Yep....He reminds me on this guy here...
and sometimes
Posted on 05/01/2005 9:14:03 AM PDT by Destro
Yep....He reminds me on this guy here...
and sometimes
At the April's international police conference held in Sofia, Bulgaria, 04-14-2005
reiterated that Islamic terrorism is creeping up in the Balkans. Speaking at a regional police anti-crime conference, Bulgarian General Boiko Borisov urged for "joint efforts to fight the global terrorism network" calling on the participants from the likes of Germany, Albania and Turkey to join efforts in limiting militants' access to financing and to enhance security of transport and border control.
Earlier in March, the Bulgarian spy chief Kircho Kirov issued a more specific warning on presence of al Qaeda in the Balkans and bluntly stated that extremists with links to Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network are present in the Balkans and are infiltrating other European countries. In a joint NATO-Bulgarian report published in March 2005, Kirov cities Kosovo as a direct source of regional instability and a hub for international terrorism.
Indeed, speaking by proxy is nothing new, so these broad and sweeping statements by Bulgaria are significant because it is the US with its FBI offices in Sofia that ultimately stand behind these statements. What is not new is that Washington itself, as usual, has elected to remain mute on the specific al-Qaeda presence among Kosovo Albanians so one is left to search for the terrorist dots elsewhere in order to connect them.
For example, Reuven Paz, who teaches at Haifa University and is regarded as one of Israel's leading researchers of radical Islamic movements, says that the Islamic countries and particularly Saudi Arabia view the conflicts in Kosovo as that of Islam against Christianity. "All of the Sunni Muslim groups as well as Iran are making lots of propaganda for Kosovo and see it as a symbol," Paz said. The reason for the propaganda is to attract Muslim volunteers to go to Kosovo and fight. Al-Qaeda then is the only well established network that can provide such a trip for a young prospective Muslim eager to do his Islamic tour of duty and willingly die for Allah.
While reports abound that Bosnian Jihadists simply swerved upon Kosovo during the 1995-1999 period, Jane's International Defense Review reported that some fresh Jihadists were entering Kosovo via Albania as well. In February 1999 Jane's cites that documents found on the body of a KLA member showed that he had escorted several volunteers into Kosovo, including more than a dozen Saudi Arabians.
A more specific case is that of a Syrian-German businessman, Mamoun Darkazanli, who was arrested in Hamburg in October of 2004 on charges that he “helped fund the al-Qaeda terrorist network for years and who is seen in a video at a mosque with some of the Sept. 11 hijackers.” According to the Hamburg authorities, “Darkazanli is alleged to have been involved in the purchase of a ship for bin Laden, handling administrative details, and paying bills. He also allegedly traveled to Kosovo in late 2000 on an al-Qaeda mission”.
In 2003, NBC News acquired a videotaped statement of Muhammad Talal al-Jafar al Tallani Ackbar al-Walid, described as al-Qaeda's Deputy Under-Emir for Defensive Intelligence and Holy War Operations, denouncing US and calling for world Jihad against the West. The report then goes on to describe Muhammad Talal as one that was “involved in noteworthy military operations in the past, serving in covert operations alongside the CIA in Afghanistan and in Bosnia and Kosovo before joining al-Qaeda.” The report cites that American soldiers Lt. Gen. William Boykin and Will Dunham contributed to the report.
Yet, the most blunt admittance that al-Qaeda is in Kosovo comes from the big dogs themselves - Britain and the US.
Alarmed that al-Qaeda may hit Britain during the run-up to the May 5 general elections, UK says that "the main threat is posed by around 200 people based here who have been trained by al Qaeda in Afghan camps for conflict in places such as Chechnya, Bosnia and Kosovo."
Also stated as an inadvertent afterthought that al-Qaeda is in Kosovo came few weeks earlier by the FBI citing an arrest warrant for a certain Kifah Wael Jayyousi accused of "conspiring with two other men in the 1990s to finance, recruit and provide equipment to extremists fighting in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo and Somalia."
The question then is no longer whether al-Qaeda is in Kosovo, but rather how could al-Qaeda have infiltrated Albanian inhabited areas of the Balkans precisely during the period when the US was blanketing it with its own troops.
The Albania Romance
Following the collapse of Stalinism in Albania, the newly elected President Sali Berisha quickly decided to leverage his strategic European location and Islamic heritage by placing his country on sale to the highest Muslim bidder and acquire money from that Islamic sponsor. According to the IWPR “The Islamic connection [in Albania] can be traced back to 1992, when the Tirana-based Economic Tribune published a letter from Berisha to his prime minister, Aleksander Meksi, in which he said was going to help accept aid from Muslim countries because the West had not lived up to promises of financial assistance.”
Islamic countries, and especially Saudi Arabia, were long interested in using Albania as a hub via which to infiltrate Europe and Islamize it. Albania quickly became a distinguished member of world Islamic institutions, including the Islamic Conference and The Islamic Development Bank.
Although there is no indication that the US was alarmed of the new Islamic sponsors at the time, Washington initiated a takeover of Albania and dully began supplying direct assistance following Berisha’s visit to the US in March 1991 while in 1992 Washington deployed a Military Liaison Team to the country and started outfitting the Albanian military. Albania was subsequently used by the US and Turkey to provide supplies to Bosnian Muslims in their war against Serbs.
While US was instituting a military takeover of Albania, Albanian-Jihadist nexus was maintained by Albania’s Chief of Security Baskim Gazidede. Israeli Mossad documented that the Security Chief Gazidede had extensive connections with the Jihadists and was the chief link between al-Qaeda, Albania and KLA. Says Albanian Gazeta Shqiptare: “'The Gazidede file', widely disputed of connections with the Islamics must have already been completed with data which 'Mossad' has gathered over the last years". Gazidede subsequently ran off to Syria, another terror sponsoring nation.
