Replies

I've been too busy to participate in this particular discussion over the past few days, although I wish I could have -- it hits on a lot of my favorite topics.

But since I'm getting pinged to a bunch of the posts, I couldn't help noticing a number of things I felt I couldn't let go by without at least tossing a few comments into the mix.

So if y'all don't mind, I'd like to take this opportunity to whip out the rhetorical shotgun and spray a loose pattern of shot at a wide target. I'm still rather pressed for time, so forgive me in advance if some of my items might be a bit terse.

And I especially apologize if some of the questions I may have, or some of my presumptions about what you're saying, might already have been addressed in earlier posts and/or threads. Trying to entirely catch up on such a looong-standing discussion at this point, I hope you'll agree, would take an inordinately long time, and involve trying to find the wheat kernels among all the side-discussion chaff. So please bear with me as I join the discussion in mid-stream.

Now without further ado... To avoid fragmenting contiguous arguments, I'll skip the usual typography and just start quoting y'all, with my interspersed points in [brackets]:

AG: The moved finger is classic, easy to identify. The physical mechanism is a bit more obscure because it involves a non-corporeal - information aka "success communications".Moreover, the "intent" itself is non-corporeal, non spatial/non temporal. [Whoa! Unsupported assertion(s). You need to first *demonstrate* in some way that "intent" does indeed have those properties. You seem to do a lot of circular reasoning in these posts -- you presume that "intent", "will" and so on are "ethereal" in some sense, then you incorporate that premise (as in this example) to eventually "conclude" that they are ethereal. And how have you ruled out "intent" being a special (but non-ethereal) case of "information"?] It cannot be put under a microscope, it cannot be measured like information as a reduction of uncertainty in the receiver, it cannot be translated to thermodynamics of the dissipation of energy into the local surroundings. [Again, unsupported assertion -- you're trying to reason out *what* intent might be. By presuming these properties about it, you're putting the cart before the horse.]
AG: But "intent" is nevertheless the origin of the successful communication, in this case to move a finger - or in the albatross dropped from the Leaning Tower of Pisa flying away, while the dead one falls to the ground with the 12 lb cannonball. [There's a bit more to it than that this example might imply: Drop a live human with the other items and regardless of his "intent" to avoid hitting the ground, he'll still impact next to the dead albatross.]
AG: So you ask about why some "intentions" don't manifest. One cause may be actual boundaries - physical boundaries of an autonomous organism. I cannot "intend" for a mountain to be moved, for instance, because the mountain is not part of my autonomy. [Again, that isn't the whole story, as the fellow plummeting next to the dead albatross could tell you -- his "intent" for even just his "own boundaries" to avoid falling isn't going to accomplish much.]
AG: And yet, in the animal kingdom, there are groups of organisms (like bees, ants, schools of fish) which act with a single intent. [What makes you think that their behavior is due to "intent" of any sort?] Therefore, another cause may be "perceived" boundaries. I cannot "intend" the mountain to move because I believe I cannot - or vice versa, I can "intend" it to move and it will because I believe I can. [There seems to be no evidence of either alleged effect.]
BB: Based on my own observations, the hypothesis you [js1138] suggest does not seem to fit with what I know from experience. [I think you got the impression that js1138 was saying that there's no such thing as memories or stored experiences. That's not what he was saying.]
AG: If you were to take a chunk of the numbers out of the extension, it might appear to be random. But it would not actually be random at all, because it originated with a simple calculation of circumference divided by diameter.Thus what might seem as happenstance is actually "designed". ["Structured" does not equal "designed".]
AG: It is also the basis of my standing hypothesis around here, i.e. that algorithm at inception is proof of intelligent design. ["Inception" relative to what? And "algorithm" is not properly defined here either. And how complex an "algorithm"? Simple algorithms can easily occur by accident.]
AG: Jeepers, RightWhale. That is how it works!It is an origination, an inception, a beginning of a successful communication (Shannon information: the reduction of uncertainty in a receiver or molecular machine in going from a before state to an after state).It is like the "Big Bang" only on a smaller scale: an origination. [I'm with RightWhale on this one -- you're begging the question. Saying that it just "begins" as if out of "nowhere" doesn't resolve anything. Indeed, it needlessly creates more issues. It's also remarkably vague -- are you saying that "intent" just "pops" into existence from no source whatsoever, for no reason whatsoever? And how have you determined that it *is* actually causeless, as you seem to be claiming? Please clarify.]
