BKMK.
The German Consulate in Jerusalem reported much stronger sympathies — for the Germans in general and for the "Führer" in particular.
'Ausschlaggebend für die bei den Arabern Deutschland gegenüber jetzt bestehenden Sympathien ist aber die Bewunderung, welche unser Führer genießt. Gerade die Unruhezeiten boten mir öfter Gelegenheit festzustellen, wie weit diese Sympathie verbreitet ist. Wenn man sich bei einer bedrohlichen Haltung einer arabischen Volksmenge als Deutscher zu erkennen gab, war dies im Allgemeinen schon ein Freibrief für ungehindertes passieren.
Wenn man sich aber durch den deutschen Gruss "Heil Hitler," auswies, schlug die Haltung der Araber meist in Begeisterung um und der Deutsche kam zu Ovationen, bei denen die Araber den deutschen Gruss stürmisch erwiderten. Die Begeisterung für unsren Führer und das neue Deutschland ist wohl deshalb so verbreitet, weil die palästinensischen Araber in ihrem Kampf um ihre Existenz einen arabischen "Führer" ersehnen und weil sie sich im Kampf gegen die Juden in einer Front mit den Deutschen fühlen.'
['The decisive factor for the sympathy that the Arabs now have towards Germany is the admiration our leader enjoys. The times of unrest in particular often gave me the opportunity to determine how widespread this sympathy is.
If one identified oneself as a German in a threatening attitude of an Arab crowd, this was generally a license to pass unhindered. But if you identified yourself with the German salute "Heil Hitler," the attitude of the Arabs usually turned to enthusiasm and the German received an ovation, during which the Arabs returned the German salute stormily. Enthusiasm for our leader and the new Germany is probably so widespread because the Palestinian Arabs long for an Arab "leader" in their struggle for their existence and because they feel they are on a front with the Germans in the fight against the Jews'].
After Hitler's victory in 1933 elections, there were at least two attempts to establish with German help Arab off-shoots of the NSDAP in Arab countries.
In April 1933 the German Consul General in Jerusalem, Heinrich Wolff was contacted by the Palestine correspondent of the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahrām, Joseph Francis, who acted as a spokesman for a group of Palestinian Arabs. In the same month, the German envoy in Baghdad, Fritz Grobba, was approached by 'Abdalghaffūr al-Badrī, an anti-sharifian ex-officer and editor of the Baghdad newspaper al-Istiqlāl. Both requested German assistance in establishing such a party. In both cases the answer was negative.
The Auswärtiges Amt stated in the case of the Palestinian group:
'A direct connection between Mr. Francis and members of the Ortsgruppen of the. NSDAP in Palestine would be regrettable. As German citizens then would be suspected of interfering in the domestic affairs of Palestine.'
Thus, paradoxically enough, it was the German side which effectively stopped all efforts to create Arab cells of National Socialists parties. As far as the Near East was concerned, the overriding idea behind this policy was the wish not to encroach on the British position in the Bear East.
For the same reason, not all demonstrations of sympathy towards Hitler's Germany were viewed favorably by the German side. When at the maulid-celebrations in Jerusalem in 1937 German and Italian flags were flown and in some cases also portraits of Fauzi Qawuqdjī, Mussolini and Hitler were shown, the reaction of the German Consulate was reticent:
'Ich betrachte diesen arabischen Versuch , durch Hissung deutscher Flaggen und Ausstellen von Bildern des Führers ihren Unwillen über die Engländer und die Juden zum Ausdruck zu bringen, als wenig erfreulich und als einen gewissen Missbrauch. Die Engländer dürften sich aber darüber im Klaren sein, dass man von deutscher Seite zu der Durchführung dieser Demonstration nicht beigetragen hat und dass es sich um eine von langer Hand vorbereitete rein arabische Aktion handelt. Die jüdische Presse hat diese Demonstration ausführlich behandelt und unter anderem darauf hingewiesen, dass die Begeisterung der Araber für den Führer widersinnig wäre, weil dieser alle Semiten, also auch die Araber, hasse. Die arabische Presse hat hierauf nicht reagiert. Von deutscher Seite sind arabische Anfragen auf Überlassung deutscher Flaggen abschlägig beschieden worden. Von einer Einwirkung auf die Araber, eine Benutzung der deutschen Bilder und Flaggen zu unterlassen, habe ich vorerst abgesehen.'
