Agreed, homogeneity isn't a controlling factor. But don't you think that having a foreign force there is problematic and complicates things just a little? That's what Buckley is saying. He implies suspicion of social engineering, and when things go awry, who gets blamed but us... because by going to war, we are the ones who started this kind of social engineering. Japan and Germany didn't have an active insurgency that's approaching its 4-year mark. Indonesia never had a foreign force guiding them towards democracy.
Again, Buckley says in the article that the prevailing strategic postulates--like our belief in freedom--ought to be sustained, and are being sustained in latin American and much of Asia (to include Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, etc). But Buckley also says that Iraq may be a particular example where things don't work. And the way things are headed (i.e. Sunnis breaking off political talks with Shia and Kurds, continued disappearance of mixed neighborhoods in Shia-Sunni-Kurdish border areas, resulting homogenization of the country into 3 ethnic-based areas, etc.), the tactical picture does not look good.
He's saying that we can preserve our strategic mission while sustaining a tactical loss--albeit a big one in the form of Iraq.
Of course,. No one loves an occupier. We are liberators and we will leave if the government of Iraq asks us to leave. I don't see that happening since the Iraqi government knows that it still doesn't have the resources to maintain security nationwide. We never stay in a country where we are not wanted.
For example, public polls in South Korea would seem to indicate that the US is not popular and that it would be better if we left. Yet, let Rumsfeld suggest that we are going to reduce our token forces there, and the Korean government goes bananas. The Germans have reacted similarly with the German mayors of cities adjacent to our bases coming to the US to plead for our bases to remain.
That's what Buckley is saying. He implies suspicion of social engineering, and when things go awry, who gets blamed but us... because by going to war, we are the ones who started this kind of social engineering and when things go awry, who gets blamed but us... because by going to war, we are the ones who started this kind of social engineering.
That goes with the territory. As long as the Iraqi government supports our presence, that is all that really matters. I would be concerned if millions of Iraqis took to the streets demanding our withdrawal. That hasn't happened. If you believe the reports from our military personnel, most Iraqis want us to stay and finish the mission. We don't want to be there for ever either, which is why we are handing over more and more of the security responsibilities to Iraqis.
Japan and Germany didn't have an active insurgency that's approaching its 4-year mark.
Different cultures and different circumstances. Both countries, Japan and Germany, suffered immense devastation and loss of life. Iraq is paradise compared to the state of the infrastructure and political structure.
I have seen this 4 year mark tossed about by the Dems and other kooks. Fact: We have been in Iraq since March 20, 2003 , the date of the invasion. We entered Baghdad on April 9, 2003. We really didn't start administering the country until May, 2003. The bottom line is that we have been there less than three years. During that time, there have been three national elections and an adoption of a constitution. Schools and hospitals have been built, roads contstructed, and a host of other infrastructure projects undertaken.
Indonesia never had a foreign force guiding them towards democracy.
Indonesia was a Dutch colony from the early 17th century until 1945 or 1949, depending on your perspective. Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 but the Dutch didn't recognize it until 1949. The leagal system is based on Roman-Dutch law, substantially modified by indigenous concepts and by new criminal procedures and election codes It has a written constitution. Having lived in Indonesia in the early 1970s, I can testify to the major influence the Dutch had on the political system and other democratic institutions.
Again, Buckley says in the article that the prevailing strategic postulates--like our belief in freedom--ought to be sustained, and are being sustained in latin American and much of Asia (to include Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, etc). But Buckley also says that Iraq may be a particular example where things don't work. And the way things are headed (i.e. Sunnis breaking off political talks with Shia and Kurds, continued disappearance of mixed neighborhoods in Shia-Sunni-Kurdish border areas, resulting homogenization of the country into 3 ethnic-based areas, etc.), the tactical picture does not look good.
I am not ready to conclude that the sky is falling tactically or strategically. We are talking about a country of 25 million and the size of California. The vast majority of the country is not in turmoil.
He's saying that we can preserve our strategic mission while sustaining a tactical loss--albeit a big one in the form of Iraq.
Much too early to come to such a conclusion. Also, we are fighting AQ in Iraq. Does Buckley think that AQ will leave Iraq if we leave? What kind of message does that send to our enemy?