Naturalization most certainly does come into play. You can't become a 'natural-born citizen of something that doesn't yet exist, which is exactly WHY the Justice used the term 'entitled' and did NOT say 'natural born'.
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Justice Gray cites to Calvin's case.
We weren't talking about Calvin's case.
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You're mixing the apple and the orange.
No, your avoiding the point.
There were 2 things under discussion. First was Inglis entitled to claim citizenship due to being in the States, and 2) If so, did he have the right to inherent.
Story said No to the first question. He believed him to be a British citizen, (Page 28 U. S. 170) but he did acknowledge that without evidence to the contrary, he couldn't justify refusing him the ability to inherit a commercial property.
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such "temporary stay" persons, would owe a temporary allegiance "strong enough" that, if they "hath issue" during that uncertain period, such would be a natural born citizen.
Story DOES NOT use the term 'natural born citizen'...merely the word 'citizen', nor does he say anything about 'having issue'. Don't put Cokes words into Story's mouth just because you think they agree. Story made it plain he dissented with the court's reasoning for allowing Inglis to claim citizenship.
And again, you might want to keep reading right past where you quoted
Their "temporary stay" is manifestly used in contradiction to "abiding," and shows that the latter means permanent intentional residence. So Mr. Chief Justice Spencer, in Jackson v. White, 20 Johns. 313, 326, considered it. He says "Residence in this state prior to that event [the declaration of independence] imported nothing as regards the election or determination of such residents to adhere to the old or adopt the new government. The temporary stay mentioned in the resolution of the convention passed only twelve days after the declaration of independence by Congress and within five days after the adoption of the declaration by the convention of this state, clearly imports that such persons who were resident here without any intention of permanent residence were not to be regarded as members of the state;"
It comes into play, yet none of the Justices make one mention of naturalization.
I submit you are for your own convenience reading something into the opinion that isn't there.
We weren't talking about Calvin's case.
We were talking about whether Justice Story subscribed to a jus soli view on birth citizenship. And you brought up the point you didn't think Story was (or would) accept a mere temporary presence to support the requisite allegiance. That Story cites to Calvin's Case makes Calvin's Case highly relevant and instructive as to both points.
First was Inglis entitled to claim citizenship due to being in the States . . . . Story said No to the first question.
No, he didn't. He said that he would be inclined to view Inglis as an alien. "unless he was born between 4 July and 15 September, 1776." This repeats what Story had just said earlier -- if Inglis was born in that period (when his parents would have been under American jurisdiction) then he'd view Inglis as born a citizen.
Story DOES NOT use the term 'natural born citizen'
He speaks of being a citizen at birth. Citizenship came by two means: 1) birth and 2) naturalization. Contrary to Birther lore, there was no secret third category of native born persons who were not natural born. The terms were equivalents.
Plus, Story's summary of the common law rule:
"Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children even of aliens born in a country while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government and owing a temporary allegiance thereto are subjects by birth.
Don't put Cokes words into Story's mouth just because you think they agree.
Story's words so closely track Coke's words that it is implausible to suggest they don't agree; especially given Story gives a citation to Calvin's Case. Story made it plain he dissented with the court's reasoning for allowing Inglis to claim citizenship.
It's a confusing case to follow. One almost has to diagram it out. The majority took the view that no matter when Inglis was born he either was born a British subject (options 1 and 3 noted earlier) or under a disability precluding him from making the election required of all citizens as to which side of the war they were on. (It was Justice Johnson who wrote the clearer statement of citizenship I quoted earlier; Justia, unlike Cornell, doesn't break out the opinions by judge).
Story agreed with the majority in treating Inglis effectively as an alien (though, as noted Story would treat him as a citizen upon proper proof of birth between July 4 and Sept. 15) though Story offered different reasoning: "Upon another leading point, that of the alienage of the demandant, my opinion coincides generally with that of the majority of the Court, but the reasons on which it is founded are given more at large than in that now delivered by my brother THOMPSON."