AG: Thought - intention - is non-corporeal. It does not exist "in" space/time. It does not have space/time coordinates, is not composed of fields, is not geometric [Multiple unsupported assertions. And if it's not "in" space/time, then why do particular thoughts only occur at certain times, and for certain durations? Why do they only occur in your own head (i.e., localized?) And again, how did you supposedly determine these "properties" of thought?]
BB: I suspect it [memory] isn't corporeal at all, in the sense of a bodily organ. [Why not?] I suspect it is something that is carried by a universal field, [Because? And what is a "universal" field? Why a field at all? Why not carried by the Invisible Pink Unicorns(tm)?] and can be accessed via the brain if we so direct it. But I certainly haven't worked out all the details yet! [How is the "universal field hypothesis" (with or without IPUs) superior to this model of memory?]
BB: In general, I think that consciousness is field-like at the level of the individual, ["field-like" in what way, exactly?] and that moreoever there is such a thing as collective consciousness. [Evidence?] It seems there are many instances of what appears to be collective consciousness in the natural world; e.g., the behavior of the social insects for instance. [The group behavior of social insects hardly requires a "collective consciousness" to explain.] Also there seem to be instances of it in the human world, e.g., in what is known as "public opinion," or what we mean by zeitgeist or the spirit of the age for examples. [How is this actually an example of "collective consciousness", and not just the usual dynamics of consensus?]
BB: Dr. G. has suggested that the Bauer life principle also requires a field, [again, why a "field"?] at the organismic level, and also at the universal level. [And why "universal"?] And of course, consciousness -- or at least rudimentary sensation or awareness -- is a property of every living being. [Plants are conscious and aware?]
BB: What I mean is: What is required in order to execute a "mental operation," a thought? What is needed? [Current evidence is that at minimum, one needs a working brain -- zap the brain with anesthetics or other means to incapacitate it, and no thoughts take place.] how do we get it? [I was born with mine.] and from whence do we get it? ["Mom!"]
BB: Alternatively, you could just ask yourself, "What do I want for lunch today?" Just study what happens next, pay really close attention to it. i think if you were to do this experiment, you might find that you have a valid, actual basis for suspecting that the brain is, in all probability, not the party "responsible" for this process; [Strange, I didn't find any such basis at all -- please explain.] though it is clear it has a facilitating role to play.
BB: I am not some freaking computer running Unix!!!! And neither are you. [Not literally, of course, but why do you reject out of hand the possibility of the metaphor being true: that our minds are sophisticated "software" running on the "hardware" of our brains?]
BB: So, what is it in your theory that qualifies you as an eminent professor of chemistry at a highly respected university? If your brain is doing all the work, then how come you are getting the paycheck? [Because "he" -- as an self-aware entity -- *is* his brain. Take RWP and yourself and do a surgical procedure to swap brains between the two bodies. When you awake, from which bed will someone say, "I'm RightWingProfessor, over here?"]
BB: That is ridiculous B.S. on its face, RWP: The proposed exercise or experiment reveals everything about the way we think, if the person conducting it is really paying attention. [Oh? Well then by all means, write out this "everything" so that the world can stop speculating, and you can win your Nobel Prize.]
BB: IMHO, unless we hope to continue to slide around on the surface of "expert opinion" that denies the fundamental reality of human experience in principle, we better figure out the way thinking is actually, legitimately done [What "fundamental reality" would that be?]
AG: One of the problems with associating thinking, willfulness and memory with the brain is that we also see it in biological systems where there is no brain. [Be very careful of anthropomorphizing... Just because some behavior superficially *looks* like thinking(willfulness/memory/etc.), doesn't mean it necessarily actually *involves* thinking. Different processes can have similar outcomes by very different means.]
AG: The amoeba, for instance, which has been exposed to Chinese ink, will remember the experience and refuse to go for it the next time. [I've not heard of this, nor could find anything googling -- not even anything about amoebae "learning" in general. Details please?]
