Posted on 12/17/2006 4:03:30 PM PST by DAVEY CROCKETT
VEVAK learned its methodology from the Soviet KGB and many of the Islamist revolutionaries who supported Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini actually studied at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, the Oxford of terrorism. Documented Iranian alumni include the current Supreme Leader (the faqih) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, under whose Velayat-e Faqih (Rule of the Islamic Jurisprudent) apparatus it has traditionally operated. Its current head is Cabinet Minister Hojatoleslam Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ezhei, a graduate of Qom's Haqqani School, noted for its extremist position advocating violence against enemies and strict clerical control of society and government. The Ministry is very well funded and its charge, like that of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (the Pasdaran) is to guard the revolutionary Islamic Iranian regime at all costs and under all contingencies.
From the KGB playbook, VEVAK learned the art of disinformation. It's not so difficult to learn: tell the truth 80% of the time and lie 20%. Depending on how well a VEVAK agent wants to cover his/her tracks, the ratio may go up to 90/10, but it never drops below the 80/20 mark as such would risk suspicion and possible detection. The regime in Teheran has gone to great lengths to place its agents in locations around the world. Many of these operatives have been educated in the West, including the U.K. and the United States. Iranian government agencies such as embassies, consulates, Islamic cultural centers, and airline offices regularly provide cover for the work of VEVAK agents who dress well and are clean shaven, and move comfortably within our society. In this country, because of the severance of diplomatic relations, the principal site of VEVAK activities begins at the offices of Iran's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York.
Teheran has worked diligently to place its operatives in important think tanks and government agencies in the West. Some of its personnel have been recruited while in prison through torture or more often through bribery, or a combination of both. Others are Islamist revolutionaries that have been set up to look like dissidents - often having been arrested and imprisoned, but released for “medical reasons”. The clue to detecting the fake “dissident” is to read carefully what he/she writes, and to ask why this vocal “dissident” was released from prison when other real dissidents have not been released, indeed have been grievously tortured and executed. Other agents have been placed in this country for over twenty-five years to slowly go through the system and rise to positions of academic prominence due to their knowledge of Farsi and Shia Islam or Islamist fundamentalism.
One of the usual tactics of VEVAK is to co-opt academia to its purposes. Using various forms of bribery, academics are bought to defend the Islamic Republic or slander its enemies. Another method is to assign bright students to train for academic posts as specialists in Iranian or Middle East affairs. Once established, such individuals are often consulted by our government as it tries to get a better idea of how it should deal with Iran. These academics then are in a position to skew the information, suggesting the utility of extended dialogue and negotiation, or the danger and futility of confronting a strong Iran or its proxies such as Hizballah (Hezbollah). These academics serve to shield the regime from an aggressive American or Western policy, and thereby buy more time for the regime to attain its goals, especially in regards to its nuclear weaponry and missile programs.
MOIS likes to use the media, especially electronic media, to its advantage. One of VEVAK's favorite tricks is setting up web sites that look like they are opposition sites but which are actually controlled by the regime. These sites often will be multilingual, including Farsi, German, Arabic French, and English. Some are crafted carefully and are very subtle in how they skew their information (e.g., Iran-Interlink, set up and run by Massoud Khodabandeh and his wife Ann Singleton from Leeds, England); others are less subtle, simply providing the regime's point of view on facts and events in the news (e.g., www.mujahedeen.com or www.mojahedin.ws). This latter group is aimed at the more gullible in our open society and unfortunately such a market exists. However, if one begins to do one's homework, asking careful questions, the material on these fake sites generally does not add up.
Let's examine a few examples of VEVAK's work in the United States. In late October, 2005, VEVAK sent three of its agents to Washington to stage a press event in which the principal Iranian resistance movement, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK), was to be slandered. Veteran VEVAK agent Karim Haqi flew from Amsterdam to Canada where he was joined by VEVAK's Ottawa agents Amir-Hossein Kord Rostami and Mahin (Parvin-Mahrokh) Haji, and the three flew from Toronto to Washington. Fortunately the resistance had been tracking these three, informed the FBI of their presence in Washington, and when the three tried to hold a press conference, the resistance had people assigned to ask pointed questions of them so that they ended the interview prematurely and fled back to Canada.
