry an out an attack, regardless of whether the camp is located in the Netherlands or abroad. The Justice Ministry said participation in a terrorist training camp should be considered a serious crime, proposing up to 10 years in prison for anyone convicted of attending or supporting such a camp - in the Netherlands or abroad. The proposed measure is the latest in a series of laws enacted here since the 9/11 attacks to empower authorities to prosecute would-be terrorists before they act.



Source: http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=1&story_id=37271

[nw_arizona_granny]

Emerson Exposes MPAC's Agenda (back)



March 14, 2007

In 'Threatened by the Jihad' at Front Page (thanks to Mackie), Steven Emerson tells the truth about the Muslim Public Affairs Council:

On January 26, 2007, I appeared on Fox News Channel’s Hannity and Colmes program to discuss a January 8, 2007 meeting between the Attorney General of the United States and various Muslim and Arab groups, some of which have a long history of supporting terrorist groups and extremist ideologies. In response to a question from Alan Colmes about the importance of “good relations” between Attorney General Gonzales and the Muslim community, I stated, “[b]ut when you say the ‘Muslim community’ – [the Attorney General] is anointing them representatives of the Muslim community, when in fact there are many others who support the war on terrorism, who don't tell their members not to cooperate with the FBI, who don't support Hamas and Hezbollah, unlike members of this group. So, in fact, I think it's wrong to confer legitimacy on those very organizations that inhibit cooperation with the FBI, that support Hamas or justify Hezbollah, and who are radical in terms of portraying the war on terrorism as a war against Islam.”

On February 16, 2007, MPAC’s lawyer sent me a letter demanding an apology for my allegedly “[f]alse statements about the Muslim Public Affairs Council on Hannity and Colmes.” The letter demands that I “immediately issue a public apology and … cease and desist from making false statements about MPAC,” and that “MPAC is willing to pursue all available legal remedies” should I not comply with MPAC’s demands.

And what are the allegedly “false statements” MPAC is claiming I made? That “MPAC told its ‘members not to cooperate with the FBI,’” and that MPAC “are the ones radicalizing their community.” Now let’s analyze those charges by looking at MPAC’s own words.

First, that MPAC has instructed American Muslims not to cooperate with the FBI:

MPAC and its lawyers claim this to be untrue. But at a July 1, 2005 ISNA conference in Dallas, MPAC Executive Director Salam Al-Marayati did just that. Al-Marayati, speaking of the FBI’s terrorism investigation in Lodi and the use of Muslim informants in that case, California, told the assembled crowd of Muslim-Americans, “[c]ounter-terrorism and counter-violence should be defined by us. We should define how an effective counter-terrorism policy should be pursued in this country. So, number one, we reject any effort, notion, suggestion that Muslims should start spying on one another.” Right there, Al-Marayati is instructing Muslim Americans to not even attempt to observe any extremism or terrorist activity in their community, and even if they should observe something troubling, to not inform law enforcement authorities, that the duty owed to the Muslim community by the government is greater than to society at large.

And Al-Marayati continued, “Law enforcement is going to come to your mosque. It already has as far as I can tell. Everywhere I go, either somebody tells me that officials have met with them publicly or they tell me that they know who those folks are that are representing law enforcement. So we know they have communicated one way or the other with the Muslim community. The question is how do you deal with it in a healthy, open, transparent manner. That is why we are saying have them come in community forums, in open-dialogues, so they come through the front door and you prevent them having to come from the back door.”

Here, Al-Marayati is instructing Muslim Americans not to cooperate with the FBI’s preferred methods of investigation, and that, as he stated earlier, it is the Muslim community, and its so-called leaders, that should define the terms of the FBI’s investigation. That approach can hardly be described as full-fledged cooperation with law enforcement. Far from it, in fact. Al-Marayati used the Lodi case as an excuse to tell Muslim Americans not to deal with the FBI directly. Demanding that the American Muslim community only work with FBI agents and other law enforcement in public forums clearly detracts from the ability of investigators to do their job, which is to protect American citizens from the threat of radical Islamist terrorists. MPAC, and groups like it, are also clearly seeking to intrude into and ultimately to dominate the relationship between the law enforcement and the Muslim community, ensuring that the degree of allowable cooperation is regulated by these self-appointed leaders.

And why did Mr. Al-Marayati not urge his listeners in Dallas that they should extend full cooperation to the FBI and law enforcement community at every instance, rather than to demand a specific approach which is debilitating from an investigatory standpoint? Or that law abiding American Muslims need some sort of self-appointed intermediary when working with the FBI? And how can people feel comfortable providing information to law enforcement if they can only do so in an open forum? I will leave that to the reader to decide. But one thing is clear: MPAC is on the record telling American Muslims not to directly cooperate with the FBI, while at the same time advocating an impractical or impossible way for those who actually have information to relay it to law enforcement.

Now let’s analyze the other alleged “false statement”: that MPAC serves to radicalize the American Muslim community:

This claim is even easier to demonstrate, as MPAC officials give speeches and quotes to the media that can only serve to alienate and radicalize Muslims who hear them. The constant refrain: a conspiracy theory that the War on Terror is a contrivance of the U.S. government and is really a “War against Islam.” Such a conspiracy dismissed legitimate efforts by law enforcement to fight terrorism and terrorist financing perpetrated on U.S. soil. By virtue of the sheer number of times MPAC officials (and, for that matter, officials of other U.S.-based Islamist groups,) have made that claim, it is impossible to include them all here. But here are several instances that easily serve to make the point:

· Aslam Abdullah, MPAC Vice Chairman and Editor of the MPAC-linked magazine, the Minaret, in a 2002 online forum entitled, “The Truth behind America 's War on Terrorism,” wrote, “[t]here are three specific lobbies that are turning the ongoing war on terrorism against Islam. The Christian Evangelicals who want to see Muslims converted, the political Zionists who want to see Muslim [sic] politically obliterated, and the Hindu Extremists who want to see Muslim [sic] humiliated…Mr. Bush and his administration have not been able to challenge these lobbies. Many members of these lobbies are in the administration and in FBI, law enforcement and even Congress.”[1] (emphasis added)

· MPAC “hate crime prevention coordinator” in May 2004, speaking to the Inter Press Service article reported, “The war on terror is a war, really, on a community that is being connected to the (9/11) hijackers.”[2]

· In a January 2002 article in the Minaret, stated that, “[s]ince the Sept. 11 attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, the U.S. government has pursued a policy where it has targeted Islamic, Arab and Palestinian organizations and individuals, in a manner that often lacks legal legitimacy.”[3]

· And al-Marayati, in the Los Angeles Times in March 2003, blasted “the FBI’s policy of targeting people because of their race and religion.” He added, “That’s what they’ve been doing since the attacks, and we don’t know of any case that has resulted in the arrest, indictment or prosecution of a terrorist.”[4]

A recent study conducted by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has concluded that the repeated use of “War on Islam” mantra is directly related to the radicalization of the “homegrown” jihadists.[5]

Al-Marayati also infamously told an L.A. radio station after 9/11, “[i]f we’re going to look at suspects we should look to the groups that benefit the most from these kinds of incidents, and I think we should put the state of Israel on the suspect list,” engaging in the very kind of conspiracy theories heard in the most radical quarters around the globe. Additionally, MPAC officials have defended Hezbollah, blasted the U.S. government for actions taken to stop the funding of Hamas by U.S. front organizations, and repeatedly defended convicted Palestinian Islamic Jihad operative Sami al-Arian, downplaying his jihadist exhortations and claiming that his prosecution was merely “political.”

As a well-known analyst of militant Islamist groups in the United States , I have been a target of a vicious smear campaign by organizations which are afraid of having the bright light of day shone on their words and deeds. For example, in December 2004, MPAC, published a “policy” paper titled “Counterproductive Counterterrorism,” in which more than 20 of the 48 pages were at their core a personal hit piece against me. And after failing to de-legitimize me through character assassination, MPAC is now threatening to silence me using the court system.

Legal action has become a mainstay of radical Islamist organizations seeking to intimidate and silence their critics. In September 2005, journalist Robert King, writing in the Indianapolis Star, outlined the strategy[6]:

Sayyid Syeed, the secretary general of ISNA (Islamic Society of North America), a group generally less vocal than CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relations), earlier in the weekend said his organization is considering filing defamation lawsuits against some of its sharpest critics.

King goes on to write that one of the potential targets frequently cited by America ’s Muslim leaders is yours truly. And why is that? Because I have spent more than a decade exposing radical Islamists in the United States , many of whom are functioning in leadership capacities in these very groups in question. CAIR by the way, as King noted, has repeatedly taken to the courts, fortunately with very little success, to stifle criticism. Thankfully, the First Amendment protections granted by the U.S. Constitution do not favor this latest tactic employed by the Islamist groups.

MPAC cannot stand to have its agenda exposed, especially when it comes in the form of having its own words, and the words of its officials, used against them. In their minds, any such efforts need to be stifled. MPAC’s smear tactics have not worked, and as such, their lawyers have now stated that “MPAC is willing to pursue all available legal remedies” to silence me. MPAC’s bullying attempt to stifle free speech will not stand. Such tactics should be vigorously opposed, and MPAC, like CAIR before it, must learn that legal threats will not work to stifle legitimate criticism, especially when the facts underlying the criticism are both well documented, and as is often the case, straight out of the horse’s mouth, so to speak.

