Russian Options in Ukraine: Are Nuclear Weapons Under Consideration?

Last week, I discussed the nature of tactical nuclear weapons. They are built for tactical effect, not strategic effect. Strategic nuclear weapons, such as the ones dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, can devastate a large area, with both the blast and the nuclear fallout. The blast area would be devastated, and the fallout would increase the lethality and carry it a significant distance downwind. However, it must be remembered that regardless of casualties, neither city was completely abandoned, and both were populated and functioning at a reasonable level about a year after the bombs were detonated. The power of tactical nuclear weapons (depending on the type) is less than 1 percent of the Hiroshima blast, and as important, they yield little nuclear fallout.

Tactical nuclear weapons can determine the outcome of a battle but not a war, and would not make the land unlivable. Therefore, Russia’s other nuclear option is strategic: to destroy Ukrainian cities with a Hiroshima-type weapon. This option has two weaknesses. The winds in Ukraine are variable and in eastern Ukraine, for example, blow to the northeast. A strategic nuclear detonation would send fallout blowing into Russia and in this example toward Voronezh, a strategic Russian city. Any use of a strategic nuclear weapon would likely affect Russian territory.

A second risk, however unlikely, concerns the Western response. The United States, the United Kingdom and France all possess strategic nuclear weapons. Any of them might take a Russian strike on Ukraine as a potential threat to themselves, triggering an exchange. This may be farfetched and none of the three might imagine it, but in a command center, fears are magnified. Given the limited value of tactical nukes and the potential disaster of strategic nukes, Russian nuclear threats are excellent psychological warfare (unless a Russian enemy takes the threat seriously) but cannot solve Russia’s military problem.

Its problem consists of four parts.

The first is that the Russians are deployed in Ukraine as they began the war, on salients vulnerable to flank attacks, which happened. A retreat into more defensible formations would make sense but would also have serious political consequences, as it would indicate another retreat after the one in the north earlier in the war.

A second problem appears to be insufficient, poorly trained and unmotivated forces with which to mount a counterattack sufficient to force a major Ukrainian retreat.

A third problem is the long-standing Russian/Soviet problem: logistics. In order to mount a counterattack, the Russians must have not only initial supplies but also massive additional supplies arriving reliably where they are needed.

This leads to their fourth problem. U.S. satellites are providing constant, accurate intelligence on all forces, including logistical movements. In addition, U.S. artillery of various sorts is capable of cutting the Russian line of supply, leaving an offensive paralyzed. And finally, Ukrainian forces are sufficiently dispersed that a last-ditch tactical nuclear strike would likely impact the Russian offensive.

It would seem that Russia has been forced into a permanent defensive posture. If this were World War II, Russia would be able to rebound. But Russia has not fought a multidivisional war for 77 years. We saw the Russians open the war with three armored thrusts largely unable to cope with logistical problems and anti-tank weapons. In effect, they were forced to retreat from offensive missions, regroup and wind up in the position they are in. They are fighting an enemy in the same position, but one that does not have a logistical problem thanks to the U.S., which has also had its share of failure but whose most robust capability is logistics.

The Russians must obviously change the dynamic of the war if they are not going to be forced into a political settlement. The key is to pose threats to the Ukrainians from multiple directions, both tactically and strategically. Indeed, their primary need is to diffuse U.S. logistics by creating a serious military threat to another American ally or directly attacking one. It is not clear that the U.S. would be unable to supply two fronts, but it might unbalance the U.S. and force it to reduce support for Ukraine, possibly opening opportunities for Russia.

Geography provides few options for this, but the most likely ones are Moldova and Romania, two countries connected to one another. It could not be an overland offensive but would have to take advantage of the Black Sea, landing significant forces in Romania, a NATO member and host to an American naval force. To achieve this, the Russians would have to first use missiles to eliminate Ukrainian anti-ship missiles like those that sank the Moskva. Having done this, they would have to achieve and maintain air or missile superiority over the Black Sea and then land and lodge sufficient force to compel Romanian forces into combat with substantial American forces. Given that there are American naval forces outside the Bosporus, and given that NATO’s mandate or sheer necessity would force the Bosporus shut, this would pose a serious threat to the Russians. Add to this an air attack on Russian forces, and this operation would likely fail.

There are perhaps other viable diversionary actions of sufficient significance to compel the United States to divert its forces, but all of them would be built on land movements at a time when Russia is hard-pressed. An attack on the Baltics would bring a significant Polish attack on Russia’s flank, and mounting an attack on Finland, for example, would be detected and anticipated. The same is true with Romania, but with somewhat lower opportunity.

