Replies

NothingMan,

"I put up portions of the declassified 2001 NIE"

I have learned from bitter experiences to not accept the NIE's as being factual for the simple reason that they are public knowledge.

We will never tell our enemies what we know. The alphabet agencies are black holes when it comes to releasing information about direct threats to the United States.

I had accepted the 2001 NIE, which I cite as a George Tenet intelligence estimate. The same George Tenet who began in the Clinton White House and continues in the role as DCI and CIRCIA for the Bush Administration. As a result of accepting the NIE I later had me head handed to me with information which directly refuted the 2001 NIE.

My bottom line is that some of the info is truthful, but certain portions of it are absolute horse hooey, the statement about the Taep'o Dong 2/3 (Hwasong 5/6 programs) being chief among them.

"Your 3500 km figure is from a 1995 Clinton-era estimate."

Sorry pal, but this is absolutely incorrrect. Your are about 8 years off the mark here. My information comes, in part, from the asseessment of the study done by David Wright, Co-Director and Senior Scientist for the Global Security Program at the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and which is dated in their PFO 03-20 as March 18, 2003, but was originally released by him the previous month.

I quote Mr. Wright:

"The US intelligence estimates that were released today on the capability of the North Korean Taepo Dong-2 missile are not new. These estimates, as well as projections of how quickly the missile could be successfully tested and deployed, are controversial. This missile, which has never been flight-tested, would be significantly different than any missile North Korea has built or tested. As a result, it is not known how long it might take North Korea to develop successfully a working missile once they started flight-testing. Moreover, official range estimates appear to assume the missile uses significantly better technology than North Korea's past missiles, including lighter materials."

Have a look-see for yourself.

http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0320A_%20Wright.html

additional commentary can be found here:

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/108569_missile14.shtml

Additionally, we have George Tenet on record telling the the United States Congress on February 12, 2003 that the Taep'o-Dong 2 missile is capable of striking the West Coast of the U.S. as well as Alaska and Hawaii, however at this time, North Korea is not in the position to test the system."

http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/169/documentid/1953/history/3,2360,652,169,1953

George Tenet said nothing about the entire continental United States, NothingMan, absolutely nothing! Nor did he even mention the TD-3 (Hwasong 6).

A review of the "facts" you accept would appear to be in order, and I offer my assistance to you in any way I can.

"A review of the "facts" you accept would appear to be in order, and I offer my assistance to you in any way I can."

I think I can manage the factual review. Thanks.

Maybe it's just me, but the tone of the thread seems different (more combative and hostile) the past couple of days than the other thousands of posts over the past three months. I referenced the Congressional North Korean Advisory Group already. I went through and cut and paste the relevant excepts from the entire report.

In addition to dropping Russia, I'm dropping this too. I come to this thread to see the latest AQ (or wannabees) threats/diatribes/pronouncements. I don't come here to be lectured on Russia or North Korea. If you knew me, you would be aghast at the absurdity of it.

I am trying to recall if anyone else has been "called out" like I have (three times on Russia and now on North Korea) even though I have made several *long* posts defending my opinions. Disagree if you wish. No problem. But this is (as one poster warned me when I first posted a couple days ago) a lot of spinning and baiting and sparring. It's not dialogue.

(from post 6535 of the last thread)

Oh brother!!!
You believe this claptrap????
Why are you so eager to defend Mother Russia, eh comrade?
Shto eta? (Russian for "What's this?")

I don't have anything to prove.

I tried to overlook the nonsense. Challenging my patriotism is beneath contempt and was unworthy of a response. I had hoped the negativity and the baiting were temporary, but it has dragged into this thread.

I'll go back to "lurking", if even that.

I *really* don't have time to get sucked into virtual debates. It was my mistake for posting in the first place. So I blame myself.

But for the most part, the rest of you guys are good folks and pretty sharp.

Keep fighting the good fight.

For anyone interested in a congressional report from *five* years ago . . .

Members of the Speaker's North Korea Advisory Group (1999)

Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, NY
Chairman, North Korea Advisory Group and Chairman, Committee on International Relations
Rep. Doug Bereuter, NE
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
Rep. Sonny Callahan, AL
Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
Rep. Christopher Cox, CA
Chairman, Republican Policy Committee
Rep. Tillie K. Fowler, GA
Vice Chair, Republican Conference
Rep. Porter J. Goss, FL
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Rep. Joe Knollenberg, MI
Member of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
Rep. Floyd Spence, SC
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
Rep. Curt Weldon, PA
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development

(snip)

". . .North Korea's WMD programs pose a major threat to the United States and its allies. This threat has advanced considerably over the past five years, particularly with the enhancement of North Korea's missile capabilities. There is significant evidence that undeclared nuclear weapons development activity continues, including efforts to acquire uranium enrichment technologies and recent nuclear-related high explosive tests. This means that the United States cannot discount the possibility that North Korea could produce additional nuclear weapons outside of the constraints imposed by the 1994 Agreed Framework. In the last five years, North Korea's missile capabilities have improved dramatically. North Korea has produced, deployed and exported missiles to Iran and Pakistan, launched a three-stage missile (Taepo Dong 1), and continues to develop a larger and more powerful missile (Taepo Dong 2). Unlike five years ago, North Korea can now strike the United States with a missile that could deliver high explosive, chemical, biological, or possibly nuclear weapons. Currently, the United States is unable to defend against this threat. The progress that North Korea has made over the past five years in improving its missile capabilities, its record as a major proliferator of ballistic missiles and missile technology, combined with its development activities on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, ranks North Korea with Russia and China as one of the greatest missile proliferation threats in the world. . . .

