Journal of the Federal Convention June 16th 1787

Patterson Plan Debate. Lansing Speech. Federal v. National. Articles as Treaty. Comparison of Plans. Wilson Speech.

Mr. LANSING called for the reading of the 1st. resolution of each plan, which he considered as involving principles directly in contrast; that of Mr. Patterson says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective States, that of Mr. Randolph distroys it: the latter requires a negative on all the laws of the particular States; the former, only certain general powers for the general good. The plan of Mr. R. in short absorbs all power except what may be exercised in the little local matters of the States which are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance. He grounded his preference of Mr. P.'s plan, chiefly on two objections agst. [FN2] that of Mr. R. 1. [FN3] want of power in the Convention to discuss & propose it. 2 [FN3] the improbability of its being adopted.

1. He was decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal nature, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being. The Act of Congress The tenor of the Acts of the States, the Commissions produced by the several deputations all proved this. And this limitation of the power to an amendment of the Confederacy, marked the opinion of the States, that it was unnecessary & improper to go farther. He was sure that this was the case with his State. N. York would never have concurred in sending deputies to the convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were to turn on a consolidation of the States, and a National Government.

2. was it probable that the States would adopt & ratify a scheme, which they had never authorized us to propose? and which so far exceeded what they regarded as sufficient? We see by their several Acts particularly in relation to the plan of revenue proposed by Cong. in 1783, not authorized by the Articles of Confederation, what were the ideas they then entertained. Can so great a change be supposed to have already taken place. To rely on any change which is hereafter to take place in the sentiments of the people would be trusting to too great an uncertainty. We know only what their present sentiments are. And it is in vain to propose what will not accord with these. The States will never feel a sufficient confidence in a general Government to give it a negative on their laws. The Scheme is itself totally novel. There is no parallel to it to be found. The authority of Congress is familiar to the people, and an augmentation of the powers of Congress will be readily approved by them.

Mr. PATTERSON, said as he had on a former occasion given his sentiments on the plan proposed by Mr. R. he would now avoiding repetition as much as possible give his reasons in favor of that proposed by himself. He preferred it because it accorded 1. [FN4] with the powers of the Convention, 2 [FN4] with the sentiments of the people. If the confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain larger powers, not assume them of ourselves. I came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me. Our object is not such a Governmt. as may be best in itself, but such a one as our Constituents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve.

If we argue the matter on the supposition that no Confederacy at present exists, it can not be denied that all the States stand on the footing of equal sovereignty. All therefore must concur before any can be bound. If a proportional representation be right, why do we not vote so here? If we argue on the fact that a federal compact actually exists, and consult the articles of it we still find an equal Sovereignty to be the basis of it. He reads the 5th. art: of [FN5] Confederation giving each State a vote- & the 13th. declaring that no alteration shall be made without unanimous consent. This is the nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done, must be unanimously undone. It was observed [by Mr. Wilson] that the larger States gave up the point, not because it was right, but because the circumstances of the moment urged the concession. Be it so. Are they for that reason at liberty to take it back. Can the donor resume his gift without the consent of the donee. This doctrine may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice the lesser States.

The large States acceded readily to the confederacy. It was the small ones that came in reluctantly and slowly. N. Jersey & Maryland were the two last, the former objecting to the want of power in Congress over trade: both of them to the want of power to appropriate the vacant territory to the benefit of the whole. -If the sovereignty of the States is to be maintained, the Representatives must be drawn immediately from the States, not from the people: and we have no power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty.

The only expedient that will cure the difficulty, is that of throwing the States into Hotchpot. To say that this is impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be tried, and we shall see whether the Citizens of Massts. Pena. & Va. accede to it. It will be objected that Coercion will be impracticable. But will it be more so in one plan than the other? Its efficacy will depend on the quantum of power collected, not on its being drawn from the States, or from the individuals; and according to his plan it may be exerted on individuals as well as according [FN6] that of Mr. R.

A distinct executive & Judiciary also were equally provided by his plan. It is urged that two branches in the Legislature are necessary. Why? for the purpose of a check. But the reason of [FN7] the precaution is not applicable to this case. Within a particular State, where party heats prevail, such a check may be necessary. In such a body as Congress it is less necessary, and besides, the delegations of the different States are checks on each other. Do the people at large complain of Congs.? No, what they wish is that Congs. may have more power. If the power now proposed be not eno', the people hereafter will make additions to it. With proper powers Congs. will act with more energy & wisdom than the proposed Natl. Legislature; being fewer in number, and more secreted & refined by the mode of election. The plan of Mr. R. will also be enormously expensive. Allowing Georgia & Del. two representatives each in the popular branch the aggregate number of that branch will be 180. Add to it half as many for the other branch and you have 270. members coming once at least a year from the most distant as well as the most central parts of the republic. In the present deranged state of our finances can so expensive a system be seriously though of? By enlarging the powers of Congs. the greatest part of this expence will be saved, and all purposes will be answered. At least a trial ought to be made.

