The DC Court of Appeals said “This court has held that equity will not be barred from issuing an injunction to restrain invalidly appointed officers if the alternative remedy of quo warranto is inadequate.”
I'm not a lawyer, but I believe that the word "equity" in this quote is a specific legal term of art meaning the following:
"The principles of justice used to correct or supplement the law as applied to particular circumstances. For example the judge decided the case by equity because the statute did not fully address the issue. In this sense it is also termed natural equity"
http://definitions.uslegal.com/e/equity/
I think the point the DC Appeals Court was making is that it would be unjust to require an injured interested party to make a quo warranto demand on a public official only from AG or US Attorney if the AG and US Attorney have a conflict of interest. This would create the possibility of an "equity exception" to the ruling of this same appeals court that all quo warranto demands must go through the AG or US Attorney. Such an equity exception would allow the court to go around the AG and US Attorney to grant quo warranto to an interested party with standing.
Here is some of the context that preceded this quote from the passages I posted earlier in this thread:
“For instance, the Attorney General was responsible for appointing appellees Diegelman and Lauer to their jobs. Requiring appellants to convince the Attorney General to file a quo warranto action on their behalf in this case would effectively bar their access to court. If appellants attempted to petition the court for leave to have the writ issued under 16 D.C.Code Sec. 3503, they would face the difficult task of persuading the court that they were “interested persons.” In feudal times, when the writ of quo warranto originated, public offices were similar to a form of property right, and a quo warranto action was like an action of ejectment, in which the only party who could bring a lawsuit was a claimant who sued to regain possession from one who was unlawfully in possession. Some courts have continued to insist that only a claimant to the defendant's office is sufficiently “interested” to bring a quo warranto action.”
“Given these restrictions, quo warranto is an extremely difficult and uncertain remedy for the type of claim at issue in this case. This court has held that equity will not be barred from issuing an injunction to restrain invalidly appointed officers if the alternative remedy of quo warranto is inadequate.”
Like these chaps: http://www.texascherokeenation.org/
Thank you.
Who in the eyes of the court, then, could possibly be an injured interested party? That seems to be the difficulty (legal dancing on heads of pins, I think there millions of injured in reality).
On the contrary, the court has been clear in stating that an interested party may, when granted permission, institute quo warranto proceedings in the name of the United States. Orly was refused permission. Thank goodness.
For your reference, here are the links to Donofrio's three-part legal brief on Quo Warranto and a couple of relevant excerpts. Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3.
§ 16-3502. Parties who may institute; ex rel. proceedings.The Attorney General of the United States or the United States attorney may institute a proceeding pursuant to this subchapter on his own motion or on the relation of a third person. The writ may not be issued on the relation of a third person except by leave of the court, to be applied for by the relator, by a petition duly verified setting forth the grounds of the application ...
In Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 at 546 (1915), the Supreme Court interpreted the role of the AG and US attorney as follows:The District Code still treats usurpation of office as a public wrong which can be corrected only by proceeding in the name of the government itself. It permits those proceedings to be instituted by the Attorney General of the United States and by the attorney for the District of Columbia. By virtue of their position, they, at their discretion and acting under the sense of official responsibility, can institute such proceedings in any case they deem proper. But there are so many reasons of public policy against permitting a public officer to be harassed with litigation over his right to hold office that the Code not only does not authorize a private citizen, on his own motion, to attack the incumbent’s title, but it throws obstacles in the way of all such private attacks. It recognizes, however, that there might be instances in which it would be proper to allow such proceedings to be instituted by a third person, but it provides that such “third person” must not only secure the consent of the law officers of the government, but the consent of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia before he can use the name of the government in quo warranto proceedings.