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Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
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https://bsky.app/profile/militarynewsua.bsky.social/post/3m5isdbrbgc2d
On the 19th September 2025 between 0958 and 1011hrs Russia carried out another, in a series of air incursions into Estonian airspace. They were technically minor infractions but the last one lasted almost 12 minutes, and in the context of tensions with NATO – largely created by Russia itself, it was just another dangerous move in the never ending game of Baltic chess.
The F-35’s closed from behind – unseen – and identified the aircraft using their optical scanner before pulling away. The Gripens commander then used the emergency radio frequency to tell the Russians, “You are under our control. Return to Russian air space immediately”.
At first confused the Russian pilots turned one after another and departed Estonian air space, back into international space and continued their journey to Kaliningrad. Who would like to have been in the briefing room after that escapade?
@aegrotattoo9018
1 hour ago
Ukraine was always the ‘Rheinmetall’ of the Soviet Union, the brains of the whole mess. These are big shoes they’ve always worn.
KABOOM! Novorossiysk on fire.
Kyiv Independent (14 Nov):
Russian oil terminal in Novorossiysk on fire following reported Ukrainian drone strikes
“Ukrainian drones struck the Russian port city of Novorossiysk on Nov. 14, damaging an oil terminal and sparking a large fire, multiple Russian Telegram channels reported.
The attack hit the Sheskharis oil complex, where infrastructure facilities were damaged and a blaze broke out.
The facility is a major oil export terminal that serves as the endpoint for pipelines run by Russia’s state-run Transneft, the world’s largest oil pipeline company.
Russian state media RIA Novosti also resported that a civilian vessel in the port was also hit during the mass UAV strike, leaving three crew members injured.“
Wikipedia, on the oil terminal just struck in Novorossissyk:
“The united complex of Sheskharis and Grushevaya Balka oil terminals became the largest in Europe and the most efficient in USSR… In 2012 Sheckharis and Grushevaya merged into united enterprise ‘Sheskharis oil terminal’.
By 2012 Sheskharis oil terminal accounted for more than 30% of Russian oil export. The terminal has 3 docks of 200 meters total length.
Berth No.1 is the deepest, it can handle vessels with deadweight up to 250,000 tons and 19-meters draft, it transfers only oil cargo with 10,000 tons per hour capacity.
Berth No.2 is 14.5 meters deep, it can take vessels up to 90,000 deadweight and 13.9 m draft, its capacity range from 90 up to 6,000 tons per hour.
Berth No.3 accepts ships up to 33,000 DWT, draft alongside is 10.9 m, it processes mainly naphtha residue and diesel (800—900) tons per hour.
Berth No.4 serves bunkering vessels up to 3.6 DWT. Berths No.5 and No.8 transfer oil derivatives and accept tankers up to 12,000 tons DWT.
Berths No.6 and No.7 are able to take tankers up to 65,000 tons DWT, draft alongside is 13 m. Sheskharis oil terminal can simultaneously process 7 tankers.”
Oil markets react in the short term to strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, especially the four big Western export terminals for Urals grade crude (Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Ust Luga and Primorsk) - but fundamentally, enough replacement supply is available on the market. Prices will rise as Russia’s oil infrastructure get’s destroyed, but they won’t go crazy high - because President Trump has masterfully prepared the battlefield.
OilPrice.com (Nov 13, 2025):
Oil Prices Jump as Ukraine Hits One of Russia’s Biggest Export Hubs
“Oil prices climbed in early Asian trade on Friday as markets responded to renewed attacks by Ukraine against energy infrastructure in Russia. A Ukrainian drone attack on the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, one of the country’s most important oil export hubs, triggered renewed fears of supply disruptions in what has been a very bearish market of late.
At the time of writing, WTI had risen 1.52% to $59.58 while Brent was trading at $63.88.
The attacks damaged a ship, nearby apartment buildings, and an oil depot, injuring three crew members aboard the vessel, Russian regional authorities confirmed.
Ukrainian forces have increasingly targeted Russian oil-refining, storage, and export infrastructure using drones and missiles. The campaign has gained intensity in recent months, with the Center for European Policy Analysis noting a shift in strategy “from smaller-scale strikes on storage tanks to targeting hard-to-replace refinery equipment, like cracking units, much of it western-made and subject to sanctions.”
