...and the Budapest Agreement was an accession to that ratified nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
Doesn’t pertain:
“Accession
“Accession” is the act whereby a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to become a party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states. It has the same legal effect as ratification. Accession usually occurs after the treaty has entered into force. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his function as depositary, has also accepted accessions to some conventions before their entry into force. The conditions under which accession may occur and the procedure involved depend on the provisions of the treaty. A treaty might provide for the accession of all other states or for a limited and defined number of states. In the absence of such a provision, accession can only occur where the negotiating states were agreed or subsequently agree on it in the case of the state in question.
[Arts.2 (1) (b) and 15, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969]
For more glossary terms, visit the UN Treaty Website’s Glossary of terms relating to Treaty actions.”
...and the Budapest Agreement was an accession to that ratified nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
Bullcrap, as I have told you before.
The MEMORANDUM is not a Treaty for anyone, and it is NOT and Accession instrument by Ukraine.
The MEMORANDUM states "Welcoming the Accession of Ukraine...." Who is welcoming the accession of Ukraine in the third person? Ukraine?
You AGAIN willfully and deliberately misrepresent a diplomatic MEMORANDUM by four nations as Ukraine's accession document, and as a Treaty. As it was not a treaty, it was not submitted to the Senate for ratification.
While you must run and hide from the actual text of the Budapest Memorandum, or what an accession instrument actually looks like, here they are again.
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/modelinstruments/model_instrument_of_accession-English.pdf
MODEL INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION(To be signed by the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs)
ACCESSION _____________
WHEREAS the [title of treaty, convention, agreement, etc.] was [concluded, adopted, opened for signature, etc.] at [place] on [date],
NOW THEREFORE I, [name and title of the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister for Foreign Affairs] declare that the Government of [name of State], having considered the above-mentioned [treaty, convention, agreement, etc.], accedes to the same and undertakes faithfully to perform and carry out the stipulations therein contained.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed this instrument of accession at [place] on [date].
[Signature]
- - - - - - - - - -
4. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
Having brought the matter before the UN Security Council, the assurance given in the Budapest Memorandum was satisfied.
The Breach: Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum
Mariana Budjeryn
[excerpt]
Though some in Washington were inclined to entertain the idea of a nuclear Ukraine, US Secretary of State James Baker took a firm view that only Russia should succeed the Soviet Union as a nuclear state, lest the unraveled Soviet Union should become a “Yugoslavia with nukes.”[...]
On December 5, at the CSCE summit [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] in Budapest, presidents of the US, UK, Russia, and Ukraine signed a diplomatic Memorandum that, as pledged, confirmed the now familiar security assurances. In addition, it included a truncated version of the consultation mechanism Ukraine once proposed. Article 6 of the Memorandum merely stated that the parties “will consult in the event a situation arises which raises a question concerning these commitments.”
[...]
The perceptions of Russian threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine that underpinned its demands for security guarantees in the early 1990s have proved justified. Bereft of allies and weakened by perennial ad governance that led to an internal political crisis, Ukraine became an easy target for Mr. Putin. The Budapest Memorandum failed to deter Russian aggression because it imposed no immediate cost for its violation. The political assurances it provided rested on the goodwill and self-restraint of the guarantors, an arrangement that can work between allies but not potential adversaries.
This did not guarantee any military action. It only gave non-binding assurances to bring any future acts of aggression before the U.N. Security Council.
Those assurances were the best Ukraine could get. They were accepted and Ukraine acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty because it could not achieve international recognition as a sovereign state as a nuclear nation.