Just for fun, here are some excerpts from Scott Ritter's testimony in front of Congress on Sept. 3, 1998, after the inspectors were kicked out of Iraq:
"Iraq today is not disarmed, and remains an ugly threat to its neighbors and to world peace.
...verifiable disarmament of Iraq so that neither we nor Iraq's neighbors in the Middle East will be threatened by Saddam Hussein's nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or long-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons.
But what I can say is that we have clear evidence that Iraq is retaining prohibited weapons capabilities in the fields of chemical, biological and ballistic- missile delivery systems of a range of greater than 150 kilometers. And if Iraq has undertaken a concerted effort run at the highest levels inside Iraq to retain these capabilities, then I see no reason why they would not exercise the same sort of concealment efforts for their nuclear programs.
My understanding of the -- first of all, I'd need to make clear that the issue of the discovery of weaponized VX in Iraq was done by another team, a team that I was not directly associated with. I'm familiar with their work. It's a very important discovery. It's one that shows clearly that, A, Iraq has not disarmed, and they've lied across the board about not just VX, but once we get to the bottom of the VX issue, we'll find it exposes additional lies, which cause concern for a number weapons issues. When that issue became public in June of 1998, I believe that the administration was forced to endorse the findings that indeed there was weaponized VX in Iraq today, and as such, they expressed support for continued inspection operations in Iraq to disclose not only the VX but all aspects of Iraq's retained weapons capabilities.
MR. RITTER: They're -- Iraq has positioned itself today that once effective inspection regimes have been terminated, Iraq will be able to reconstitute the entirety of its former nuclear, chemical and ballistic missile delivery system capabilities within a period of six months.
MR. RITTER: The Special Commission has intelligence information, which indicates that components necessary for three nuclear weapons exist, lacking the fissile material. Yes, sir.
SEN. MCCAIN: So that means to you that in what period of time, if these inspections cease, that Saddam Hussein will have that nuclear capability?
MR. RITTER: It's a question of how he chooses to acquire enriched uranium, either through indigenous enrichment or through procurement from abroad. If it's indigenous, it would take some time because the IAEA has effectively dismantled the internal enrichment -- but they have not dismantled the weaponization program per se.
SEN. MCCAIN: So what period of time are you talking about, roughly?
MR. RITTER: For a total reconstruction, it would be a period of several years to reconstruct enrichment capability. Yes, sir.
SEN. MCCAIN: And the biological and chemical?
MR. RITTER: That's a much less time frame. I believe within a period of six months Iraq could reconstitute its biological-weapons and chemical-weapons capability.
SEN. MCCAIN: And the missiles to deliver them?
MR. RITTER: Within a period of six months. We know in fact that Iraq has a plan to have a breakout scenario for reconstitution of long-range ballistic missiles within six months of the "go" signal from the president of Iraq.
SEN. MCCAIN: So it is your opinion that if these inspections are further emasculated, then within a six-month period of time, Saddam Hussein would have the capability to deliver a weapon of mass destruction?
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir.
http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/ritter.htm
Excerpt of Kerry's statement:
KERRY: "You know, Saddam Hussein has got to be delighted with what he's hearing here today and what he's seen in the last days, because he's winning. His strategy is working. Make no mistake about it, his strategy is not to lift the sanctions. His strategy is to build weapons of mass destruction. And his strategy has been able to nip away at UNSCOM over the course of months so that he's created sanctions fatigue among our allies, who also have a different set of international or national interpretation of interest here. And the fact is that our administration recognized some time ago that it had great difficulty building the coalition to support what was necessary to let Major Ritter and his team do what they do. "
The issue is much bigger than that. If Scott Ritter and his team can't get in, then the fundamental accepted policy of our country and of the Security Council, to be able to enforce the notion that Saddam Hussein will not have weapons of mass destruction, is ineffective. And I think that's exactly what Major Ritter is trying to tell us, and has put his job on the line in order to emphasize.
Testimony of Scott Ritter, former UNSCOM Inspector before the U.S. Senate. September 3, 1998