the People's Bank of China published a report that looked at corruption monitoring and how corrupt officials transfer assets overseas. The report quotes statistics based on research by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: 18,000 Communist Party and government officials, public-security members, judicial cadres, agents of state institutions and senior-management individuals of state-owned enterprises have fled China since 1990. Also missing is about $120 billion.
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2079756,00.html
North Koreas commercial information technology (IT) industry has operated overseas, largely unnoticed, for decades. It sells a range of products and services including website and app development, administrative and business management software, IT security software, and biometric identification software for law enforcement applications. Its global network includes a myriad of front companies, intermediaries, and foreign partnerships. Yet despite the attention currently paid to North Koreas overseas revenue streams and its offensive activities in cyberspace, the spotlight has yet to illuminate the money-spinning North Korean IT firms whose offerings seem to have found their way into corporate supply chains and potentially even Western-allied law enforcement agencies. Drawing upon extensive open-source investigations by the authors, this paper examines several nodes in North Korea-linked IT networks and considers the implications for current and future policy efforts to stem North Korean revenue and mitigate the cyber-security threats the country poses.
North Koreas activity in the IT sector is likely to continue to pose an underappreciated cybersecurity threat. At present, it seems that many affected clients have unwittingly engaged North Koreans. While the level of access Pyongyang may have into their customers systems and data depends upon the services rendered, there is demonstrated potential for North Korea to exploit these relationships for its cyber activities. As long as North Koreas IT sector remains in the shadows, Pyongyangs concerning sale of such goods and services will likely continue unabated. https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/op36-the-shadow-sector.pdf