She is the one who tried to get Moussousi investigated
As for her advice that the local field agents seek a FISA warrant, Rowley did not know what she was talking about. She had not discussed the case with National Security Law Unit attorneys or anyone else in Washington. She had not reviewed the FISA statute or any other training material about FISA warrants. She said her advice was based on her knowledge of problems with the "smell test," problems with the local US Attorney's office, and "optimizing" the chances of of getting a warrant by pursuing the FISA process first (132). Asked by the Inspector General whose decision it was not to seek the criminal warrant (Minneapolis's or Washington's), she stated: "I thought it was kind of, I don't know, kind of a joint thing. I thought Headquarters, somebody at Headquartes had also recommended we try FISA first, too. But I think ultimately it was [the local agent's] decision to try FISA first or our field division's." (132.)If Moonbat Crowley hadn't insisted on a FISA warrant, Moussaoui's computer would've been searched and 9/11 would've likely been prevented.FBI headquarters declined to seek a FISA warrant based on the lack of evidence linking Moussaoui to a foreign power. After this decision was conveyed to the Minneaoplis office, no one in Minneapolis or Washington reconsidered the merits of seeking a criminal search warrant. As opposed to a FISA warrant, a criminal search warrant would not have required proof of any connection on the part of Moussaoui to a foreign power. Moreover, now that a FISA warrant had been ruled out, the "smell test" was no longer an issue. Rowley told the Inspector General that she did not know why a criminal warrant was not sought once the FISA route was exhausted. She noted that she did not have a leadership role in the case and she felt that the people involved knew what they were doing (168-169).