Before his departure to Syria, however, Gazidede established training camps across Albania and the often cited ones are in Tropoje and Bajram Curi. Given the influx of al-Qaeda into Albania it is then logical to conclude that these Jihadists had to have, at least, some form of an orientation meeting somewhere in Albania before let lose in Kosovo.
Indeed, reports abound that US, British SAS and German BND trained, equipped and used the Kosovo Liberation Army units, by now pregnant with al Qaeda Jihadists, to destabilize Serbia. In March of 2000, for example, London Times uncovered American agents that “admitted they helped to train the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA] before Nato's bombing” of Serbia while in August of 2000 the KLA deputy chief of staff Colonel Dilaver Goxhaj gave an interview to UPI stating that senior Albanian commanders were trained in Albania since 1991.
French Le Monde, furthermore, states that by “1996 the BND intelligence service was building up its offices in Tirana and Rome to select and train prospective KLA cadres. Special forces in Berlin provided the operational training and supplied arms and transmission equipment from ex-East German Stasi stocks as well as black uniforms.”
During March-May 1999 when NATO bombed Serbia, NATOs General Wesley Clark’s cell phone number was found among the killed KLA commanders in Kosovo.
Seized KLA weapons such as American Barrett M82 .50 cal sniper rifles along with German models, as well as reports of American 'Stinger' SAMs used by KLA Albanians during their war with Macedonia also point to the US-Albanian collaboration.
Finally, in February 2005, German Network TV ZDF concluded that the Albanian “KLA has stronger ties with the CIA than the [German] BND. Commander Hoxha had ties with the CIA, the BND and with the Austrian military intelligence service which has devoted great attention to this region and has very good connections with the KLA."
Far from ignorant of al-Qaeda in Albania, the US appears to have had an uneasy relationship with them. Illustrates Tirana based Gazeta Shqiptare: “The arrests of Ahmed Ibrahim Al Naggar and Mohammed Hassan Mahmoud, and the extradition of the director of the Revival of Islamic Legacy foundation as a jihad collaborator in Tirana in June 1998, the arrest of Amoid Naji in Turin of Italy and his deposition before Italian investigators that he was in Albania to blow up the US embassy in Tirana, and other facts of this kind go to prove that the activity of terrorist jihad organizations is present and well-organized in Albania.”
Gazeta Shqiptare goes on to say that “Islamic terrorist organizations managed to set up Albania's first cell of the Islamic Jihad, which was headed by Aiman Al Zavahiri.” the famous Osama bin Laden No. 2.
Regarding Naggar, the New York Times says that he is “the Jihad member, [who] tied Mr. bin Laden directly to the network in Albania”. The Times then provides a vivid detail: “Albania cell's members, most employed at Islamic charities in Tirana, were forced to transfer 26 percent of their salaries to Islamic Jihad.” The chief of the Albanian al-Qaeda, the Egyptian Shawki Salama Mustafa, moved in there with his wife Jihan Hassan, who later testified that their business was to turn out passports and that she “saw a passport with my name on it and it said I was Albanian".
According to the Global Policy, in addition to the drug and human trafficking, Albanian criminal network in Brussells specializes in forging of documents and false passports. An al-Qaeda operative, Djamel Beghala, was arrested in Dubai after the customs agent recognized one of these Albanian type false passports.
What these reports suggest is that Clinton extended his "don't ask, don't tell" policy to Albania allowing it to assimilate al Qaeda within the Albanian KLA army and only then to provide the training, equipment and arms to them in order to wage war on Serbia. The "assimilation" part is what kept Clinton safe from being accused of being in bed with the al-Qaeda.
Since 9/11, the original mandate of waging war on Serbia appears to have been appended with a danger sign: "Our presence in the Balkans has not only promoted peace in the region, it has also enhanced our ability to conduct counter-terrorism operations." said Gen. Richard Myers in 2003 following his trip to Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo.
Has the US established a firm enough infrastructure in the Balkans to combat the terrorist Islamic plague emanating out of the Albanian-dominated Kosovo?
The Bulgarian Romance
Denying Russia airspace in 1999 was historically unprecedented move by Bulgaria that initiated its gambit to be the Western spy proxy in the Balkans. During the bombing of Serbia that followed, moreover, Bulgarian intelligence agents were used to point sensitive targets in Serbia and later were inserted as a spy unit within the Dutch contingent of KFOR, the NATO army that runs Kosovo. The KFOR Commander Reinhardt was rather impressed by the Bulgarian spies so he extended their mission in order "to activate the collaboration with the Kosovo population in the spying and the collection of information".
To speed up the American intelligence approachment, Bulgaria made another gambit and removed Russia from the Bulgarian picture. Impressed by Bulgaria's removal of Russian spies out of their country, the director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, said, "Bulgaria is a key strategic partner for the U.S., not just in the security area," and announced in March 2001 that FBI may open an office in Bulgarian capital Sofia.
In 2002, General Borisov was summoned to the US and, to his delight, told that FBI will establish a permanent FBI office in Bulgaria.
In 2004, the US Embassy in Bulgaria announced that a permanent office is in place and the mission is "to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats."
This year, FBI is undergoing an expansion that will open up 2,086 new spy jobs, 615 agent and 508 Intelligence Analyst positions, of which FBI plans to have permanent Legal Attachés in Bulgaria and Bosnia.
