Lukasz wrote:
So is Poland a Trojan Horse nation working for the secret KGB?
We (Poles) were accused for many things but never that we are a Trojan Horse nation working for the secret KGB . Here on FR I can learn many interesting things about my country and nation. ROTFL
Dear GIJoel
Excuse me that I don’t write nothing more but you understand I have more important things to do in my secret agenda.
Lukasz, I was going to save this for later because I'm not finished with it yet, but I will post what I have so you can decide whether or not you want to seriously join the discussion about the continuing Soviet drive towards World Hegemony. This is what Anatoly Golitsyn had to say (partially said, because I'm not finished typing up the whole piece) about Solidarity in Poland:
WESTERN MISINTERPRETATION OF EVENT IN POLAND
New Lies For Old, 1984 (Notice this book was published long before the Soviet Union and its satilites collapsed!)
Page 328: “Because the West has failed either to understand communist strategy and disinformation or to appreciate the commitment to it of the resources of the bloc security and intelligence services and their high-level agents of political influence, the appearance of Solidarity in Poland has been accepted as a spontaneous occurrence comparable with the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and as portending the demise of communism in Poland. The fact that the Italian, French, and Spanish Communist parties all took up pro-Solidarity positions gives grounds for suspecting the validity of this interpretation.”
“Western misreading of events led to predictions of Soviet intervention in Poland in 1981, which turned out to be unjustified. It may lead to more serious errors in the future.”
“There are strong indications that the Polish version of ‘democratization,’ based in part on the Czechoslovak model, was prepared and controlled from the outset within the framework of bloc policy and strategy. For twenty years the Polish Communist party had been working on the construction of a ‘mature socialist society’ in which the party and its mass organizations would play a more active and effective political role. In 1963 the party’s ideological commission was set up. In 1973 new means of coordinating the activities of youth organizations were established. In 1976 a new law was adopted on the leading role of the party in constructing communism and on the party’s interaction with the Peasant and Democratic parties. In the same year all youth organizations, including those of the army, were merged into one Union of Socialist Polish Youth.”
Page 329: “Party membership increased from 1 million in 1960 to 3 million in 1980. In the same period Polish trade unions increased their membership from 5 to 13 million. The Union of Socialist Polish Youth had 2 million members in 1980. By the end of that year, 85 percent of the army’s officer corps were party members. All Poles of Jewish origin had been eliminated from the army.”
“Throughout the twenty-year period Polish leaders have been fully involved in the coordination mechanisms of the bloc, such as Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, as well as in bilateral meetings with other communist parties. The Polish security service took part in the conference in Moscow in 1959 of bloc security services at which their new political role was discussed and means of coordination were improved. Poland was among the countries visited by Mironov, the originator of this new political role, when he was head of CPSU’s Administrative Department.”
“Significantly two of the key figures in recent Polish events, the so-called ‘renewel,’ took up important positions soon after the ‘Prague Spring’ in 1968: Jaruzelski became Minister of Defense, and Kania became head of the Polish communist party’s Administrative Department, with responsibility for the affairs of the Polish security service. In 1971 Gierek took over from Gomulka and the future leader of Solidarity, Walesa, began his political activity. Gierek and members of other important departments, including Kania’s Administrative Department, consulted with their Soviet counterparts in Moscow. In the same year the Polish and Czech leaders had several meetings. In 1973 an agreement on ideological cooperation was signed between the two parties. In 1977 a delegation led by Gierek signed an agreement on the further strengthening of cooperation between them. Gierek also took part in Crimean summit meetings in the 1970s at which strategic questions were discussed.”
“In the course of the 1970s Kania was promoted to be Minister of the Interior and a member of the Politburo with responsibility for supervising the army and the security police. He also acted as the government’s principal link with the politically active Catholic church. After the ‘renewel’ had begun, Kania was further promoted to be leader of the party. Two other security chiefs were also promoted, Moczar to membership in the Politburo and Kowalczyk to be deputy premier. These promotions are the clearest indication of the involvement of Kania and the security services in the preparation of the Polish ‘renewel.’”
Page 330: “There was intensive consultation between Polish and Soviet leaders and party officials in the two years preceding the ‘renewel.’ Among the more significant items, apart from Comecon and Warsaw Pact meetings, were the appointment of a new Soviet ambassador to Poland in 1978 (Aristov, a senior party official from Leningrad); a conference in Moscow of bloc officials (including Poles) on organizational matters and mass organizations; Jaruzelski’s visit to Moscow in 1978; the meeting of Jaruzelski and the commander in chief of the Warsaw pact forces in 1979; two meetings in 1978 and 1979 between Soviet and Polish party officials responsible for strategy and coordination of the communist movement, at which there were discussions on international and ideological questions; visits to Moscow by Cruchek, the chairman of the Polish trade union organization, and by Shidlyak, head of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society, who discussed the strengthening of Soviet-Polish cooperation with his Soviet counterpart, Shytikov. This last visit is particularly interesting, since between February and August, 1980—just before the ‘renewel’—Shidlyak was head of the Polish trade unions.”
