Posted on 07/30/2003 12:00:10 AM PDT by SAMWolf
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are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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In the classic horror movie "Jaws" there is a character played by Robert Shaw who tells the story of a World War II cruiser, which sank after completing a top secret, run to Tinian Island in 1945. This ship's name was the USS Indianapolis. Several times during the peace before the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor the Indianapolis would carry President Franklin Roosevelt and members of the cabinet for meetings and the President's "Good Neighbor" cruises to South America. On November 1, 1933 she became the flagship of the United States Scouting Force and remained as such for the remainder of peacetime before Pearl Harbor. When the Japanese bombs dropped on Pearl Harbor, the Indianapolis was making simulated bombardments of Johnston Island. She immediately stopped her maneuvers at Johnston and headed for Pearl Harbor to join Task Force 11 on December 13, 1941. Their mission was to search for Japanese carriers that were supposed to still be in the area. During the war, the Indianapolis would go into action in some of the heaviest of South Pacific battles. Rabaul and Salamaua as well as Kiska Island and Attu in the Aleutians were just the beginning of her wartime battles. In November of 1943 she was a part of the assault force for Operation "Galvanic" in the Gilbert Islands as well as participating in the battles in January 1944 for the Marshall Islands. Tarawa, Makin and Kwajalein Atoll were just a few of the famous engagements in which the Indianapolis participated. In June 1944 the ship played a major role in the Marianas assault, the raids on Saipan and the Battle of the Philippine Sea as well as Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. On March 4, 1945 a pre-invasion bombardment of Okinawa began and the Indianapolis participated in this and then on March 31st, the day before the actual invasion, the lookouts spotted a single engine Japanese fighter plane as it vertically dove at the bridge. The ship's guns began firing but less than 15 seconds after it was first seen, the plane was over the ship. Although the plane was hit by tracer shells and caused to swerve, the pilot was able to release his load at a mere 25 feet above the ship. As the plane crashed into the port side of the of the after deck, the bomb itself pierced through the deck armor and continued through the crew's mess hall, the berthing compartment, the fuel tanks and the bottom of the ship. It finally exploded in the water beneath and the concussion blew two holes in the ship's bottom, killed nine crewmen as well as flooded compartments in the area. North Field and West Field, Tinian, as seen from the air. Settling slightly to the stern and listing to port, the cruiser was able to steam to a salvage ship for emergency repairs under her own power. During the repairs, it was discovered her propeller shafts were damaged, fuel tanks ruptured and her water-distilling equipment completely ruined. Surprisingly, even with the damage the Indianapolis was able to complete the long trip across the Pacific to Mare Island for extensive repairs and an overhaul still under her own power. Once the repairs were completed, the fate of the Indianapolis and her crew were to be forever changed. She received orders to forego the post repair shakedown cruise and proceed at top speed to San Francisco to pick up cargo and then to deliver it to Tinian. Capt. Lewis L. Haynes who was the senior medical officer on board the Indianapolis wrote later of how they arrived at an almost deserted Navy Yard and two large trucks came alongside the ship. One of the trucks had a huge crate that was immediately put into the port hanger and the other truck had several men as well as Army officers Capt. James Nolan and Maj. Robert Furman. These two men carried a three-foot by four-foot tall canister up to Admiral Spruance's personal cabin and welded it to the deck. The Captain of the Indianapolis at this time was Capt. McVay and all he told his senior officers of the mission was that it was special. He even admitted, "I can't tell you what the mission is. I don't know myself but I've been told that every day we take off the trip is a day off the war." Capt. McVay also informed his officers that if for any reason the orders were given to abandon ship, the canister in the Admiral's cabin was to be place in a boat before any crewmember. From an empty Naval Yard in San Francisco to an equally quiet Pearl Harbor for refueling, the Indianapolis proceeded at top speed and unescorted to Tinian and in doing so, set a record by covering the 5000 miles