The NATO-Bulgaria spying agreement also indicates that NATO has decided to make Bulgaria the spymaster not only for the Muslim Kosovo Albanians but of Chechens with whom Bulgaria once shared a common Stalinist brotherhood. The conspicuous Bulgarian spying on Chechnya along with Kosovo indicates that the US may be alarmed at the already reported Kosovo-Chechen terror network. In February of 2000, Russian intelligence from the Federal Security Service (FSB) made a claim that "Chechen warlords started buying up real estate in Kosovo... through several real estate firms registered as a cover in Yugoslavia” and have extensive ties with the Albanian organized crime figures in Kosovo whose relatives are involved in Kosovo politics and are seeking independence from Serbia.
Therefore, Bulgarian blunt claims that al-Qaeda is in Kosovo are not some haphazard blabber but rather a carefully orchestrated plan where the burden of spying and intelligence discovery is shifted away from the West because it is a diplomatic burden in their dealings with Kosovo Albanians who were their proxy fighters and a manufactured, and a well processed, ready-to-use pretext against Serbia.
Sidelining of Serbia
Sensing the imminent decision to anoint Bulgaria as the Balkan spymaster, Serbian intelligence chief Momir Stojanovic gave an interview to the official government news agency Tanjug in February 2004 and said that Islamist militants - including al Qaeda - are actively operating in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia.
While the official pretext for Stojanovic’s interview was to protest previous day's NATOs declaration that Kosovo operations are “a success and a benchmark for future NATO missions”, Stojanovic’s interview reads more like an invitation to the US rather then criticism.
Heavy on specifics, Stojanovic began touting that Serbia has "procured" loads of detail on al-Qaeda in the Balkans: “We have also procured evidence that Al Qaeda has its strongholds in Kosovo and northern Albania… and their activities have also been reported in western Macedonia", said Stojanovic then proceeded to make a direct sales pitch of Serbia to the US with the statement that Serbia has a well established spying infrastructure across the Balkans because the Serbian intelligence agents have been monitoring the Islamists for more than a year.
The then-Serbian Minister of Defense Boris Tadic, now President of Serbia, quickly denied Stojanovic’s claims although in September 2003 Tadic himself told a Macedonian newspaper that militant Islamic organizations are active in the region and are acting in concert. Tadic’s denunciation of Stojanovic’s statement was followed with a similar NATO statement that publicly trashed Stojanovic’s statement as another Serbian gibberish.
The trashing of Stojanovic effectively sidelined Serbia and sealed Bulgaria’s anointing as the Balkan spymaster.
That Stojanovic was not talking gibberish, however, was proved in December 2004 when an intelligence tip was made that al Qaeda operatives were planning to land in Kosovo capital, Pristina, and use the Albanian terror cells in Kosovo to attack US and the West but abruptly changed these plans and moved in to another Albanian stronghold in the village of Kondovo near Macedonia’s capital Skopje. The US took this intelligence tip seriously enough and shut the US embassy and all US government offices in Skopje.
Washington Mute
While American stubborn denial, and often a belittling public denouncing, especially of Serb sources, that al-Qaeda is in Kosovo may be politically motivated, it is, nevertheless, fueling delusional belief among Albanian public that al-Qaeda is not among them.
For example, Balkan Affairs Adviser for the Albanian lobby group in Washington, the AACL, claims that “Bogus reports have proliferated since the bombing of New York’s World Trade Center about Bin Laden’s forays into Albania and the existence of mujahedin training camps in Kosova” and that those reports have Serbian origin. The problem with this spin is not that the followers of this lobby group get indoctrinated in believing statements that are contrary to the facts, but that the policy-makers close with the AACL may compromise the security of the US in that region. For example, the most notable recepient of Albanian money and a great friend of AACL, Senator Joseph Biden sits on the powerful Foreign Relations Committe and is contempleting a presidential run in 2008.
Although reports on al-Qaeda's Kosovo presence by FBI, USA Today, New York Times or German papers hardly qualify as spin, the American silence on specifics of al-Qaeda in Kosovo also impacts the Serbian side. Infuriated by the silence, Serbian officials issue bellicose responses: “Belgrade should have done more and should have looked for partners in the fight against terrorism" laments Rada Trajkovic, a deputy of the President of the People council of the north Kosovo. Trajkovic is in effect, blaming Belgrade for its inability to translate presence of Islamic terrorists in Kosovo into a pro-Serb policy shift of the West on the issue of the Kosovo status.
Of course, having Milosevic give a presentation on al Qaeda in Kosovo is indeed the case where the messinger is killing the message, the case of the US Embassy shut down in Skopje indicates that the the likes of Stojanovic should be taken seriously. In fact, the January 2005 report of the Washington based Center For Strategic & International Studies indicates that what Stojanovic has "procured" is taken seriously: "Al Qaeda’s influence in the Balkans was established a few years ago... Islamist extremist groups in the Balkans such as 'Vehabija', 'Crvena Ruza' (Red Rose), and 'Teratikt', which remain closely linked with Al Qaeda, are active in Kosmet..., Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Macedonia."
Furthermore, in eastern Kosovo's city of Pec, Wahhabies have established an orientation camp where holy Muslim warriors congregate around a recently erected Wahhabi mosque. The Mosque is run by certain Mahmutovic from Sjenica, a Serbian city in area of Sadzak that is a brewing hotbed of Islamic hatred of the West and the Jews. Sandzak is also the center of the Islamic Community, an outfit that governs Balkan Muslim Imams including the Albanian ones in Kosovo.
Based on these reports then, the map of al-Qaeda centers in Kosovo indicates a satellite-type organizational structure: KLA controls the center of Kosovo with Drenica as the stronghold with strategic satellite to the west near Junik necessary for control of smuggling routes from Albania. Just across from Junik range is Tropoje and Bajram Cura, another reportedly al-Qaeda centers in Albania itself.