Unlike five years ago, North Korea can now strike the United States with a missile that could deliver high explosive, chemical, biological, or possibly nuclear weapons. The United States currently is unable to defend against this threat. . . .

In the last five years, North Korea has made significant progress in improving its missile capabilities. It has produced, deployed and exported missiles to Iran and Pakistan, launched a three-stage missile (Taepo Dong 1), and continues to develop a larger and more powerful longer-range missile (Taepo Dong 2). . . .

North Korea attempted to orbit a small satellite using the Taepo Dong 1 in August 1998, but the third stage failed during powered flight; other aspects of the flight, including stage separation, appear to have been successful.

If it had an operable third-stage and a reentry vehicle capable of surviving ICBM flight, North Korea could now strike the continental United States with a Taepo Dong 1. In such a case, about two-thirds of the payload mass would be required for the reentry vehicle structure. The remaining mass is probably too light for an early generation nuclear weapon, but could strike a target in the United States with a biological or chemical warhead. . . .

A two-stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a payload of several hundred kilograms (enough for an early generation nuclear weapon) to Alaska or Hawaii, and could deliver a lighter weapon to the western half of the continental United States.
A three-stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a payload of several hundred kilograms, an early generation nuclear weapon, anywhere in the United States. . . .

This report specifically addresses the threat North Korea poses to the United States security over the past five years. Given the extraordinary progress made by North Korea in enhancing its missile capabilities in that time-frame, it is reasonable to conclude that the missile threat facing the United States will only increase, and probably dramatically so, over the next five to ten years, absent effective policy. This is particularly true if one considers those factors which were heavily discounted in the 1995 NIE regarding the ballistic missile threat facing the United States. Specifically, the 1995 NIE was criticized, among other reasons, for: basing its assessment on the vulnerability of only the United States' 48 contiguous states; for underestimating the time it would take a rogue nation to develop a long-range ballistic missile; for downplaying the impact of foreign assistance on the missile programs; for undervaluing the effect of space launch vehicle (SLV) development on missile proliferation; for being unrealistic about the potential sale of SLVs, and for dismissing the threat of an accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile launch.(43) Each of these factors has particular relevance for North Korea's missile programs. The Rumsfeld Commission, formally know as the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, more fully analyzed these factors. The Commission also made recommendations for the Intelligence Community to consider as it prepared to issue its next ballistic missile threat assessment (the 1999 NIE, which was released in September 1999).(44) . . . .

TAEPO DONG 1

North Korea is in the process of developing longer-range ballistic missiles. The two-stage Taepo Dong 1 has a range of 1,500-2,000 km (930-1,240 miles) and at one point was expected to enter production in 1995. On August 31, 1998, North Korea used a Taepo Dong 1 with an additional solid-fuel third stage in an attempt to place a small satellite into orbit. Apparently, the first stage (based on the No Dong missile motor) and the second stage (based on the SCUD C motor) operated as planned, and the third stage separated and carried the payload a distance before becoming disabled. The test demonstrated North Korea's ability to integrate numerous components in building a multi-stage missile, building a guidance package, and using both liquid and solid fuel. The test did not demonstrate a capability to construct a reentry vehicle that could survive atmospheric reentry at the speed of an ICBM, nor did it show the capacity to build a fully operational solid-fuel third stage.(54)

DoD estimated that the Taepo Dong 1, with a properly functioning third stage, could have a range of 3,850-5,600 km (2,400-3,500 miles), enough to reach Alaska and Hawaii. One expert predicted that the Taepo Dong 1 with a third stage could reach Alaska and Hawaii with a small nuclear warhead, and could reach much of the continental United States with a lighter warhead, such as a biological or chemical weapon.(55) The 1999 National Intelligence Council estimate indicated that if the Taepo Dong 1 had a properly functioning third stage and a survivable reentry vehicle, it could strike targets in the United States with sufficient size for a chemical or biological weapon, but not for an early-generation nuclear weapon.(56) It is not known where North Korea acquired the solid fuel third stage for the August 1998 test, but there are several possibilities. David Wright of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) said the solid fuel motor could have been acquired from Pakistan, which may have copied it from a French missile motor, or North Korea may have used, or copied, one stage of the Chinese M-11 short-range ballistic missile. Pakistan reportedly received M-11 missiles, components, and production technology from China. Iran received solid missile technology from Russia, and perhaps China, and may have passed it to North Korea in return for SCUD and No Dong missiles and technology. Another possibility is that North Korea might have modified a motor from an SA-2 surface-to-air missile, which North Korea reportedly produces as the HJ-2, or may have used an engine from an SS-21 SCARAB, which North Korea reportedly acquired for reverse engineering.(57) . . . .

TAEPO DONG 2

The Taepo Dong 2's range would enable North Korea to strike portions of Alaska and Hawaii with a payload of several hundred kilograms (enough for an early generation nuclear weapon), and could deliver a lighter weapon to the western half of the United States. Some analysts even suggest that the size of the Taepo Dong 2 allows space for enough liquid fuel to carry a missile almost 10,000 kilometers (6,200 miles) if the construction materials and warhead were sufficiently light.(58) With such range, the missile could reach most of the United States. Multiple-stage technology would enable the missile to travel further or to carry a larger payload. It is estimated that a three-stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a payload of several hundred kilograms, equivalent to a first generation nuclear weapon, anywhere in the United States.(59)"