Posted on 12/15/2004 10:41:21 PM PST by SAMWolf
Two months later, Rowlett and his colleagues were excitedly combing through the secret files of Yardley's defunct organization. This most clandestine and most valuable form of intelligence thrilled them. They went on to study basic cryptography and the solution of machine ciphers, clearly the wave of the future. In 1932, their training completed at last, they attacked Japanese diplomatic cryptographic systems, working on messages provided by the Army's new intercept service.
They first cracked a simple code, the LA. That code did little more than replace the syllables of the plaintext with pairs of code letters listed in a code book. In fact, the system resembled simple cryptograms found in Sunday newspapers. First the Japanese words of the message were transliterated into romanized letters (so that Western telegraphic systems could be used in sending them). This was done by using the katakana (literally, "borrowed words"), a syllabary that expresses Japanese words phonetically. The words were then encoded by looking up each syllable.
As difficult as machine systems are, however, study of the cryptograms did yield clues. Vowels, for instance, had a relatively higher frequency than consonants. It appeared that the machine divided the romanized alphabet (used in the katakana transliteration) into two subsets, the six vowels and the twenty consonants. Working with one of the less garbled intercepts, and perhaps with some help from the Navy's solution of another Japanese cipher machine, Rowlett and Solomon Kullback, one of the other original junior cryptanalysts, struck gold one day: Among their tentative recoveries of plaintext were three letters followed by an unknown and then another letter: oyobi. They knew then that they had cracked the system, because oyobi is romanized Japanese for "and." They named this machine system Red (not related to the Red Code).
By 1937, for the first time in American history, solutions of foreign messages began going to the White House, probably to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Gentlemen were once again reading someone else's mail. It revealed, for instance, advance information about Italy's possible adherence to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact. This was in March 1937, six months before American diplomats began reporting on it. Later it provided part of the text of the treaty.
These half-dozen cryptanalysts were providing the United States with its best secret intelligence on Japan as relations with that nation, which was persisting in its aggression against China, deteriorated. The cryptanalysts plunged into their work in Rooms 3416 and 3418 in the Munitions Building. Room 3418, about 25 feet square with a steel door secured by a combination lock and with barred windows, was known as the vault. As additional cryptanalysts were assigned to the Purple problem, the group moved into larger quarters, finally occupying about eight rooms.
Reconstructing a cipher system is like solving an immensely complicated scientific problem, with this difference: Nature does not deliberately conceal her secrets. The researchers concoct hypotheses and test them. If x stands for e, will the other cipher-to-plain equivalents that it entails make sense? Or will they merely yield gibberish, or lead to a self-contradiction? Can one recovered alphabet be linked with another? There is no clear way to the answer, as there is in the algebra problems posed in math classes. Particularly in the early stages of a difficult cryptanalysis, the work is one of the most excruciating, agonizing, tantalizing, compelling mental processes known to humans--and, when successful, one of the most satisfying.
Despite Rosen's remarkable advance, the totality of Purple still resisted the Americans. Friedman, who had been supervising the work rather loosely, was asked by his bosses--all extremely supportive, financially as well as psychologically--to participate personally. His genius helped considerably. The Navy also lent a hand temporarily, organizing its files the same way as the Army's to facilitate cooperation. After about four months, however, the Navy returned to its main effort, Japanese naval codes. The SIS pushed ahead. Within Rowlett's group, teamwork was extremely close; determination was pervasive. No one complained that a task was too menial. Rowlett was confident from the start that they would reconstruct the Purple mechanism the way he and others had reconstructed the Red Code. He never got depressed, even though months went by without a solution. As they sought a breakthrough, the cryptanalysts spent much of their time trying to match possible plaintext--guesses, often educated, as to the cipher-text, or encoded language and numbers. Early in the effort, for example, many identical Japanese telegrams were sent to multiple addresses; some of the telegrams were composed using the Red machine, some the Purple. The cryptanalysts could read Red, which then gave them the text of the same Purple messages. They knew, too, that many diplomatic dispatches began "I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that..." and they often tried that as the start of the plaintext. In a very few cases, the State Department gave them the text of notes to or from the Japanese ambassadors, which the code-breakers used as cribs.