“In 1979 Gierek had two meetings with Brezhnev and separate meetings with the Czechoslovak, East German, West German, and French Communist party leaders. At the meeting with Brezhnev in the Crimea in August 1979, the discussion focused on ‘favorable new conditions for joint action against Europe.’ In February 1980 a Soviet publication referred to the strengthening of fraternal relations between the two countries resulting from agreements reached at their meetings.”
“A Polish party delegation attended a twenty-nine-party conference in Hungary in December 1979 that discussed relations between communists and social democrats and perspectives for European security. Suslov, the late leading Soviet ideologist and strategist, headed the Soviet delegation to the Polish party congress in February 1980. At the congress Gierek attacked NATO and the deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe and offered to act as host to an East-West disarmament conference in Warsaw. In May 1980 Brezhnev, Gromyko, and other senior Soviet officials attended a conference of bloc leaders in Warsaw. In his introductory speech Gierek said that the conference would open new prospects for peace and security in Europe and the world. His speech was the only part of the proceedings to be published.”
Page 331: “There were frequent consultations between Polish party officials responsible for the press, TV, and radio with their Soviet collegues, suggesting preparation of the Soviet and Polish media for a forthcoming important event.”
“Brezhnev awarded honors to Gierek and Jaruzelski in 1978 and Gierek honored Rusakov, head of the CPSU’s department for bloc affairs, in February 1980. The awards can be seen as recognition of the contributions made to the preparation of the ‘renewel’ by some of its key figures. It may also be surmised that Gierek’s departure from the scene was envisaged at this stage. He doubtless had good reason for saying, shortly after his dismissal, that ‘proper appraisal of the Polish developments in the 1970s could only be made from a certain distance in time.”
“All of the foregoing evidence points to the conclusion that a major development in Poland, the ‘renewal,’ was planned was planned thoroughly, and well in advance, by the Polish Communist Party in cooperation with its Communist allies and with a view to furthering the Communist strategy for Europe. The conclusion is further supported by the evidence of the Polish Communist Party’s involvement in the formation and functioning of Solidarity.”
Page 334: “The creation of Solidarity and the initial period of its activity as a trade union may be regarded as the experimental first phase of the Polish ‘renewal.’ The appointment of Jaruzelski, the imposition of martial law, and the suspension of Solidarity represent the second phase, intended to bring the movement under firm control and provide a period of political consolidation. In the third phase it may be expected that a coalition government will be formed, comprising representatives of the Communist Party, a revived Solidarity movement, and of the church. A few so-called liberals might also be included. A new-style government of this sort in Eastern Europe would be well equipped to promote Communist strategy by campaigning for disarmament, for nuclear-free zones in Europe, perhaps for a revival of the Rapacki Plan, for the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and ultimately for the establishment of a neutral, socialist Europe. The revival of other elements of Communist strategy for Europe [such as human rights negotiations] would be timed to coincide with the emergence of such a government.”
Page 335: “A coalition government in Poland would in fact be totalitarianism under a new, deceptive and more dangerous guise. Accepted as the spontaneous emergence of a new form of multi-party, semi-democratic regime, it would serve to undermine resistance to Communism inside and outside the Communist Bloc. The need for massive defense expenditure would increasingly be questioned in the West. New possibilities would arise for splitting Western Europe away from the United States, of neutralizing Germany, and destroying NATO.”
I don’t know how I can seriously join to this discussion cause this discussion isn’t serious.
What you trying to proof:
- polish communists liked the Soviets ones? Of course they did, they had power only thanks to Soviets. It is nothing strange that they tried to cooperate with them.
- Solidarity was communists organization? Some members of Solidarity often must spent several years in prisons. Solidarity was supported by polish society because it was anti-communists organization and anti-Soviet. For sure communists had own spies in Solidarity but it not change the general character of this organization.
- polish people are generally communists? Because 3 millions of them was in party? It is rather poor result for communist regime for almost 40 millions of Poles. If you think that all members were communists, you are totally wrong, some of them was forced, some joined only because it was a lot easier to get a flat. Some peasants even don’t know what it is this “communism”.
- Poland want to destroy NATO? One of the most important points of our national security? Tell me some examples of our policy of destabilization?
- Communists had some plans, how to destroy “Western values” and implant communism there? No doubt that they had! They failed, tell me some effects of their plans and what Poland have to do with this effects?
Your logic it is a proof that whatever we do, we will always find people who are ready to believe in mysterious world plots theories.