The control of Shar Mountain range to the southeast can be used by al-Qaeda to send groups into Macedonia to wage violence there as well as maintain logistical support for their criminal enterprise in other al-Qaeda centers in western Macedonia such as the cities of Tetovo, Gostivar and Kichevo.
The reported Al-Qaeda presence in the Pomoravlje region in the East Kosovo appears to be the staging area for fomenting violence into southern Serbia while the northern al-Qaeda satellites such as in Bajgora, north of Mitrovica, is there to foment fear among Serb communities in Mitorvica, most sizable in Kosovo, and thus give them an incentive to leave. The reports also indicate that a so-called Abu Baqr Sadiq mojahedin unit is operating in southern Mitrovica, indicating that the city is surrounded and ready to be cleansed of Serbs at the next outbreak of violence in Kosovo that may dwarf the one that occured in March 2004.
Could this be a deliberate set up that will be used as the pretext to allow the Serbian troops back into Kosovo according to the UN Resolution 1244? Or is a deliberate in the other direction: to finally exterminate all Serbs out of Kosovo?
One can interpret Washington's silence both ways.
Well...see Monty...If it would go after Marks' world....We would start calling "Cop-killers"...."Freedom Fighters"...
ohhh..btw...the articel above is from Bozinovich (who btw was one of the founder of "Serbs for Bush")...
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1385664/posts
My country is the USA and we did not destroy your country of Serbia. You guys managed to do that for yourselves.
No American made Milosevic fight wars with four of his neighbors. No American ordered Serb soldiers to murder 8,000 people at Srebrenica or slaughter hundreds of others at Vukovar or drive 860,000 Albanians out of their homes and over the border or to deliberately destroy hundreds of churches in Croatia and hundreds of mosques in Bosnia. And no American made those that committed those atrocities into national heroes. And it darn sure wasn't Americans who made Milosevic take those millions in Oil for Food money from Saddam Hussein and ship munitions and even Serb military advisers to Iraq.
The reasons that sanctions and with-holding of American aid and cooperation with Serbia began under the first President Bush and continued under this President Bush is not because of Clinton or Albright or because W likes Osama--and the reason Serbia is moving its way back into good standing with America is not because of who is in charge in America, its because of what you are finally doing in Serbia to change your ways. You quit fighting wars with your neighbors. You've quit supporting the Greater Serbia project. You threw out your criminal leader. You've dismantled the state-run media that propagandized the Serb populace. You're starting to cooperate with the war crimes tribunal and even trying the Vukovar miscreants yourselves.
dj, you've got to get over this victimology complex. Take responsibility for your actions. Your government in Belgrade is starting to do so and your cousins in Srpska are as well.
US Balkans policy in general and toward Serbia specifically has been pretty consistent over the past three administrations. It is based on American values and interests. It is applied based on Serb actions. Continue to change your actions and W & Condi will continue to apply less stick and more carrots.
marky-mark has bought into his own (and the Islamofascists) propaganda. Expect no reason or wisdom from that source.
Not that you'll ever abandon your dream of Greater Albania built upon land stolen from murdered victims, eh marky?
dj, you say you were not for Milosevic or for atrocities, but you have stated you supported Milosevic in Kosovo. Milosevic's policy in Kosovo was inseparable from atrocities--it is one of the main reasons he is in the Hague today. It is why President Bush said:
:"I applaud today’s transfer of indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic to the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. This very important step by the leaders in Belgrade ensures that Milosevic can finally be tried for his war crimes and crimes against humanity. The transfer of Milosevic to the Hague is an unequivocal message to those persons who brought such tragedy and brutality to the Balkans that they will be held accountable for their crimes."
"Milosevic was responsible for great suffering throughout the Balkan region. He deserves to be tried for his crimes against the Serbian people. He also deserves to be tried for violations of international law."
dj, it is completely disingenuous to say you're for Milosevic in Kosovo, but then say you weren't supporting atrocities--kind of like being for Stalin in the Ukraine, but not for all that starvation.
Now, if you want to say you meant that you were for keeping Kosovo as part of Serbia, but not for Milosevic's policy of attacking the civil populace and ethnic cleansing the Albanians out of Kosovo to do so, then I take back saying you support atrocities.
Sorry, F-Lib, you are wrong yet again. Not only do I not support a "Greater Albania", I have worked in the Balkans to help prevent external Albanian support for the 2001 insurgency in Macedonia, to include the removal of the Ground Safety Zone around Kosovo and facilitating the re-introduction of Serb forces into that area. You have fallen victim to the Balkans disease in which anyone not on your (Serb, in this case) side, is automatically placed in the opposition category.
I'm on the American side, the policy of which is to establish the mutually supporting goals of democracy and stability in the Balkans so the Balkans people can live in peace & freedom and we can withdraw our troops.
And speaking of withdraw, I'm outta here for a while--gotta go consult with Ambassador-designee Bolton on U.S. terms of reference for Kosovo future status negotiations. Don't worry, F-Lib, I'm open to your input. In fact, I've taken all your posts here on FReeRepublic and subtracted the name-calling and unsupported assertions and have listed what's left below:
...except when you're supporting the creation of terrorist enclaves in the Balkans and using your hatred of the Serbian people as your justification.
Send us a telegram if you ever come within cable distance of reality, okay marky?
Actually, it's more like saying you were for the US in Vietnam and then saying you weren't supporting the leftist distortions that claimed our every action was an atrocity.
Milosevic was attempting to stop terrorist cells who supported the takeover of a Serbian province via a flood of illegal immigration. Yes, he was completely incompetent in doing so in an effective manner that didn't allow Clinton to get Monica and Juanita off the front page while allowing the NATO guys to flex their muscles in order to bolster their 50th anniversary party.