Notes:

[1] Aslam Abdullah, “The Truth Behind America’s War on Terrorism,” November 30, 2002, http://www.islamonline.net/livedialogue/english/Browse.asp?hGuestID=Og1n6h.

[2] Amantha Perera, “US Muslims Fear Second Term for Patriot Act,” Inter Press Service, May 7, 2004.

[3] “Relief Groups Shut Down,” The Minaret, January 2002.

[4] H.G. Reza, “FBI Has a Pledge and a Request for Muslims,” The Los Angeles Times, March 16, 2003.

[5] Stewart Bell, “Jihadization of youth a 'rapid process'; CSIS: Study Of Extremism,” National Post, January 26, 2007. http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=25e76872-b309-47a7-841b-938bdd9ffd71

[6] Robert King, “Muslims aim to challenge critics in America ; Convention seminar focuses on best ways for followers to respond when their faith is attacked,” Indianapolis Star, September 5, 2005, http://www.faithfreedom.org/oped/RobertKing50905.htm



Source: http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/015654.php

[nw_arizona_granny]

Terror Attacks Perpetrated by Terrorists Freed From Prison (back)



March 14, 2007

by Hillel Fendel

The Almagor Terrorist Victims Association has published a report on the results of Israel 's release of imprisoned terrorists in prisoner exchanges. At least 30 recent terror attacks were perpetrated by terrorists who were released from Israeli jails.

Almagor conducted and published the report Iight of the apparent intention to release terrorists 'without blood on their hands' - i.e., terrorists who did not succeed in murdering their victims - in exchange for one or more of the three kidnapped soldiers. Eldad Regev and Udi Goldwasser were kidnapped by Hamas nine months ago, and Gilad Shalit was kidnapped by Hamas two weeks earlier; Shalit is believed to be alive, but no positive sign has been heard from the others.

'It should be emphasized,' the Almagor report states, 'that the term 'without blood on their hands' portrays these terrorists as less dangerous - but in fact they are 'without blood on their hands' only because the Israeli security services managed to arrest them before they could murder, or because they were indirectly involved in murder, or the like. In actuality, they would be quite happy to be 'with blood on their hands.''

The 30 attacks perpetrated in recent years by terrorists freed in prisoner exchanges or otherwise killed no fewer than 177 innocent citizens, mostly Israeli Jews. Many were also serious wounded.

Almagor has found that a clear majority of freed terrorists returned to terrorism after their release - 'leading to a price in human life many times greater than the grave difficulties faced by a given individual family.'

'We therefore call upon the Israeli public,' Almagor states, 'not to be led astray by word games that make light of the terrorists' murderous intentions, and not to comfort ourselves with the hope that the next attack won't hit us or those close to us. We, victims of terrorism, know from our own bitter experience that for us, these were false illusions. As soon as the Tenenbaum exchange was completed [in Jan. 2004, when Israel released over 400 Arab prisoners in return for hostage Elchanan Tenenbaum and the bodies of three Israeli soldiers murdered by Hizbullah - ed.], Hizbullah began planning its next kidnapping - the results of which we all experienced in the war last summer. We call upon the public to totally oppose these vain and lethal exchanges, despite the emotional difficulties.'

Almagor's findings:
Between 1993 and 1999, 6,912 terrorists were freed. As of August 2003, 854 of them (12.4%) had been re-arrested for murderous activity. Another two-thirds of them returned to terrorist activity, be it in capacities of command, training or actual perpetration of attacks.

Among the attacks perpetrated by freed terrorists were:
* the lynching of two soldiers in Ramallah (Oct. 2000)
* shooting deaths of Binyamin and Talia Kahane (Dec. 2000)
* suicide explosions in Netanya, 8 dead (March and May, 2001)
* Sea Food Market suicide blast, 3 dead (March 2002)
* shooting in Atzmona yeshiva, 5 youths dead (March 2002)
* Park Hotel suicide bomber during Passover Seder, 30 dead (March 2002)
* bus blasts at Megiddo, Karkur, Jerusalem, 55 dead (June 2002 - June 2003)
* double suicide attacks in Be'er Sheva, 16 dead (August 2004)

Among the terrorists imprisoned and later released by Israel who were responsible for the above and other attacks are:
Marwan Barghouti - originally arrested in 1976; released; a leader of the first intifada; arrested and expelled to Jordan; allowed to return in 1994; became Tanzim terrorist leader in 2000, overseeing many terrorist attacks involving the murder of some 35 Israelis; arrested in 2002, sentenced to five life sentences; PA demands his release - Shabak objects.

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin - originally arrested in 1983; released a year later in the Jibril exchange; founded Hamas in 1987; arrested for ordering the kidnapping and killing of two soldiers and sentenced to life in prison; released in 1997, after the botched assassination of Khaled Mashaal; continued to organize terrorist attacks; killed by Israeli rockets in 2004.

Saleh Shehade - released from prison in 2000; headed the Hamas military wing; oversaw many attacks, including the infiltration into an IDF outpost in which four soldiers were murdered and the Atmonah murder of five youths; killed in IDF air attack in 2002.

Abdullah Abdel Kader Kawasme - first arrested in 1988; expelled to Lebanon in 1992; after his return, imprisoned again for Hamas membership and terrorist activity; released in 1994; oversaw many terror attacks, including over 40 deaths, and became known as 'Father of the Ticking Time Bombs; killed by Israeli forces while trying to escape arrest in June 2003.

Karim Yunis Awis - sentenced to life in 1991 for killing informant; released several years later as part of the 'gestures' to Palestinian Authority; dispatched two terrorists to murder two Israelis in Afula bus station in November 2001; dispatched terrorists to murder three Israelis in Jerusalem in March 2002; later that year, an IDF Military Court ruled that 'the gesture [of his release] was not justified, and the heavy price was paid by many Israeli families.'

Nasser Abu Hameid - arrested several times, sentenced to life in prison in 1990 for murdering informants; released in 1999 in the framework of the Sharm a-Sheikh agreement; Dec. 2000 - murdered Eli Cohen near Givat Ze'ev and the Kahane couple near Ofrah; Feb. 2002 - initiated two murderous attacks in Jerusalem area; Dec. 2002 -sentenced to seven life sentences.

Abbas Mahmad Alsid - imprisoned for leading riots in Tul Karem in 1993; released in 1996; convicted in 2003 of overseeing the Park Hotel massacre and other attacks.

Matsab Hashalmon - imprisoned in 2003 for terrorist organization membership; freed in 2004 in Tenenbaum exchange; oversaw double suicide attack in Be'er Sheva; now in Israeli prison.

Iad Sawalha - 1992 - imprisoned for involvement in murder of informants; 1993 - freed as part of Oslo prisoner exchange deals; June '92 - organized suicide terrorist who blew up bus in Jezreel Valley , killing 17; Nov. '02 - killed by IDF forces in Jenin.

Nidal Salameh - freed from prison as part of exchanges of 1999; later headed terrorist group in southern Gaza ; oversaw many attacks; killed in IDF operation in April '03.



Source: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/121845

[nw_arizona_granny]

JIHAD IN INDIA : A Conference in Florida Report (back)



March 14, 2007

by Narain Kataria

A three day Conference starting March 5, 2007 in the city of St. Petersburg , Florida , United States was organized by Intelligence Summit, a non-partisan, non-profit educational forum. Intelligence Summit website has recently surpassed in popularity even the Jane’s Weekly, the most widely read source of intelligence news in the world. In this Conference Maj. Gen. Paul E. Valley, Deputy Commanding General, US Army (Retd.), Gen. Thomas G. McInerney USAF (Retd.), Cmdr. Richard Marcinko, USN (Retd.), and many other former CIA officials, counter-terrorism experts, and experts on Islamic studies participated in deliberations and enlightened the audience about the danger posed to the humanity at large by radical Islam, political Islam, Islamo-fascism, Wahabi Islam, or by whatever name you call them. Some of the topics discussed at length in the Conference were as under:

§ Can radical Islam escape the opprobrium that it is systematically using the violence, threat, murder and terrorism to establish the Islamic Law called Sharia all over the word?

§ Is the existential threat to humanity from the political Islam real?

§ Will the rising Muslim population in regions like India , European Union and United States ultimately transmogrify the decent and civilized people into suicide bombers prepared to kill all of us?

§ Is the doctrine of Jihad really meant for the purpose of purifying one’s inner self only, as expounded selectively by the apologists of Islam all over?

§ Or, is the Jihad a doctrine of permanent military warfare eventually to annihilate infidels and to subjugate them completely?

§ Is there any way out to mitigate the effects of this hateful ideology that not only instigates but literally commands its followers to kill others in the name of Allah? § Should the civilized nations insist on the doctrine of reciprocity while dealing with Islamic nations?

§ Are the concepts of Dar-ul-Islam (Islamic country) and Dar-ul-Harb (Enemy country) at the root of Islamic terrorism? § Is the Far Left media hand in gloves with the Jihadists?

§ Is the 145-million strong Islamic nation Pakistan which is already armed with the nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver these weapons more dangerous than Iran ? § Can the sanctimonious rhetoric of Pakistan that she is an ally on ‘fighting the war on terrorism’ be relied upon at its face value?

§ Is Pakistan actually becoming a safe sanctuary for the terrorists, as often reported? § Will Bangladesh also, in not too distant future, turn into the next global epicenter of the Islamic terrorism?

§ Will the pervasive prevarication of the political class and its willful malfeasance embolden the political Islam, and ultimately ruin all of us? Officials of the Indian American Intellectuals Forum of New York were invited by the Intelligence Summit to speak on 'Indian Experience with Jihadists'.

