While the United States undertook a prompt response the invasion of Afghanistan it did not undertake the same measures as it did for the purpose of winning World War II (namely overwhelming and overly destructive force). There were, of course, the two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but also overwhelming destructive force throughout the war in the form of carpet bombings, flame throwing tanks, and picket destroyers. The carnage of Okinawa fundamentally changed how the West viewed war, particularly against the fanatical Japanese.
Gen. Curtis Lemay was an architect of this strategy and advocated it not only in Korea (where it was not used), but also Vietnam, where his advocacy of keeping the nuclear option open is often cited as one of the things that destroyed the 1968 presidential campaign of George Wallace for whom Lemay was the vice presidential candidate. The idea was that overwhelming destructive force led to fewer casualties for the Allies. Here, Gen. Lemay discusses the concept with regard to the Korean War:
“What I’m trying to say is, once you make a decision to use military force to solve your problem then you ought to use it. And use an overwhelming military force. Use too much. And deliberately use too much. So that you don’t make an error on the other side, and not quite have enough. And you roll over everything to start with. And you close it down just like that. You save resources. You save lives. Not only your own but the enemies too. And the recovery is quicker. And everybody is back to peaceful existence hopefully in a shorter period of time.”
America spends billions of dollars developing highly destructive military technology. But since World War II, it has failed to deploy this in the defense of its citizenry.
Worldwide philosophical asymmetric war of the enemy is very tough to beat. Most would rather submit, or join forces. (1400 years and still a threat. Any ideas?)
When it comes to warfighting military audiences tend to focus on the military and power aspects of warfare; the tangibles of terrain, enemy, weather, leadership, and troops; quantifiables such as the number of tanks and artillery tubesthe correlation of forces. Analysts steer toward the familiar rather than the unfamiliar; people tend to think in their comfort zones. The study of ideology or philosophy is often brushed aside, its not the stuff of muddy boots; it is more cerebral than physical and not action oriented. Planners do not assess the cor- relation of ideas. The practitioners are too busy.
Dr. Antulio Echevarria recently argued the US military does not have a doc- trine for war as much as it has a doctrine for operations and battles.5 The military has a deficit of strategic, and, one could add, philosophic thinking.
From The Quranic Concept of War p.108