Saddam totally dominated the Regimes strategic decision making. He initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made, whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait), maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position itself in the international community.
Loyal dissent was discouraged and constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his intent became Iraqs strategic policy.
Saddams primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspectionsto gain support for lifting sanctionswith his intention to preserve Iraqs intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring.
The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime. OFF rescued Baghdads economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development.
By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999.
Saddam wanted to recreate Iraqs WMD capabilitywhich was essentially destroyed in 1991after sanctions were removed and Iraqs economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capabilityin an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risksbut he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.
Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi offi cials considered Iran to be Iraqs principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary.
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddams belief in the value of WMD. In Saddams view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shia revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire.
The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.
Great post and it should be said over and over by the Whitehouse communications staff ....
BTTT
Interesting. Was the deterrent Saddam's use of WMD or was the deterrent Saddam's threat to use WMD ? His actual use of WMD was the only logical reason to stop the M1 tanks on the road to Baghdad. We later learned that their really was nothing of a conventional nature within Iraq that could stop our tanks. And we now know that even if coalition partners such as the French would have pulled out of the coalition, who cares ? The way things are going in France right now, the French may not even have a country in 10 years.