Abolghasem Bayyenet is a member of the Iranian government. He serves as a trade expert for the Ministry of Commerce. But his background of study and service in the Foreign Ministry indicates that Bayyenet is more than just an economist or a suave and savvy businessman. In an article published in Global Politician on April 23, 2006, entitled “Is Regime Change Possible in Iran?”, Bayyenet leads his audience to think that he is a neutral observer, concerned lest the United States make an error in its assessment of Iran similar to the errors of intelligence and judgment that led to our 2003 invasion of Iraq, with its less than successful outcome. However, his carefully crafted bottom line is that the people of Iran are not going to support regime change and that hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad actually has achieved greater popularity than his predecessors because of his concern for the problems of the poor and his fight for economic and social justice. To the naive, Bayyenet makes Ahmadinejad sound positively saintly. Conveniently overlooked is the occurrence of over four thousand acts of protest, strikes, anti-regime rallies, riots, and even political assassinations by the people of Iran against the government in the year since Ahmadinejad assumed office. So too, the following facts are ignored: the sizeable flight of capital, the increase in unemployment, and the rising two-figure rate of inflation, all within this last year. Bayyenet is a regime apologist, and when one is familiar with the facts, his arguments ring very hollow. However, his English skills are excellent, and so the naОve might be beguiled by his commentary.
Mohsen Sazegara is VEVAK's “reformed revolutionary”. A student supporter of Khomeini before the 1979 revolution, Sazegara joined the “imam” on his return from exile and served in the government for a decade before supposedly growing disillusioned.
He formed several reformist newspapers but ran afoul of the hardliners in 2003 and was arrested and imprisoned by VEVAK. Following “hunger strikes”, Sazegara was released for health reasons and permitted to seek treatment abroad. Although critical of the government and particularly of Ahmadinejad and KhameneМ, Sazegara is yet more critical of opposition groups, leaving the impression that he favors internal regime change but sees no one to lead such a movement for the foreseeable future. His bottom line: no one is capable of doing what needs to be done, so we must bide our time. Very slick, but his shadow shows his likely remaining ties to the MOIS.
http://www.ocnus.net/artman/publish/article_27144.shtml
More on Austrian Sniper Rifles Arrival in Iraq via Iran
From Green member of Austrian Parliament Peter Pilz' website at
www.peterpilz.at:
HS.50 is a armor piercing rifle produced by Steyr-Mannlicher and this
is
how it made it's way via Tehran to Iraq:
2003
October 20, 2003
Steyr-Mannlicher plans to export 2.000 units HS.50 to Iranian police
for
the purpose to fight smuggling of drugs. Therefore Steyr-Mannlicher
requested an export license for 2.000 rifles and 500.000 pieces of
ammunition for a total of EUR 8.885.000 (USD 11.622.000) at the
Ministry
of Interiours (BMI). Iranian Company J.S.Ind. provided an EUC (End User
Certificate) dated October 15 2003, which is not accepted by BMI. But
BMI even failed to check J.S.Ind. - a simple look on their website at
www.js-ind.com would reveal that the Iranian company deals with
"industrial and urban piping" and "sealing tapes".
The presented EUC reads: "...to protect our officers in conduct of
their
official law enforcment duties, anti-narcotics, anti-terrorism and
border control..." Although counterterror activities are mentiond the
Austrian Office for protection of the Constitution and Counterterror is
not involved in the process. Department II/BVT-2 (collection and
analysis) is not informed.
2004
May 24-26, 2004
Gert Polli, Head of the BVT, travels to Tehran in order to meet with
MOIS, the Iranian Ministry Information and Security. He is accompanied
by Mr Shafazand of the Iranian embassy in Vienna, who is tasked "to act
as an interpreter". Later it will emerge that Polli holds close
intimate
contact to Iranian intelligence agencies.