AG: The will to live exists in all living organisms, from bacteria to whales. [And how exactly have you determined that bacteria have a "will to live", in any meaningful sense of the word "will"? Tropisms which tend towards survival are hardly the stuff of "will" as the word is usually used. Does a plant have a "will" to grow facing towards the sun? (Warning: The process by which plants do this is known and is very mechanistic)] And even if one uses the Shannon definition (successful communications) to delineate between what is life v non-life/death - viruses have the will to live. [Oh?? This seems like anthropomorphism of the highest order -- viruses are extremely "mechanical" in the way they operate. How do you find "will" in their operations?]
AG: This is prima facie evidence that the will does not exist in the physical brain. [Jumping the gun a bit? First you have to establish that the processes you offer as examples actually *are* "will" in any real sense of the word.]
AG: I perceive the "will to live" being universal [Including perhaps perceiving it where it is not] (perhaps a field) [Again, why a "field"? Why not "crystal energy"?] or perhaps global to this biosphere, i.e. Fecundity principle, the evolution of one. [Actually, natural selection would select for survival, including the "will" to survive as well as other survival-enhancing behaviors having nothing to do with "will" -- why postulate an additional "field" or "fecundity principle", when it results naturally through evolutionary processes?] Thus the phenomenon of collective consciousness among bees, ants, etc. [You have not established that bees/ants/etc. actually *have* anything which could properly be described as a "collective consciousness"] - and the trend to autonomy, semiosis and self-organizing complexity.
AG: The "will to live" is voluntary, i.e. willful. Specialization, function and capability are involuntary, i.e. circumstantial. [Are you not contradicting yourself here? You earlier pointed to the "Specialization, function and capability" of viruses as an example of the "will to live"]
AG: Since you brought it up, it is fascinating to note that the “will to live” accrues to the autonomous organism or collective (in the case of ants and bees). [Again, you have yet to establish that there is a "collective will" among ants/bees. Actually, the fact that ants/bees/wasps are genetically haplodiploid very neatly explains why what *seems* like a "collective altruism" among these insects is actually a classic example of the individual protecting the survival of their *own* genes, and thus explains *why* these insects have evolved a "eusocial" lifestyle.]
AG: The “theory of evolution” does not address these things – the will to live, the autonomy, the integration of function to purpose, information (successful communication) and semiosis (encoding/decoding). [Huh? How did you arrive at *that* conclusion? I've seen *lots* of "addressing" of those issues with regards to evolution in the primary literature, and evolution explains them rather well (e.g. see the above remarks concerning the eusocial insects)]
AG: IMHO, the biologists seem to have a much too simple concept of what life is. H.H. Pattee said they weren't even interested in the question. [Probably because they have intimate familiarity with the "nuts and bolts" of life, and thus are far less likely to to mysticize it than those to whom the process of life is a "cosmic mystery" which seems like it requires some Big Ethereal Explanation (cue theramin music here). Similarly, poets may wax lyrical about the "magic and soul of flight", but airplane mechanics know that there's no "magic" involved, just machinery, and angled surfaces meeting moving air. Biologists have examined all the nooks and crannies of living things, and taken them apart like cuckoo clocks, and know that there's no "magic spark" hiding within them.]
AG and BB: "Free will", et al. [In college came one credit shy of having a Minor in Philosophy to go with my science degree, and although we spent a lot of time on it, the whole "free will" philosophical debate and all its endless verbiage always struck me as nothing more than a classic case of arguing over definitions. There are multiple types of freedom and constraint in human behavior, and arguments over "free will" are at root just disagreement over what a particular person wants to label as "free" (or "not free") and "will" (or not). It's sort of the philosophical version of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, and I don't see that it ever achieves anything, since all conclusions are determined "by definition". FWIW.]
AG: I am quite certain that the will does not exist in the physical brain. [Oh. Okay then... But how do you then explain how the "will" can be altered, or eliminated entirely, by drugs applied to the brain, and/or brain damage? And how exactly did you arrive at this "certainty" in the first place?]
AG: This is based on the Shannon "mathematical theory of communications" - ["Based" *how*?] which is the bedrock to "information theory and molecular biology". [Well, no, not exactly. It's one of the cornerstones of information theory, certainly, but it's hardly "the bedrock of molecular biology".] Shannon's theory is the basis of the field, "information theory". [But you repeat yourself. Personally, I'd like to see more *explanation* of how you think Shannon information/communication actually helps explain or support any of your positions, along with specific *examples* of it in action in the way you imply it is involved in the processes you postulate, instead of repeated mentions of it without any such analysis.]