In a small get together of VIPs, the President of IAIF, Mr. Narain Kataria, Senior Vice President Mr. Arish Sahani and the Board Member Mr. Mohinder Singh Gulati, brought to the attention of Gen. McInerney the duplicitous, deceitful and disingenuous role played by Pakistan’s Gen. Musharraf in the war on terror. They elaborated the terrorist activities conducted by ISI and Far Left militants in collusion with the sleeping cells in the region, and the unparalleled atrocities perpetrated by Islamic invaders in the past on peaceful Hindus.

Gen. McInerney expressed confidence that a very powerful action would take place at an appropriate time which would eliminate terrorism completely from the Earth. In the Conference deliberations, Dr. Babu Suseelan, a Board Member of Indian American Intellectuals Forum and a well-known Hindu scholar presented the Hindu view point to the Conference delegates covering India ’s past and present History. Hindu View Point on the Islamic Terrorism Addressing the gathering, Dr. Suseelan said: 'In the first instance, it gives me great pleasure to thank all of you for giving me an opportunity to present before this august body the Hindu views relating to their Experience with the Islamic Jihadists of Indian subcontinent. 'I am a firm believer in Hinduism, the ancient civilization of India , with more than one billion adherents. We Hindu people believe in the peaceful coexistence with all cultures and religions on the globe. Hindu people, in the past known history, never went out of their country to attack, loot, rape and forcibly convert other nations to their way of thinking. We have maintained this civilized tradition for almost 6000 years. India like United States , has always given unconditional shelter to the tired, sick and persecuted people from other countries. India has provided the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, equality and justice to all. India is, probably, the only country in the world where Jewish people were never persecuted. As recently as in 1950, India gave shelter to Dalai Lama and thousands of his followers who were driven from their native land, Tibet , by the Communist China.

To the bewilderment, dismay and shock of the audience, Dr. Suseelan poignantly described the cruelties that were perpetrated on hapless Hindus during the long Islamic rule as under: 'The barbarity, the butchering, the savagery practiced by the practitioners of Islam were so extreme in nature, so enormous in scope, so stark in reality, so brutal in action that they demand eternal condemnation from the civilized world. The utter vandalization of India under the Islamic rule continued for a long period of 600 years. There is a deep stamp of hatred and Islamic vengeance in each and every city all over the country in India .'

Tracing the history of India , Dr. Suseelan narrated: 'Before the advent of Islam , Afghanistan was a Buddhist nation. To safeguard their ancestral religion and beliefs, the brave people of Afghanistan confronted the brutal Islamic invaders for 300 years but finally were defeated and, then, Islamized. After converting to Islam, the same non-violent Buddhists eventually turned into the Talibans of today. They took to terrorism and even destroyed the centuries old priceless statues of Bamyan Buddhas.

In 1990, these fanatics forcibly drove out or converted the 50,000 Hindu-Sikh minority population of Afghanistan .' Quoting Mr. M.A. Khan of Islamic Watch, Dr. Suseelan said: 'Eleventh century saw the barbaric assault of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni on India . Mahmud’s army slaughtered 15,000 fighting men in what they described as the ‘splendid action’ before capturing 500,000 men and women as slaves. The barbarity and cruelty of Sultan Mahmud was proudly and vividly described by contemporary Muslim historians. In the attack on Thanesar, ‘the blood of the infidels flowed so copiously that the stream was discolored and the people were unable to drink it’.

Mahmud attacked and destroyed the famed Somnath temple in the Western India and massacred over 50,000 Hindus guarding the temple. 'Sultan Allauddin Khaliji (1296-1316) attacked Chittor in the present Rajasthan State and killed 30,000 people in cold blood. No wonder that 50,000 slave boys were engaged in his personal services and 70,000 slaves worked continuously in his buildings. Firoz Tughlaq, who ascended the throne in 1351, killed another 180,000 Hindus in Bengal and erected the infamous ‘ Tower of Skulls .’ '

As recently as 1946, the Muslims slaughtered more than 5,000 Hindus in Kolkata in one day alone and threatened Hindus at large that this action would be repeated in all the major Indian cities if Hindus refused to the partitioning of India ; this ultimately was agreed upon. In 1947, India was divided into the Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. Hindus mistakenly believed that by agreeing to the separate Muslim Pakistan their problems with the Islam would be over. 'But in Pakistan , the worst reign of repression awaited the minority Hindus. Millions of them were uprooted, butchered and slaughtered like chicken and goats. Hundred of thousands of Hindu girls were kidnapped. Their chastity violated, they were raped and forcibly married to Muslims.

'Muslims ethnically cleansed the entire Hindu-Sikh population from Pakistan , the land they got from partitioning of the historic India . They systematically used all official machinery and resources to reduce the Hindu population to merely 2% from its earlier 20% in 1947. ' Bangladesh is another perfect example of the ethnic cleansing. Its population of Hindu-Buddhists-Christians was about 39% in 1947.

During the 1971 India-Pakistan war, Hindus were the prime target of genocide and gang rape by Islamic Pakistani army. In a period of nine months, three million people were mercilessly murdered by Pakistan army, of which more than 80% were Hindus. From then on, the covert and overt assault on Hindus continued relentlessly. Three hundred thousand girls were raped, out of which 95% were Hindu girls. Over ten million Hindu refugees took shelter in India . 'The slaughter of Hindus in subcontinent continued and the world remained unperturbed.

In 1990, more than 400,000 Hindus were forcibly driven from the Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir region by the Jihadists that were militarily trained and funded by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, ISI (Inter Services Intelligence).'

There are articles in Koran which enjoin on Muslims as under: 'O Prophet! Make war against the unbelievers and the hypocrites and be unyielding to them; and their abode is hell, and evil is the destination.' And in 8:12, the Koran says, 'I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve. Therefore strike off their heads and strike off every fingertip of them.' The big question that still remains is: 'Have these Koranic injunctions on Muslims outlived their utility? Is it not possible to adequately modify the above religious teachings in Islam so as to suit the needs of modern civilization,' quipped Dr. Suseelan.

The Rising Muslim Population in South Asia, the Greatest Danger to the World In South Asia the number of Muslims at this time is as under: India 150 million, Pakistan 145 million, Bangladesh 140 million and Afghanistan 16 million. Thus the total number of Islamic people in the region is about 450 million; one and half time the US population. South Asia is sitting on a tinder box. Hindus alone will not be able to stem the wrath of ferocious brutes. Hence the cooperation between India , Israel and United States is absolutely essential to save the world from the impending doom and imminent disaster.

It is difficult for a civilized person to understand the Muslim psyche. Hindus foolishly thought that by conceding to the demand for Pakistan , they could buy peace with the Muslims. They were one hundred percent wrong. Now Islamic Pakistan and Muslims are aiming at the separation of Kashmir from India . It is a matter of great regret that many Hindu scholars, particularly the Far Left Liberals in India , still fondly believe that coexistence with Islamic people is possible! Why the converts to Islam ultimately end up being the terrorists?

Appealing to the top-notch experts on the counter-terrorism, Dr. Suseelan asked them to ponder over the question as to why the converts to Islam become violent and fanatic and kill the innocent people without any remorse. Is there something in their religious scriptures which motivates them to kill in the name of Allah?

Dhiren Barot, a Hindu convert to Islam, became Al Qaeda’s top operative. His Islamic name is Abu Musa al-Hindi. He traveled to Pakistan for terrorist training in 1995. He has written a book 'The Army of Medina in Kashmir .' In this book, he has described in detail as to how to kill the Indian army in Kashmir . He conducted a good amount of research work in the field of radiological weapons which he wanted to use in the terrorist attacks on New York Stock Exchange, International Monetary Fund Headquarters, World Bank, etc.

Adam Gadahn, an American, converted to Islam at the age of seventeen rose to the position of top operative of Al Qaeda operations. In one of his speeches in 2005, he said: 'We love slitting the throats of Infidels.' He invited Americans to convert to Islam before it is too late. He praised the attackers of the World Trade Center as 'dedicated, strong-willed and motivated individuals.' His Islamic name is Azzam al-Amriki (Azzam the American).

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Father of Pakistan, was grand child of a Hindu and very secular at heart. But when he came in contact with Imams (Muslim priests), he became a dangerously fanatic Muslim and broke India into two pieces. The current ground situation in the South Asia is fraught with dangerous consequences. There has been an astronomical rise in Islamic fundamentalism in India . Islamists, in democratic societies like India , exploit the vulnerabilities of constitutional governance to the hilt. Almost all the Hindu leaders in India are facing death threats from the Islamic extremists. Muslims use chicanery, stratagem and subterfuge to beat the democratic system. Imam of Ghaziabad district in India has appealed to Muslims to adopt the Sharia law to settle their dispute. In February, 2007, the State Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir passed a bill bringing the country's only Muslim-majority state in the ambit of Sharia laws. Moved as a private member's bill from the Opposition leader Abdul Rahim, the House passed the legislation by a voice vote without any dissent.