from San Francisco in only ten days. Once at Tinian the cargo was unloaded, she proceeded to Guam to disembark several men and was given orders to report to Vice Adm. Jesse Oldendorf for duty in the vicinity of Okinawa. Capt. McVay was told to take a direct route and although he requested one, an escort was denied. He was informed the route would be safe but later would find that Naval Intelligence actually knew there were Japanese submarines in the area. Two days out of Guam at 12:15 a.m. on July 30, 1945 in moderate seas and good visibility, torpedoes from Japanese Sub I-58 with Commander Machitsura Hashimoto in command, hit the USS Indianapolis. The explosions were against her starboard side and the mighty ship capsized, sank in only 12 minutes and sent 1199 crewmembers into the sea. Her location at this time as 12 degrees 02 minutes N., 134 degrees 48 minutes E. Capt. McVay would later be charged for negligence of duty and a variety of other things but the true negligence was on the part of the Navy. The Indianapolis was due to reach Leyte on July 31, 1945 but no report was ever made when she didn't arrive on schedule. In fact, on August 2, 1945 when a plane on routine patrol accidentally came across the survivors at 10:25 a.m. a report still had not been filed. The pilot of the plane immediately radioed for help, dropped a life raft and a radio transmitter to the survivors but it would be August 8th before rescue operations in a hundred mile radius had been combed with survivors was found throughout. Capt. Hayes reported no attacks from sharks in his group but reports from other groups told horrific stories of them and in the end, of the 1,199 crewmen who went into the water, only 316 were found alive. The rescuers usually found the men in groups but a great number of the crew had gone into the water wounded or without life jackets. Officers tried to herd the men together and have the ones without jackets to put their arms through the shoulders of someone else's jacket while desperately attempting to keep the men from drinking the seawater. Capt. Charles McVay would be vindicated from any blame concerning the loss of the Indianapolis but its sinking would haunt him the rest of his career until he committed suicide years later. One of the main witnesses at his trial was Commander Machitsura Hashimoto who told the board that no special maneuvering by Capt. McVay would have changed the outcome of the submarine attack. The personnel who failed to report the ship not arriving on schedule at Leyte would also be exonerated. North Field, Tinian. Worlds largest airdrome in 1945 - four 8500 ft runways, 13 taxiways and 230 hardstands (created by the seabee's in 6 months!) Home of the 313th Wing. The USS Indianapolis traditionally served as the flagship of the 5th Fleet and during her 14 years of service, she was honored with 10 battle stars for her actions during World War II.
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As clouds moved in and the sun set over the Philippine Sea, Capt. Charles Butler McVay ordered his ship, the USS Indianapolis, to stop zigzagging and head straight for the island of Leyte. It was Sunday night, July 29, 1945, and for McVay, it was a routine decision. The evasive "zigzag" technique made ships less vulnerable to attack, but in poor visibility conditions the practice was suspended at the captain's discretion. And here, in the waning days of World War II, the Allies controlled the Pacific, including this stretch between Guam and the Philippines.
Shortly after midnight, two Japanese torpedoes tore into the ship: A 610-foot floating city, the Indianapolis sunk in 12 minutes. McVay was among some 900 men (out of 1,196) to live through the initial blasts and abandon ship. And he was one of 316 to live for five days awaiting rescue in the oil-slicked Pacific, while more than 500 of his men drowned, succumbed to thirst, hunger and injuries, or were eaten by sharks.
But McVay, then 46, did not ultimately survive the ordeal, professionally or personally. Three months after the torpedo attack, he was tried for "hazarding his ship by failing to zigzag." The Japanese submarine commander testified that zigzagging would have made no difference; he still would have sunk the Indianapolis. But McVay was convicted.
Many of the survivors believed then and continue to maintain that McVay was the Navy's scapegoat, court-martialed to divert questions, namely: Why did hundreds of men struggle to survive in shark-infested waters for five days while the Navy failed to launch a search? And why is McVay the only captain in U.S. Naval history prosecuted for losing his ship during combat?
Twenty-four years after the court-martial, McVay shot himself to death with a Navy-issue .38-caliber revolver.