AG: Information is the "reduction of uncertainty in the receiver or molecular machine in going from a before state to an after state". It is the action, not the message. The value or meaning of the message is irrelevant to the theory. [Do you have a keyboard macro for those?]
BB: The brain is like a kind of geiger counter, recording the activity of neuronal firings, etc., etc. [Um, what? Okay, I'll bite -- exactly how and where does it "record" them?] That is to say the brain is not the cause of the neuronal firings, etc., etc. [Then what's up with all those neurotransmitters release across synapses by neurons (IN THE BRAIN) farther "upstream"? They sure *seem* to cause "neuronal firings" -- and the "neuronal firings" do not occur if we block them.] It facilitates them, and can produce a read-out if properly hooked up to an EEG. [ACK! This is an... odd way to describe what's actually happening when you take an EEG...] Then we, the observer can look at the read-out, recognize patterns of activity, etc., etc. But we cannot say that the brain knows anything about that, or is "aware" of these activities. [We can't? Do you mean "aware of individual neural firings"? Or "aware of the mental activities they represent"? Or something else?]
BB: Consciousness also includes unconscious states; dreaming is likely a good example of such. [Dream states are more accurately described as "semiconscious states".] Consciousness also includes self-consciousness, which (apparently) is an attribute of humans only (as far as we know). [We can't know for *certain*, of course, but to all appearances, most mammals, at the very least, show clear signs of self-awareness, as well as awareness of the "self" of others.] But all living organisms -- definitely ["definitely"? see the above warning about anthropomorphism] including Alamo-Girl's amoeba, which in the experiment was observed to "learn" the difference between india ink and a food source, so as not to mistake the former for the latter, and so "wouldn't be fooled again" -- possess some type of sentience, awareness -- and these are things that also belong to consciousness. [Again, don't attribute to "sentience" that which can easily be explained by tropisms and such.] So I agree with Alamo-Girl: even living organisms that do not have organized brains still have access to some form of consciousness. [Again, neither of you have actually established this.]
BB: As I'm somewhat aware of her thoughts in this matter, I'd hazard to say that what she's about is to rescue biology from physics ["rescue" -- there's an interesting word choice: from what is it in danger?] -- in the sense that biology isn't reducible to the physical laws. [...because...?] Or to put it another way, living organisms have a physical basis, plus something else which is not physical. [Unsupported assertion.] The latter is what makes them living. [Ditto. And what exactly would this "something" be?]
BB: The operative word in this statement, it seems to me, is simulate. Obviously, before someone may "simulate" something, there must first be a something to simulate. That something, however, remains unaffected, whether the simulation is successful or not: Either way, it continues to be the something it is. [Actually, that was clearly a poor choice of words on his part. Bear in mind that when it comes to information processes, there is strictly speaking no such thing as a "simulation". Computers do not "simulate" addition, they *perform* addition -- what they do is *actually* addition. Similarly, genetic algorithms do not "simulate" evolution -- the algorithms are *actually* evolving. The same would hold true if we figured out what consciousness actually was and it turned out to be some particular sort of information process: Implementing it in a computer or other suitable machine wouldn't be "artificial" or "simulated" intelligence, it would *be* real, honest-to-goodness intelligence.
AG: I think we can agree in principle that there is more going on in biological systems than the physical laws, known today, can address. [Errr... With the possible exception of the phenomenon of self-awareness itself (which is going to take a deeper understanding of *something*, but it remains to be seen what), I would have to disagree on that one. I have seen nothing in biological systems which indicates that there is "more going on" than just the workings of the usual "physical laws".
BB: But the Darwinist model does not explain how matter "got smart" enough to drive the process all by itself. [Are you saying that there's no current explanation -- in any field, including evolution -- of what exactly self-awareness is, or are you saying that evolution itself would be unable to achieve it in living things? Or are you talking about something else entirely when you say "matter got smart"?] And I simply strongly doubt that it can. [Why?] Until this piece of the puzzle is in place, although Darwinism has a good explanation for speciation, it has nothing to say about how life arose in the universe: [Huh? Until evolution can explain consciousness, it "has nothing to say" about life arising at all? Or am I misunderstanding you here?] It cannot tell us what life is. [Life is survival and perpetuation.]
