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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20, 2025

Kremlin insider statements continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his strategy that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition against Ukraine and the West and that the West has thus far failed to convince Putin to reevaluate his strategy. Bloomberg reported on September 20 that undisclosed people close to the Kremlin stated that Putin has concluded that military escalation is the best way for Russia to force Ukraine into peace negotiations on Putin's terms.[1] The sources stated that Putin assesses that US President Donald Trump is unlikely to “do much” to bolster Ukraine's defense and that the US-Russian talks in Alaska on August 15, 2025, convinced Putin that Trump has no interest in intervening in the war in Ukraine. The sources stated that Putin intends to remain engaged in any ongoing bilateral dialogue with the United States but will continue to act in what he perceives to be Russia's interest. The sources stated that Putin intends to continue targeting Ukraine's energy network and other critical infrastructure. Putin's long-standing theory of victory posits that Russia can militarily defeat Ukraine by indefinitely maintaining the theater-wide initiative and outlasting Western military support for Ukraine.[2] The sources’ statements indicate that recent US efforts to mediate a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine have not impacted Putin's calculus and that Putin remains committed to defeating Ukraine militarily, as ISW has continued to assess. Putin's recent actions — including the decision to redeploy more forces to Donetsk Oblast and recent Russian incursions into the airspace of NATO member states — further underscore his commitment to both continued military aggression against Ukraine and future military aggression against NATO member states.[3]

Putin may have allowed these Kremlin sources to share his logic with Bloomberg and likely seeks to leverage Bloomberg‘s article to exploit friction between European and US officials, to feed into the wider Russian narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, and to create fear in Ukrainian society ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The Kremlin maintains a tight grip on the Russian information space and holds significant influence over most Russian officials and insiders, which suggests that Putin may have orchestrated or at least approved of sources in the Kremlin leaking information to a Western publication.[4] The Kremlin sources’ emphasis on the Trump Administration's reported failure to influence Putin's decision making is likely an attempt to seize on friction between US and European officials and to sow further discord between Western allies. The Kremlin has long sought to divide Ukraine's US and European supporters in order to weaken cohesive Western support for Ukraine and has intensified this campaign since Trump's inauguration in January 2025.[5]

Putin likely also intends for this article to feed into the Kremlin's long-running narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that Putin can bring about a Russian victory in Ukraine seemingly by will alone. The Kremlin sources’ emphasis on Putin's commitment to a military victory in Ukraine ignores the Russian military's systemic shortcomings and limitations that have thus far denied Putin's ability to achieve Russia's strategic objectives of politically controlling all of Ukraine, or decisively winning on the battlefield. ISW has repeatedly observed instances of Putin tasking the Russian military with goals far beyond its capabilities, and it is unclear whether Putin is receiving inaccurate information about Russian military capabilities or whether Putin is choosing to ignore Russia's limitations and push on with grinding offensives to further Russian narratives about Russia's ability to wage war indefinitely, no matter the costs.[6] ISW continues to assess that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, however, and that Ukraine, the United States, and European states maintain agency over the outcome of the war in Ukraine.[7]

Putin likely also intends for this article to generate panic in Ukraine about Russia's long-range strike campaign ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The Kremlin sources’ reference to continued Russian strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure is almost certainly intended to invoke the memory of Russia's Fall 2022 and Winter 2022-2023 strike campaign against Ukraine's energy grid and the subsequent power outages that affected Ukraine, particularly civilians.[8] The Kremlin is likely resurfacing this memory in order to create fear amongst Ukrainians and to provoke Ukrainians into demanding that the Ukrainian government negotiate a settlement to the war before Winter 2025-2026. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in August 2025 that Russia was increasingly targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure in order to undermine Ukraine's preparations for the winter heating season.[9] Putin is likely hoping to seize on the uncertainty that recent large-scale long-range Russian strikes have caused in Ukraine in order to exacerbate domestic discontent and increase pressure on the Ukrainian government to end the war.