As a group, the aging survivors long sought to clear McVay's name. Four years ago, they were joined by an unlikely assistant: 12-year-old Hunter Scott of Pensacola, Fla., who became interested in the Indianapolis after seeing a reference to it in the movie, Jaws. He began researching the story and interviewed survivors for a history fair project, then contacted Rep. Joe Scarborough, a Florida Republican.
www.discovery.com
www.whysanity.net
www.history.navy.mil
www.web-birds.com
starbulletin.com
www.ussindianapolisinharmsway.com
'The Navy knew that the submarine which sank us was in our path. They did not tell Captain McVay. We were sent into harm's way, then forgotten, by these and many examples of carelessness.' -- From statement submitted at September 1999 Senate hearing by Michael N. Kuryla Jr., -- From testimony at September 1999 Senate hearing by Hunter Scott, -- From statement submitted at September 1999 Senate hearing by Florian Stamm, -- From statement submitted at September 1999 Senate hearing by Lyle M. Pasket, -- From statement submitted at September 1999 Senate hearing by Paul J. Murphy, |
Folks, be sure to update your virus definitions and download the latest critical updates for your computer.
Today's classic warship, USS Cecil J. Doyle (DE-368)
John C. Butler class destroyer escort
Displacement. 1,350 t.
Lenght. 306'
Beam. 36'7"
Draft. 13'4"
Speed. 24 k.
Complement. 186
Armament. 3 5"; 4 40mm; 10 20mm; 3 21" tt.; 8 dcp.; 1 hedgehog.
Cecil J. Doyle (DE-368) was launched 1 July 1944 by Consolidated Steel Corp., Orange, Tex.; sponsored by Mrs. O. P. Doyle; and commissioned 16 October 1944, Lieutenant Commander D. S. Crocker, USNR, in command.
Cecil J. Doyle carried out her first mission while still in shakedown, when she cruised on an air-sea rescue station during the flight of Government officials to the Yalta Conference. On 30 January 1945, she rendezvoused with HMS Ranee, and guarded the escort carrier through the Panama Canal and north to San Diego. Cecil J. Doyle continued on to Pearl Harbor and Eniwetok, where she arrived 28 March to join the Marshalls-Gilbert Patrol and Escort Group. Her escort duties took her to Guam, and Ulithi, where on 30 April she was transferred to the Carolines Surface Patrol and Escort Group. On 2 May, Cecil J. Doyle 's commanding officer became Commander, Screen, Peleliu, protecting the great anchorage in Kossol Roads.
While on patrol, Cecil J. Doyle several times rescued downed aviators, and on 27 May 1945 bombarded a by-passed Japanese garrison on Koror Island.
On 2 August, she was ordered to the rescue of a large group of men in rafts reported at 11°30' N., 133°30' E., and bent on top speed to be the first to reach the survivors of torpedoed Indianapolis (CA-35). It was Cecil J. Doyle's melancholy duty to radio the first report of the cruiser's loss.
HAVE ARREVED AREA X AM PICKING UP SURVIVORS FROM USS INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) TORPEODED [sic] AND SUNK LAST SUNDAY NIGHT
She rescued 93 survivors, and gave final rites to 21 found already dead. Remaining in the area searching until 8 August, Cecil J. Doyle was the last to leave the scene.
From 26 August 1945, when she sailed into Buckner Bay, Okinawa, the destroyer was assigned to occupation duty. She sailed with hospital ships to Wakayama, Japan, to evacuate released prisoners of war, then screened carriers providing air cover for landing of occupation troops. Through 12 November, she cruised on courier duty between Japanese ports, and after drydocking at Yokosuka, sailed for San Francisco, arriving 13 January 1946. She was decommissioned and placed in reserve at San Diego 2 July 1946.
Stricken from the Navy list on July 1 1967, she was sunk as target off California December 2 1967.
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The Imperial Japanese navy air force issued a requirement for a new carrierborne torpedo bomber in 1932. Three companies reacted: Aichi, Mitsubishi and Nakajima. Each of these built a single prototype, but none of these were deemed satisfactory, however, and the navy thus issued a 1934 requirement for a more capable type to replace the obsolescent Yokosuka B3Y.
The design selected for production was the Yokosuka B4Y, but this was regarded only as an interim type as the Imperial Japanese Navy wanted a torpedo bomber offering greater compatibility of performance with the Mitsubishi A5M monoplane fighter.