BB: I can tell you that when my car is totaled in a collision, it probably won't run anymore, and it may not be "fixable." Even though it still has a driver (me), it still wouldn't be able to take me anywhere. If the brain is a "machine" or tool of consciousness (which is my argument), if it is "totaled in a collision, it probably won't run anymore. And it may not be 'fixable.'" [The problem with this analogy is that brain damage (or temporary drug-induced alterations, including anesthetics) don't just affect the "car", leaving the "driver" wide awake and alert and punching the "steering wheel" saying, "dangit, this thing's not responding right", and griping about the "windshield" distorting or obscuring the outside view. Instead, the "driver" *itself* is affected. Anesthetics don't just shut down the eyes and ears and muscles, leaving the "will" bored in a dark space, they actually impair or entirely knock out the "will" itself. Likewise, brain damage of various types imparts various types of characteristic damage to the *consciousness* itself, and its ability to think, feel, remember, or otherwise function. For many striking examples, see most of neurologist Oliver Sack's books, especially "The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat". Sacks and one of his earlier clinical experiences, by the way, was the real-life basis for the movie "Awakenings".]
BB: This seemingly was the case with my late Aunt Ann, whose Lou Gehrig's disease eventually impaired brain function as regards speech. The loss of function did not cause her to lose the ability and desire to keep on communicating. [That's one kind of brain damage, the sort that affects only a part of the brain used for "input/output", as it were. But damage in other parts of the brain have striking, and at times incredibly bizarre, effects on the "self" itself.]
AG: {in response to js1138's: "Before your extra-dimensional hypotheses become mainstream they will have to explain everything that is known and add something new to the pot."} We are not making this up. Cancer and pharmaceutical research continues based on information theory (Shannon) applied to molecular biology. [Whoa! Change of subject! He was talking about your suggestions that there is something "non-space-time-ish" or "extradimensinoal" about "will" and so forth, he wasn't disputing anything about information theory, which you are defending here.]
AG: Every successful communication must have an inception, a beginning, an origination. This is where we are focused. When you willfully decide to move your finger, a cascade of successful communications continues through your molecular machinery until that will is made manifest. [...and also BEFORE the "willful decision to move your finger" -- such "decisions" do not occur in a vacuum. You often describe this as if the "decision" comes out of nowhere, or the ether, or whatever.]
AG: This does not require a physical field hosted in extra dimensions (beyond the three spatial, one time we are able to sense with our mind and vision) – but neither does it preclude such a field. [But his point -- with which I concur -- is that unless there is actually a compelling "need" to throw such an additional process into the "explanation", it is premature to do so. One might as well credit the Invisible Pink Unicorns also, and/or anything else, along with the "fields" and such. Other than "because you like the idea", what leads you to conclude that there actually likely *is* some sort of "field" involved, as opposed to any other possible explanation or process?]
AG: Assuming what you say is true then all it establishes is that the space/time coordinate point of the inception of a successful communication (such as willing to move a finger) – is located inside the physical brain. It does not at all address the location of the will itself. [...but see the above "driver in a car" analogy -- such brain damage *also* establishes that the "internal workings" of the will *itself* are also within the physical brain -- or at least very strongly indicates it. Why then postulate that *any* of it resides "elsewhere"?]
AG: Nor could the will be located in the physical brain when we know of creatures who act willfully but have no brain (amoeba, etc.) - and other collectives of creatures (such as ants and bees) which act together with a single will. [One. More. Time. You have not established that these "other" kinds of "will" are in fact "will" at all, or if they are in some sense, that they are of the same *kind* as the kind which manifests in "brained" creatures.]
AG: It suggests that the will is non-local and real which is why we believe it is "field-like" if not an actual field, like gravity, electro/magnetism, strong and weak atomic. [Err... Even if the evidence did indicate that it was "non-local and real" (and I don't see that it does), that still wouldn't be sufficient grounds for concluding that it was "field-like" in any sense of the term. Furthermore, "fields" in science have very specific types of properties, and I really don't think you want to tie your hypothetical "non-material will" to those sorts of restrictions. You might want to find some other name for it -- even "ethereal essence" is actually less jarring to me (and I'll bet others) as a "science guy" than invoking the term "field", which seems as out of place in this particular context as would calling it "surface tension", or whatever.]