Some people have conjectured that this fabulous decoded information made it clear to Roosevelt and his advisers that Pearl Harbor was going to attacked. They say the president, wanting to bring the United States into the war on the side of Great Britain, traitorously suppressed this information and sacrificed American ships and American lives to achieve his goal. Various theories have been put forth to support this notion.![]() Safford himself, by then a captain, agreed. He based his argument upon the so-called winds code. Japan had notified its diplomatic posts in a J19-K10 circular telegram on November 19 that if diplomatic relations and international communications were likely to be cut off, it would warn these posts with a fake weather forecast in the middle of the Japanese shortwave news broadcast. If Japanese-American relations were in danger, the forecast would predict "east wind rain." American code-breakers solved this message on November 28. Immediately, a frantic effort was made to pick up this broadcast. Safford insisted that the "winds execute"--the forecast--was heard on December 4 and that the intercept was subsequently removed from the files as part of a coverup. Virtually no one has supported this contention. But even assuming that an execute message had been transmitted, it would at best confirm that relations were strained. In no way could it point to Pearl Harbor. Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton has argued that the lack of a Purple machine in Hawaii prevented Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short, the commanders there, from using Magic-provided information on international affairs to illuminate their situation. This would have enabled them to predict the attack, Layton has claimed. But this is speculation, supported only by hindsight. Moreover, the presence of a Purple machine in the Philippines did not prevent the American forces from being surprised. Author John Toland found several former radio operators who had been listening in San Francisco or at sea. They said that in the week before December 7, they had heard a cacophony of radio signals from northwest of Hawaii--presumably the strike force heading for Pearl Harbor. They said they reported this, to no effect. But this story founders because, according to the Japanese, the strike force maintained absolute radio silence throughout its voyage. And American naval intercept units, straining to pick up whatever they could on the Japanese naval circuits, heard nothing. U.S. radio-intelligence operators knew that several carriers had dropped out of the traffic picture. They thought that the ships were in home waters, covering a movement to the south--the Philippines or the oil- and rubber-rich Dutch East Indies. Carrier communications had likewise vanished in February and July 1941, and naval radio-intelligence operators hypothesized then that the carriers had been held near Japan--a hypothesis later determined to be factual. But what happened then was not what was happening in December. ![]() Several writers have suggested that the solution of the many messages dealing with ship movements in and out of Pearl Harbor should have alerted the authorities to the impending attack. But similar messages were transmitted about the Philippines, the Panama Canal, San Francisco, San Diego and Seattle. In fact, from August 1 to December 6, 59 such intercepts dealt with the Philippines and only 20 with Hawaii. The writers have pointed to one intercept, instructing the consulate in Hawaii to divide the Pearl Harbor anchorage into smaller areas for more precise reporting of ship locations, as a clear indication of a forthcoming attack. That is hindsight. At the time, the authorities viewed it merely as evidence of the thoroughness of Japanese intelligence or of the need to abbreviate communications. James Rusbridger, in his book Betrayal at Pearl Harbor, claims that the British code-breaking unit at Singapore solved enough of JN25 to reveal the plan to attack Pearl Harbor and that this information was passed on to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who withheld it from Roosevelt to ensure American entry into the war, thereby enabling the attack to succeed. Citing the Official Secrets Act, British authorities have denied Rusbridger any access to the records of the unit, and the U.S. Navy reports that it cannot find any of these JN25b solutions, partial or complete, from before December 7. His thesis rests on the memory of an Australian code-breaker working in Singapore. That is a slender reed upon which to base so heavy a charge. Moreover, Rusbridger does not distinguish between the a and b editions of JN25--and does not make clear why Churchill would try to get the Americans to fight Japan instead of Germany. A retired communications intelligence analyst, Fred Parker, has dredged through the files of Japanese messages intercepted before Pearl Harbor but not solved until afterward. Though he has found no smoking gun, no message referring specifically to an attack on Pearl Harbor, he believes that the messages he has found point clearly to an impending attack there. He cites, for example, the presence of an oiler on what became the strike force's homeward route and the broadcast of the message "Climb Mount Niitaka 1208." The oiler obviously was put there, he says, to refuel the returning ships. The 1208 in the message meant December 8, the attack date on the Tokyo side of the international date line. Mount Niitaka (Hsin-kao in Taiwan) was the highest peak in what was then the Japanese empire. Parker contends that a solution of these messages would have suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor. Like the other theories, however, this is hindsight. ![]() Some historians have contended that if only the Army and Navy intelligence officers, and perhaps State Department officials as well, had found the time to analyze all the intercepts as a group, they would have discerned a pattern that pointed to Pearl Harbor. This argument resembles one that Roberta Wohlstetter made in her book Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, in which she holds that the noise of the false evidence drowned out the indications of the true signals: "We failed to anticipate Pearl Harbor not for want of the relevant materials, but because of a plethora of irrelevant ones." This is wrong. There were no true signals, no clear indications of the attack. The fact is that code-breaking intelligence did not prevent and could not have prevented Pearl Harbor, because Japan never sent any message to anybody saying anything like "We shall attack Pearl Harbor." The ambassadors in Washington were never told of the plan. Nor were any other Japanese diplomats or consular officials. The ships of the strike force were never radioed any message mentioning Pearl Harbor. It was therefore impossible for the cryptanalysts to have discovered the plan. What, then, is the answer to the joint congressional committee's question? What about that "finest intelligence"? The simple answer is that, fine though it was, it was not fine enough. Perhaps if the United States had established intercept operators in the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to obtain enough messages to make a solution of JN25b more likely, or had been able to buy a spy in the top circles of the Japanese government, or had been able somehow to fly aerial reconnaissance regularly above the island empire--then perhaps there might have been a chance that the Pearl Harbor attack would be detected in advance. None of these things could have been easily done. Even if they had, discovery of the plan would not have been certain. Japan had successfully closed all openings through which foreigners might gain information about its intentions. The real reason for the success of the Pearl Harbor attack lies in the island empire's hermetic security. Despite the American code-breakers, Japan kept her secret. For Americans, the Rising Sun rose in eclipse. |
To all our military men and women past and present, military family members, and to our allies who stand beside us
Thank You!