In 1935, therefore, the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force issued its requirement for a three-seat attack warplane with folding wings and the ability to carry a 1,764 lb (800 kg) torpedo or an equivalent weight of bombs at a maximum level speed of 207 mph (333 km/h) at 6,560 ft (2.000 m) with a powerplant of one Nakajima Hikari or Mitsubishi Kinsei radial engine. This new requirement resulted in designs from Mitsubishi and Nakajima, the latters offering being the Type K design created by a team under the supervision of Katsuji Nakamura.
The Type K was a cantilever low-wing monoplane of basically all-metal construction with fabric-covered control surfaces, and included among its more advanced features wide-track main landing gear units that hydraulically retracted inward, and outer wing panels that folded upward and inward with the starboard wing under the port wing. The core of the structure was the oval-section fuselage, which was of semi-monocoque construction with accommodation for the crew of three in a long cockpit under a glasshouse canopy with sliding sections to provide means of entry and exit. This core section carried the flying surfaces, which comprised a perfectly conventional tail unit with a mid-set tailplane, and the wing. This was based on a flat center section with tapered leading and trailing edges, and dihedraled outer panels that were tapered in thickness and chord. The center section carried trailing-edge Fowler flaps while the outer panels, outboard of the wing fold hinge lines, carried trailing-edge ailerons.
The B5N1 prototype made its first flight in January 1937 with a powerplant of one Nakajima Hikari 2 radial engine, driving a three-blade metal propeller of the variable-pitch type.
Like almost all Japanese aircraft, the B5N were most succesfull during the early War years. The B5N1 entered service as a land-based as well as carrierborne bomber, in the former capacity serving as a level bomber in the early stages of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937 - 1945). Here the B5N1 proved moderately successful, especially when escorted by A5M fighters, but by 1939 it had become clear that the lack of crew and fuel tank protection was a tactical liability that could only be offset by the provision of such protection. This would mean an increase in weight and subsequently a reduction in performance and agility. The Japanese decided not to do so, placing a greater importance on speed and maneuverability.
By the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, all B5N1's had been withdrawn from first-line service, and had been replaced by B5N2's. On 7 December 1941 144 B5N2's were among the Japanese attackers on Pearl Harbor, and these made short work of the US fleet anchored there. In the year to come the B5N2's claimed more victories, amonsgt others three US Navy aircraft carriers, the Lexington, the Yorktown, and the Hornet during three separate encounters.
The type also operated in the land-based role, suffering very heavy losses in the campaign that followed on the US invasion of the Philippine islands in October 1944. The B5N was then withdrawn from bomber service only to be pressed into service as an anti-submarine type. This role had been suggested by the B5N2s long endurance (minimal 4 hours, maximal 7 hours, depending on height and speed) and adequate payload capability. The aircraft were modified with either air-to-surface search radar, using antennae on the sides of the rear fuselage and along the wing leading edges, or with the Jikitanchiki magnetic anomaly detection system. Other aircraft were adapted as trainers, target tugs and glider tugs along the line of the B5N1-K.
Specifications:
Manufacturer: Nakajima Hikoki K.K.
Primary Role: Torpedo BomberU-boat DestroyerMaritime/Coastal patrol reconnaissance Bomber
Crew: 3 - Pilot, navigator/bombardier/observer, radio operator/gunner
First flight: (prototype) January 1937 / Operational Service 1938 - 1945
Powerplant: One Nakajima Hikari 3 nine-cylinder air-cooled radial, rated at 840 hp (626.21 kW)
Fuel capacity internal: 255 Imp gal (306 US gal)
Dimensions:
Length: 33 ft 9.5 inch
Height: 12 ft 1.75 inch
Weights: Empty 4643 lb / Operational weight 8157 lb typical / Maximum 8852 lb
Wing Span: 50 ft 10.9 inch unfolded, less than 24 ft 7.9 inch folded.
Performance :
Service ceiling: 24280 ft
Maximum speed: 229 mph at 6560 ft
Cruising speed: 159 mph at 6560 ft
Initial climb rate: Climb to 9,845 ft in 7 min 50 sec
Range: 679 miles typical, 1404 miles max
Armaments:
Two fixed forward firing 7.7mm machine guns,
One or two 7.7mm trainable Type 89 machine gun in rear cockpit
Bomb load Up to 1,764 lb, carried on one under fuselage hardpoint rated at 1,764 lb.
