al-Qaeda’s Zawahiri And Saddam Hussein Were Planning Attacks After 9-11

On February 17 2008, Al-Ekhlaas which is the largest terrorist forum on the internet published an Al Qaeda document that talks about the life of Abou Musaab Al Zarqawi and indicates that Zarqawi came to Iraq before the war to prepare the terrorist insurgency against the US troops. According to the document Zarqawi arrived to the Sunni areas in central Iraq. This document was written by one of Al Qaeda top leaders called “Saif Al Adel”.

There were many accounts about Zarqawi presence in Iraq before the war in particular in Northern Iraq with “Ansar Al Islam” an active Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist group that was present in the Kurdish areas of Iraq long before the war started. The document also proves that Ansar Al Islam helped Al Qaeda members establish themselves in Iraq before the war started.

The author of the document wrote that there were no relations between Saddam regime and Al Qaeda but this does not negate at all the most important fact that Al Qaeda was in Iraq before the war for the sole purpose of preparing for its most important front to fight the U.S and it is now in Iraq where Al Qaeda is suffering its most crushing defeat since its existence.

It is very important to note that despite the author of the document denial of a relationship between Saddam regime and Al Qaeda it does not mean that Saddam regime was not aware of Al Qaeda presence in Iraq. In fact the documents clearly points out that Zarqawi went to the Sunni areas in Central Iraq before the war and these areas were totally controlled and loyal to Saddam regime and it very hard to imagine that Zarqawi stayed and prepared his terrorist sleepers cells in these Sunni areas without the approval of Saddam regime.

El-Ekhlaas terrorist forum is a password protected so you cannot access the document unless you are registered there as a member.

Below is a partial translation of Al Qaeda document written by “Saif Al Adel”.

… " We started the work and the contact with the leadership, and we began to support and help the leadership again, and this was our goal after we left Afghanistan. We began establishing the fighter groups. On one hand to return to Afghanistan and conduct planned operations there, and on the other hand we began to study the situation of the groups and bothers to find new places for them. After long discussions, brother Abou Mussab with his Palestinian and Jordanian companions decided to go to Iraq because of their dialects they can quickly mix and assimilate in the Iraqi society. Our analysis was that the Americans were going to make the mistake sooner or later to invade Iraq, that this invasion will lead to the fall of the regime, and that we should play an important role in the confrontation and resistance, and that this is our historical chance to establish the Islamic State who will have the biggest role in removing injustice and establish justice in this world allah willing. I was in agreement with brother Abou Mussab regarding this analysis. There were no relation between Al Qaeda and Saddam regime that is worth mentioning, as opposite to what the Americans are saying so they can create excuse and legal justifications according to their laws that they imposed on the world that is enslaved by the West, the Israelis and the Anglo-Saxons.

The plan was to have our brothers enter Iraq from the North, where the road is not controlled y the regime, and then go down South to the Sunni areas where we have some of our brothers. Also the brothers in “Ansar Al Islam” showed their willingness to give us any help to achieve this goal.

The Americans noticed that the Iranians were having a blind eye against our activities in Iran so they began a media attack against Iran accusing them of helping Al Qaeda and international terrorism. The steps taken by the Iranians had confused us and had caused 75% of our plans to fail. Many of our comrades were arrested. 80% of Abou Musaab Al Zarqawi group members were arrested. There should be a quick plan to arrange the escape of Zarqawi and the remaining of his group, the destination was Iraq and the route was the Northern borders between Iraq and Iran. The goal was to reach the Sunni areas in central Iraq and the beginning of the preparation to confront the US invasion and defeat it allah willing. The choice was not arbitrary but a studied one.

When he said goodbye to me leaving for Iraq, Abou Musaab has added a new dimension to his personality. This new dimension focused on punishing the Americans for the crimes that they committed in their bombing of Afghanistan and that he witnessed in his own eyes, the hate and hostility that Abou Mussab had for the Americans guaranteed to form new traits to Abou Musaab personality."

End of partial translation.

It’s difficult to imagine they are so blatantly antiAmerican!

See this :

Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam and the American Left

And a review:

**********************************

By	Kat Bakhu (Albuquerque, NM United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam and the American Left (Hardcover)

I had long wondered why people on the Left had the propensity to speak more positively about people who would slit their throats than they do about their own country, which affords them more freedom and opportunity than anywhere else. David Horowitz has answered that question thoroughly and convincingly in his Unholy Alliance. Where I felt bewildered and confused, I now feel crystal clear. Unholy Alliance is such a great book.