Mr. WILSON entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two plans so far he said as there had been time to examine the one last proposed. These points were 1. in the Virga. plan there are 2 & in some degree 3 branches in the Legislature: in the plan from N. J. there is to be a single legislature only-2. Representation of the people at large is the basis of the [FN8] one: -the State Legislatures, the pillars of the other-3. proportional representation prevails in one: -equality of suffrage in the other-4. A single Executive Magistrate is at the head of the one: -a plurality is held out in the other.-5. in the one the [FN9] majority of the people of the U. S. must prevail: -in the other a minority may prevail. 6. the Natl. Legislature is to make laws in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent &-: -in place of this Congs. are to have additional power in a few cases only-7. A negative on the laws of the States: -in place of this coertion to be substituted -8. The Executive to be removeable on impeachment & conviction; -in one plan: in the other to be removeable at the instance of [FN10] majority of the Executives of the States-9. Revision of the laws provided for in one: -no such check in the other-10. inferior national tribunals in one: -none such in the other. 11. In ye. one jurisdiction of Natl. tribunals to extend &c-; an appellate jurisdiction only allowed in the other. 12. Here the jurisdiction is to extend to all cases affecting the Nationl. peace & harmony: there, a few cases only are marked out. 13. finally ye. ratification is in this to be by the people themselves: -in that by the legislative authorities according to the 13 art: of [FN11] Confederation.

With regard to the power of the Convention, he conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty to propose any thing. In this particular he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the two plans.

With regard to the sentiments of the people, he conceived it difficult to know precisely what they are. Those of the particular circle in which one moved, were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He could not persuade himself that the State Govts. & Sovereignties were so much the idols of the people, nor a Natl. Govt. so obnoxious to them, as some supposed. Why sd. a Natl. Govt. be unpopular? Has it less dignity? will each Citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection? Will a Citizen of Delaware be degraded by becoming a Citizen of the United States? [FN12] Where do the people look at present for relief from the evils of which they complain? Is it from an internal reform of their Govts.? no, Sir. It is from the Natl. Councils that relief is expected. For these reasons he did not fear, that the people would not follow us into a national Govt. and it will be a further recommendation of Mr. R.'s plan that it is to be submitted to them, and not to the Legislatures, for ratification.

Proceeding now to the 1st point on which he had contrasted the two plans, he observed that anxious as he was for some augmentation of the federal powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed that he could ever consent to give powers to Congs. he had two reasons either of wch. was sufficient. 1. [FN13] Congs. as a Legislative body does not stand on the people. 2. [FN13] it is a single body. 1.

He would not repeat the remarks he had formerly made on the principles of Representation. he would only say that an inequality in it, has ever been a poison contaminating every branch of Govt. In G. Britain where this poison has had a full operation, the security of private rights is owing entirely to the purity of Her tribunals of Justice, the Judges of which are neither appointed nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The political liberty of that Nation, owing to the inequality of representation is at the mercy of its rulers. He means not to insinuate that there is any parallel between the situation of that Country & ours at present. But it is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the smallest bodies in G. B. are notoriously the most corrupt. Every other source of influence must also be stronger in small than [FN14] large bodies of men. When Lord Chesterfield had told us that one of the Dutch provinces had been seduced into the views of France, he need not have added, that it was not Holland, but one of the smallest of them.

There are facts among ourselves which are known to all. Passing over others, he [FN15] will only remark that the Impost, so anxiously wished for by the public was defeated not by any of the larger States in the Union. 2. Congress is a single Legislature. Despotism comes on Mankind in different Shapes, sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a Military, one. Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single House there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it.

On another great point, the contrast was equally favorable to the plan reported by the Committee of the whole. It vested the Executive powers in a single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey, vested them in a plurality. In order to controul the Legislative authority, you must divide it. In order to controul the Executive you must unite it. One man will be more responsible than three. Three will contend among themselves till one becomes the master of his colleagues. In the triumvirates of Rome first Caesar, then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The Kings of Sparta, & the Consuls of Rome prove also the factious consequences of dividing the Executive Magistracy. Having already taken up so much time he wd. not he sd. proceed to any of the other points. Those on which he had dwelt, are sufficient of themselves: and on a decision of them, the fate of the others will depend.