It is completely appropriate to support his goal of defending his nation while acknowledging that his methods were wrong (Here's where marky-mark exclaims surprise that Serbs disdain Milosevic's actions, thereby proving that while marky can read, he cannot comprehend).
We had our "9-11"-moment, if you know what I mean, when the NATO planes bombed our families in Serbia...We had to be "UNITED" to face the threat at that time...
I was at the demonstrations March 1991 against Milosevic in Belgrade...What happened...???...Where was Americas support to help the Serbian people to get rid of Milosevic...???...NOWHERE...!!!!...They were busy signing agreements with Milosevic...!!!!
See it this way....Serbian Army had some "collateral damage" in Kosovo...just like you had in Serbia...
I blame Milosevic for selling us out in Kosovo....We should have kept fighting...and waiting for the NATO ground troops to come in...
We were ready to die for our country and our heritage...Just like, when the NAZIS attacked us in 1941...
Mark doesn't understand that the NATO bombing was our "9-11"-moment....SERBIA WAS UNITED...Just like America was on 9-12...
Good reply.
Man, we've been saying this sort of thing here on FR since 1999.
No. It's an anti-Clinton book from a research scholar, backed by far more facts than the likes of you can produce to support wild-eyed claims of mass graves of hundreds of thousands in Bosnia.
That Iranian mujaheeden terrorists fought for Bosnian Muslims in Kosovo and Bosnia is no secret, for instance. That President Clinton sided with them instead of with Christian Serbs is likewise no secret.
In 1996/1997, my friends and relatives were demonstrating in Belgrade for three months braving freezing weather and the batons of Milosevic police.. A delegation of students went to see Albright and beg for help to topple Milosevic.
The Mad Cow responded: United States does not interfere in the affairs of other nations.
MIlosevic was her ally in the Balkans.
But of course, Mad Cow did not mind to "interfere in the affairs of other nations" and help create Kosovo hoax as a pretext to aggression on Serbia.
The United States' Congress disagrees with you.
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_rpt/bosnia.htm#pg17
The "no instructions" policy: In April 1994, Croatian President Tudjman asked the U.S. Government what its view would be if Croatia resumed transshipment of arms to Bosnia (which U.S. officials knew would come primarily from Iran). National Security Advisor Tony Lake told the Committee that the U.S. decision to have Ambassador Galbraith reply that he had "no instructions" was taken in the belief that this would likely result in Croatia going ahead with the resumed arms flow, and with that specific intent.
Although the instructions were "no instructions," Ambassador Galbraith also told President Tudjman "to focus not only on what I had said yesterday, but what I had not said." Ambassador Redman later explained that "we don't want to be put in a position of having to say no."
U.S. officials were fully aware that such arms flows would violate United Nations Security Council binding resolutions that the United States had voted for and by which this country was still bound.
The National Security Advisor had the instructions to Ambassador Galbraith transmitted orally, rather than by cable. On May 2, 1994, the National Security Advisor told Ambassador Redman that a cable on his meeting with President Tudjman would not be necessary (which instruction was relayed by Redman to Ambassador Galbraith). On May 6, 1994, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott told Galbraith that a cable would be in order, but not until the Assistant Secretary or his deputy got back to Galbraith -- which never occurred.
Also on May 6, at the suggestion of his Deputy Chief of Mission, Ambassador Galbraith prepared and kept for himself a memorandum for the record regarding the key events, which the Deputy Chief of Mission countersigned, attesting to its accuracy. This memorandum states that in the May 6 phone conversation between Ambassador Galbraith and Under Secretary Talbott, Ambassador Galbraith explained that "anything short of a statement that the Croats should not facilitate the flow of Iranian arms to the Bosnians would be understood as a US green light." As Galbraith later testified to the Comniittee, "They would interpret this then that we had not objected, that we had, in essence, given them a green light. No matter what we said, this was how they would in fact interpret it."
Encouragement of Croatian military resupply in Bosnia: A memorandum for the record by a senior U.S. Government official in Croatia indicates that, in early 1995, after consultation with another U.S. official, he encouraged a military resupply effort that Croatia was conducting in Bosnia by reassuring Croatia that any international reaction would be limited and that the United States did not want Croatia to stop.
Inspection of long-range rockets: In late summer of 1995, a shipment of long-range rockets bound for Bosnia was held by the Croatians, who, according to U.S. Govemment cables, threatened to stop transferring any arms shipments to Bosnia. A senior Croatian official approached Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and Ambassador Galbraith with an offer for the United States to inspect the aircraft carrying the "missiles" for chemical warheads. Two such inspections occurred, both involving the use of U.S. Govemment personnel. They determined that there were no chemical warheads on the rockets, although the rockets were probably capable of being fitted with such warheads.
According to one report, a senior U.S. Govemment official in Croatia was determined to prevent this incident from leading to a cut-off of arms shipments to Bosnia. A senior Croatian official said that U.S. officials pressured the Croatians to release the rockets to Bosnia. A second Croatian official identified the senior U.S. official -- who denied the allegation -- as the person who applied such pressure. According to these allegations, this led to the release of the rockets despite the normal practice of Croatia taking a 30-percent cut of the arms flow.
Section 503(e) of the National Security Act defines "covert action" as "an activity or activities of the United States Govemment to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Govemment Will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." Certain activities are exempted from the definition, including "traditional diplomatic or military activities."