In July 2004 the USA and UK will try to intervene in order to cancel
exporting the rifles. US ambassador Lyons Brown intervens with
(Austrian) ambassador Kyrle, who was at the time secretary-general of
the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BMaA). The USA also wrote to
BVT.
September 30, 2004
Mr Krauss of BMaA wrote to Mr Grosinger at BMI that it must be made
sure
that the rifles in question must be used for purposes of
anti-narcotics,
anti-terrorism and border control only.
November 4, 2004
An EUC issued by Iranian police dated October 27, 2004 has come to hand
of BMI. It is signed by Mr. N. Kalkhorani and notarized by the Austrian
embassy in Tehran.
Polli calls Grosinger telling him that he learned that the US embassy
intervened at BVT of which he has inaccurate information. Grosinger
updates Polli. Polli states that on behalf of BVT no objections on
exporting the rifels are made. Mr. Kitzler, who is deputy to Grosinger,
made a handwritten note to the file: "BVT ok - Tel Grosinger November
12".
BMI issues an export license valid until August 1, 2005.
December 20, 2004
BVT is contacted by the Vienna CIA resident.
December 23, 2004
Mrs. Prokop becomes new Minister of Interiours. Ambassador Lyons asked
immediatly to schedule a meeting over the rifles. Prokop has no time
for
that and goes on leave.
2005
January 17, 2005
Ambassador Lyons has his inaugural visit with Prokop and asks her to
withdraw the export license, which Prokop refuses.
At the same time a public debate sparks. Repeatedly Prokop's attention
is brought to a) the export is illicit and b) that there are clear and
present dangers that the rifles will end up with terrorists in Iraq and
Lebanon.
July 14, 2005
Prokop concludes that too much political preassure emerges. Her CDC,
Mr.
Ita, requests Gorsinger to dismiss an application for exporting another
30 HS.50. Grosinger asks Polli in an email whether "the rifles could be
used for purposes of terror".
July 15, 2005
Kroger, Polli's deputy, mails back that "under reserve of a deeper
analysis by BVT, circustances for issuing a export certificate have not
changed". Copies of that email were sent to Mr. Buxbaum (at the time
Director General for public saftey), Mr. Ita and Mr. Polli.
Now it's amde impossible for Grosinger to deny the export and Polli
made
sure that all of th HS.50 were exported to Iran.
September 15, 2005
BMI needs a justification to withdraw the export license. Prokop asks
BMaA for help in order to keep the remaining 1.200 pieces away from
Iran. Ambassador Mayr-Harting writes to Grosinger: "BMaA requests
urgently to withdraw the export license ... due to huge international
furor ... would be contrary to (Austrias) foreign-policy interests...".
The export license is withdrawn.
It took more then six month that preassure from oppositional parties,
media and the USA helped to restore Austrian laws on export of
materials
of war (Kriegsmaterialiengesetz) over business interests. The rifles
made their way to Iraqi terrorists and the liabilty rests with five
politicians:
Ernst Strasser, who was Minister of Interiours when the export was
licensed;
Liese Prokop, who took over from him an covered him;
Ursula Plassnik, who as Minister of Foreign Affairs approved the
export;
Günter Platter, who as Minister if Defense also approved (and who is
Minister of Interiours by now);
Wolfgang Schussel, who, as federal chancellor, systematically put
business interests over laws.
Steyr issued a press release vindicating that the rifles found are
copies. That might be possible. But first there is never a copy without
an original and second Austrian politicians took with wide open eyes
the
risk of rerouting those rifles. They are hypocritical accomplices of
Iran.