One 1,764 lb torpedo
or Two 551 lb bombs instead of torpedo
All photos Copyright of Ken's Aviation
- Although the Navy was aware of Japanese subs in the area due to the ULTRA code, and although such information was routinely passed down to subordinates in sufficiently vague form, there was a break in the chain of command (the info stopped at Captain Oliver Naquin) and that information was never passed to Captain McVay. In addition, McVay's request for an escort was denied.
- Zizagging was always a procedure of questionable worth, as was testified to by experts such as Glynn Donaho, among others, at McVay's court-martial. In any case, the weather was dark with only intermittent moonlight - the Japanese sub seems to have come along during one of those intermittent periods - and it was a totally accepted practice to cease zigzagging under such circumstances.
- McVay was the only mariner in World War II to go along the "Peddy Route" - the straight-line route from Guam to Leyte - without an escort. In addition, he was the only skipper in that conflict to be court-martialed for losing a ship.
- The evidence of a cover-up is great: sailors from ships that received an SOS from the Indy but did not go out, for varying reasons (in one case, the ship's captain was drunk; in some others, the SOS was assumed to be a prank), were told not to talk about the incident, and one sailor told Hunter Scott that a Navy man had actually boarded his ship and torn out pages in the logbook showing evidence of a message reception.
The prosecutor representing the Navy in this case also used his superior rank in an unsuccessful attempt to get Giles McCoy, a Marine serving with a detachment on the Indy when it went down, to sign a false statement alleging that McVay had failed to give an abandon ship order in a timely fashion.
In addition, the members of the court-martial jury were chosen by, and depended on promotions from, none other than Admiral Ernest King - the man who decided to court-martial McVay even though an inquiry board had not yet come out with its findings. King's orders were that combatant ships were not to be reported when they showed up at port - this was taken to mean that the nonarrival of combatant ships should not be reported, either. Because of this, the Navy never even realized the Indy was missing, and so King had a direct interest in seeing McVay convicted and getting the spotlight off of himself.
The Navy, in typical bureaucratic fashion, announced the sinking of the Indy to the public on August 14, 1945 - the same day Japan surrendered, ensuring that the event would be overshadowed by the big headlines of the day.
The commander of the Japanese sub which sank the Indy, Mochitsura Hashimoto, told people many years later that the interpreter at the trial had routinely misinterpreted his words - Hashimoto knew enough English to recognize this - but that his objections had been routinely brushed aside. Hashimoto has long held that the charges against McVay were unjust and contrived.
One of the subordinates to a judge on the court-martial board who was responsible for weighing evidence was none other than Captain Oliver Naquin, the man who had the information about Japanese subs in the area but, for whatever reason, did not pass it on to Charles McVay. In an ordinary case, such a judge would have recused himself. This was not an ordinary case. The judge stayed on.
- It may be of some interest to Freepers, in an era of great negativity about youth, to note that Hunter Scott (now 17) is quite an extraordinary individual. He managed to get McVay exonerated before so much as getting his driver's license. He recognized that his youth would serve him well in his cause, and he routinely buttonholed Congressman with his requests to vote for an "exoneration bill." He knew that cameras don't lie, and that no Congressman wants to be caught on tape saying no to a 12-year old.
Scott's role was more than just serving as p.r. spokesman: he uncovered a number of facts through diligent research, including the discovery that the Navy had known about Japanese subs in the area, and the fact that numerous ships in the area had received an SOS from the Indy (Scott talked to retired sailors who reported this, thus contradicting the Navy's old claim that no word had gotten out) but that no action had been taken.
I interviewed Scott on December 8, 2002, for my research paper, and found him a very polite and engaging young man. He nearly "sirred" me to death - he was raised in a Southern family where such things are almost surely taken for granted. He is a devout Christian, and mentioned his faith to me within the first 5 minutes of our interview. Jokingly paraphrasing the Blues Brothers, he said that he always felt like he was on a "mission from God" to get McVay exonerated. He will attend either the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill or the University of Virginia at Charlottseville next fall.
Until recently, Scott was also the head of his high school's Young Republicans Committee.
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