Although the activities surrounding the "no instructions" policy were conducted primarily by diplomats, the Committee believes that the interchange between the United States Ambassador to Croatia and the Croatian President in April 1994 did not constitute traditional diplomatic activity, at least as that term is understood by most Americans.(7) Traditional diplomatic activity may include secret meetings with foreign heads of state. It is also traditional to consider the conversations during those meetings privileged. Moreover, it may be frequent in that type of diplomatic activity to espouse a policy different from publicly announced policy. But it was not traditional diplomatic activity to: (1) give a response to a foreign head of state which effectively contradicted stated U.S. policy on isolating a country, in this case Iran, against which U.S. law imposed sanctions; (2) implicitly turn a blind eye to activity that violated a United Nations Security Council resolution which the United States had supported and was obligated to obey; and (3) direct a U.S. Ambassador not to make a written report of a conversation with a foreign head of state.
In considering the law on covert action, some may argue that a diplomatic activity is either traditional or a covert action. There are many forms of non- traditional diplomatic activity, however, only one of which is covert action within the meaning of section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 413(e)). To be a covert activity, it must influence political, economic, or military conditions where it is intended that the role of the U.S. Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.
Given the facts available at this time, the Committee is unable to reach agreement as to whether the actions of the U.S. Government, in addition to satisfying other elements of the definition in section 503(e), were designed to influence the Croatians to allow the flow of Iranian arms into Bosnia, which would constitute a covert action, or simply intended to allow events to proceed without U.S. influence.
It appears that the parties directly involved in the arms shipments had agreed upon this plan without any U.S. involvement. Croatia, Bosnia and Iran each had their own reasons to want to resume this arms pipeline. Based on the information available to the Committee at this time, it seems unlikely that the United States initiated this proposal. Administration officials have admitted that they were concerned about the military situation in Bosnia, but they have testified that they did not want to encourage any countries to supply arms in violation of the embargo for fear that such an action would cause our allies to withdraw their troops. When Croatian officials brought the proposed arms flow to the attention of U.S. officials, they did not ask whether they should go forward, but simply whether the U.S. would object. Ambassador Galbraith apparently urged Washington to send a clearer signal of encouragement, but his proposal was not accepted. If U.S. policymakers believed the arms would flow without any need for U.S. encouragement, their response of "no instructions" can be seen as simply a decision not to intervene to stop the flow. No encouragement was needed.
On the other hand, there is little doubt the United States wanted the arms flow to proceed. They may have viewed the Croatian request as an indication that the Croatians would not proceed without encouragement from the United States, in which case their response of "no instructions" would provide that encouragement while preserving deniability for the U.S. Government. This view is buttressed by the conversations, following the delivery of the "no instructions" response, in which Ambassadors Redman and Galbraith urged President Tudjman to listen to what was not said and told him that the United States did not want to have to say no. One policy official's request to U.S. intelligence to bolster the message through its own channels also seems to reflect a concern that Croatia needed additional encouragement. In the end, U.S. officials seem to have decided that "no instructions" was indeed sufficiently encouraging, with Ambassador Galbraith saying it would be perceived as a "green light."
The U.S. decision to send personnel -to Croatia to inspect rockets bound for Bosnia is similarly subject to varying interpretations. It may have been simply a straightforward effort to determine whether chemical weapons were being shipped into Bosnia. It was certainly, at least in part, an opportunity to examine a rocket in which the United States had some interest. But it may also have been designed to ensure that Croatia would not shut down the arms pipeline.
The Committee was particularly troubled by documents provided by the State Department in late August and September. Not only do these documents raise questions as to what additional relevant information may remain undiscovered, they also contain new information about U.S. actions. For example, one of these documents is a memorandum recording a senior U.S. official in Croatia's conversations with a Croatian official in early 1995 regarding a military resupply effort that Croatia was conducting in Bosnia. The Croatian official described this ongoing effort and expressed concern over possible international reaction. The U.S. official consulted another U.S. official and then reassured the Croatian official that any such reaction would be limited. When the Croatian official said that his country could not afford to stop the military resupply effort, the U.S. official replied that the United States did not want Croatia to stop-
The Croatian official clearly wanted to continue the resupply effort and did not appear to need any encouragement from the U.S. official. On the other hand, the U.S. official did encourage him and it appears the United States was prepared to take action to limit international reaction to the resupply effort. Whether they actually did take any such action is unknown.
In the end, the Committee was unable to reach agreement, given the available facts, as to which of these interpretations of the events surrounding the "no instructions" policy is more accurate: that U.S. actions, in addition to satisfying other elements of the definition in section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, were intended to influence the Croatians to allow the flow of Iranian arms into Bosnia, which would constitute a covert action; or that they were simply intended to allow events to proceed without U.S. influence. While additional facts or time may provide a basis for agreement in the future, the Committee is not reaching a conclusion on this issue at this time in the interest of coming out in a timely fashion with a bipartisan report that informs the public of the facts uncovered by this inquiry and provides guidance and recommendations for future action.
In the course of the Committee's inquiry into the events surrounding the flow of Iranian and other arms into Bosnia, some current and former Executive branch officials have made statements which the Committee believes do not reflect accurate interpretations of the laws governing intelligence activities. For example, some witnesses have asserted that the requirement in Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 for the President and agency heads to "ensure that the intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity" does not impose an obligation to notify Congress of any of the intelligence information produced by those intelligence activities. This unreasonably narrow reading of the statute is not consistent with the general understanding of the applicable provisions or with past practice. This Committee cannot be fully and currently informed of intelligence collection activities if it is not provided insights into the information those activities produce. How much of that information must be provided to Congress is an issue that the committees and the Director of Central Intelligence have worked out over the years and that continues to be refined as the interests and needs of the oversight bodies change over time.