Russian forces conducted one of the largest drone and missile strikes against Ukraine in recent weeks on the night of September 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 8 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai; 32 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; and 579 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 2 Iskander-M/KN-32 ballistic missiles and 29 Kh-101 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 552 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that an unspecified number of ballistic and cruise missiles and 23 drones struck ten locations and that drone fragments fell in ten locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted a simultaneous strike on targets with large numbers of missiles and drones and that Ukrainian forces used tactical aviation, including F-16s, to intercept the cruise missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces targeted Dnipro City and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast broadly and locations in Mykolaiv, Chernihiv, Zaporizhia, Poltavka, Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Kharkiv Oblasts.[11] Zelensky stated that Russian forces directly struck a high-rise residential building in Dnipro City with a missile equipped with cluster munitions.[12] Footage reportedly shows a Kh-101 cruise missile striking the residential building in Dnipro City, underscoring the need to further bolster Ukraine's air defense umbrella.[13] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that the strike killed one and injured 13 civilians.[14] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported that Russian strikes in Khmelnytskyi Oblast killed one and injured three civilians.[15] Other Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[16]

Russia is intensifying its efforts to test NATO's defensive capabilities and resolve by violating NATO members’ safety zones in the air domain. Polish Border Guards reported on September 19 that two Russian fighter jets performed a low altitude pass over the Polish Lotos Petrobaltic oil and gas drilling platform in the Baltic Sea in direct violation of the platform's safety zone.[17] The Polish state-owned energy company Orlen Petrobaltic owns and operates the Petrobaltic platform and is Poland's only offshore oil platform.[18] Polish Border Guard Spokesperson Katerzyna Przybysz stated, and open-source naval vessel tracking sites indicate, that the Petrobaltic drilling platform is in Poland's exclusive economic zone.[19] It remains unclear whether the Russian jet incursion near the Petrobaltic platform occurred during the September 19 sortie in which three Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets violated Estonia's airspace or if this was a separate incident.[20] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 19 that Russian aircraft did not violate Estonian airspace and that the three Russian jets completed a “scheduled flight” from Karelia airfield to an unspecified airfield in Kaliningrad Oblast in accordance with international law.[21] ISW continues to assess that Russia is deliberately testing the limits of NATO's capabilities with various air incursions in an effort to gather data on the alliance's response measures and political will that Russia may then apply to potential conflicts against NATO.[22]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the start of Ukraine's managed weapons exports program. Zelensky announced on September 19 that Ukraine will begin financing its defense industrial base (DIB) funding deficit partly through the managed export of certain Ukrainian weapons.[23] Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian DIB produces surpluses of certain modern weapons systems, such as naval drones and anti-tank weapons, and that Ukraine intends to export these surpluses in order to finance the production of additional drones for Ukrainian forces. Zelensky noted that supplying Ukrainian forces fighting against Russia's invasion and replenishing domestic weapons stockpiles remain the Ukrainian DIB’s top priorities. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will present three export platforms by October 4: a platform for export and economic interaction with the United States, a second platform for export and interaction with Ukraine's European partners, and a third platform for Ukraine's other international partners.

Russian commanders continue to order Russian forces to execute Ukrainian civilians and commit acts of perfidy as part of an ongoing trend of Russian commanders systematizing deliberate war crimes among Russian units. Russian servicemembers from the Russian 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) stated on September 17 that their commanding officer ordered them to dress in civilian clothes (an act of perfidy) and execute any military-age male under 45 that Russian forces encountered in Kupyansk.[24] ISW observed geolocated footage of Russian forces in the Lyman direction wearing civilian clothing on September 16, among other reports of Russian forces committing acts of perfidy.[25] Russian soldiers have notably committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in now-liberated areas of Ukraine and occupied Ukraine, including executions of civilians.[26]

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21, 2025

Russia has reportedly been forming a strategic reserve from new recruits since July 2025. A Russian insider source that has consistently provided accurate reports about changes in the Russian military command stated on September 21 that roughly 292,000 people signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) between the start of 2025 and September 15—an average of approximately 7,900 recruits per week or 31,600 per month.[1] The insider source stated that some of these recruits are joining the strategic reserve that Russia has been forming since early July 2025. The source did not specify how many recruits are going to the strategic reserve as opposed to the frontline in Ukraine.