['I look at this Arab attempt by hoisting German flags and exhibiting pictures of the Führer expressing their displeasure with the English and the Jews as unpleasant and a certain abuse. However, the English should be aware that one has not contributed to the implementation of this demonstration from the German side and that it is a long-hand prepared purely Arab action. The Jewish press has discussed this demonstration in detail and, among other things, pointed out that the enthusiasm of the Arabs for the Führer would be absurd because he hates all Semites, including the Arabs. The Arab press did not react to this. From a German side, Arab inquiries on transfer of German flags have been decided. From an action to the Arabs, to refrain from using German pictures and flags, I have for now'].
The Palestinian paper al-Jāmi'a al-Islāmiyya wrote on January 1, 1938:
'Many Arabs consider that Germany is a friend of the Arabs. This friendship is perhaps the result of the German hatred of Jews. Germany's anti-Jewish policy has caused a strong outflow of emigrants to Palestine - German Jews. This is the good that Germany did us.'
[...]
However, the Haavara agreement which regulated Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine was never commented on, let alone criticised in the Palestinian Press. And the image of Hitler's personality remained positive : his short cut to military power had - according to the Palestinian paper al - Kirmil — its only precedent in the military achievements of the "Prophet."
The man who dominated Palestinian resistance to Zionism and who during the Second World War became an unhappy symbol of close collaboration between National Socialism and the Arabs, Hajj Amin al-Husaini, made clear that he welcomed the new regime in Germany and hoped for the spread of "fascist, antidemocratic leadership to other countries" and also approved of the anti -Jewish measures of the new regime. It is true that the Mufti also appealed "for a German-Jewish policy which would direct German Jews away from, not towards Palestine."
The German Consul General in Jerusalem Wolff observed "that the Arabs were too primitive politically to fully appreciate the fact that Germany and German Jewish policy were greatly intensifying their problem.
Francis Nicosia has shown in detail that Germany refused consistently in this period to become involved in anti-British policy in the Near East. When Fauzī al - Qāwuqjī approached the German envoy in Baghdad, Fritz Grobba, to obtain arms for the Arab rebellion in Palestine, he answered that relations with Great Britain were more important to the Hitler-government than possible gains of sympathy in the Arab world. The Arabs were given general sympathy for plans of self-determination — not more.
The channels of transmission of National-Socialist and Fascist ideas to the Arab Near East were manifold.
There was the deliberate attempt to spread these ideas via the usual diplomatic channels and the media.
Broadcasts in Arabic from Germany started relatively late - in April 1939. The program consisted of recital of passages from the Koran, Arabic music, Arabic literary texts and political commentaries.
One of the Arab speakers was Yūnus al-Bahri, who later wrote his memoirs about his time in Berlin under under the title Hunā Berlin. Hayyi l - 'arab (Here is Berlin. Greetings to the Arabs) which was the customary start of the broadcasts Here is berlin (greeting to the Arabs) which was the customary start of broadcasts.
Approximately at the same time Radio Berlin edited an Arab bulletin Barid al-Sharq (Orient - Post), which regularly carried extracts from Hitler's speeches and political commentaries.
There were the activities of the German embassies and legations, one of the most active diplomats being certainly the German envoy in Iraq, Fritz Grobba. These diplomats worked closely together with the local groups (Ortsgruppen) of the NSDAP, as far as they existed. There were a variety of contacts between the diplomatic missions and writers, politicians, journalists of different persuasions in Iraq, Egypt, Syria , Lebanon and Palestine. There were the Arab Clubs in Germany which were under the close supervision of the Gestapo. And there were free-lance journalists and politicians, Arabs who resided in neutral countries, who were influenced and sometimes paid by German money but were not under complete controle, like the Druze -Lebanese Emir Shakib Arslan (1869-1946), an Arab intellectual who resided in Switzerland, where he published his political journal La Nation Arabe...