Mr. PINKNEY, the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Natil. system. He thought the Convention authorized to go any length in recommending, which they found necessary to remedy the evils which produced this Convention.

Mr. ELLSWORTH proposed as a more distinctive form of collecting the mind of the Committee on the subject, "that the Legislative power of the U. S. should remain in Congs." This was not seconded though it seemed better calculated for the purpose than the 1st. proposition of Mr. Patterson in place of which Mr. E. wished to substitute it.

Mr. RANDOLPH, was not scrupulous on the point of power. When the salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be treason to our trust, not to propose what we found necessary. He painted in strong colours, the imbecility of the existing Confederacy, & the danger of delaying a substantial reform. In answer to the objection drawn from the sense of our Constituents as denoted by their acts relating to the Convention and the objects of their deliberation, he observed that as each State acted separately in the case, it would have been indecent for it to have charged the existing Constitution with all the vices which it might have perceived in it. The first State that set on foot this experiment would not have been justified in going so far, ignorant as it was of the opinion of others, and sensible as it must have been of the uncertainty of a successful issue to the experiment. There are certainly seasons [FN16] of a peculiar nature where the ordinary cautions must be dispensed with; and this is certainly one of them.

He wd. not as far as depended on him leave any thing that seemed necessary, undone. The present moment is favorable, and is probably the last that will offer. The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been fully displayed by the trial already made. There are but two modes, by which the end of a Genl. Govt. can be attained: the 1st. is [FN17] by coercion as proposed by Mr. P.s plan 2. [FN18] by real legislation as propd. by the other plan. Coercion he pronounced to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals. It tended also to habituate the instruments of it to shed the blood & riot in the spoils of their fellow Citizens, and consequently trained them up for the service of ambition.

We must resort therefor to a National [FN19] Legislation over individuals, for which Congs. are unfit. To vest such power in them, would be blending the Legislative with the Executive, contrary to the recd. maxim on this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore in Congs. has been safe, it has been owing to the general impotency of that body. Congs. are moreover not elected by the people, but by the Legislatures who retain even a power of recall. They have therefore no will of their own, they are a mere diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to the views of the States, who are always encroaching on the authority of the U. States. A provision for harmony among the States, as in trade, naturalization &c.-for crushhing rebellion whenever it may rear its crest-and for certain other general benefits, must be made. The powers for these purposes, can never be given to a body, inadequate as Congress are in point of representation, elected in the mode in which they are, and possessing no more confidence than they do: for notwithstanding what has been said to the contrary, his own experience satisfied him that a rooted distrust of Congress pretty generally prevailed. A Natl. Govt. alone, properly constituted, will answer the purpose; and he begged it to be considered that the present is the last moment for establishing one. After this select experiment, the people will yield to despair.

FN4 The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the transcript.

FN13 The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the transcript.

FN16 The words "certainly seasons" are transposed to read "seasons certainly" in the transcript; but the word "seasons" was erroneously printed "reasons," which error has been followed in other editions of Madison's notes.

Committee of the Whole.

Large State v. Small State dispute continued.

John Lansing (NY) read the resolutions from both the Randolph and Patterson plans. One destroys the states, the other preserves them. Randolph’s leaves only inconsequential powers to the states. He disputed the authority of the convention to discuss Randolph’s plan, and didn’t think it had a chance of acceptance and ratification.

NY would not have sent a delegation to discuss such a consolidation of power.

Why would the states ratify that which they did not authorize? Lansing referred to state defeats of revenue proposals. (In 1782, with the country still at war, RI defeated an impost. In early 1783, George Washington talked some officers of his unpaid army to cease their seditious talk. Congress also refused to consider Madison’s proposed modification of revenue requisitions based on land value.)

“Great changes can only be gradually introduced.”

Given the facts, said Lansing, the temper of the states would not accept anything like the Randolph Plan. Especially abhorrent was the notion of a general government veto over state laws. He thought because Congress was familiar to the people, they would accept some increase in its powers.

William Patterson would not repeat his sentiments regarding the Randolph Plan. He supported the NJ plan because it was within the powers given the convention and was agreeable to the people. Should wider powers have been necessary, they should go home to get such powers from their states. The delegates did not gather to discuss the best government they could devise, but the best they were authorized.