If Ukraine continues to press its deep-strike campaign and Russia faces rolling or compounding infrastructure losses, the supply risk to global oil markets could rise meaningfully.
Russian oil supply is being further suppressed by renewed U.S. sanctions, most notably new restrictions on Russian oil majors Rosneft and Lukoil, effective Nov. 21, prohibiting transactions with the companies as Washington increases pressure on Moscow.
The broader oil market outlook, however, remains bearish (headed toward lower prices) with U.S. crude inventories rising and multiple warnings of a severe glut in 2026
“Ukraine was always the ‘Rheinmetall’ of the Soviet Union”
Yes, it was the core of the Soviet Defense Industrial Base, in many critical aspects.
Russian forces continue to advance and to intensify offensive operations in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions, exploiting the effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and poor weather that hampers Ukrainian drone observation. Russian forces continued their advance toward Hulyaipole and the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway — one of the main ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying Ukrainian forces in the town. Ukrainian and Russian statements indicate that Russian forces have advanced to positions near the villages of Solodke, Yablukove, and Vesele, within a roughly nine-kilometer range northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[1] Russian forces conducted infiltration operations further north toward Danylivka on the T-0401 highway as well. ISW assesses that the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and elements of the 36th CAA are attempting to isolate and possibly encircle Hulyaipole from the northeast in accordance with a new campaign design that aims to degrade Ukrainian defenses to enable advances through a combination of BAI, infiltration tactics, and advances. Elements of the Russian 35th CAA, deployed to the south and southwest of Hulyaipole, have reportedly redeployed to the 5th CAA sector.[2] The Russian military command thus seems unlikely to launch an effort to encircle Hulyaipole from the south at this time, likely because Ukrainian defenses in the area are strongest in that direction. The prospects for and timeline of this Russian effort remain unclear at this time, but the situation in the Hulyaipole direction is serious.
Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows Russian servicemembers raising Russian flags in Danylivka (southwest of Velykomykhailivka on the T-0401 highway) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission, likely through Tsehelne and Yehorivka (both just east of Danylivka and southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[3] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Rivnopillya (northeast of Hulyaipole) and that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Danylivka.[4] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Rivnopillya on the evening of November 11, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on November 13 that Russian forces are operating near Solodke (north of Rivnopillya), Yablukove (south of Rivnopillya), and Vesele (southeast of Rivnopillya), indicating that Russian forces continue relatively rapid advances northeast and east of Hulyaipole.[5]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 13 that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) reached the Novooleksandrivka-Oleksiivka line (southwest of Velykomykhailivka), gained a foothold east of Yehorivka, and achieved “tactical successes” in the Yehorivka-Danylivka direction within the last two weeks.[6] Mashovets added that Russian forces also crossed the Yanchur River near Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) and advanced west to the Solodke-Rivnopillya line, covering a distance of seven kilometers.[7]
Mashovets noted that the Russian military command has concentrated elements of up to nine brigades and regiments, including one tank brigade, and up to six other regiment- and battalion-sized units and detachments, along a 41-kilometer front.[8] Mashovets noted that the Russian military command committed elements of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade and the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 35th CAA, EMD) to reinforce the efforts of the Russian 5th CAA and its 127th Motorized Rifle Division, likely east and northeast of Hulyaipole[9] Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command may also redeploy elements of the Russian 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD], operationally subordinated to the Dnepr Grouping of Forces) from western Zaporizhia Oblast and elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and 41st CAA (both of the Central Grouping of Forces) to further reinforce efforts in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions[10][11]
ISW continues to assess that the effects of a monthslong Russian BAI campaign targeting Ukrainian GLOCs in the Hulyaipole and Velykomykhailivka directions — including roads, highways, and railway lines — and worsening weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone effectiveness — have facilitated recent Russian advances.[12] A servicemember of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) acknowledged on November 13 that Russian forces take advantage of foggy and rainy weather conditions to conduct assaults.[13] A Russian milblogger published footage on November 13 reportedly showing elements of the Russian 11th Air and Air Defense Forces Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) conducting FAB guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velykomykhailivka.[14]
Russian forces continue to advance in the Pokrovsk direction as Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks. Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) by advancing through Rodynske, northeast of Pokrovsk, but the settlement remains contested. Geolocated footage published on November 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Rodynske, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in southern Rodynske.[15] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces established a foothold in Rodynske, however.[16]
Pokrovsk itself remains contested as well. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control areas of Pokrovsk south of the railway but that heavy fighting continues in northern Pokrovsk.[17] Geolocated footage published on November 12 and 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in the Pokrovsk City Council building in central Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces still operate in northwestern and north of Pokrovsk.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian positions on the western outskirts of Pokrovsk and near the entrance to Pokrovsk, likely referring to its northwestern entrance.[19] A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces also cleared Russian positions in northern Pokrovsk, secured a logistics route into the town, and are operating along the Donetska railway.[20] A Ukrainian officer operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to interdict Ukrainian logistics into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and will conduct assaults to draw fire from and subsequently attack Ukrainian drone and artillery crew positions.[21] The Ukrainian officer reported that Russian forces can strike a single Ukrainian position in the area with up to 10 Molniya strike drones, six bomber drones, and artillery and mortar fire within an hour.