In addition, in the course of the Committee's inquiry, some Executive branch officials have asserted that a request to another country to conduct a covert action on behalf of the United States would not constitute a U.S. covert action under Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. They base this argument on the fact that, as originally passed by Congress as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, section 503 contained a provision in the definition of "covert action" stating that U.S. requests to third countries to conduct a covert action on behalf of the United States would be deemed to be a covert action, but the provision was dropped after then-President George Bush pocket-vetoed the bill based in part on his objection to the provision. Executive branch officials argue that the absence of the so-called "third party request" provision in the version of section 503 that was later enacted means that U.S. requests to third parties to take certain actions do not constitute a U.S. covert action. This Committee does not agree that the effect of the Bush veto was to exempt all U.S. requests to third parties from the law regarding the approval and reporting of covert actions.
The Committee notes that the definition of "covert action" in section 503 was part of an extensive revision of the intelligence oversight provisions in Title V of the National Security Act. These revisions were intended to clarify and tighten the law governing covert actions in the aftermath of the Iran-contra scandal. The "third party request" provision was added in conference by House conferees and was intended "to prevent the conduct of a covert action at the specific request of the United States that bypasses the requirements for Administration review, presidential approval, and consultation with the intelligence committees."
In a November 30, 1990, Memorandum of Disapproval setting forth his reasons for refusing to sign the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, President Bush stated that he was:
particularly concerned that the vagueness of this [third party request] provision could seriously impair the effective conduct of our Nation's foreign relations. It is unclear exactly what sort of discussions with foreign governments could constitute reportable "requests" under this provision, and the very possibility of a broad construction of this term could have a chilling effect on the ability of our diplomats to conduct highly sensitive discussions concerning projects that are vital to our national security.
Thus it appears that what was at issue was not whether actual formal requests to third parties would constitute a covert action but, rather, what kinds of discussions might be deemed to constitute a request. The Chairmen of both congressional intelligence committees had previously written to the President to state that the provision was not intended to preclude "informal contacts and consultations which would be required prior to the United States officially requesting a third country or private citizen to undertake such [covert action] activities on its behalf." Apparently, however, President Bush was not sufficiently reassured by this letter to overcome his concern regarding the statutory language.
Subsequent attempts to refine the legislative language to clarify this aspect of the definition of covert action failed. When a second version of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991 was passed by Congress on July 3 1, 1991, neither the final bill nor the accompanying conference report addressed the issue of third party requests. Instead, the conference report stated that:
the conferees ... do not intend that the new definition exclude any activity which heretofore has been understood to be a covert action, nor to include any activity not heretofore understood to be a covert action. The new definition is meant to clarify the understanding of intelligence activities that require presidential approval and reporting to Congress; not to relax or go beyond previous understandings.(8)
The Committee does not agree that this legislative history should be interpreted as evidence that requests to third parties to conduct covert action are not covered by the definition of covert action. There is a legitimate concern that the definition of covert action should not include preliminary discussions with foreign countries that are not designed to influence events, but merely to explore feasibility, potential willingness, and the like -- such as have been acknowledged by Ambassador Holbrooke. This does not mean, however, that an actual request to a third country, whether explicit or conveyed through indirection, would never be a covert action. In the Committee's view, the Bush veto did not have the effect of creating an exclusion for an activity that would otherwise be a covert action, merely because it is implemented through a request to a third country.
On September 25, 1991, the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, adopted Resolution 713, imposing a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia." Resolution 713 was subsequently applied to all former Yugoslav republics, including Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, even after these states became members of the United Nations as independent countries in May, 1992. On December 15, 1991, the Security Council established a sanctions compliance committee, made up of members of the Security Council, to review reports on member states' implementation of the arms embargo, consider information regarding violations of the embargo, and recommend to the Security Council appropriate measures in response to embargo violations. Resolution 724 called upon all states to cooperate fully with the sanctions compliance committee on overseeing the effective implementation of the arms embargo. On February 7, 1992, Resolution 740 expressed concern at indications that the arms embargo was not being fully observed and again called upon all states to cooperate fully with the sanctions compliance committee, including reporting any violations.
The Committee is not aware of any reports filed by the United States with the U.N. Sanctions Committee regarding what the U.S. Government knew about the flow of Iranian arms through Croatia and into Bosnia. Moreover, acquiescence in the flow of arms -- particularly when presented with a clear opportunity to object -- is not consistent with the obligation "to cooperate fully ... on overseeing the effective implementation of the embargo." Certainly any effort to encourage the flow of arms would have been inconsistent with these resolutions.
Violations of United Nations resolutions do not constitute violations of U.S. law. There were a number of executive orders implementing these resolutions, however, and Section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, codified at 22 USC 287c, provides criminal penalties for noncompliance with a Presidential order that seeks to comply with a United Nations Security Council Resolution.
Based on the facts available to the Committee at this time, there does not appear to have been a violation of any of these executive orders. Executive Order 12846, 58 FR 25771 (April 25, 1993), however, tightens sanctions against the former Yugoslavia and harmonizes these and prior sanctions with U.N. Security Council Resolution 820 of April 17, 1993. Among other things, EO 12846 prohibits:
[a]ny dealing by a US person relating to the importation from, exportation to, transshipment through the U.N. protected areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, or activity of any kind that promotes or is intended to promote such dealing." [Emphasis added.]
Thus, any evidence of U.S. officials encouraging, or "promoting," the exportation to Bosnia of arms could reflect a violation of EO 12846. The Committee does not have sufficient information to conclude that U.S. officials engaged in such encouragement or promotion, although there are allegations of this.
The Committee found three areas in which administrative or legislative actions appear to be required. The first area is the need for written records of secret foreign policy decisions. The second area relates to keeping the intelligence committees informed of intelligence activities. The third area relates to keeping Congress informed of significant changes in foreign policy.
Recommendation No. 1: The Executive branch, especially the White House and the Department of State, should make a written record of every significant foreign policy decision, and especially of those decisions that reflect a change in policy; and it should ensure that adequate mechanisms are in place to generate and protect communications that are particularly sensitive.