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370249
The Threat of Grassroots Jihadi Networks: A Case Study from Ceuta, Spain
By Javier Jordán, Robert Wesley
On December 12, 2006, Spanish police executed a spectacular counter-terrorism operation in the neighborhood of "Príncipe Alfonso" in Ceuta (a Spanish city located in North Africa, just south of Gibraltar). Those arrested belonged to a grassroots jihadi group planning attacks on local targets in the Spanish enclave. The following analysis emphasizes the principal characteristics of this former jihadi network and explores two issues of particular importance: 1) the relationship between the network's members and Spanish soldiers garrisoned in Ceuta, and 2) the inclusion and importance of the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla in jihadi rhetoric as Muslim territories that must be liberated from their infidel occupation.
The jihadi group in Ceuta was composed of at least 11 individuals and constitutes another good example of the emergence of grassroots jihadi networks in European countries. "Grassroots jihadis" refers to groups that sympathize with and relate to the global jihadi movement, sharing common strategic objectives, but have little or no formal connections to al-Qaeda or any other associated organizations. They could, however, eventually secure relationships with some established operatives.
The History and Characteristics of the Ceuta Jihadi Network
The group's origins stem from meetings in a small mosque called Darkawia that was dominated by a radical imam and located in the Príncipe Alfonso district—a disadvantaged area of Ceuta, where around 12,000 Muslims live. At the time of the raids, the area was practically considered a conflict zone by local police and residents, with high rates of unemployment and delinquency. In the months preceding the December 12 operation, the local police had resigned from patrolling the neighborhood due to various threats, especially from ambushes by local organized delinquent groups [1].
The majority of the group's members were born in Ceuta and lived in the Príncipe Alfonso district, with all but one having Spanish nationality. Many of the group's members also had criminal records. The principal leader of the jihadi network, Karin Abdelselam Mohamed, became radicalized while serving time in prison for minor crimes. Within the group, the members justified these illegal activities by claiming that they were done in support of jihad, a seemingly common occurrence among jihadis.
In terms of linkages with external jihadi groups, their primary connection was Karin's relationship with Tarik Hamed, who has been incarcerated in Spain since June 2005 for his involvement in a network established to recruit and facilitate travel for recruits heading to the jihad in Iraq. The group's radicalization, however, was largely independent of external mentoring, with its two leaders Karin and Mohamed Fuad Mohamed driving the process. The group's "gatherings," which were held in the mosque outside of normal praying hours and in the homes of its members, played a very important role in the development of the group's radicalization. Another apparent contributing element in this path was the incorporation of jihadi propaganda distributed via CDs containing videos, songs and text archives.
A common characteristic of grassroots networks is that they direct their aggression against targets of close proximity [2]. In the case of the Ceuta network, that hostility underwent several stages of escalation. In the first stage, the network started to spread rumors of possible attacks in the city and painted threatening graffiti around town. The next step consisted of destroying a morabito—a small building that lodges the tomb of people considered holy by Muslims in the Maghreb [3].
The third stage was aborted by the police. At the time of their arrests, the members of the group had already started to plan a high-casualty attack in Ceuta using explosives. They had discussed several targets: a shopping mall, a fairground during a time of festivities and a fuel depository. During their investigations, police found a will of a jihadi and evidence that some of them had expressed their willingness to die as martyrs (El Mundo, December 17, 2006; El País, December 16, 2006).
What has been described, so far, resembles other grassroots networks dismantled in Spain and Europe during the past few years and underlines the vitality of the third jihadi generation (if we follow the terminology used by the strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri) [4]. There are two aspects of the Ceuta case, however, that merit special attention.
First, the network tried to recruit Spanish soldiers of Muslim origin born in Ceuta. Approximately 30% of the troops in the Ceuta and Melilla garrisons have Muslim backgrounds. Each of the cities has on paper the equivalent of a light brigade. For many young Muslims born in Spanish territory, the military is an attractive employment opportunity, as many of them encounter difficulties securing jobs in the civil sector. The military provides an acceptable salary and offers the opportunity to learn a profession, while opening the door to other jobs such as occupations in the national and local police services. A significant portion of young soldiers also end up finding stable jobs in the public security domain.