A Russian milblogger complained that recent footage of Russian forces conducting logistics into Pokrovsk under the cover of fog allowed Ukrainian forces to interdict the effort. Russian milbloggers broadly amplified footage on November 10 and 11 showing Russian motorcycles, buggies, and transport trucks advancing into Pokrovsk under heavy fog, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) social media accounts geolocated the footage to southern Pokrovsk along the M-30 Selydove-Pokrovsk highway by November 11.[22] Russian milbloggers praised the tactic of advancing under fog cover that inhibits Ukrainian drone surveillance.[23] Another milblogger complained on November 12, however, that the “idiot who filmed” the video published it online and “so popular [mil]bloggers” underestimated the threat of Ukrainian artillery in a drone-dominated war, suggesting that the publication of the footage allowed Ukrainian artillery to strike Russian forces involved in the logistics effort.[24]
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that the Kremlin remains unwilling to compromise on its long-held maximalist war aims that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation. Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera requested an interview from Lavrov, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published the alleged full transcript of the interview on November 13.[25] Lavrov claimed that the war in Ukraine is “not a war for territory” or an effort to bring Ukraine back within Russia's sphere of influence, but is meant to “reliably guarantee Russia's security” and to “thwart NATO and EU plans” to turn Ukraine into a “puppet state” hostile to Russia. Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine must commit to “neutrality” and adhere to the international agreements under which Russia recognized Ukrainian independence — implying that Ukraine has no sovereignty as long as it does not acquiesce to Russia's demands, which would certainly deprive Ukraine of its sovereignty. The Kremlin has consistently reiterated its commitment to its original war demands, which include Ukrainian “neutrality,” the removal of the legitimate government of Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Russian government, and changes to NATO's Open Door Policy.[26] Lavrov’s November 13 interview with a prominent Italian newspaper was likely meant to rebroadcast this commitment to a European audience as part of ongoing efforts to convince the West to cease supporting Ukraine as it defends against Russia's war of aggression.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strikes campaign against Russian energy infrastructure on the night of November 12 and 13 with the second known use of FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces employed FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles and long-range Bars and Lyutyi drones in overnight strikes and published footage showing Ukrainian forces launching Flamingo cruise missiles, but did not specify against which exact targets.[27] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had stated on October 9 that Ukrainian forces employed Flamingo missiles in combat for the first time during the previous week but did not identify their targets.[28] A Ukrainian channel reporting on Mykolaiv Oblast reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces struck Oryol City (roughly 173 kilometers from Ukraine) with an FP-5 Flamingo missile and posted footage of the missile.[29] Geolocated imagery shows damage to boiler and turbine buildings at the Oryol Thermal Power Plant in Oryol City.[30] Russian authorities issued a missile warning for Oryol Oblast overnight, and Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on November 13 that Russian air defenses destroyed unspecified objects in the air over Oryol Oblast overnight.[31] Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows a fire, likely at a primary oil processing unit, at the Nizhnekamsk Oil Refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan.[32] Refinery officials acknowledged a fire at the plant but did not identify the cause.[33]
Russian forces continue to commit war crimes against Ukrainian civilians. Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows the aftermath of a Russian drone strike against civilians traveling along the P-79 Kupyansk-Borova highway north of Novoplatonivka (north of Borova).[34] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on November 13 that the strike murdered three civilians and injured a fourth civilian heading southward toward Borova to receive humanitarian aid and pensions.[35] The deliberate murder of civilians is a violation of the international legal principle of distinction that requires that parties only target combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities.[36] Russian forces use tactics to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) that involve indiscriminately striking vehicles and people traveling on roadways, frequently leading to Ukrainian civilian casualties. ISW has long assessed that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield.[37]