BB: Our correspondents seem to want to ignore this evidence, Alamo-Girl. Either that or they have not yet appreciated its full significance. [*ahem*. This "swine" begs to differ about the genuineness of the "pearl".]
BB: Perhaps there are biofields at work, extending both to life and consciousness. [Or maybe it's the IPUs again.]
AG: His self-will so far exceeds the "will to live" of ordinary life, that we must look beyond space/time, beyond the corporeal, to understand how it came to be. [Even if you were correct that man's "self-will so far exceeds" that of "ordinary life" -- and I don't see that it does -- how do you jump from that to: "we must look beyond space/time, beyond the corporeal, to understand how it came to be"? We "must"? Why "must" we? Couldn't man's unusual traits be the result of, say, an evolutionary breakthrough, among other "not beyond the corporeal" possibilities?]
AG: I suspect they have not yet grasped the full significance of it! [*cough*]
AG: Er, actually the design hypothesis doesn't dictate whether the designer is divine, alien or collective consciousness - only that the physical laws and mechanisms of traditional evolution (happenstance of random mutation + natural selection) are not adequate to explain what we actually observe. [So... You're saying that ID doesn't need to demonstrate that there *was* a designer of life (or design *in* life), it only has to show that "traditional evolution" is "not adequate", and then ID "wins by default"?")
AG:But I am "all for" a thread to battle it out! Let's finally get down to the nitty-grit of mathematics (including information theory) and physics in biological systems - complex systems theory, quantization of continuums, autonomy, semiosis and the whole nine yards. Let's finally get a consensus of what is life v non-life/death. [I don't see that it's that complicated: Life is that which preserves and perpetuates itself. And despite the attempts on these threads to define it in terms of "exchange of Shannon information" and whatnot, that seems rather a dead-end, since lots of things "exchange Shannon information", including for example my modem, yet I really don't think you want to include that in the definition of "life".]
AG:We circumlocute the subject all the time on these threads. It's high time we hit the nail on the head and see what's there! [I'm game.]
AG: Under Shannon, information is the reduction of uncertainty (Shannon entropy) in the receiver or molecular machine in going from a before state to an after state. It is an action, not a message. It is measured in bits (not binary) and has a corresponding dissipation of energy to the local surroundings, paying the thermodynamic tab of the second law.It is not the message. The value or meaning of the message is totally irrelevant to Shannon information theory.[You *do* have a keyboard macro! ;-)]
AG: The will is the inception (beginning or origination) of the transaction or cascade of successful communications in biological systems which ensues from the will. [Whoa! How do you choose an arbitrary point and declare it the "inception" (or "beginning" or "origination") of this "transaction or cascade"? It's not as if the brain is quiescent until "suddenly" there's an "inception" of processes which results in the finger moving. Your "willful decision" to move your finger isn't done ex nihilo, unless you have Parkinson's disease. It's based on prior "cascades", such as the incoming sensory signal, "my finger itches", or prior stimuli such as reading something on FreeRepublic which triggers an emotional reaction and a subsequent desire to move the finger to hit the "Post Reply" button, etc. etc. etc. Your descriptions of an "act of will" invariably make it sound as if such decisions come from "somewhere out there" beyond the here and now, yet this utterly ignores (and in fact, misleadingly obscures) the fact that most -- perhaps all -- such decisions which result in a "cascade of successful communications" are not some uncaused "initiation" of a cascade, but are themselves the result of (or part of a larger chain of) *earlier* cascades. Even when there is no sensory "trigger", the mind itself is always self-triggering due to its own internal flow of "train of thought" (which reflects in constant brain activity, by the way, so this entirely "internal dialog" is not taking place "just" in some "remote location"...) To define the "will" as something which "initiates" all the "cascades of successful communications" is to divorce it from the obvious fact that the will *itself* is affected by prior "cascades of successful communications" and its decisions are part of a continuous chain of "cascades", *not* the "man on top of the mountain" which only sends things rolling "downhill" after plucking them out of thin air. If that *were* the case, then you might have a solid basis for asking from whence such "inceptions" sprang. But as that is *not* the case, I think your model needs to be modified to better take into account the way that the "will" is not the prime "initiator" or "source" of information, it is more in the role of a "traffic cop", controlling the ongoing flow of information.]
