Washington clueless on Pakistan

United Press International ^ | 7/16/2004 | K.Kapisthalam

[JimBr]

Outside View: Washington clueless on Pakistan
By Kaushik Kapisthalam
A UPI Ouside View
Published 7/16/2004 10:32 AM

ATLANTA, July 16 (UPI) -- The July 14 hearing at the Senate Foreign Relations committee on U.S. policy toward Pakistan presented a stark picture for policy watchers. While the ranking Democrat on the committee, Sen. Joe Biden, D-Del., excoriated the Bush administration's Pakistan policy in his submitted opening statement, it was surprising to note that even the Republicans in the panel, led by Chairman Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., expressed a sense of helplessness with what to do with Pakistan.

Biden's recounting of conversations with Bush administration officials conveyed the executive branch's unwillingness to do anything different with Pakistan simply because it saw no alternatives to the current course. How did Washington get to this state?

U.S. interests in Pakistan are widely agreed to fall under three broad areas -- counter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation and regional relationships. With counter-terrorism, American goals have been to arrest or eliminate al-Qaida leadership and the dregs that may have leaked into Pakistan from Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 and thwart Pakistani jihadi groups and madrassas that provide the manpower for the next generation of terrorists.

On nuclear proliferation, the U.S. would like to roll up the Pakistan-based A.Q. Khan nuclear E-bay and strive to prevent Pakistan's own nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists.

In terms of regional issues, America would like to see Pakistan avoid meddling in Afghanistan using the Taliban remnants, and, more important, maintain a durable peace with India and to avoid nuclear saber rattling with India over the Kashmir issue. Tied to all these goals is the strategic objective of "stabilizing" Pakistan by building its institutions and foster democracy.

The panel included three old South Asia hands -- Ambassador Teresita Schaffer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dr. Vali Nasr of the Naval Postgraduate School, and Dr. Marvin Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute. The witnesses' testimony read like a litany of failures of the current U.S. policy toward Pakistan.

Ambassador Schaffer, in her own diplomatic way, chastised the Bush administration for creating and making false choices between counter-terrorism and other goals like nuclear proliferation and democracy. She also faulted the current policy for over-relying on one individual, President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. She advised against any major military equipment transfer to Pakistan since it has historically emboldened Pakistan to undertake risky military adventures.

Nasr focused on Pakistan's counter-terror efforts. He contended that far from making a clean break with Islamist terror groups, Musharraf had only put them on ice, hoping to use them at a future date of his choosing. Sure enough, said Nasr, Pakistan has arrested 500 or more al-Qaida suspects, but such arrests have been carefully orchestrated to pick up the mainly Arab al-Qaida elements while seeking to avoid harming the Pashtun Taliban and the local jihadi groups that do Pakistan's dirty work in Kashmir. Nasr also noted that Musharraf has done little to reduce the power and influence of madrassas, which continue to produce jihadi fighters at an alarming rate, despite an explicit promise by Musharraf on this front.

Weinbaum looked at the role of Musharraf, whom he called a "marginal satisfier." According to Weinbaum, Musharraf has so far shown that he only seeks to do the bare minimum required by the various interests that compete for his time. Given this, Weinbaum contended that Musharraf is unlikely to fully commit to supporting U.S. policies and in fact seeks to keep the various problems alive in order to maximize his value. Weinbaum also noted that at a strategic level, Musharraf has sought to marginalize the mainstream secular political parties within Pakistan, while unapologetically cutting deals with obscurantist parties and jailing or silencing those who disagree with him. He flailed the U.S. policy of lavishly praising Musharraf publicly and said that it emboldens the general to act contrary to U.S. interests with a feeling of impunity.

The comments and questions by the senators in response to the testimony indicated an unwillingness to question the assumptions that form the basis of the current and past U.S. policy toward Pakistan. There was a palpable evidence of Groupthink -- the same malaise that the Senate claimed that the U.S. intelligence community was afflicted with in its recent report on Iraq. Social psychologist Irving Janis defined Groupthink as "a mode of thinking ... when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action." Groupthink in the Pakistan policy context is manifested by the ease with which U.S. policy framers accept certain ideas on Pakistan as axioms.