The network's leader, Karin, succeeded in attracting several young soldiers garrisoned in Ceuta to his private meetings. Karin's jihadi group wanted the soldiers to facilitate access to a military deposit of arms and explosives with which to perpetrate further terrorist attacks. The soldiers, however, were not persuaded. Despite the group's overall failure, news of the group's military contacts and the fact that one of the apprehended had been an infantry soldier in Ceuta (and as a consequence had been taught the use of light weapons) produced alarm about the possible infiltration of jihadis in the Muslim ranks of the garrisons.
In addition, this news coincided with the non-renewal of the contracts of more than 15 soldiers of Muslim backgrounds in the Ceuta garrison due to the findings of internal intelligence reports. In fact, the worry over possible infiltration of radical Salafism in the military began much earlier than this recent operation. It was already explicitly mentioned in a military intelligence report leaked to the press in September 2005, which led to the non-renewal of at least three soldiers in the previous months (El País, September 12, 2005; El País, November 5, 2006). The most recent news of non-renewal, however, has helped precipitate an antagonistic climate among the associations and the opinion leaders of the Muslim community, a problem that has been politicized rapidly. La Unión Democrática Ceutí—the political party in Ceuta that receives most of the Muslim vote—has started a protest campaign that has included the distribution of thousands of leaflets at the entryways of mosques denouncing the "persecution of the Spanish soldiers of the Muslim faith" (El País, January 21).
The tension has increased even more with a police union requesting to control Muslim candidates' access to vacancies in the national police coming from Ceuta and Melilla in order to avoid potential infiltration by radicals (there were 434 Ceuta/Melilla Muslim applicants for the most recent entrance examination). This request has also been harshly criticized by Muslim collectives in Ceuta and throughout Spain (EFE, January 25).
It is quite possible that this frictional dynamic will continue or worsen in the future if the two factors evident in this case study continue to be present: a) that grassroots jihadi networks remain resolute in their campaign to attract members of the security services; and b) that thousands of qualified second generation Muslims continue to apply for vacancies in the army and police forces.
In facing this situation, the Spanish government will have to find the appropriate balance between protecting the constitutional right to non-discrimination regardless of ethnicity or religion and necessary counter-intelligence activities. It is an equation which will require discretion and an acute sense of the social climate from policymakers in the military and police intelligence units to avoid additional polarization and the permissive conditions that could further recruitment and radicalization in local communities.
Another salient aspect of this case is its implications for future networks to operate in the region based on the grievances emerging from local interests (i.e. perceived discrimination in the military), and those emanating from exogenous jihadi propaganda. The Ceuta counter-terrorist operation overlapped with an increase in global jihadi rhetoric concerning the rightful ownership of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla. Although there is apparently no relationship between this most recent network's activities and these claims, such rhetoric cannot be overlooked when considering the future of jihadi activity in the region.
In May 2006, a direct threat to Spanish interests appeared in the radical al-Ansar forum, in which the fight for the liberation of Ceuta and Melilla was compared with those of Iraq, Chechnya and Kashmir. The communiqué was posted by a group calling itself Nadim al- Magrebi, which is the name occasionally used by an Algeria-based jihadist network (El País, November 5, 2006).
The communiqué quite naturally caused alarm throughout Spanish counter-terrorism agencies. Even more worrying, however, was the reference to Ceuta and Melilla as occupied cities in the December 20, 2006 diatribe of Ayman al-Zawahiri. These types of proclamations have the potential to pressure or motivate groups acting in the Maghreb or in Spanish territory to plot new attacks on Spanish interests.
This threat could be compounded further by the recent partnering initiatives of groups operating in the Maghreb (i.e. the GSPC's tactic of changing its name to "Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb"). These more established groups are in part attempting to harness the potential of such local grievances and grassroots groups to further their agenda of reinvigorating their beleaguered movements.
Notes
1. Javier Jordan & Humberto Trujillo, Favourable situations for the jihadist recruitment: The neighbourhood of Principe Alfonso (Ceuta, Spain), Jihad Monitor Occasional Paper No. 3, November 27, 2006.