Of course, the Romanian gambit itself is highly dubious, but here we are assuming that Russia has been forced to the defense and that it is unwilling to abandon the war. Few options are attractive at this point, but the political cost of abandoning the war is enormous. If they must continue and the Russians can’t regain the initiative, then a Hail Mary is the only option.

The final option is one I wrote about before, which is massing forces in the east and then attacking Ukraine with new forces. That remains the most likely solution for Russia, assuming it can mass, train and motivate a large force. If not, Russia might achieve a poor draw, but it cannot impose its will on Ukraine.

Putins preemptive nuclear doctrine threat is on the table.

As well, tactical nuclear artillery is reasonably m.j ot an option in close frontline combat, as it could cause losses to Russia’s own side.

As well, Russian doctrine also fully utilizes the “civilian as weapon”, in a strategy of forcing complete collapse of all societal function. This is also a Russian tried and true method from at least three recent conflicts, and has already been widely utilized across Ukraine.

As such, it is almost unlikely Putin would not use at least lower dialed strategic nuclear weapons.

As well, Russia has at least 3 new Chemical Weapons Brigades since 2012, with arguably the most advanced CW weapons distribution platforms in the world.

Russia already had the world’s most active and tangible Bio Weapons program in the world, but Putin ordered the continued development and significant increase in budget allocation for Bio Weapons as one of his first “formal” orders after being appointed President by Yeltsin in 1999. Of course that was just ahead of the New Years/Russian Orthodox break, so after January 7th of 2000. This is a very real threat as well, but much less likely to be used in Ukraine, as a number of those weapons don’t have reliably working anecdotes

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In late March 30/31, 2022, Russia flew two Sukhoi 24 bombers armed with nuclear missiles, with two Sukhoi 27 fighter escorts over Finish and Swedish airspace.

As these were intercepted by Swedish JAS-39’s, the SU-24’s rolled so the Swedish fighter pilots and cameras could photo the nuclear missiles.

Off and on in 2019, 2020, and heavier in 2021 Russian nuclear subs encircled Britain. The following is only a piece referencing 2021, as for about 5 years, the Royal Navy sought hard to keep a lid on the information -

https://metro-co-uk.cdn.ampprojereferct.org/v/s/metro.co.uk/2021/05/23/russian-submarines-are-constantly-circling-britains-entire-coastline-14630396/amp/?amp_gsa=1&amp_js_v=a9&usqp=mq331AQKKAFQArABIIACAw%3D%3D#amp_tf=From%20%251%24s&aoh=16639097196623&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com&ampshare=https%3A%2F%2Fmetro.co.uk%2F2021%2F05%2F23%2Frussian-submarines-are-constantly-circling-britains-entire-coastline-14630396%2F

In January 2022, Russia held a 140+ ship naval exercise off the coast of Ireland, but then a number of ships and nuclear subs were reported to British Parliament to be loitering all the way around Britain, coastal France, and “in the pocket” between Germany, Belgium, Poland, and Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Baltics.

Simultaneously, Russia held a 144 ship and sub exercise stretching from coastal Oman and Gulf of Aden, to right up next to US Navy Base Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. Just before reaching Lemonnier, China’s Navy joined the then joint exercise which went right up the Red Sea to one of Russia’s refurbished naval facilities opposite Yemen, where they have really been supplying weapons to the Houthi and Iranian backed Rebels attacking SA, with the goal of destroying Saudi and UAE energy lines to Israel and Europe.

Off and in since Bill Clinton, but steady under Obama, the up to 11 Russian nuclear subs, which are associated with the Russian nuclear battlecruiser “Peter the Great” (which calls the Venezuelan island of La Orchila home, routinely travel or loiter within approximately 1500 NM from “Peter the Great”. Sub locations are regular between Bermuda and Newfundland and Labrador, but also occasionally test Bill Clinton’s 12 NM territorial boundaries of the US East Coast. It happened under Clinton, and Obama multiple times, but over the past two years, these incidents are almost routine, and stretch from Texas to Maine, with the occasional stop in Cuba. There is also overlap utilizing the Chinese controlled Panama Canal, between Russia’s Pacific and Atlantic hybrid nuclear battle group’s.

There is a whole lot more, including a highly nuclear weaponized Kaliningrad, and Philippine area, but enough for now.

No one wants this, but nuclear blackmail, utilizing a known weak US fraud president, and utilizing fearful trembling populations, is obviously the new toy by a leftist fascist to move his border.

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