[Eric in the Ozarks]

Do you not recall Rummy's rejection of additional troops in country for the first 4 years of this campaign ? Would it have been a better idea to have doubled the force in the first place ? Now, at the end of his presidency for all practical purposes, we have the surge, which is working.
Why not 1,000 days ago ?

[Racehorse]

Hey, I subscribe to the Powell doctrine. But, we didn’t follow the doctrine. To spin off Rummy’s wit, we fight the war we’ve got.

I also believe that when Bush chose Petraeus he also chose to pursue a follow-on strategy dependent on the success of “the surge.” Whatever that strategy might be, so long as the results are positive, Petraeus has an implacable will in Bush supporting him.

And if Petraeus does continue to effect the goals we set out to accomplish, the Democrats become increasing impotent and politically vulnerable. IMHO, of course. :-)

The mistakes of a 1,000 days ago, if they were all mistakes, are utterly useless contemplation. What matters is what happens today and tomorrow and the next day. Don’t ya think?

[uncbob]

That is why he was fired

[agere_contra]

I think there was the longest period when the Iraqis (case in point: the residents of Ramadi) just didn’t realise what the fanatics of Al-Queda were like.

During that period I’m not sure it would have been helpful having more troops around. Maybe it was better that people had the animal brutality of Al-Queda shoved in their faces, so that they could compare and contrast with the Coalition forces. After all the horror they went through few in Anbar province would want Al-Queda back.

Strictly armchair general here though. I’m ready to be contradicted. An immediate 1 to 10 ratio of troops to citizens (as in post-war Germany) obviously worked there.

[vbmoneyspender]

Why not 1,000 days ago ?

[Petraeus] then reflected on the past strategy. “For a variety of reasons, some pretty good reasons, we were gradually consolidating in larger bases and handing off to the Iraqis. The transition to Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi control and local control was emphasized heavily. That was sort of moving along reasonably well until it was really undone by the bombing of that mosque and the resulting sectarian violence.

[vbmoneyspender]

Would it have been a better idea to have doubled the force in the first place ?

I'm just wondering. Who do you think is fighting us in Iraq? And why do you think they are fighting us? What is their goal?

[karnage]

Hindsight is always 20-20.

Although one may criticize how long it took the President to dramatically change strategy in Iraq, it is more impressive that he: a) never panicked, even when things weren’t going well; b) was steadfast enough to stick with his original plan, despite criticism, backing his military leaders, rather than second-guessing and micro-managing them.

That’s leadership.

I think GWB will be regarded by history as one of our greatest presidents. I’ve said it many times over the years, and I say it again today.

[LS]

1. It wasn't "Rumsfeld's rejection." It was the generals, who drew up the plan. If the original plan went as everyone thought, Saddam's guys would have fought early, and died early. We needed speed and mobility. More troops=slow, more supplies.

2. As I wrote in "America's Victories: Why the U.S. Wins Wars," the "surge" was working before it worked. That is, one of the MAIN reasons it's working---which everyone seems to ignore---is that we killed more than 40,000 of these guys, wounded 200,000, captured 25,000, and in all likelihood another 10,000 simply quit or defected. These are astounding numbers, and they mean that by the time the "surge" got in place, we had already hollowed out AQ in Iraq, very, very badly.

[dougd]

Why not 1,000 days ago

1000 days ago it probably would not have worked and likely would have made the situation worse:

(1) The Iraqis were not then sick of AQ. More troops would have fed the fear among many that we were there to occupy and take over.

(2) We had not then developed the current strategy. More troops under the old strategy would not have been effective.

The point is, we are still pursuing the old strategy which is not wrong - to train and stand up the Iraqi security forces (top level state building) and combined it with Petraeus' new ideas of standing up local security and rehabilitation (bottom up state building).

They both have their place, but the second part had to await the Iraqis having educated themselves as to the disaster of the alternatives they were sold by AQ and other sectarian factions.