2. This hostility can also be observed in other European networks such as the Hofstad Group that assassinated Theo Van Gogh, the network that authored the Madrid attacks, as well as other Spanish-based groups arising after the March 11, 2004 attacks.
3. Their construction and veneration constitutes a habitual practice in the north of Morocco; nevertheless, it is considered abominable by Salafis.
4. Brynjar Lia, "Al-Suri's Doctrines for Decentralized Jihadi Training," Part 1 and 2, Terrorism Monitor, January 18 and February 1.
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370251
Three Explanations for al-Qaeda's Lack of a CBRN Attack
By Chris Quillen
The evidence of al-Qaeda's interest in conducting a terrorist attack with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons appears compelling. As early as 1998, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden declared the acquisition of CBRN weapons a "religious duty" for Muslims [1]. He followed up in 2003 by asking for and receiving a fatwa from Saudi Sheikh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd that condoned the use of CBRN weapons by Muslims against infidels [2]. Combined with the multitude of warnings from al-Qaeda associates that a CBRN attack against the West is not only forthcoming but also long overdue, the Muslim "duty to warn" has been firmly established. In al-Qaeda's opinion, no further justification is needed and no additional warnings are required [3].
These words have also been backed up by deeds. In the early 1990s, al-Qaeda began its efforts to acquire radiological and nuclear materials [4]. While no evidence exists that these efforts have succeeded, there is little doubt that al-Qaeda continues to pursue this capability today. Prior to the fall of the Taliban, the training camps in Afghanistan taught recipes for the manufacturing of poisons and toxins including cyanide and botulinum. A video recovered by CNN in Afghanistan in 2002 clearly demonstrates that al-Qaeda had some success in manufacturing chemical weapons in the form of a poisonous gas capable of causing death. The WMD Commission reported that al-Qaeda had similar success with biological weapons, including the acquisition of at least small quantities of the virulent strain of "Agent X" which has been widely reported to be anthrax [5]. While some technical hurdles remain for al-Qaeda to weaponize and effectively employ CBRN weapons on a mass-casualty scale, the terrorist group clearly is capable of conducting small-scale, low-tech CBRN attacks.
Given this stated desire and apparent capability to conduct a CBRN terrorist attack, why has al-Qaeda not yet launched an attack with such weapons? This analysis explores three possible explanations for this lack of a CBRN attack: disruption, deterrence and, most disturbingly, patience.
Disruption
An encouraging explanation is that al-Qaeda's efforts have thus far been disrupted through a combination of stepped-up counter-terrorist efforts after 9/11 and possibly the simple luck enjoyed by government authorities. Clearly, the al-Qaeda CBRN programs that existed in Afghanistan under the Taliban were at least temporarily disrupted by the 2001 U.S.-led invasion and subsequent need to move to safer locales. According to this explanation, al-Qaeda's CBRN programs have yet to recover from this significant setback.
Several specific CBRN attack plots have apparently been disrupted, although none advanced far beyond the initial planning stages. In May 2002, Jose Padilla arrived in the United States, reportedly planning a "dirty bomb" attack, but never got much beyond the idea stage. Similarly, Dhiren Barot (also known as Issa al-Hindi) was arrested in the United Kingdom in 2004, carrying relatively detailed plans for conducting a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) attack, but had not yet acquired the necessary materials [6]. Given that an RDD attack is widely considered the CBRN attack most likely within al-Qaeda's capabilities, these disruptions could be especially significant.
Al-Qaeda's chemical and biological plots have not fared much better. In 2003, UK police arrested a group of Algerians with recipes and materials for creating ricin and cyanide, although stories conflict about whether any actual poisonous material was recovered (BBC, April 13, 2005). A 2004 chemical plot against multiple targets in Jordan had apparently advanced to the point of acquiring vehicles and materials, selecting targets and assigning duties (al-Jazeera, May 2, 2004). It remains unclear whether the materials recovered were for the manufacture of conventional explosives or chemical gases [7].
