LOL!
We clearly let up on Fallujah just as victory seemed to be at hand. At least on the surface, it seems we could have finished the job relatively easily ourselves, so why did we suddenly bring in a bunch of unproven Iraqis?
Perhaps we knew something that precluded finishing the job (heavily mined defenses assuring very high civilian casualties, WMD booby traps, whatever). Or perhaps we decided the time was not right for some other reason.
The most commonly given reason is that we bowed to political pressure from the Iraqis. However, a different explanation is possible. Perhaps we decided Al Sadr had to be dead or defanged first, thus reducing the "outrage" factor in other parts of Iraq when the job is finished in Fallujah.
If that is the underlying reason, it may succeed on the Al Sadr side, but still fail in Fallujah. Latif would not follow orders to withdraw, and getting him and his "troops" out of the way could be tricky.
I agree, your ideas seem to be part of the mix of our thinking over there.
Nope. Read #18.
The most commonly given reason is that we bowed to political pressure from the Iraqis. However, a different explanation is possible. Perhaps we decided Al Sadr had to be dead or defanged first, thus reducing the "outrage" factor in other parts of Iraq when the job is finished in Fallujah."
I believe that our military understood, correctly, that the real challenge in Iraq to our success is political not military, that we had to create conditions FOR IRAQIS TO BE WILLING TO STAND UP FOR IRAQI DEMOCRACY.
Our willingness to put Baathists in charge of forces created an interesting reaction: All the Iraqi saddam-haters realized that WE MIGHT GIVE THEM BACK BAATHISM if they didnt get their act together.
We have put Iraqis on the spot, and in the process have accelerated the democratization process.