Hindu leaders killed in India

The India Government at this time is so wracked of Islamic rowdies that two days after the Mumbai bombings in July 2006 -- that killed more than 180 people -- the government of India issued a directive banning 17 websites that were critical of Muslim misdeeds. These websites were singled out because, according to the Indian government, they might incite religious violence. The nine American websites banned by India are all critical of the Islamist movement. Shockingly enough, not a single website of the Islamic extremists justifying -- and even celebrating -- the Mumbai bombings was banned. According to Mr. Fitzgerald of the 'Jihad Watch,' 60 to 70 million Hindus were killed by Islamic Jihadists (http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/015399.php#more). However, it is a matter of disgrace that no Hindu leader in India ever broaches on this subject. Actuated by a desire to crush and obliterate the Hindu people in India , an overt and covert war has been unleashed by Jihadists on them. The aim is to frighten them into submission and push them into the vortex of pan-Islamic movement. Islamic communalism has taken a fatal turn in Bihar and U.P. -- two of the biggest -- provinces in India .

According to Pramod Kumar, a renowned Indian journalist, more than three dozen Hindu leaders have recently been eliminated by the Islamists. Hindu leaders are murdered in the broad daylight by Islamic goons. Mr. Sukhanand Shetty was murdered by Islamic fundamentalists in Dec. 2006. In January, one Hindu leader Mr. Ravindran was brutally murdered by Jihadists. On February 12, one Hindu Mr. V.K. Shaju was attacked and killed. In Assam more than 60 Hindus were killed by a separatists group in North East India allegedly supported and trained by Bangladeshi intelligence. One Muslim scholar Mr. Tawfik Hamid loudly declared in the Conference that the militant Islam is a cancerous disease and has to be eradicated. 'We have to liquidate this mindset, or else it would wipe us out,' thundered Mr. Hamid amidst a great ovation. Dr. Suseelan spoke with volcanic intensity for about an hour and won accolades of the audience. In the end, Dr. Suseelan fervently appealed to the global experts on counter-terrorism and Islamic studies to emerge from torpor, come out openly to denounce the ideology of savagery and hate. The need of the hour is the leaders with farsightedness, perspicacity and Machiavellian steeliness to them who can find the lasting solution to the fast spreading menace of Islamic terrorism in the world.



Source: Unknown, from a newsletter

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U.K.: The Concern over Tablighi Jamaat (back)



February 20, 2007

Summary

The proposed construction in East London of a sprawling mosque complex by the Tablighi Jamaat (Propagators of the Faith) -- a proselytizing group with suspected ties to radical and extremist Islamist organizations -- has raised concerns in the United Kingdom that the complex could serve as a center for jihadist recruitment. However, although the organization could unintentionally serve as a front for, or strong conduit to, organizations such as al Qaeda, it would be incorrect to assume that the Tablighis act willingly as a global unified jihadist recruiting arm.

Analysis

The proposed construction in east London of a 17-acre, 70,000-person-capacity mosque complex by the Tablighi Jamaat (Propagators of the Faith) -- a proselytizing group with suspected ties to radical and extremist Islamist organizations -- has raised concerns in the United Kingdom that the complex could serve as a center for jihadist recruitment. The concerns have been exacerbated by the fact that at least one of the men charged in the plot to kidnap, torture and kill a British Muslim soldier in Birmingham , England , attended the Tablighi-run Hamza mosque in the Sparkhill area of Birmingham . Although much of the fear and suspicion is excessive, such a massive complex could indeed attract some Islamist extremists.

Tablighi Jamaat, established in Mewat , India , in 1927, stems from the Deobandi brand of the Hanafi Sunni school of jurisprudence in the region. Operating as what it says is an apolitical, pietistic organization, Tablighi Jamaat sends missionaries across the globe on proselytizing missions to bring wayward Muslims back to more orthodox practices of Islam.

The Tablighis, mostly Urdu-speaking and of South Asian origin, operate in 150 countries and have 70 million to 80 million active followers, making them the largest extant Muslim group. The group's mission is to work at a grassroots level, reaching out to Muslims across the social and economic spectrum. The Tablighis do not solicit or receive donations, but rather are largely funded by senior members.

At face value, Tablighi Jamaat is a peaceful, egalitarian and devotional movement that stresses individual faith and overall spiritual development. Some Islamist groups, in fact, refer to the Tablighis as 'Muslim Jehovah's Witnesses.'

While the Tablighis say they follow a peaceful agenda, however, there is speculation that the organization serves as a de facto conduit for Islamist extremists and for groups such as al Qaeda. Upon joining the group, Tablighi recruits are given the option of attending the Tablighi center in the Pakistani city of Raiwind , near Lahore , Pakistan , for four months of additional religious training. Once the recruits are in Pakistan , representatives of various Islamist groups, such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba and al Qaeda, are said to woo them actively -- to the point of offering them military training. And some of them accept the offer.

Little is known about Tablighi Jamaat's organizational hierarchy because the group operates under a veil of secrecy. What is known, however, is that a purported militant offshoot, Jihad bin Saif (Jihad through the Sword), was established in Taxila, Pakistan, and that members of this group were accused of plotting a coup against former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1995. Yet, because of the organization's extreme secrecy, little is known about its offshoot other than it most likely developed in reaction to Tablighi Jamaat's apolitical, peaceful stance. Evidence does point to an indirect connection between the group and the wider radical/extremist Deobandi nexus composed of anti-Shiite sectarian groups, Kashmiri militants and the Taliban. This link provides the medium through which Tablighis who are disgruntled with the group's apolitical program could break orbit and join militant organizations.

However, U.S. and British intelligence authorities, citing a number of cases, contend that the Tablighis have direct ties to al Qaeda. For instance, at least two of the suicide bombers who attacked the London Underground on July 7, 2005, had worshipped at the Tablighi-run Markazi mosque in Dewsbury, West Yorkshire (the group's European headquarters). Additionally, several of those arrested Aug. 9, 2006, in connection with an alleged plot to blow up airliners en route from London to the United States had attended Tablighi study sessions in the United Kingdom, while failed 'shoe bomber' Richard Reid is known to have Tablighi associations.

Then there is the connection to the Tablighi-run Hamza mosque by at least one of the suspects in the plot to behead a Muslim soldier in Britain -- though there are claims that most of the nine suspects in the case had attended the mosque. Also, according to French intelligence reports, up to 80 percent of Islamist extremists in France have passed through the Tablighi system at some point. These supposed links are not limited to Europe . By some estimates, Tablighi Jamaat has a 50,000-strong following in the United States . Indeed, Tablighi mosques currently operate in several U.S. States, including California , Texas and New York , while the Al-Falah mosque in the Corona area of Queens , N.Y. , apparently is the group's North American headquarters. John Walker Lindh traveled with Tablighi preachers to Pakistan in 1998 to further his Islamic studies before joining the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan .

Also, the Buffalo cell, otherwise known as the Lackawanna Six, that was convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda and the Oregon cell that conspired to bomb a synagogue and was charged with providing material support to al Qaeda were both involved in Tablighi missionaries.

Despite these apparent links, however, the idea that Tablighi Jamaat serves as a de facto factory for churning out al Qaeda recruits -- or any other Islamist fundamentalist organizations for that matter -- is disputable. For instance, the Tablighis face severe criticism from Deobandi Islamists for their apolitical stance regarding the war on terrorism, which many Muslims perceived as a war against Islam. And orthodox groups, such as Sunni Wahhabis, strongly disagree with the organization's practice of innovation in Islam.

In fact, fundamentalists who go on to join the ranks of jihadist groups are almost always among those who disagree with Tablighi Jamaat's benign intentions and political neutrality. Despite the growing concern among British officials over the proposed construction of the mosque complex in London -- which some local media are calling an 'Islamic village' -- the stated purpose of the facility is to provide an Islamic center for the 2012 Olympic Games.

Although the group promotes a benign apolitical message, the same conservative Islamic values espoused by the Tablighis are also part of jihadist ideology -- and so some Muslims attracted to the Tablighi movement could be enticed into becoming involved with jihadists. However, although the organization could unintentionally serve as a front for, or strong conduit to, organizations such as al Qaeda, it would be incorrect to assume that the Tablighis act willingly as a global unified jihadist recruiting arm.



Source: http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=284592

[nw_arizona_granny]

March 17, 2007 Anti-Terrorism News

(Iraq) Suicide chlorine bombers kill eight - 85 ill - two suicide
bombers driving tanks filled with chlorine in Falluja; second bomber targed
tribal leader opposed to Al-Qaeda
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21400302-1702,00.html
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070317/wl_nm/iraq_falluja_dc_1;_ylt=Am3U8QHLg5ROhn3CzcIktR1X6GMA

(Iraq) 2 Iraqi police killed by roadside bombs
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070317/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_violence_1;_ylt=AnrnC07oPI7SdUUSS43NfcZX6GMA
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/focusoniraq/2007/March/focusoniraq_March119.xml&section=focusoniraq

US rushes division into Iraq
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21397626-1702,00.html

(Afghanistan) Suicide Bomber slays child in Afghanistan
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070317/ap_on_re_as/afghanistan_1;_ylt=Ao6qrtS83jTYUQOrJUBH6FXOVooA
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-03/17/content_5860559.htm

(Afghanistan) Taliban attack NATO convoy, several Afghans hurt
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/subcontinent/2007/March/subcontinent_March673.xml&section=subcontinent&col=

(Afghanistan) Taliban extend Italian hostage deadline
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/subcontinent/2007/March/subcontinent_March666.xml&section=subcontinent

Turkish Police Raids Net 39 Al-Qaeda Members; Police Find Al-Qaeda
Pledge in Turkish School
http://www.thememriblog.org/blog_personal/en/953.htm

(Pakistan) Three blasts in Quetta
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\03\17\story_17-3-2007_pg7_22