At the same time as these arrests, however, al-Qaeda succeeded in launching devastating conventional attacks in Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, Indonesia, Jordan, Spain, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, while al-Qaeda has suffered some setbacks in its CBRN efforts, these disruptions alone do not appear sufficient to have prevented al-Qaeda from conducting a CBRN attack given its other successful attacks.
Deterrence
Another possible explanation for al-Qaeda's apparent restraint is the threat of massive retaliation. Although an intriguing possibility, the complications of deterrence theory may offer more questions than answers.
Al-Qaeda's initial rationale for pursuing CBRN weapons was the desire to deter enemies such as the United States from attacking the organization [8]. In 2001, bin Laden specifically warned, "We have [chemical and nuclear] weapons as a deterrent" (Dawn, November 10, 2001). While this particular strategy clearly failed after the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda may still be using its CBRN efforts as part of its deterrence strategy [9].
Traditional deterrence theory indicates that terrorist organizations are less susceptible to deterrence strategies because they lack the defined territory that can be held hostage to a retaliatory attack. Al-Qaeda's strategy, however, has long been to acquire just such territory. In his book Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, Ayman al-Zawahiri described this goal when he wrote, "Confronting the enemies of Islam and launching jihad against them require a Muslim authority, established on a Muslim land." Al-Qaeda is no doubt aware of the risks of acquiring territory. Previous efforts to establish al-Qaeda authority in Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan and Iraq have all resulted in U.S. attacks. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda is an organization that requires territory to operate and carry out its mission and is clearly willing to accept this risk to achieve its stated goals.
Today, al-Qaeda is heavily dependent on its safe haven in the tribal areas of Pakistan. This dependency may have driven al-Qaeda to compromise its immediate desire to launch CBRN attacks against the United States for the longer-term goal of establishing their authority in a Muslim land as a stepping stone to future attacks and ultimate victory. In particular, al-Qaeda may assess that a significant CBRN attack against the West (or, for that matter, another major attack on the U.S. homeland) would invite a U.S. invasion of the tribal areas. The Pakistani government—always staking a position somewhere between Washington's and al-Qaeda's interests—may have even warned al-Qaeda's leadership that such an attack will lead to U.S. troops on Pakistani soil (with or without Islamabad's consent) and the subsequent end of al-Qaeda's safe haven. The U.S. occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention the presence of thousands of U.S. troops across the border in Afghanistan, make the threat of an American invasion more than credible.
Of course, al-Qaeda is not the only combatant being deterred in this war. In fact, the United States and al-Qaeda appear to have settled into a pattern of violence acceptable to both sides. While al-Qaeda continues to launch terrorist attacks around the world, the terrorist organization appears to be deterred from launching another major attack on the U.S. homeland or a significant CBRN attack against U.S. interests by the threat of a U.S. invasion of Pakistan. Meanwhile, the United States occasionally launches missile strikes against al-Qaeda targets on Pakistani territory, but is reportedly deterred from sending ground troops into Pakistan due to the possibility that the Musharraf government would fall and an even more dangerous Islamic terrorist threat would rise from the ashes. Al-Qaeda may very well assess that a CBRN attack would upset this delicate balance.
Patience
A final possibility is that al-Qaeda simply is waiting for the right time to launch a CBRN attack. Bin Laden has often been described as an exceedingly patient man, willing to wait for the right moment to act. Major terrorist attacks such as 9/11 were in the works for years before the final order was given. Al-Qaeda's leaders reportedly view their struggle against the United States as a long one, likely to continue well after they have left this world. In this view, the attacks on September 11 were only one battle and the final destruction of the United States may take generations to complete.
Under this scenario, al-Qaeda is building its capabilities in anticipation of a great victory and will not rush to act just for the sake of acting. The planned attack on the New York City subway system with the "mubtakkar" improvised chemical device may be an example of such patience. Al-Zawahiri reportedly called off the attack because it was not an adequate follow-up to September 11 [10]. Al-Qaeda apparently wanted an even more devastating attack for its second wave. Given the carnage of 9/11, it is hard to imagine al-Qaeda wreaking even more havoc, but a CBRN attack—including the physical, psychological and economic impacts—could certainly fit the bill.