The first one is the notion that current Pakistani dictator, Musharraf is striving to be a "moderate" Islamic leader and seeks to wean his country away from jihad-friendly policies. In fact, had the senators heard the panel testimony with an open mind, they would have come to the conclusion that Musharraf's actions since 9/11 have displayed that he has only two goals. The first one is to keep himself in power, and the second one is to zealously guard Pakistan army's corporate interests.

The main reason for Musharraf's U-turn after 9/11 was a desire to avoid his army from being targeted by an angry and hurt United States. Since then, he has sought to finesse his counter-terror actions with an aim of keeping his army's interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir unharmed. Had the United States looked at Pakistan as a tactical ally in its quest to take out the 9/11 culprits, it would have made sense. Instead, America tried to turn Musharraf into what Kemal Ataturk was for Turkey and as a consequence is disappointed when that came to naught.

The second Groupthink assumption is that the U.S. alliance with Pakistan would collapse were Musharraf to be killed or replaced. This is sheer nonsense. The doomsday scenario of a Taliban-like regime in Pakistan controlling nuclear weapons is unlikely. The main reason Musharraf might get replaced is because his junior commanders' feeling that without a new chief, they cannot get promoted. In such a scenario, the successor to Musharraf is likely to be another general who would seek to do the same things as Musharraf -- keep himself in power and protect the army's pot of gold. A Pakistan sans Musharraf is likely to be no better or worse than the one with Musharraf. Therefore, the idea that "we cannot push Musharraf too far" is just an alibi for paralysis.

The biggest Groupthink assumption is the U.S. acceptance that the Pakistan military's interests coincide with the country's interests. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The Pakistani military itself suffers from Groupthink when it seeks to obtain a military victory over India in Kashmir and its belief that its superior Islamic warriors have only been kept from a victory over the "weak and cowardly Hindu nation" through a series of international conspiracies and American betrayals. Even a casual reading of writings by retired Pakistani generals would reveal a mindset filled with paranoia and strong belief that only U.S.-Jewish-Indian conspiracies have "kept Pakistan down." The Pakistan army's goals are absolutely in dissonance with what U.S. strategic objectives of regional peace, Islamic moderation and nuclear non-proliferation.

The United States can therefore understand why Pakistan developed nuclear weapons, but it cannot tolerate Pakistani army -- the supposed nuclear gatekeeper -- bartering nukes with rogue regimes irrespective of its perceived insecurities and strategic needs. Pakistani generals ought not to be allowed to play the "Give me fighter jets, or I'll be forced to sell nukes" game.

While the United States can sympathize with Pakistan's genuine military requirements, it cannot afford to be seen as subsidizing a military that spends millions on golf courses while poor Pakistanis are dying due to drinking contaminated water. Instead of worrying about how to provide the Pakistan army with sops so that "it doesn't have to embark on dangerous adventurism to the east and to the west," as Biden stated, the United States must make it clear that it will not underwrite or encourage irrational Pakistani military adventures seeking revenge for past defeats by India or "strategic depth" in Afghanistan.

For a Pakistan policy to succeed, Musharraf needs to be explicitly reminded of U.S. red lines -- no nuclear trade, no adventures on either border and no victimization of secular political parties while enjoying unstinting U.S. support.

Every time he reneges on promises, instead of privately nudging him, the United States needs to make its reminders public. Pakistan's generals are not suicidal maniacs like al-Qaida. They might cry wolf, but are likely to fall in line rather than lose face internationally.

U.S. policymakers should also cease their public comments that tend to portray Musharraf as indispensable and instead focus aid toward institution building in Pakistan. The Pakistan policy situation is a quagmire only because of America's own faulty assumptions. Sans those assumptions, it is not that hard to frame a meaningful and effective Pakistan policy.

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(Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance commentator on U.S. policy on South Asia and its effects on the war on terror and non-proliferation.)

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