(Pakistan) Bhutto warns of Taliban threat to Pakistan
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/subcontinent/2007/March/subcontinent_March669.xml&section=subcontinent&col=

(Pakistan) Riots push Pakistan towards political crisis - Musharraf's
dismissal of chief justice "serious miscalculation"
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/03/16/wpakistan216.xml

(Palestinian) Fatah Al-Islam: New Islamist Group Denies Al-Qaeda Link
http://www.playfuls.com/news_10_19530-Fatah-Al-Islam-New-Islamist-Group-Denies-Al-Qaeda-Link.html

Palestinian unity cabinet to be approved
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070317/wl_nm/palestinians_dc_2;_ylt=Al.884V4GKpqr7LJUJBNftQUvioA

(Israel) IDF troops find 2 pipe bombs in Palestinian's car
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1173879102721&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

Israel rejects new Palestinian unity government
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2007/March/middleeast_March260.xml&section=middleeast&col=

Syria's Muslim Brotherhood calls on Assad to quit
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2007/March/middleeast_March256.xml&section=middleeast

(US) Pearl's widow unmoved by Khalid’s confession
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/theworld/2007/March/theworld_March476.xml&section=theworld

(US) Update: Probe of Al-Qaeda Leader's Handling Sought - Senators Urge
Inquiry After Khalid Sheik Mohammed Alleges Abuse -- Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/16/AR2007031602033.html

Indian Muslim group calls for beheading of writer Taslima Nasreen
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070317/wl_sthasia_afp/indiareligionculturenasreenbangladeshcrime_070317084710;_ylt=AuSNcIOPK2c9AHdshfSQfQNA7AkB

India vows crackdown on Maoist rebels after police killings
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070317/wl_sthasia_afp/indiaunrestmaoists_070317062127;_ylt=ArsnslwUmjgBrm_Io3GHbghA7AkB

(Thailand) Massacre suspects in custody - 14 suspects arrested for Thai
south minibus attack
http://www.bangkokpost.com/News/17Mar2007_news01.php
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17234339/

Thailand mulls expanding curfew in restive Muslim south
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070317/wl_afp/thailandsouthunrestcurfew_070317070622;_ylt=AkHm7jwWnv1En05NI_ksQN_uNREB

(Thailand) Violence continues in Thai South despite curfew
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-03/16/content_5858391.htm

(Thailand) Arrest warrant out for New Year's Eve suspect
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/03/17/national/national_30029533.php

Indonesian Militant "Condemns Bombings" - Jemaah Islamiyah leader
declined to directly condemn 2002 Bali bombings and other attacks
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17658759/

(UK) Uproar over IRA bomb as 'best thing for city' - British Labour MP
who said the IRA bomb in Manchester was "the best thing to happen to
the city"
http://www.unison.ie/irish_independent/stories.php3?ca=9&si=1795949&issue_id=15386

(UK) 'BBC Arabic Service anti-western'
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/03/17/wbeeb17.xml

(UK July 21 Bomb Trial) It wasn't a bomb, I was just making a protest,
says the "21/7 ringleader"
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article1527815.ece

(UK July 21 Bomb Trial) I didn't want to kill anyone, says London bomb
plot accused
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/03/17/nterr17.xml

Colombians want Chiquita banana execs extradited
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070317/ap_on_re_eu/colombia_terrorism_bananas_3;_ylt=AmyXfje7j8y.lyuy11Up512wv7kA

Somalia: Islamists return to Jubba following Ethiopian pullout
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Islamists_return_to_Jubba_following_Ethiopian_pullout.shtml

(Sudan) Commentary: When Muslims ignore the Prophet -- regarding Darfur
killings
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article1528008.ece

Insurance data shows global terror rising
http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view.php?StoryID=20070316-115214-6944r

France extradites two ETA members to Spain
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-03/17/content_5859773.htm

Sri Lanka toll climbs amid heavy shelling
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070317/wl_afp/srilankaunrestattack_070317045003;_ylt=AjWOf7Nq8G7IXEh0coTMDK4tM8oA

Sri Lanka seeks US pressure on LTTE funds
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/subcontinent/2007/March/subcontinent_March668.xml&section=subcontinent&col=

North Korea demands unfreezing of $25 million - Envoy says Pyongyang
won't stop nuclear activity until funds are released
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17658737/

WND Report: Bin Laden capture forecast
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=54741

Analysis: Note to FBI: Remember Canadian Terror Plot & Beslan School
Massacre
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/03/note_to_fbi_remember_canadian.php


Other News:

Muslim nations set up US forum to discuss concerns - Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC)
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\03\17\story_17-3-2007_pg7_1

Islamic Republic of Iran News Network (IRINN TV) on '300': 'Zionist
Warner Company' Propaganda Against Iran
http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD150607

Iran Is Playing a Growing Role in Iraq Economy
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/17/world/middleeast/17iran.html?hp

Iran ready to help Pakistan generate power
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\03\17\story_17-3-2007_pg7_20

[nw_arizona_granny]

Russia issues warning to ‘rogue’ EU airline s

http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=138541&version=1&template_id=39&parent_id=21

Russia issues warning to ‘rogue’ EU airlines
Published: Saturday, 17 March, 2007, 08:58 AM Doha Time

MOSCOW: Russia is threatening to close its air space to EU airlines
which continue to breach safety regulations, Russian news agencies
reported yesterday, quoting the federal air navigation regulator.
The regulator did not name the companies alleged to have breached the
rules, saying it did not want to “compromise their reputation”. It
said
that the breaches arose from a “lack of discipline” and poor
training of
pilots.
The agency had written to the European civil aviation conference asking
the European Union to take “urgent measures” to improve control of
flights through Russian air space.
The complaint was based on a study of flights in the Moscow area
between
June 2006 and February 2007 which showed that the airlines had breached
air traffic procedures on 18 occasions and on five occasions flew over
“forbidden zones”.
The letter was from the head of the Russian federal air navigation
agency Alexander Neradko to the president of European civil aviation
conference Michel Wachenheim.
It said that if European air authorities “do not take adequate
measures
immediately to deal with this situation”, the Russian agency would be
“obliged to refuse to grant flight clearance for flights over Russia
by
airlines” which had breached the rules.
European Commission transport spokesman Michele Cercone said the EU’s
executive arm had received no official report or letter on the matter
from the Russian side and so could not comment.
“All I’ve seen so far have been reports in the press indicating
that the
Russian authorities appear to be concerned about a number of cases of
European airlines flying their aircraft either too high or too low,”
he
told a press conference in Brussels. – AFP

[nw_arizona_granny]

Russia to build 3 nuclear plants each year from 2016

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200703/17/eng20070317_358586.html

13:49, March 17, 2007
Russia to build 3 nuclear plants each year from 2016

Russia will be laying the foundation of three nuclear power plant units
per year starting from 2016, and four starting from 2018-2020, head of
Federal Atomic Energy Agency Sergei Kiriyenko said on Friday.

"Starting from 2016 we will be annually laying the foundation of three
units, and we will think about the fourth starting from 2018-2020,"
Kiriyenko was quoted by the Itar-Tass news agency as saying after a
Friday meeting of the agency board chaired by First Vice-Premier Sergei
Ivanov.

The industry will speed up the construction of nuclear power plants
without governmental funding, Kiriyenko said. "We plan to enlarge the
construction of nuclear power plant units at our own expense," he said,
referring to the related program.

The Russian atomic energy industry will become self-supporting and
build
new units with its own funds by 2015, Ivanov said.

The government will allocate 674 billion rubles (26 billion U.S.
dollars) from the federal budget for the industry before 2015, which
will make it self-supporting, he said.

[nw_arizona_granny]

Pakistan: No Explanation From Authorities on Disruption of Phone, Internet Link

Pakistan: No Explanation From Authorities on Disruption of Phone, Internet Link

Words within double slantlines in English

Originally published on 3/16/2007 by Geo TV (Internet Version-WWW) in Urdu

Internet and telephone service has been partially restored in various cities including Islamabad. To know more about it we have contacted our correspondent Zubair Qasuri:

[Begin recording] [Anchor Salman Hasan] Yes Zubair what is the //update// with you.

[Qasuri] Salman, let me tell you that it has been going on for the last two hours. Initially it was a total breakdown. Then the internet and telephone was restored, was disrupted again, and then restored again. So far we have not been able to find out [the reason]. We have tried to contact the heads and technical staff of the mobile phone companies and internet companies. They are saying that whatever is happening is going on without any prior information and the high officials of the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Limited [PTCL] have not given any reason. At times they say a fault has developed in Shikarpur and at other times they say it is a fault in Karachi.

Meanwhile, let me tell you that the //traffic// from Lahore also remained suspended for a while. We tried to make calls from Lahore to Karachi but that was suspended. Let me tell you about the technical [aspect] once again that the PTCL maintains a ring. If a call is disrupted from one side they can link it up from the other side but at this time the technical people in PTCL say that the ring was completely blocked because of which our contact with Karachi, Dubayy and the whole world has been cut off.

Meanwhile, all the call centers all over the country, which provide international call services, are closed. Services of internet companies are badly disrupted. Internet service could not be restored and the PTCL people have not given any credible explanation of it. Let me also inform you that the mobile phone companies can contact each other within the //limits of// Islamabad but they are unable to send messages outside of Islamabad. My call also could be connected after continuous efforts in the past two hours. The call got connected //by chance//. The link has been restored a little while ago. But the chiefs of mobile phone companies and internet companies say that they have not been given any information about the situation while their consumers are extremely upset. Yes Salman.