Good evidence exists on the interception of the "Winds" message by the US Navy, and the destruction of evidence after the Pearl Harbor attack.
No good evidence exists that intercepts indicated that Pearl Harbor was the target beforehand.
Very excellent evidence exists that intercept intelligence from early November showed the Japanese would make war on the United States in the first two weeks of December. The Friday before the Sunday, December 7, there was a decrypt that was officially read as a Japanese attack on elements of the US Navy within the next few days.
All from memory. The Eric Nave book is the best non-technical one.
Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Foxhole.
Read: Exodus 20:1-20
Honor your father and your mother. Exodus 20:12
Bible In One Year: Amos 4-6; Revelation 7
Through her books and lectures, Edith Schaeffer has become much appreciated for her insights into the value of life's ordinary days. When she and her husband Francis were first married, both sets of parents lived nearby. The newlyweds divided each Sunday afternoon and evening be-tween the Schaeffers and the Sevilles.
After a few years, Edith and Francis moved to Switzerland, where they could talk with their parents only once a year in a brief phone conversation.
Looking back half a century later, Edith wrote of being glad for the way they had used those Sunday afternoons. She noted that "proximity of loved ones is not an endless situation." She concluded that a package labeled "time to care for parents and exhibit love" doesn't just arrive someday. We must show love while we can.
The fifth of the Ten Commandments says: "Honor your father and your mother, that your days may be long upon the land which the Lord your God is giving you" (Exodus 20:12). The command to love and respect our parents applies equally to children living at home, newly independent young couples, and empty-nesters.
Seize each moment you have to love and honor your family. The opportunity won't last forever. David McCasland
Good Morning
Christmas Sand
I had no Christmas spirit when I breathed a weary sigh, And looked across the table where the bills were piled too high.
The laundry wasn't finished and the car I had to fix, My stocks were down another point, the Dolphins lost by six.
And so with only minutes till my son got home from school I gave up on the drudgery and grabbed a wooden stool.
The burdens that I carried were about all I could take, And so I flipped the TV on, to catch a little break.
I came upon a desert scene in shades of tan and rust, No snowflakes hung upon the wind, just clouds of swirling dust.
And where the reindeer should have stood before a laden sleigh, Eight Hummers ran a column right behind an M1A.
A group of boys walked past the tank, not one was past his teens. Their eyes were hard as polished flint, their faces drawn and lean.
They walked the street in armor with their rifles shouldered tight, Their dearest wish for Christmas, just to have a silent night.
Other soldiers gathered, hunkered down against the wind, To share a scrap of mail and dreams of going home again.
There wasn't much at all to put their lonely hearts at ease, They had no Christmas turkey, just a pack of MREs.
They didn't have a garland or a stocking I could see, They didn't need an ornament-- they lacked a Christmas Tree.
They didn't have a present even though it was tradition, the only boxes I could see were labeled "ammunition."
I felt a little tug and found my son now by my side, He asked me what it was I feared, and why it was I cried.
I swept him up into my arms and held him oh so near and kissed him on the forehead as I whispered in his ear.
There's nothing wrong my little son, for safe we sleep tonight, Our heroes stand on foreign land to give us all the right,
To worry on the things in life that mean nothing at all, Instead of wondering if we will be the next to fall.
He looked at me as children do, and said it was alright, to thank the ones who help us and perhaps that we should write.
And so we pushed aside the bills and sat to draft a note, to thank the many far from home, and this is what we wrote:
God Bless You all and keep you safe, and speed your way back home. Remember that we love you so, and that you're not alone.
The gift you give you share with all, a present every day, You give the gift of liberty and that we can't repay.
1944 Battle of the Bulge begins
with apologies ro valin, hope the new windows go well :-)
Regards
alfa6 ;>}
Good Morning Radu.
Pearl Harbor mobilized the nation for quick victory as 9/11/01 has not - Draft, Rosie the Riveter war production, War Bonds to raise money. Just think three years after Pearl Harbor Italy was defeated, Japan was on the ropes and we were on the border of Germany. Four years after Pearl Harbor we were completely occupying and controlling the well-armed axis powers and starting them toward democracy. Japan awoke a 'sleeping giant' and the 'giant' answered back.
I read "At Dawn We Slept", pretty good book with lots of detail. Seems all the "clues" were there, putting them together and drawing the proper conclusions was the problem.
Morning Aeronaut.
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