The Russian military command may have assessed that Russia could afford to create a strategic reserve after Russian losses began to decrease in the summer of 2025. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia suffered roughly 32,000 to 48,000 casualties per month between January and July 2025—more casualties than the average reported monthly recruitment rate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia suffered roughly 29,000 casualties in August 2025 and 13,000 casualties in the first half of September 2025—the only months so far in 2025 with casualty rates below the average reported recruitment rate. ISW recently assessed that Russian territorial gains were less costly in May to August 2025 compared to the spring of 2025, as Russian forces sustained a lower casualty rate per square kilometer seized.[2] The reduced casualty rates in Summer 2025 may have convinced the Russian military command that Russia could afford to transfer some new recruits to a strategic reserve while still maintaining the tempo of offensive operations on the frontline in Ukraine. Changes in Russian tactics on the battlefield in the past few months likely contributed in part to the reduced casualty rates. Russian forces have been conducting assaults in smaller infantry groups and are increasingly employing small group infiltration tactics that seek to find and exploit weaknesses and holes in Ukraine’s undermanned defenses.[3] The formation of the strategic reserve may indicate that the Russian military command assesses that Russian forces will be able to continue their current rate of advance using these small group tactics that allow the Russian command to deploy fewer personnel to the frontline.

Reports that Russia is creating a strategic reserve further indicate that the Kremlin is not interested in ending its war against Ukraine but remains committed to achieving its war goals on the battlefield and may be preparing for a conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly put forward a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to make slow, creeping advances on the battlefield indefinitely, enabling Russia to win a war of attrition against Ukraine.[4] The reported decision to create a strategic reserve and not deploy all new recruits to the frontline indicates that Putin and the Russian military command are content with the current rate of advance, even though Russian forces continue to only advance at a foot pace. The reported creation of a strategic reserve suggests that Russia plans to escalate offensive operations in Ukraine in the near-to-medium term rather than end the war. Russia may also be building out its strategic reserve as part of wider Kremlin preparations for a possible Russia-NATO conflict in the future, particularly as Russia intensifies its youth military-patriotic programs that aim to recruit Russian youth into the military in the years to come.[5]

Russia continues to test the limits of NATO’s air defenses over the Baltic Sea as Russia increases the frequency of its violations of NATO states’ airspace. The German Air Force reported on September 21 that NATO tasked the German Air Force with scrambling two German Eurofighters to intercept an unidentified aircraft without a flight plan or radio contact in international airspace over the Baltic Sea.[6] German forces later visually identified the plane as a Russian IL-20M reconnaissance aircraft. The German Air Force did not specify where over the Baltic Sea the incident occurred. Russia’s violation of standard operating procedures in international airspace is the latest in a string of aerial incursions into NATO territory since the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10.[7] US President Donald Trump reaffirmed on September 21 that the United States will “help” Poland and the Baltic States if Russia “keeps accelerating.”[8] ISW continues to assess that Russia is pursuing an aggressive campaign to test NATO air defenses and political will as part of a broader effort to collect actionable intelligence that Russia may then apply to a potential future conflict against NATO.[9]