[Hasan] Thank you very much Zubair Qasuri. [end recording]


: Karachi Geo TV in Urdu -- Website of 24-hour satellite news TV channel owned by Pakistan's Jang publishing group; root URL as of filing date: http://www.geo.tv

[nw_arizona_granny]

What's behind the American/European policy shift towards Syria?

By Salim Nazzal

Al-Jazeerah, March 17, 2007
http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20editorials/2007%20Opinion%20Editorials/March/17%20o/What's%20behind%20the%20American-European%20policy%20shift%20towards%20Syria%20By%20Salim%20Nazzal.htm


Last week's picture showing President Bashar Al-Assad confidently test-driving the prototype of the 'Sham' (name of historical Syria), soon to be the first Syrian-produced car, seemed to be a symbolic gesture intended to indicate Syria's increasing confidence. The later American /European pilgrimage to Syria shows that Assad perhaps has more reasons for this confidence than simply celebrating a new car model. In the past two years, Syria had suffered from American and European pressure, both in the form of Resolution 1559 and for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which, it was apparently hoped, would lead to a weakening of the Syrian position in the region as part of American efforts to weaken regional forces opposing US policy. Obviously, the very geopolitical position of Syria puts on it a number of challenges: its borders is made of America in the occupied Iraq, Israel in the occupied Palestine, the pro Us regime in Jordan and the pro US Saniora government in Lebanon, the result of this that only Turkey which too enjoy close contact with the Us and varying degrees friendship with Israel has become the only comfortable side for Syria. Yet Syria has perhaps learnt through years how to deal with these challenges especially during the long period of Hafiz Al-Assad who managed to turn Syria an important player in this complicated situation.


The Syrian media has extensively reflected on the recent shift in European and American policy towards Syria, considering this to be proof of the wisdom of its steadfast policy, which has ensured that Syria has not changed its anti-American/Israeli positions in regard to any of the three main issues in the Middle East.

The Syrian officials not only welcomed the American visit, but hoped, as Faisal Al-Miqdad, Syria's Deputy Foreign Minister put it, that such dialogue would be wide-ranging in debating inter-related regional problems. Yet it is not difficult to see that behind Al-Miqdad's words there is a sceptical Syrian position regarding the seriousness of this new American attitude, remembering all too well Bush's labeling of Syria as one of the 'Axis of Evil' countries, alongside North Korea and Iran.

However, despite what is perceived as the difference between the pragmatic Assad senior (1970-2000) who maintained reasonable ties with the US and the conservative Arab countries, now known, ironically, as the moderate Arab countries, and his son, who has taken a more critical position towards these regimes, it is difficult to ignore the fact that Syria has managed to survive and thrive, even under these pressures, and to return to a position of being a major player in the region, and one which, as the Irish foreign minister Dermot Aheren said, cannot be ignored.


The recognition of Syria's current position was obvious in last week's events, which demonstrate, in the view of some Arab observers, a development that can not be underestimated. The first noteworthy event was Syria's participation, apparently with American consent, in the Baghdad conference on Iraq. The second event was the visit of the US Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration, Ellen Sauerbrey to Damascus, ostensibly to discuss the situation of the approximately one million Iraqi refugees currently in Syria, who have fled there from Iraq since the American occupation in April 2003. Since Sauerbrey is the first prominent American official to visit Damascus since Richard Armitage's last visit in 2005 it is questionable, however, whether the wellbeing of the Iraqi refugees there was the only motive for her visit. Compare this, for instance, with the US's attitude to another politically important issue in its Middle East agenda; the US continues to blockade and impose sanctions on Palestine which has caused and continues to cause severe suffering there, and has shown no empathy with the besieged Palestinians. This demonstrates that the United States acts first and foremost according to its political agenda and its foreign office have certainly not become a charity organization.

The main issue engaging the political analysts in the region, therefore, is to understand the extent of and ultimate motives behind the recent American policy shift, especially since Sauerbrey's visit coincided with Javier Solana's, with the EU foreign policy chief representing the European Union. As was publicly declared, Solana's visit is supported by major European countries, in a further indication, as some observers see it, of changing attitudes in Europe towards dialogue with Syria. These observers see the French position as reflecting that change; last year French leaders were annoyed at the visit of some European foreign ministers to Syria, while France now expresses its full support for Solana's diplomatic efforts.

Muhammad Al-Zubaidi, a veteran Palestinian politician well-acquainted with the Syrian political scene, warns against what he describes as over-optimism at such meetings. >From his perspective, nothing has changed in the situation regarding the three primary Middle Eastern problems, Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon, to raise expectations unduly. The USA and Europe still accuse Syria of providing support to the resistance movements in these countries. Al-Zubaidi postulates that the recent political moves are being made by Bush as a tactical step to win the support of the "Iraq study group" which, to find an honorable exit for the Americans bogged down in Iraq, advocates opening dialogue with Syria and Iran. Bush desperately needs the support of the Democrats and the sceptical Republicans in Congress to continue his policy of sending more soldiers to Iraq and probably to bomb Iran. Last week's speech by the American military commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, insisting that there is no military solution to events there, has given more support to the increasing skepticism among senior American politicians about the war in Iraq, contradicting the arrogant and hubristic language of the neoconservative team during the invasion. If there is a relation between the shifts in American and European policy towards Syria, Al-Zubaidi is unsure whether these policy shifts were consciously coordinated, but since Europe has not so far adopted any independent policy stance towards the Middle East, it is hard to believe that such a change in attitude is entirely unrelated to the change in the Americans' approach, even if the two were not systematically coordinated.

In the view of more sceptical observers, the American and the European policy change towards Syria is an attempt to isolate Syria from Iran at this critical time, when pressures are being increased on Iran regarding its nuclear power program. According to this view, the Americans have pressurized Israel to accept, at least for the time being, the Saudi Arabia peace initiative (after separating it from the right of return issue which is the main issue in the Palestinian question ) adopted by the Arab League summit in Beirut in 2002, which it has consistently refused to recognize to date.

From this viewpoint, Bush is primarily concerned at present with exerting more pressure on Iran, with the visit to Syria seen as part of isolating Syria from Iran in his efforts to prepare the political ground for launching a strike against Iran. However regardless of the reasons behind these recent policy shifts, the American approach towards solving the Middle Eastern problems remains, in essence, the same as before. The diplomatic maneuvering must not blind Arabs from seeing the negative results of American policy in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon, nor blind them to perceiving the possible very real dangers which lay ahead.

Dr. Salim Nazzal is a Palestinian historian. He has written extensively on social and political issues in the Middle East. Can be contacted at gibran44@hotmail.com.

[nw_arizona_granny]

The Enemies Finally Meet in Baghdad
http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=8313
15/03/2007

Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed
For over three years, the US Government insisted stubbornly on not negotiating with its adversaries in the Middle East, from the principle that contact would be recognition of their role and a reward to them for their hostile actions.

In Baghdad, the United States finally agreed and sat down officially with the two enemies and its Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and on a latter date will sit down with the foreign ministers of Iran and Syria in Turkey, an important but somewhat belated step.

The Americans might have the right to hold the two governments partially responsible for the tragedy of tens of thousands of Iraqis killed because of their allowance of terrorist groups to cross their borders into Iraqi territories. The Americans know very well that more than 5,000 terrorists had entered Iraq and carried out suicide operations that succeeded in undermining security, thwarting to a large extent the Iraqi central government, and bringing matters almost to the brink of civil war. Therefore logic would have dictated talking to Iran and Syria, if they had a hand in what is happening. It is true that there might not be a need for sitting at the table with the Iranians and Syrians in two cases, one if the Americans had succeeded in Iraq and defeated terrorism or the other if they have the ability to deter the two countries.

Washington certainly failed in confronting terrorism in Iraq, failed to prevent it, and was unable to influence the Iranian and Syrian Governments.

Refusing to negotiate with adversaries is the twisted logic behind the US Government's boycott of the Palestinian Government following Hamas's victory in the elections on the basis that it is a hostile organization and because it does not recognize what the United States wants it to recognize, thus causing more deterioration and not agreement or submission. If international relations were always confined to friends, then there would not have been a need to open embassies and to give foreign ministries a role. The opposite is true. In crises, one needs the utmost degree of contacts with the adversaries in the hope of finding a chance to repair what was spoiled, finding a solution plan, or discovering unknown points of agreement and even more than this, exchanging the correct information that might otherwise be received distorted through indirect channels between the adversaries.

If Iran and Syria have a hand in Iraq's anarchy and destruction -- and this is something they hinted at recently by talking about their readiness to cooperate to impose security -- then the Baghdad conference opened the road of cooperation and its price. I say its price because we know that there is in our region a big market for political bargaining whose tools are wars and terror. Crises are fabricated in order to attain other goals that have nothing to do with what is happening in front of our eyes.

If the Syrians and Iranian can cooperate for the sake of establishing peace in Iraq, ending the anarchy, and stopping the terror, then this will be a major turning toward solving the remaining pending issues in the region. If they do not, then we will be going down a slope from which we cannot climb later. The Americans have reached the conviction that others will pay the price for their failure in Iraq and not the Americans and Iraqis alone and they will not leave except by widening the circle of the crisis.