It begins with the leftist movements at the beginning of the 20th Century, and works its way up to the present day, exploring the anti-American attitude of these movements in detail. Horowitz shows that the enemies of the US back then are largely the same group today, operating under the same misperceptions, making the same mistakes, and pursuing the same impossible utopia.

Individual chapters are included on the Patriot Act (I was persuaded that it is a GOOD thing); the democratic flip-flop on Iraq once G.W. Bush implemented what they agreed with Clinton needed to be done; the driving components of the current anti-war movement; as well as chapters on individual personalities who are major spokespeople of the Left. Horowitz covers a lot of ground, and he covers it concisely and clearly. Unholy Alliance is richly informative without ever being boring or plodding.

This book is so illuminating that I simply cannot do justice to it here. I love people who reason so clearly that they help me get my own reasoning clear. Horowitz is just that type of person! In the terrain of mindless clichés (no-blood-for-oil, etc.), he is a breath of real fresh air.

Speaking of Saif al Adel, Iraq & Iran - inless he has multiple personalities, the Al-Ekhlaas terror forum letter above was just Iranian spin:

* Saif al Adel : al-Qaida leader who's wanted in connection with the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa and may now be the terrorist group's third-ranking official. Believed to have found refuge in Iran, where he remains active. U.S. officials, who all spoke on the condition of anonymity, said there was evidence that members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard were sheltering Saif al Adel. The Iranian government has expelled more than 500 lower-ranking al-Qaida members and denies harboring any of the group's senior leaders.
The suspicions of a link between Iran and the bombings are focused largely on Saif al Adel, who some U.S. officials think is now the head of al-Qaida operations in the Persian Gulf. U.S. intelligence officials said that Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the extremist group that counted Saif al Adel and bin Laden's top deputy, Ayman al Zawahri, among its members and later merged with al-Qaida, had closer ties to Tehran. Saif al Adel himself, the officials said, got help from the Iranian-backed Hezbollah after a suicide boat attack against the U.S. Navy destroyer The Sullivans went awry in Yemen in January 2000. Armed with new plastic explosives and a better bomb design, al-Qaida attacked the USS Cole in Yemen that October, killing 17 Americans.- "U.S. checking whether Saudi bombings were planned in Iran," By JOHN WALCOTT, Knight Ridder Newspapers via The Mercury News, Posted on Wed, May. 14, 2003, http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/politics/5861884.htm

Addressing the Lord Mayor's banquet in London last night — an occasion traditionally used by the Prime Minister to set out the Government's foreign policy — Mr Blair said he wanted to launch a diplomatic initiative to secure peace in Iraq by establishing dialogue with Iran and ending threats of military force against the regime. He confirmed that a major rethink of strategy was under way on both sides of the Atlantic as he offered Iran a partnership rather than isolation if it stopped supporting terrorism in Lebanon or Iraq and halted attempts to develop nuclear weapons.
With the British and American governments looking for an exit strategy from Iraq, the Prime Minister admitted that they needed Iran's co-operation to prevent the country descending into civil war and to secure an overall Middle East peace settlement.
But the revelation that Iran is working hard to establish a closer relationship with bin Laden's fanatics, who provoked the war against terrorism with the attacks on September 11 2001, is likely to undermine severely Downing Street's attempts to effect a rapprochement. Iran is also suspected of arming insurgent groups in southern Iraq – many of which have links to al-Qa'eda – that have been responsible for many of the roadside bomb attacks against British troops.
But intelligence officials have been most alarmed by reports from Iran that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is trying to persuade al-Qa'eda to promote a pro-Iranian activist to a senior position within its leadership. The Iranians want Saif al-Adel, a 46-year-old former colonel in Egypt's special forces, to be the organisation's number three. Al-Adel was formerly bin Laden's head of security, and was named on the FBI's 22 most wanted list after September 11 for his alleged involvement in terror attacks against US targets in Somalia and Africa in the 1990s. He has been living in a Revolutionary Guard guest house in Teheran since fleeing from Afghanistan in late 2001. -------Iran plotting to groom bin Laden's successor The Daily Telegraph (UK) ^ | November 14, 2006 | By Con Coughlin and George Jones, Political Editor

From the LWJ:

Saif al-Adel, Zarqawi, al Qaeda and Iran
By Bill RoggioJune 16, 2005 12:13 PM

************************EXCERPT*********************

News on the Zarqawi front has gone cold; however the Coalition continues its efforts to dismantle his organization by attacking the middlemen. Abed Dawood Suleiman, Zarqawi’s military aide, and his son Raed, a former captain in Saddam’s army, have been captured outside of Baghdad. Jassim Hazan Hamadi al-Bazi, a bomb maker who “built and sold remote-controlled bombs used in roadside attacks from an electronic repair shop in Balad, 50 miles north of Baghdad” has also been detained.

