Posted on 11/14/2003 3:33:02 AM PST by swilhelm73
That's highly unlikely. In both the 1862 and 1863 campaigns Lee was operating in unfriendly territory. The same case can be made for the Union Army in Virginia, but at least they had established supply lines leading back to Union territory. Lee did not, he was basically alone in enemy country without any supply line south, living off the land and what he could carry with him. Regardless of the lost order, McClellan knew the general area where Lee was and was in pursuit. At one point or another there would have been a battle, no doubt a major battle with a large number of casualties. Win or lose, any such battle would have left Lee with a large number of casualties that would have had to be cared for while he was in unfriendly territory. He would have had to return home and the invasion would be ended.
A victory at Gettysburg - which certainly was obtainable - would have accomplished the same thing.
No it would not. The chance for European recognition died in 1862 when it became clear that the Union wasn't going to quit and when Lincoln more closely tied the Union cause to the end of slavery. A victory at Gettysburg would have meant no more than did the victory and Chancellorsville two months before. The Army of the Potomac would have regrouped, Vickburg would still have fallen, Grant would have still come east, and the war would have gone on to its inevitable conclusion.
What the hell are you talking about?
That's highly unlikely. In both the 1862 and 1863 campaigns Lee was operating in unfriendly territory.
True.
The same case can be made for the Union Army in Virginia, but at least they had established supply lines leading back to Union territory. Lee did not, he was basically alone in enemy country without any supply line south, living off the land and what he could carry with him.
Also true.
I do not see why operating by living off the land rather than by supply line is such a great disadvantage. After all: Grant did so with success in the Vicksburg campaign in the spring of 1863; and Sherman did so in the March to the Sea. And surely you concede that neither central Mississippi or Georgia was any better endowed with forage than the rich German farmsteads of southern Pennsylvania.
In any case, Lee himself operated quite well by forage in Maryland and Pennsylvania during both of his offensives north of the Potomac. So I do not find the argument of inadequate supply lines to be a convincing one. It was accomplished successfully by well-led field armies on several occasions during the war. Note that in this regard Banks' Red River expedition does not qualify.
Regardless of the lost order, McClellan knew the general area where Lee was and was in pursuit. At one point or another there would have been a battle, no doubt a major battle with a large number of casualties. Win or lose, any such battle would have left Lee with a large number of casualties that would have had to be cared for while he was in unfriendly territory. He would have had to return home and the invasion would be ended.
The difficulty here is that McClellan moved very cautiously (as usual) until he got hold of SO 191. He was operating under the inaccurate belief that Lee greatly outnumbered him. It was only the intelligence that Lee's army was badly divided and vulnerable to destruction in detail that impelled him to move with such expedition against South Mountain; an alacrity which so mystified Lee and Jackson that they remained puzzled about it until they learned of the lost order the following spring. Without 191, all the evidence suggests that McClellan would have moved slowly out of Frederick, and not reached South Mountain until Lee had wrapped up the Harpers Ferry campaign and reunited his army to resume the march north. At that point Lee would be back in a position to choose the time and place for battle on his terms.
McClellan was an able and intelligent commander but an exceedingly cautious one, and this was reinforced by his constant belief of Lee's numerical superiority. The only time he managed any success against Lee was when he had an enormous intelligence advantage and had an overwhelming numerical superiority (Antietam); even then he only managed a draw despite outnumbering the ANV better than 4 to 1.
Given all that, it seems hard to credit McClellan with any kind of victory against Lee in Pennsylvania in October of 1862 without some very powerful additional advantage. Lee would have had his stragglers up (a likely strength of 55,000+), Stuart operating effective reconnaisance, and Jackson at his side, to say nothing of the confidence of having an unbroken record of military success since Fair Oaks.
And that one success - however qualified - would have brought the foreign recognition that the South needed. It would also have encouraged Bragg in Kentucky, who fell back listlessly after hearing of Lee's setback in Maryland. It would instead have been the laconic Buell who fell back listlessly.
No it would not. The chance for European recognition died in 1862 when it became clear that the Union wasn't going to quit and when Lincoln more closely tied the Union cause to the end of slavery. A victory at Gettysburg would have meant no more than did the victory and Chancellorsville two months before. The Army of the Potomac would have regrouped, Vickburg would still have fallen, Grant would have still come east, and the war would have gone on to its inevitable conclusion.
The South's situation in 1863 was more desperate but the public morale in the north was still shaky. A major defeat on northern soil with Lee operating at will in Pennsylvania or Maryland might well have been enough to force peace talks. Imagine also that the New York City draft riots of the next week would have been much more powerful, with no Gettysburg veterans available to suppress them.
Vicksburg certainly would have fallen still. Of course, the fruits might well have been thrown away when Grant and many of his veterans were hurried back east to confront Lee.
And then there is the opportunity of 1864, when stalemate in Georgia and Virginia and appalling casualty lists left Northern morale so low that Lincoln was convinced that he would not win reelection. If Davis had left Johnston in place to continue to defebsive stalemate rather than the reckless Hood, Atlanta might have remained in Confederate hands by election day.
And if it had, Lincoln's chances of reelection would have been much grimmer.
Of course, a Southern victory in 1864 would have been a terribly expensive one. Much of its territory was in ruins and much of its slave force accustomed to liberty.
But the fact remains that the Civil War was a close-run thing. The North had powerful advantages, but not powerful enough to assure easy victory.
What was the one position on which Davis was immobile? Come on, Non - it's your big chance to talk about Davis (with invite, even)!
Southern independence. As late as January 1865 he was insisting on that as a precondition to talks with the Union, in spite of the fact that everyone else in the government recognized how foolish that stand was.
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