[nw_arizona_granny]

Pakistan: Chief Justice Asked To Resign, Confined to Residence

Report by special correspondent: "References Are Not Filed on Basis of Letters: Justice Iftikhar"

Originally published on 3/15/2007 by Nawa-e Waqt in Urdu

Islamabad -- Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry has said that references are not filed on the basis of letters. The allegations of which I was informed are the same ones that Naeem Bokhari [advocate who wrote a letter to the chief justice about the misuse of power] had leveled in his letter. He said I was asked to tender resignation. If I had done so, it would have hurt the honor of the judiciary. He said that what I was doing is aimed at [safeguarding] the independence of the judiciary and nothing else.

He said this on Wednesday [ 14 March] during a meeting with Muttahida Majlis-e Amal senators belonging to Baluchistan, Senator Kamran Murtaza and Maulvi Aga Mohammad. They said that themorale of Justice Chaudhary is very high. However, Justice Chaudhry is not allowed to come out of his residence.

They said that Justice Chaudhry said that the independence of the judiciary rather than his honor is the present issue. They said Justice Chaudhry had invited the Supreme Court registrar to his residence yesterday [ 14 March], but he did not turn up.

[nw_arizona_granny]

Russia not to pay for Bushehr construction work: Russian atomic agency chief

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200703/17/eng20070317_358458.html

09:35, March 17, 2007
Russia not to pay for Bushehr construction work: Russian atomic agency
chief

Russia will not foot the bill for completing the construction of the
Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, the head of Russia's Atomic Energy
Agency said on Friday.

"We are ready to receive Iranian negotiators in Moscow," Sergei
Kiriyenko, head of the Federal Agency for Nuclear Power, was quoted by
the Itar-Tass news agency as saying. "But, of course, we will not pay
ourselves for the remaining works," he said.

Kiriyenko also warned that Russia will not complete the construction of
the plant without appropriate financing.

"We cannot complete the station at our own expense," he said.

Kiriyenko called on the Iranian side to stop agitation around the
matter
and comply with the terms of the contract.

Located in southwestern Iran, Bushehr is the country's first nuclear
power station, but work at the plant has been long delayed.

Russia and Iran signed the 1-billion-U.S.-dollar contract for the plant
in 1995. Under an agreement reached last September, fuel deliveries to
Bushehr is scheduled to start in March and the plant is due to come on
stream in September.

The Russian-Iranian talks to overcome the crisis over financing the
construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant began in Moscow on
March
7. When no coordinated decision was made and no bilateral agreements
signed after three days of talks in the Russian capital the talks moved
to Tehran.

The Russian delegation flew to Tehran on March 11 for bilateral talks.

No progress has been reached after five days of talks, which might last
until next week.

[nw_arizona_granny]

http://newwars.blogspot.com/2007/03/iraqs-astonishing-achievement.html

Iraq's astonishing achievement

According to Austin Bay:

In January 2003, I argued that toppling Saddam's tyranny in Iraq would do two things: begin the process of fostering political choice (democracy) in the Middle East and bring al-Qaida onto a battlefield not of its choosing. Moreover, that battlefield would be largely manned by Muslim allies, exposing the great fractures within Islam and the Middle East that al-Qaida's strategists tried to mask by portraying America as "the enemy."
Credit the Iraqi people with taking the opportunity by conducting three honest, open, democratic elections...That's an astonishing achievement.

Al-Qaida's now-deceased emir in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, understood the stakes. In a message to al-Qaida (intercepted by the Coalition in February 2004), Zarqawi wrote that after Iraqis run their own government, U.S. troops will remain, "but the sons of this land will be the authority. ... This is the democracy. We will have no pretexts." Iraq's new army and police will link with the people "by lineage, blood and appearance."
The terrorists and tyrants understand. It's a shame America's chatterers don't.

The chatterers, who see America as the problem, attempt to hinder democratization by repeating the Radical Muslims talking points that they are the victims. When a person looks for a handout instead of a hand up, he continues in his self-imposed squalor.

Posted by Mike Burleson

[nw_arizona_granny]

Musharraf Regime Unstable; Dissent in the Pakistan Army?
Source: http://www.india-defence.com/reports/2941
Musharraf Regime Unstable; Dissent in the Pakistan Army?
Dated 16/3/2007

With rioting outside the Pakistan Supreme Court in Islamabad, and police sacking offices of major television media outlets again in Islamabad; wonder why President Pervez Musharraf is doing in Lahore?

Is General Musharraf being set-up by internal forces to get him to resign?

Not only was the sacking of the Chief Justice embarrassing, but this evenings attacks on a popular Pakistani news channel by Govt. troops clearly is turning into a huge burden for Musharraf. One that he may not be able to bear any longer.

Musharraf in a telephonic message to Geo T.V. denied hand in the attack on their office and promised an investigation.

One major theory that many experts subscribe to is that Musharraf isn't in complete control of the Pakistan Army anymore. Rawalpindi (a twin city to Pakistan capital Islamabad) is the Head Quarters of Pakistan Army, and perhaps the Rawalpindi Core that controls Islamabad has turned its back on Musharraf; and that Musharraf is seeking refuge in Lahore, Punjab; which has emerged a major power base for Musharraf over the past two-three years.

What would cause a part of the Pakistan Army to turn on Musharraf? Could it be the recent arrest of Mullah Obaidullah Akhund? Or could it be the recent change in Pakistan's Afghanistan policy to support Gulbuddin Hekmatyar - a known Anti Taliban Afghan underground leader.

Either way, it would mean a part of the Pakistan Army is loyal to the extremist groups, perhaps those belonging to the Taliban-ISI nexus. And that would have serious implications to all players in the regions, especially India, United States and of course Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan.

One must remember that Pakistan has forever been susceptible to conspiracies, coups and counter-coups and that is how Musharraf initially came to power back in 1999.

Events are still very fluid in Pakistan as we publish ths report; stay tuned for the latest on India Defence.

[nw_arizona_granny]

Website Participant Promotes Videotaping Kidnap, Torture of US Troops in Iraq

Website Participant Promotes Videotaping of Kidnap, Torture of US Troops in Iraq

Originally published on 3/6/2007 by Jihadist Websites -- OSC Summary in Arabic
Terrorism: Participant Advocates Kidnapping US Soldiers in Iraq, Tape their Torture to Swing Public Opinion

On 6 March, a jihadist website posted a message "advising the mujahidin in Iraq to kidnap US soldiers and tape their severe torture, to swing public opinion against the American administration and force all countries to withdraw from Iraq, as happened in Somalia in 1993."

The following is a summary of the message:

The participant started his message by "reminding everyone of the power of pictures and videos, particularly the sight of the four American dead soldiers being dragged in the streets of Somalia during the time of the Clinton administration in 1993, and the swift response from the American people and Congress in demanding, and obtaining, the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Somalia." But he said that "when four American soldiers were dragged in Al-Fallujah and two of them were hung up on a bridge, [President] Bush declared the end of main battles in Iraq, which absorbed the severity of the pictures." He theorized that "now with other countries pulling out of Iraq, increasing losses, and the lack of victories except for the assassination of Zarqawi, the American public is questioning the usefulness of the army in Iraq, especially with the new Democratically controlled Congress, so now is the time for a decisive and powerful hit to embarrass the American administration. Therefore, I suggest that the mujahidin in Iraq capture a group of American soldiers, tape them while being tortured severely, and then distribute the pictures widely, and that will, no doubt, force the American administration to admit its failure and pull out of Iraq."

He warned that "the sight of the soldiers being tortured is much more effective than the sight of blowing up tanks and armories, and will accelerate the defeat of the enemy."

At the end of his message, he asked "brothers to post these videos as soon as possible."

[nw_arizona_granny]

Iranian Army Puts New Air Defense System Into Operation

Originally published on 3/16/2007 by Fars News Agency (Internet Version-WWW) in Persian
The Army's new air defense system capable of firing one or two missiles simultaneously was put into operation in the presence of Maj-Gen Salehi, the commander of the Military of the Islamic Republic of Iran [MIRI].

Fars news agency, quoting the Army public relations office, reports that, the air defense system, designed by army experts successfully underwent all accuracy and structural tests, can be used as a fixed or mobile system. The system, with its high level mobility and flexibility, can track and intercept all air targets under any climatic or weather condition. In addition, with its capability of firing missiles simultaneously, the system's possibility of hitting its targets increases exponentially.

The report adds: Another project of the MIRI's Army is the construction of field hospitals which are designed to use advanced medical equipment and can be transported, using two army-built Safir buses. The hospitals with their intensive care units, recovery wards and operating theaters can carry out all sorts of necessary operations.

The hospitals, which have the capabilities to resuscitate [patients] using advanced CPR [preceding letters in English] equipment, can be active like other units in any operational area.

In implementing another project and striving toward self-sufficiency, the Army also produces different types of kits used for search and rescue operations in disaster areas.

Moreover, the general also inspected the coming to fruition of two projects for giving warning about enemy radars and disrupting their performance with the capability of identifying troops and mobile equipment in the war theater. These projects became operational as a result of cooperation between the Army, some university research centers, and domestic industrial units.

These projects, as well as warning the troops that they are being monitored by enemy radars, provide the opportunity of taking action against enemy radars, that is, having identified active enemy radars, actions can be taken to disrupt their operation for a suitable range.

The items of equipment for giving warning and disrupting [enemy] radars, were designed and made in the last two years. They can be carried by troops, and having undergone all high level operational tests, can now be mass produced.