While the hunt continues for Zarqawi and his murderers, Dan Darling points us to interesting information on the relationship between Saif al-Adel, Zarqawi, al Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Saif al-Adel is widely believed to be the nom de guerre of former Egyptian Army Colonel Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi (Special Forces), who fought in Afghanistan with the mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. He is purported to have been involved with the Black Hawk Down battle in Somalia, which resulted in the deaths of 18 US servicemen, the 1998 embassy attacks in Kenyan and Tanzania, the training of several of the 9-11 hijackers, and the Riyadh bombing in 2003. After the death of Mohammed Atef, al-Adel is believed to have taken on some of the Atef's responsibilities in al Qaeda. He is believed to be the third ranking member in the organization.

Mohammed Al Shafey, in an excellent article in Asharq Alawsat, documents al-Adel’s history, as well as his relationship to Zarqawi and their dealings in Iran. The information is based on an internet posting by al-Adel. Saif lays out how Zarqawi came to be noticed by al Qaeda during his trial in Jordan; "Abu Qatadah always reminded us that we had active brothers in Jordan who were expected to have a promising future in the course of Da'wah. Thus we were very happy when we heard of their release in 1999..." Zarqawi was briefed by al Qaeda after the 9-11 attack; "we explained the aims of the September attacks to Zarqawi and provided him with some important details of phased out targets..."

Saif al-Adel also states Zarqawi was not in league with Saddam, and then provides interesting details on al Qaeda’s status in Iran immediately after the fall of the Taliban. Note that there was no crackdown on Zarqawi’s followers until after the US pressures Iran, and that Zarqawi and his remaining followers were still able to leave Iran for Iraq, while al-Adel was able to assist Zarqawi in planning to move to Iraq.

“...contrary to what the Americans continuously claimed, Al-Qaeda did not have any connection with Saddam whatsoever. American attempts to connect Saddam to Al-Qaeda were in order to create excuses and legitimate causes to invade Iraq. So after we were trapped in Iran, after being forced out of Afghanistan, it became inevitable that we would plan to enter Iraq through the north, which was free from American control. It was then that we moved south to join our Sunni brothers".
Al-Adl then moved to the question of Iran, and said "The steps taken by Iran against us shook us and caused the failure of 75 percent of our plan. Approximately 80percent of Abu Musab’s [Al-Zarqawi] group were arrested. It was important to create a plan for Abu Musab to follow with those left with him. Where were they to go? The destination was Iraq, via the Northern Iran/Iraq border. The aim was to reach the Sunni areas in the center of Iraq and then to start preparations to combat the American invasion. It was not a random choice; it was a well studied one."

Mshari Al-Zaydi, also in an article in Asharq Alawsat, provides further details on the relationship between Zarqawi, al-Adel and their flight into Iran. Zarqawi returned to Afghanistan to fight the Americans, and then fled to Iraq with al-Adel.

The United States did not delay its response [to the attacks on 9-11], and began bombing the camps of Afghanistan as it waged a “third world war” on terrorism. In response to the bombing, Al-Qaeda members decided to “melt the land”, however this was not before Al-Zarqawi, renown for his imprudence and passion, returned to Qandahar to participate in the symbolic combat against American mortars. During this time, Al-Zarqawi was injured, after the house he was in collapsed on him, causing his ribs to break. On his recovery, he escaped with Al-Adl and other fighters to Iran. On arriving in Iran, they stayed in the houses of Hizb Islami, a follower of the former Afghani leader, Qalb Al Din Hekmatyar. There is an unspoken understanding that the Iranians, or at least Iranian Intelligence, were aware of the situation.

Hekmatyar is a proxy of Iran and has a home in Tehran. A repressive regime such as Iran does not let dangerous men such as al-Adel, Zarqawi or Hekmatyar to enter their country without the approval of the government or security services.