Russian forces continue to develop drone technologies to increase the volume and precision of strikes against the Ukrainian near rear to further complicate Ukrainian logistics. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on September 21 that Russian forces developed fiber optic first-person view (FPV) repeater drones that could potentially quadruple the range of frontline drones.[10] Russia’s fiber optic drones are resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and repeater drones contain a radio repeater that extends communication signals by acting as a relay station.[11] Russian drone operators may leverage the fiber optic repeater drones to protect other Russian drones from Ukrainian EW interference and increase the viability and precision of strikes against Ukraine’s near rear. The milblogger claimed that the newly developed fiber optic repeater drones can fly 50 to 60 kilometers, while traditional fiber optic drones are only able to fly 25 to 30 kilometers. Russia’s use of the longer-range repeater drones would allow Russian forces to strike more precisely and deeper into the Ukrainian near rear, particularly along ground lines of communication (GLOCs), further complicating Ukrainian frontline logistics. Russian milbloggers claimed on September 21 that Russian forces have created a “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters that area) that extends roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline in both the Vovchansk and Kupyansk directions.[12] Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated in a September 20 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article that Russian forces are now systemically targeting Ukrainian logistics routes, depots, roads, and evacuation routes, but that Russian strikes of this nature were infrequent in 2024.[13] A sergeant of a Ukrainian reconnaissance unit reported to the WSJ that the nets that Ukrainian forces are constructing over roads to protect against Russian drone strikes are imperfect solutions, as Russian drone operators strike the poles that hold the nets up. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported to the WSJ that Ukrainian forces are constantly repairing damage to anti-drone netting. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) with drone strikes against Ukrainian GLOCs that are enabling Russian advances in eastern Ukraine, and that Russia’s recent drone innovations are likely to enhance these BAI effects.[14]

The Kremlin reportedly dismissed former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin from military service. Russian outlet RBK reported on September 21 that a source stated that Russian authorities dismissed Lapin from military service.[15] A local Republic of Tatarstan outlet, Tatar-Inform, reported on September 19 that sources stated that Lapin would serve as an assistant to Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustem Minnikhanov but that the Kremlin has not published an official decree on the appointment yet.[16] Russian business newspaper Vedomosti similarly reported on September 21 that a source close to the Republic of Tatarstan leadership stated that Lapin may become Minnikhanov’s advisor next week and that he will be responsible for recruiting contract personnel and possibly oversee security issues related to Ukrainian strikes against the republic.[17] The Republic of Tatarstan is the main recruitment hub for the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Africa Corps and is home to Russian domestic drone production at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone.[18] Lapin served as the commander of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces at the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; moved to be the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces in 2023; and became the commander of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Northern Grouping of Forces in 2024.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed in August 2025 that it replaced Lapin as the LMD and Northern Grouping of Forces commander with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[20]

Lapin has proven to be an incompetent commander throughout the war against Ukraine, but the Kremlin is likely punishing Lapin now as part of its ongoing campaign to scapegoat and punish high ranking officials for their failure to repel Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Russian President Vladimir Putin has generally been reluctant to dismiss commanders despite displayed command deficiencies, choosing rather to reappoint commanders than dismiss them.[21] Lapin’s complete dismissal from military service is a notable inflection. Lapin has faced heavy criticism for his failures as a commander throughout the war. Lapin commanded the Central Grouping of Forces in 2022, when Ukraine’s counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast in Fall 2022 forced Russian forces to withdraw from Lyman. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin were both highly critical of Lapin’s failures in Kharkiv Oblast in October 2022, accusing the Russian military command of failing to promptly respond to the deteriorating situation around Lyman.[22] Kadyrov’s and Prigozhin’s criticisms were especially noteworthy as Putin and his mouthpieces had been extremely tight-lipped about the performance of military commanders or their replacements. Lapin also commanded the Northern Grouping of Forces when Ukraine launched its incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. The Northern Grouping of Forces under Lapin had been conducting offensive operations to create a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts since May 2024 and March 2025, respectively.[23] Ukrainian forces have been successful in preventing Russian forces from establishing a significant and enduring buffer zone in both northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, however. Lapin’s dismissal from military service is likely part of the Kremlin’s wider efforts to scapegoat and punish Russian authorities who failed to prevent Ukraine’s Kursk incursion. Russian authorities have detained and charged several high-ranking regional officials in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts with mishandling the construction of defensive fortifications in Russia’s border areas.[24] The Kremlin notably did not punish Lapin for his numerous operational failures in Ukraine but is likely choosing to punish him now over his failure to protect Russian territory.

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2025/