To a degree, especially with respect to counterfeiting. With some of the other things you mentioned, there may be concurrent state/federal interest and jurisdiction. For instance, there might be OSHA or EPA regulations that apply to all of those things, in addition to other limitations or regulations that the states mandate, right?
Where the supremacy clause would be germane in all of your examples, is if the states tried to enact a regulation that countervailed a federal law. That's not allowable. But, with respect to this particular case at bar, the establishment of foreign policy falls exclusively to the federal government, or so the court (and several before it) has held.
The act of the Legislature of New York is not a regulation of commerce, but of police, and, being so, it was passed in the exercise of a power which rightfully belonged to the state. The State of New York possessed the power to pass this law before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The law was “intended to prevent the state’s being burdened with an influx of foreigners and to prevent their becoming paupers, and who would be chargeable as such.” The end and means here used are within the competency of the states.
Justice Barbour goes on in his opionion for the 6-1 majority:
...obviously passed with a view to prevent her citizens from being oppressed by the support of multitudes of poor persons who come from foreign countries without possessing the means of supporting themselves. There can be no mode in which the power to regulate internal police could be more appropriately exercised. New York, from her particular situation, is perhaps more than any other city in the Union exposed to the evil of thousands of foreign emigrants arriving there, and the consequent danger of her citizens being subjected to a heavy charge in the maintenance of those who are poor. It is the duty of the state to protect its citizens from this evil; they have endeavored to do so by passing, amongst other things, the section of the law in question. We should upon principle, say that it had a right to do so.
New York v Miln (1837)