Radio Free Europe provides further details on the operations conducted from Iranian soil by al-Adel and al Qaeda:

Al-Adl further documented al-Zarqawi's decision to establish his network of fighters in Iraq in 2001, an undertaking assisted through his relationship with the Ansar Al-Islam terrorist network based in Iraqi Kurdistan close to the Iranian border. That relationship was reportedly forged in Afghanistan.
"We began to converge on Iran one after the other. The fraternal brothers in the peninsula of the Arabs, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates who were outside Afghanistan, had already arrived. They possessed abundant funds. We set up a central leadership and working groups," al-Adl recounted. "We began to form some groups of fighters to return to Afghanistan to carry out well-prepared missions there. Meanwhile, we began to examine the situation of the group and the fraternal brothers to pick new places for them. Abu Mus'ab and his Jordanian and Palestinian comrades opted to go to Iraq…

Saif al-Adel has basically confirmed everything we know about al Qaeda's cooperation with Iran. None of this should come as any surprise as Iran has a history of assisting al Qaeda before and after 9-11.

Make no mistake, these al Qaeda “central leadership and working groups” are operating from Iran to this day. Saif al-Adel, Said bin Laden, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, and a host of al Qaeda senior operatives are under “house arrest” in Iran by name only. They are directing the global jihad in conjunction with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who are currently believed to be residing in the chaotic border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The war will not be won until they are rooted out, and the Islamist regime in Iran that succors them is defeated.

An Aside, Part I:

On May 28^th in Zarqawi’s Successors, I predicted Sulaiman Khaled Darwish would be the likely candidate to lead al Qaeda in Iraq in the event of Zarqawi’s death based on his connections to Zarqawi and al Qaeda leadership, his position in Tahwid and his knowledge and connections in the region. Here is Mohammed Al Shafey account of Saif al-Adel’s choice for Zarqawi’s successor, published on June 1^st:

One of the most important points made with regards to Al-Adl, is in relation to his knowledge of Al-Zarqawi’s successor. This was of particular importance when news emerged that Al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, had been shot in operations taking place in the West of the country. According to Al-Adl, Al-Zarqawi’s successor was believed to be a Syrian physician, Sulaiman Khaled Darwish (aka Abu Al-Ghadiah), who was the leader of the Arab Mujahedeen in Herat Camp. The Herat Camp was also personally supervised by Al-Zarqawi.

An Aside, Part II:

There is also an interesting tidbit in Mr. Al Shafey’s article about Zarqawi’s, um, personal habits, as told by Saif al-Adel:

Al-Adl reveals that Al-Zarqawi appointed himself a deputy in Afghanistan; this deputy was the Syrian physician Sulaiman Kahled Darwish. In addition, he had two aides, Khaled Arouri and Abdel Hadi Deghlas, two Jordanian young men who had accompanied him to Afghanistan in the very beginning. Al'Adl noticed that, “Abu Mossa’b [Al-Zarqawi] and his aides were very vigorous in their training”. He described it further; “they used to push themselves hard to reach higher goals all the time”.

Its interesting that al-Adel takes the time to point this out. I don’t know, but it, ah, sounds kind of gay to me. Not that there is anything wrong with that. Unless you are a berserk radical Islamist intolerant of women, homosexuals, dogs, Jews, Christians, Buddists, just about every other sect of Islam other than your own and other kaffir. Perhaps Zarqawi should brush up on Shariah Law and mete out his own punishment.

From LWJ :

Terror, Inc.
By Bill RoggioJuly 28, 2004 12:05 AM

**********************************************************

The reports from Time and Newsweek which indicated links exist between al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Iran were accurate. The 9-11 Commission's report debunks another of the myths about cooperation between different sects of Islamic terrorists:

It is unlikely Sunni (al Qaeda) and Shia (Hezbollah/Iran) terror organizations would cooperate as their hatred for each other and ideological difference are far too great.

The 9-11 Commission's report clearly lays out the case for cooperation between al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Iran:

Page 50-51 Bin Ladin seemed willing to include in the confederation terrorists from almost every corner of the Muslim world. His vision mirrored that of Sudan’s Islamist leader,Turabi, who convened a series of meetings under the label Popular Arab and Islamic Conference around the time of Bin Ladin’s arrival in that country. Delegations of violent Islamist extremists came from all the groups represented in Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army Shura. Representatives also came from organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, and Hezbollah.
Turabi sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their divisions and join against the common enemy. In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support—even if only training—for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States. Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Ladin reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983. The relationship between al Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations. As will be described in chapter 7, al Qaeda contacts with Iran continued in ensuing years.
Page 240
Assistance from Hezbollah and Iran to al Qaeda As we mentioned in chapter 2, while in Sudan, senior managers in al Qaeda maintained contacts with Iran and the Iranian-supported worldwide terrorist organization Hezbollah, which is based mainly in southern Lebanon and Beirut. Al Qaeda members received advice and training from Hezbollah. Intelligence indicates the persistence of contacts between Iranian security officials and senior al Qaeda figures after Bin Ladin’s return to Afghanistan. Khallad has said that Iran made a concerted effort to strengthen relations with al Qaeda after the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, but was rebuffed because Bin Ladin did not want to alienate his supporters in Saudi Arabia. Khallad and other detainees have described the willingness of Iranian officials to facilitate the travel of al Qaeda members through Iran, on their way to and from Afghanistan.For example, Iranian border inspectors would be told not to place telltale stamps in the passports of these travelers. Such arrangements were particularly beneficial to Saudi members of al Qaeda.
Our knowledge of the international travels of the al Qaeda operatives selected for the 9/11 operation remains fragmentary. But we now have evidence suggesting that 8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi “muscle” operatives traveled into or out of Iran between October 2000 and February 2001.
In October 2000, a senior operative of Hezbollah visited Saudi Arabia to coordinate activities there. He also planned to assist individuals in Saudi Arabia in traveling to Iran during November. A top Hezbollah commander and Saudi Hezbollah contacts were involved.
Also in October 2000, two future muscle hijackers, Mohand al Shehri and Hamza al Ghamdi, flew from Iran to Kuwait. In November, Ahmed al Ghamdi apparently flew to Beirut, traveling—perhaps by coincidence—on the same flight as a senior Hezbollah operative. Also in November,Salem al Hazmi apparently flew from Saudi Arabia to Beirut. In mid-November, we believe, three of the future muscle hijackers,Wail al Shehri,Waleed al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami, all of whom had obtained their U.S. visas in late October, traveled in a group from Saudi Arabia to Beirut and then onward to Iran. An associate of a senior Hezbollah operative was on the same flight that took the future hijackers to Iran. Hezbollah officials in Beirut and Iran were expecting the arrival of a group during the same time period. The travel of this group was important enough to merit the attention of senior figures in Hezbollah. Later in November, two future muscle hijackers,Satam al Suqami and Majed Moqed,flew into Iran from Bahrain. In February 2001, Khalid al Mihdhar may have taken a flight from Syria to Iran, and then traveled further within Iran to a point near the Afghan border. KSM and Binalshibh have confirmed that several of the 9/11 hijackers (at least eight, according to Binalshibh) transited Iran on their way to or from Afghanistan, taking advantage of the Iranian practice of not stamping Saudi passports. They deny any other reason for the hijackers’ travel to Iran. They also deny any relationship between the hijackers and Hezbollah.
In sum, there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers. There also is circumstantial evidence that senior Hezbollah operatives were closely tracking the travel of some of these future muscle hijackers into Iran in November 2000. However,we cannot rule out the possibility of a remarkable coincidence—that is, that Hezbollah was actually focusing on some other group of individuals traveling from Saudi Arabia during this same time frame, rather than the future hijackers. We have found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning for what later became the 9/11 attack. At the time of their travel through Iran, the al Qaeda operatives themselves were probably not aware of the specific details of their future operation. After 9/11, Iran and Hezbollah wished to conceal any past evidence of cooperation with Sunni terrorists associated with al Qaeda. A senior Hezbollah official disclaimed any Hezbollah involvement in 9/11. We believe this topic requires further investigation by the U.S. government.

Further investigation indeed. This is a scathing indictment of Iran's involvement with international terror and proof that ideologically different terror orgainizations are more than willing to cooperate to defeat their common enemies. After the "remarkable coincidences" that were ignored prior to 9-11, we should not downplay Iran's important role in fomenting terrorism or their willingness to assist al Qaeda or other enemies of the United States. Whether or not Iran had initmate knowledge of the 9-11 plot, its facilitation of the hijackers movements, offerring of support and sanctuary to al Qaeda both prior to and after 9-11, ongoing sponsorship of Hezbollah, and pursuit of WMD, specifically nuclear program, make it the most dangerous of terror nations. Barring an overt move against the United States or one of its allies, Iran will not be addressed until after the presidential election in November. The next president has a very difficult decision to make with respect to Iran, and it is highly unlikely the diplomatic and law enforcement options without the threat of intervention will carry much weight with the Mullahs of Iran.

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