If proportional representation was required, why were the votes at the convention taken by states and not proportionally? The Articles required unanimous consent by the states to modify them. Patterson properly referred to the Articles as a treaty; permission of all is required to change that which was ratified by all. His view was somewhat the opposite of an opinion that unless provided for, once one member of a treaty violates the treaty, the treaty is void.

So it was only under duress of war that the large states acquiesced to equality among the states? Actually the small states were the most reluctant. NJ and MD were the last to ratify, almost four years after submission of the Articles to the States. If the states were to survive, representation must be drawn from the states and not the people. The convention had no power to relinquish equal state sovereignty.

The only solution would be to get rid of states, throw all of the people together. So what if the people resisted such coercion? It was as practical an idea as denial of equal suffrage to the states.

Mr. Patterson discredited the need for a bicameral Congress. Checks on power would be inherent in the various state delegations to Congress. The people did not complain of Congress as it was; they only wished it had more power. If the NJ plan does not confer enough power, the people will ask for more. An appropriately empowered Congress under the Articles “will act with more energy and wisdom” than under the Randolph Plan. An attempt to improve the Articles should be made.

James Wilson (PA) also took up a comparison of the plans. In Randolph v. Patterson Plans, there were two branches to the legislature v. one, representation by the people v. the states, proportional representation v. equal suffrage, a single Executive v. multiple, majority of the people must prevail v. a minority, laws made to which the states are incompetent v. additional power in a few cases, a negative on state laws v. coercion, removal of an Executive on impeachment v. removal on majority vote of state governors, revision of the laws in one v. no such check in the other, inferior tribunals v. no inferior tribunals, rather extensive court jurisdiction v. limited appellate jurisdiction, jurisdiction regarding national peace and harmony v. a few cases marked out, ratification by the people v. ratification by Article 13 [which must be unanimous] of the Articles of Confederation.

As for his options at the convention, Mr. Wilson felt at ease to propose anything.

Mr. Wilson did not think anyone knew the inclinations of the people. He could not convince himself that the people held the state governments in high esteem and the idea of a national government obnoxious. Why should the national government be held in less esteem? Would there be less liberty? Where do the people look for relief of the evils they complain?

He opposed giving extensive powers to a single body, something which no state or colonial government did. Also, such extensive powers should not rest on a foundation of state government alone. He did not mean to insult the small states, but it was a fact to him that the smallest bodies in Great Britain were the most corrupt. Congress under the Articles was tiny, and the small states were, well, small. He illustrated such corruption with the current situation in a small state in Holland.

An impost amendment to the Articles a few years earlier was defeated by a single state, a small one, Rhode Island. It was the only state not to send delegates to the convention. Wilson went further to elaborate on why a single legislative house was more prone to corruption.

To reduce corruption, divide the legislature and unite the executive. He described the examples of the Caesars and Spartan Kings.

Charles Pinckney (SC) tossed a barb at NJ, suggesting that if it got an equal vote in the Senate, the rest of her objections would evaporate. He thought the convention could go to any length to recommend correctives.

(He was right, four of its five delegates would sign the Constitution. The supporters of the NJ Plan did not bother to defend it as a solution to the problems facing the Union. The basic question was, “should the Union consist of ambassadors from sovereign States, or should the government represent, in some part, the people?” Almost all of the States split their legislatures on the British model, a lower house of the people and an upper which more or less represented wealthy interests. In this way, the rich could not become a feared aristocracy, and the people could not confiscate wealth and redistribute it. Few of the delegates supported a unicameral legislature, and certainly not one with any real power.)

Judge Oliver Ellsworth (CN) made a motion that was not seconded.

Governor Edmund Randolph described the “imbecility” of life under the Articles, dangers to come, and thought it treasonous to avoid recommending necessary changes. There “are certainly seasons of a peculiar nature where the ordinary cautions must be dispensed with, and this is certainly one of them.”

He doubted there would be another time so favorable to make necessary changes. The choice was between the current federal plan, of which the problems were known, or the proposed national one. The ends of government may be achieved by coercion under the Articles or by real legislation. Pillaging fellow Americans for taxes was impractical, bloody and cruel. Vesting real legislative and executive powers in one body was dangerous. Current Congressmen are ambassadors, not legislators. Provision for harmony among the states, such as trade, naturalization, crushing rebellion (read: slave rebellions, especially) must happen. A single body, unicameral Congress cannot be given such power.

“After this select experiment, the people will yield to despair.”

Adjourned

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