: Tehran Fars News Agency (Internet Version-WWW) in Persian -- (Khabargozari-ye Fars) is a privately-owned news agency. It began operating in mid November 2002. Its managing editor is Mehdi Faza'eli, the editor in chief of the Javan daily and a member of the managerial board of the Association of Muslim Journalists. The other members of the board of directors of the news agency, are Alizera Shemirani, of Farda newspaper, Abdollah Moqaddam and Akbar Nabavi of Resalat newspaper, the former director of Farabi Foundation Hasan Eslami-Mehr, and university professor Abolhoseyn Ruholamin.

[nw_arizona_granny]

Tehran Friday Prayer Leader Criticizes Hollywood Film '300'

FYI -- Kashani Criticizes Western Pressure on Iran at Tehran Friday Prayers

Originally published on 3/16/2007 by Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 1 in Persian

Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 1 in Persian at 0844 GMT on 16 March began a live broadcast of the Tehran Friday prayer sermons delivered by Ayatollah Mohammad Emami-Kashani, member of the Expediency Council, at Tehran University Campus.

Emami-Kashani dedicated the first sermon wholly to religious matters, including the unshakable belief of Muslims in principles of their faith. He also recalled a story of the early days of Islam emphasizing the necessity of closer relationships within family bounds. He praised the kind of freedom Islam offers to the faithful, saying unfettered freedom, which fails to take account of principles, breeds corruption.

Ayatollah Emami-Kashani also talked about the passing of Prophet Muhammad, the anniversary of which is only a few days away.

The first sermon ended at 0915 GMT and was immediately followed by the second, in which the cleric said the enemy is at pains to portray Islam as a religion of violence and terror. He said the enemies are also assailing the Iranian civilization and criticized the newly-released Hollywood film "300."

He said the pressures the West is pouring on Iran are part of their efforts to interfere with the nation's progress. Emami-Kashani said the West does not have any idea about the integrity of the Iranian nation and that adoption of resolutions at the UN Security Council will not shatter the Iranian resolve.

He said: Now, why are they doing so despite Iran's adherence to Islamic ideology and its performance under the complete supervision of inspectors, cameras, and any surveillance device you can imagine? Why do they want to put Iran under so much pressure? What is this enmity all about? What kind of logic is this?

Of course the truth of the matter is that they do not want to see a lively, knowledgeable, cherished, powerful society in the world. They do not like it. In fact they are intimidated by our youth. They know that our youth seek freedom and are not ready to accept all the thoughts, crimes, lust and whatever the world of arrogance imposes on the youth in other parts of the world.

Religious matters dominated the last few minutes of the second sermon, which ended at 0935 GMT.

OSC London Bureau will file extensive excerpts from the 20-minute second sermon dealing with the nuclear issue and the Hollywood movie by 1800 GMT. No further processing from the first sermon is planned.

: Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 1 in Persian -- state-run radio

***

Tehran Friday Prayer Leader Criticizes Nuclear Pressure on Iran

Second sermon from the Tehran Friday prayers led by Ayatollah Mohammad Emami-Kashani, member of the Expediency Council, at Tehran University -- live

Originally published on 3/16/2007 by Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 1 in Persian
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. [Passage omitted: the first sermon in which the cleric talked about religious matters and the opening sentences in Arabic of the second sermon]

The world of arrogance is raising an issue about Iran these days. And that is the resolutions of the [UN] Security Council. Let me say a few sentences about this. The plans of the enemy consist of two parts. One of them is what they view as being very important. The other one is being pursued hastily and is temporary in nature.

The resolutions are at the center of the one which is being pushed hastily. This has some momentum. On the longer-term front, they are undertaking two activities. First, they are painting a bad picture of Islam. They are picturing Islam as the religion of violence and terror. And most recently, they have been talking about Iran and Iranian civilization. They are painting a violent picture of the Iranians. They want to identify the Iranians as people with [brandishing] arms.

These two points are worth paying attention to. On the first issue, I would say, it has already been said, the jurisprudence has stipulated, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution has time and again said that nuclear technology does not mean that we want to highly enrich uranium to the levels needed for development of nuclear weapons. That is not true. All we want to do is limited to industrial use of this technology to meet our needs on the international stage. This has been repeated time and again.

We have allowed the world to use all which is available to it to keep an eye on this industry. [We have told them] You are welcome to come and see everything. You can have access to them [our facilities].

Now why are they doing so despite Iran's adherence to Islamic ideology and its performance under the complete supervision of inspectors, cameras, and any surveillance device you can imagine? Why do they want to put Iran under so much pressure? What is this enmity all about? What kind of logic is this?

Of course the truth of the matter is that they do not want to see a lively, knowledgeable, cherished, powerful society in the world. They do not like it. In fact they are intimidated by our youth. They know that our youth seek freedom and are not ready to accept all the thoughts, crimes, lust and whatever the World of Arrogance imposes on the youth in other parts of the world.

This is why they want to bring down Iran from its position of power and tarnish its prestige and glory.

On the other hand, because Iran follows Islam -- and because Islam is dynamic and attractive and has attracted everyone -- they [the West] want to downplay this religion too. They are working hard to achieve this end.

We advise them. First we advise 5+1. Then we advise the Security Council. This is our advice: What you do is not going to lead anywhere. You yourselves think they may lead somewhere but that is not true. You are so unaware of developments inside Iran that when you get together you say the first resolution we adopted caused uproar inside Iran.

You are so unaware of our country. Integrity, piety, and commitment to Islamic civilization, to Iranian civilization, to religion, to nationalism, to leadership, and to the leadership who always takes account of what is expedient to Islam and the Iranian people rule the day inside the country.

It is a rule of thumb. One can easily say what the glory of the nation rests with. Considering the situation on the ground, how can you expect these resolutions to change the situation. This is wishful thinking. The holy Koran offers a response to what you are doing. The holy Koran talks about this.

[Passage omitted: a Koranic verse in Arabic] Prophet! Forget them. No matter how hard you try to advise them, they speak against you. One meaning of the word used in this holy verse is that these people [the ones acting against the prophet] are in a deep pond, the bottom of which cannot be seen. One cannot see the bottom of this pond. They have jumped in this water. They don't know what they are in for. They don't know the depth of this pond. They keep struggling but survival is elusive. That is how their situation is.

Afghanistan is an example of the trouble they are in. Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon are other examples. One can see their trouble in these places. You do not know anything about the places you venture into. You keep struggling for survival. [Passage omitted: Koranic verse in Arabic] Some interpreters say the word used in this verse refers to the Judgment Day. That is not what it is. It refers to both to the Judgment Day and life in this world.

You [addressing the West] should realize this. I don't know when you are going to realize this.

Don't do this. We advise you against this. It is not that Iran does not feel the heat. Economic questions put senseless pressure on people. It is not that it does not upset the people. Without a doubt, some become upset. You do this just because of its psychological effect.

The resolutions you adopt...[pauses] So far you have adopted one, even if the number of such resolutions reaches 10, they will not cause uproar. Unlike what you say when you get together and sip your drinks, these resolutions will not cause uproar inside the country. Integrity and unity are the name of the game in Iran. The Iranians have an understanding [of what is going on]. On 22 Bahman [11 February, marking the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979] they proved that they are there for the establishment. On any other occasion similar to revolution anniversary rallies, when millions of people turn out [in support of the establishment] you will understand what is going on. I don't know why you don't want to know what is going on. Why don't you pay attention to this [reality]?

Stop these mischievous measures. Such measures won't get you anywhere. The movie you have ordered your puppets to produce and [you have] screened abroad...[pauses] I don't want to name this film which is against Iran and the Iranians.

That does not serve your interests. It only enraged the Iranians all over the world. It made them angry. You can't make films against the Iranians. Iran's civilization is the biggest civilization. Islamic civilization is the biggest civilization. You think you can cast doubt on Iranian and Islamic civilizations? The great prophet.

[The crowd chants: "God's peace be upon Prophet Muhammad and his household"]

When the prophet recited this holy Koranic verse [Passage omitted: reads the verse] he was asked to identify who will join the ranks of Muslims. His eminence put his hand on the shoulder of Salman Farsi [a devout Iranian follower of the prophet] and said these people. They will come from Persia.

This is the reality about our civilization. This is how things are on the ground in Iran. The Muslim ummah across the world have a duty to make a stand against their propagation. The Iranian people have a duty.

Iranian expatriates have a duty with regard to these measures. You [the Iranians] have to fulfil your duty. The belief of the Iranians, our youth in particular, in the second coming of the Lord of the Age, will help us through.

[The crowd chants: "God's peace be upon Prophet Muhammad and his household"]

Let me advise the Security Council. We are not alone [God is with us]. We are believers. We believe in God. You don't believe the same. We are believers. Our nation is steadfast and firm and will not back down from its word that nuclear energy is our obvious right. This is the reality on the ground.

[The crowd chants: "God is great. God is great. Khamene'i is our leader. Down with opponents of the religious jurisconsult. Down with America. Death to Britain. Death to hypocrites. Death to Israel."]

Let me add a sentence. The anniversary of the passing of the great prophet and the martyrdom of Imam Mojtaba [the second Shiite imam] and martyrdom of Imam Reza [the eighth Shiite imam] and the New Year are approaching. At the turn of the year, people are advised to be happy. If we seek to be happy and have a blessed New Year, we have to make others happy as well. We have to make the needy happy. We have to help the needy. We have to make some sacrifice and help others.

[Passage omitted: the cleric further urges worshippers to help the poor and avoid enmity and backbiting, recalls a story of the early days of Islam and recites closing prayers]

May God bless you all.

: Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 1 in Persian -- state-run radio