The lack of a written codification of the "no instructions" decision resulted in confusion on the part of Ambassador Galbraith, CIA officials and U.S. military officers. The consequences of this confusion included Ambassador Galbraith sending an undesired cable to State Department Headquarters (which exposed the "no instructions" issue to more people than policy makers wanted), as well as the CIA engaging in extensive reporting on possible illegal covert actions (which led, in turn, to State Department distrust of CIA personnel).
The Committee realizes that some officials viewed the "no instructions" decision as not signaling a significant change in policy. Those officials conceded, however, that it was viewed as an "important" decision and that it was intended to result in Iranian and other arms flows to Bosnia in violation of a United Nations embargo; and the matter was significant enough to be taken to the President for a final decision.
National Security Adviser Lake's reason for telling Ambassador Redman that no written record was needed was the fear that any written record would lead to a leak that would prompt European reaction. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott testified to this Committee:
Another reason that diplomatic transactions and internal deliberations do not end up on paper is because of the extreme sensitivity of the subject matter. What goes down on paper is more likely to come out in public, in inappropriate and harmful ways, harmful to the national interest.
It is precisely this approach -- leaving the most sensitive decisions unwritten -- that the Committee believes is unwise and dangerous. Such records can (and should) be kept as secret as is necessary to protect the national security, and the risks that are involved in reducing significant decisions to writing are far outweighed by the inefficiency that results from doing without any authoritative statement of such decisions.
To the extent that written records of decisions and actions are foregone because the Department of State lacks an efficient system for generating and handling tightly-held cables, that, too, should be corrected. Former DCI James Woolsey noted that "Even NODIS cables in State are very widely disseminated," and a former State Department official indicated that this was why Ambassador Galbraith's NODIS cable of April 29, 1994, was viewed as a security problem. While there is a tightly-held ROGER channel for some sensitive communications from an ambassador, there is no way for an embassy to send a sensitive diplomatic cable to a very limited set of addressees. The absence of a truly limited channel for diplomatic cables is an anachronism, left over from the days in which diplomacy was seen as a more open activity. It unnecessarily limits the flexibility of ambassadors and senior officials in their handling of sensitive issues, and it should be remedied promptly.
Recommendation No. 2: The Executive branch should keep the Committee "fully and currently informed" of the substantive content of intelligence that is collected or analyzed by U.S. intelligence agencies.
Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 states: "The President shall ensure that the intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States...." In the course of its inquiry, the Committee was informed that Executive branch lawyers view this provision as not applying to the substantive content of intelligence that is collected or analyzed by U.S. intelligence agencies. The Committee has always interpreted the term "fully and currently" in that provision to mean informing Congress regarding, inter alia, the substance of the intelligence. It is hard to envisage how the intelligence committees could be kept fully informed of U.S. intelligence activities without being told what has been learned from those activities. The Committee has been provided much intelligence over the years, often at the Intelligence Community's initiative, and has rarely had difficulty in obtaining intelligence reporting that it requested.
Nevertheless, as Executive branch lawyers have highlighted an interpretation of the law under which there is no legal obligation to inform Congress of the substance of intelligence, the Committee wishes to make clear its belief that the Executive branch bears an obligation to keep the intelligence committees "fully and currently informed" of the substance of intelligence, as well as of the process. This still allows for agreement between the Executive branch and the committees on the expected level of specificity in reporting, just as exists regarding other aspects of "intelligence activities" today.
Recommendation No. 3: The Executive branch should inform Congress of significant secret changes in U.S. foreign policy.
A more difficult issue of reporting to Congress relates to those cases in which a significant change in U.S. foreign policy is determined and implemented in secrecy. In the matter of the "no instructions" decision, U.S. policy changed from one of telling other countries that the United Nations arms embargo must be obeyed to one of looking the other way as arms flowed from Iran and other countries into Bosnia and Croatia. While the impact of that policy change was publicly visible, the fact that the U.S. Government had decided consciously not to oppose such arms flows and had conveyed that decision to Croatian officials was never notified to Congress by policy makers in Washington. At a minimum, the appropriate committees should have been informed of the significant foreign policy change embodied in the "no instructions" instruction.
The Committee believes that the national interest would be far better served by an arrangement under which such significant secret changes in U.S. foreign policy were conveyed to appropriate Members of Congress. One possibility would be to notify the intelligence committees, which are used to handling sensitive notifications and could be given the duty to inform such other Members of Congress as might be specified by the law or a memorandum of agreement with the Executive branch. The committees' charters -- Senate Resolution 400 (94th Congress) and House Rule XLVIII -- already provide for the intelligence committees to include some members of four other committees in the national security field, thus encouraging attentiveness to the concerns of those other committees. The charters also offer special protection to sensitive information by requiring that "[n]o Member of the Senate [House] who, and no committee which, receives any information ... [from the intelligence committee] shall disclose such information except in a closed session of the Senate [House]."
There are also other options for notifying Congress of significant secret changes in U.S. foreign policy. One possibility would be to notify directly the members or leadership of the intelligence committees, foreign relations committees, armed services committees, defense appropriations subcommittees, and/or other relevant congressional bodies. Another option would be to notify the leadership of each House of Congress. A third option would be for Congress to designate a "contact group" of senior Members that could meet to receive such notifications.
Executive branch officials have testified that their concern in the case of the "no instructions" decision was that European countries might find out about the decision and decide to withdraw UNPROFOR forces from Bosnia. Based on twenty years of experience in handling sensitive notifications, the Committee believes that means can be crafted to ensure that such notifications are handled with complete security. The Committee also believes that information security is best guaranteed by an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of government, rather than by impediments to the sharing of information that is both of interest to the Congress and relevant to legislative issues before it.
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