Ukraine's European allies continue to provide monetary aid to Ukraine, including to support military requirements. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Union (EU) provided Ukraine with an additional 6 billion euros (roughly $7 billion) in direct budget assistance on November 13.[38] Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko announced on November 13 that Ukraine received the final tranche of funding, worth 4.1 billion euros (roughly $4.8 billion), from the interest on seized Russian assets through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) framework and 1.8 billion euros (roughly $2 billion) of funding through the EU’s Ukraine Facility program.[39] NATO announced on November 13 that several European states will fund a joint $500 million military equipment and munitions package for Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[40] Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden will contribute to the joint package.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced within Vovchansk, near Synelnykove and Tykhe and toward Vilcha (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on October 29 and 30.[38] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Synelnykove.[39]
The Russian milblogger, reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, claimed that wounded servicemembers of the Russian 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating in central Vovchansk complained that the Russian military command continues to order attritional assaults despite high losses in the regiment.[40] The milblogger claimed that Russian soldiers in this unit are still wearing summer uniforms and have limited rations and that soldiers must use their own funds to pay for equipment and supplies as the Russian military command fails to provide these in sufficient quantities. The milblogger claimed that the Russian company commanders extort money from servicemembers to purchase drones and communications equipment. The milblogger claimed that the 1009th Regiment remains undermanned after suffering heavy losses in 2024.
Order of Battle: SKAT-350M reconnaissance drone operators of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on October 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced northwest of Bolohivka (east of Velykyi Burluk).[42]
Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove, Ambarne, and Khatnie on October 29 and 30.[43]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[44]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are firing TOS-1A thermobaric artillery at Dvorichanske (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on October 30 that Russian forces seized Sadove (south of Kupyansk) and advanced in southwestern Kupyansk.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and northeast of Sadove and that Osynovo (just south of Sadove) is a contested “gray zone.”[47] ISW has not observed evidence indicating that Russian forces have advanced south of Kupyansk.
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka and Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Pishchane; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, Hlushkivka, and Pishchane on October 29 and 30.[48] Тhe Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk, Myrove (west of Kupyansk), and Osynovo.[49]
Geolocated footage published on October 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southern Kupyansk after what ISW assesses to be an infiltration mission.[50] ISW assesses that this infiltration mission did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) and Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Novovodyane on October 29 and 30 but did not advance.[52]
Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Lyman direction.
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in southern Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman), in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[53]
Unconfirmed claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Lyman.[54]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and Novoselivka and toward Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, and Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 29 and 30.[55]
Geolocated footage published on October 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southeastern Lyman after what ISW assesses to be an infiltration mission.[56] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.
Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Oleksandr Borodin reported on October 30 that Russian forces continue to conduct small group infantry attacks in the Lyman direction and reduce the intensity of assaults when bad weather degrades Russian drone effectiveness.[57] An officer of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the direction reported that Russian forces lose over 12 servicemembers a day in constant attacks in the direction.[58]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that drone strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and field depots and vehicles have been integral to Russian forces’ ability to advance in the Lyman direction and have forced Ukrainian logistics further behind the front line.[59] The milblogger noted that Russian forces’ presence within Lyman is limited and far from consolidated.
Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on October 30 that a Russian multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strike against Slovyansk killed three civilians and injured one.[60]
Order of Battle: Molniya loitering munition operators of the Russian 45th Engineer Brigade (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka.[61] Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[62]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Vyimka (south of Siversk).[63]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced farther southwest of Vyimka than the geolocated footage indicated, and south of Siversk, Dronivka, (northwest of Siversk), and Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[64]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne and Zvanivka on October 29 and 30.[65]
A Russian milblogger published footage on October 30 reportedly showing Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces near Siversk with a Kh-38 air-to-surface missile.[66]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Vyimka.[67]
Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions or recently advanced east of Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[68]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Volodymyrivka.[69]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Vyrolyubivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, and Novospaske; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on October 29 and 30.[70]
Ukrainian Eastern Command Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval refuted Russian claims that Russian forces maintain a presence within Santurinivka Microraion (southeastern Kostyantynivka) and that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Kostyantynivka and near Santurinivka Microraion.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 30 that there is insufficient evidence to confirm that Russian forces maintain a presence in Santurinivka Microraion.[72]
Ukrainian 19th AC Spokesperson Major Oleh Zelinskyi reported on October 30 that Russian small infantry groups continue unsuccessful attacks toward Kostyantynivka.[73] Kostyantynivka City Military Administration Head Serhiy Gorbunov reported that about 5,000 civilians remain in Kostyantynivka under constant Russian artillery, air, and drone strikes.[74] Gorbunov reported that Russian first-person view (FPV) drone operators are systematically targeting civilians. ISW previously observed reporting that Russian FPV drone operators have deliberately killed almost 3,000 civilians in Kherson Oblast as of late September 2023.[75]
The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on October 29 that Russian forces are employing female servicemembers dressed as civilians to carry ammunition and radio batteries near Klishchiivka and Chasiv Yar (both east of Kostyantynivka) in acts of perfidy.[76] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported that fighting continues in Chasiv Yar, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized as of August 1.[77]
A Russian milblogger published footage on October 30 reportedly showing Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces near Kostyantynivka with a FAB-3000 glide bomb.[78]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Rusyn Yar and Sofiivka.[79] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[80]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Novotoretske, Zapovidne, and Dorozhnie on October 29 and 30.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Mayak (southeast of Dobropillya) and from Shakhove.[82]
Russian forces recently advanced in Pokrovsk.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Donetska Railway in central Pokrovsk.[83]
Unconfirmed Russian claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Pokrovsk, southeast of and in northeastern Myrnohrad and central Rih (both east of Pokrovsk), and north and east of Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk).[84]
Russian forces continued ground attacks near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Hnativka, Rih, Myrnohrad, and Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and Novopavlivka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, Kotlyne, and Molodetske; and northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne on October 29 and 30.[85]
Geolocated footage published on October 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions at the intersection of the Donetska Railway and the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in eastern Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses to be a Russian infiltration mission.[86] ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in central Pokrovsk.[87] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in Myrnohrad.[88] Elements of the 1210th Rifle Battalion of the 1232nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (15th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 2nd CAA) and drone operators of the Sparta Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[89]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on October 29 and 30.[90]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) reportedly continue to operate near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[91]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
I was aware that Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner had performed useful work behind the scenes in Saudi Arabia, so decided to see what Google, AI had to say about family.
“AI Overview
Donald Trump has two sons-in-law: Jared Kushner, who is married to Ivanka Trump, and Michael Boulos, who is married to Tiffany Trump.
* Jared Kushner
Spouse: Ivanka Trump
Background: Kushner is a businessman and investor who comes from a prominent real estate development family.
* Role in First Trump Administration: He served as a powerful senior advisor to President Trump from 2017 to 2021, with a wide-ranging portfolio that included criminal justice reform (the FIRST STEP Act) and Middle East diplomacy, which led to the Abraham Accords.
* Current Activities: Since leaving the White House, he founded the private equity firm Affinity Partners, which has raised significant funds, largely from the Saudi government’s sovereign wealth fund, and is currently involved in international real estate projects, including a controversial one in Serbia.
* Michael Boulos
Spouse: Tiffany Trump
Background: Boulos is a business executive of Lebanese descent who grew up in Nigeria. He is the son of Massad Boulos, a business executive who Trump recently nominated as ambassador to France.
* Personal Life: He and Tiffany Trump were married in 2022 and welcomed their first child in May 2025.”
We can see that Trump has made good use of new family members and the backgrounds they bring to this family. Biden was not successful in doing something similar. I have wondered how his life and career would have turned out if his two boys had not been scarred by being in the auto accident that killed their mother and his new baby when they were children?
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