AG: The most simple example is the will to move your finger initiating a cascade of successful communications throughout your molecular machinery actualizing your will. [How much "will" is involved in yanking your finger off a hot stove?]
AG: Another obvious example is to drop a live albatross, a dead albatross and a 12 pound cannonball from the Leaning Tower of Pisa.[Is the action of flying away "initiated" by the will of the live albatross -- or is it initiated by the flow of sensory data which signals that the body is falling, and the "will" is just one part of the downstream chain which gets involved when the initiated-via-falling sensory data gets correlated with the "oh crap, I'm falling!" signal?]
[And speaking of which, I own parrots. I can state with pretty firm assurance that the "I'm falling, FLAP!!!" response is hardwired instinct, not an application of conscious "will". I've got a twelve-year-old parrot which has had his wings clipped all his life, and he has *never* successfully flown. Any such attempt results in a crash-landing onto a hard floor, and he's not real happy about that (and several times, he has injured himself badly enough to require surgery). And he's a really smart bird -- he *knows* he can't fly. If his "will" was involved in any way, he'd opt not to nose-dive. And yet, whenever he is startled or begins to slip from his perch, the old instincts kick in before he can override them, and he tries to take to the air again -- even on the way down to the floor, I can see the look on his face which says, "dammit!" Reflex actions *bypass* the brain (and/or "will"). This is yet another reason that the "the will is that which initiates information cascades" definition is clearly flawed.]
AG: For live creatures which have a brain, we observe that the cascade of information originates at (though perhaps not exclusively at) space/time coordinates within the geometry of the physical brain. The is the physical initiation of the information, but not the host of the will itself. [Yet again, I see a fallacy here that biological action can only "originate" or "initiate" in the "will". I strongly disagree with the accuracy of this description.]
AG: But some creatures, such as amoeba, have no brain and yet act willfully. [But do they, really?] Likewise, swarms of creatures act as a collective with a single will. [What exactly is the "will" of a flock of birds? Note: The dynamics of flock behavior are pretty well understood, and don't involve any sort of "collective will".]
AG: All of this points to a field-like corporeal “will to live” or want to live or struggle to survive. [No, I don't agree that it does.]
AG: What we actually observe in man is individualized, self-will, a gradient ["gradient"?] of willfulness which must therefore exceed the field-like collective consciousness and be hosted by the non-corporeal, non-spatial and non-temporal, and be individualized to effect self-will. [Just... Damn.]
AG: A serious debate to battle-out the issues of intelligent design v evolution would have to begin with ontology so that all the correspondents would be on the same page of "reality". [Then we're already off to a disagreement, because I think ontology is most often used as a diversion from epistemology.]
AG: Further, if I were to rank the disciplines you name - with regard to any investigation - Mathematics would be first because it is the most sure. [The problem is that while it allows one to be "sure", it does so artificially, by defining a "virtual world" in which its analyses are true by definition. Mathematics is useless for real-world application unless one has examined reality closely enough to ensure that one is likely using the right mathematical "model" in order to match the reality. Trivial example: Various geometries (Euclidean, types of non-Euclidean, etc.) will give the wrong answers or the right answers, depending on whether (and in what configuration) the space of our universe is curved, even though each one gives "sure" answers within its own formal system.]
AG: A "field" is defined as existing at all points in space/time. Thus when I am speaking of a collective consciousness being "field-like" I am indeed speaking within space/time - regardless of whatever dimensionality may apply. [but... weren't you just arguing for a source *outside* of space/time for the will/consciousness/etc.?]
AG: However, when I am speaking of man's self-will I am indeed saying that it is more than a "collective consciousness" - it is individualized. [Semantic quibble: Wouldn't an individual will be "less" not "more" than a "collective will"?]
AG: The other point is the integration. Man would have both a stake in the field-like collective consciousness [Why? And what sort of "stake"?] and also as an individual with self-will beyond that. "Beyond" entails beyond the field, beyond space and time - e.g. his non-corporeal soul/spirit. [If the "collective" consciousness resides in space/time, then why can't the individual one?]
AG: Lurkers: for more information on information theory and molecular biology: [Unless I'm missing something, I don't see anything in those links -- or in Shannon's works -- which resembles your "holistic" view of "information exchange as life" (or however you'd like to summarize it, I apologize if I do it violence with my attempt at a short label). Is your position in there somewhere, or is it your own personal extrapolation?]