It is possible that al-Qaeda's success with the September 11 attacks has set the bar too high for its current CBRN capabilities. Al-Qaeda may be concerned that a CBRN attack that "only" kills dozens of people would be perceived as a relative failure and demonstrate its weakened position relative to its pre-9/11 stature. The organization may prefer to wait until its CBRN capability has matured to the point where its chances of success are greater and its capability for destruction has increased [11]. Given the fact that there is no indication that al-Qaeda has abandoned its pursuit of CBRN weapons, the possibility of a patient al-Qaeda is a disturbing possibility worth remembering.
Conclusion
Many of the traditional reasons why terrorist groups do not attempt CBRN attacks do not exist for al-Qaeda. The organization has clearly demonstrated its willingness to engage in indiscriminate killing on a massive scale without fear of losing the support of its followers. Al-Qaeda has also shown it is willing to take on the technical challenges involved and has had some successes in developing lethal materials including cyanide, anthrax and especially the mubtakkar device. Unfortunately, this combination of continuing interest, growing capability and demonstrated patience may one day pay off for al-Qaeda.
Notes
1. Interview with Jamal Isma'il, December 1998 and re-broadcast on al-Jazeera, September 2001.
2. Sheikh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd, "A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against Infidels," May 2003.
3. Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, p. 155-156.
4. Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, Testimony before the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, United States vs. Usama bin Laden et al, February 2001.
5. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Final Report, March 31, 2005, p. 269-270.
6. See, in particular, Dhiren Barot, "Final Presentation," posted by the London Metropolitan Police Service at http://www.met.police.uk/pressbureau/rhyme/index.htm.
7. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 26, 2004. Al-Hayat, April 16, 2004. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi admitted to planning a conventional bomb attack, but called the allegations of a chemical plot "fabrications" in an audio statement posted on the al-Ansar Forum, April 29, 2004.
8. According to Abu Walid al-Masri in his book The Story of the Afghan Arabs: From the Entry to Afghanistan to the Final Exodus with Taliban, published in al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 8, 2004. See also Robert Wesley, "Al-Qaeda's WMD Strategy Prior to the U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan," Terrorism Monitor, October 7, 2005 and Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, "Does Intent Equal Capability?: Al-Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Nonproliferation Review, Volume 12, Number 3, November 2005, p. 625-626.
9. For another discussion of al-Qaeda's deterrence strategy, see Lewis A. Dunn, "Can al-Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?" Occasional Paper 3, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, July 2005.
10. Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of its Enemies Since 9/11, p. 218-220.
11. See also Dunn, p. 15 "The fact that no single attack has yet occurred may simply indicate that preparations for a more spectacular multi-attack effort are under way."
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/02/army_translator_case_raises_tr.php#014441
Counterterrorism Blog
Army Translator Case Raises Troubling Security Questions
By Michael Cutler
This article in today's Washington Post, "Translator Who Faked Identity Pleads Guilty To Having Secret Data," raises a number of troubling questions for our counter-terrorism efforts.
First of all, let us start with the way that the government, especially under this administration is apparently determined to privatize as many functions as possible. Why the military does not employ those people who serve vital functions for the United States is disturbing. By allowing private corporations to provide employees for the government creates an unwieldy system that make accountability more elusive. Additionally, because a private company is involved, the individual employee is probably paid less than if he or she worked directly for the government. The privatization of government functions inserts a "middle man" into the process who gets paid for his involvement. This only benefits the contractor and the politicians but does not, in my judgement, enhance our government's ability to attract the best employees, provide them with incentives to do an effective job by providing an opportunity to work towards a government pension by accruing years of service that would be applicable should that employee decide to change jobs within the government.
Next we need to ask, how did the translator obtain resident alien status and then go on to acquire United States citizenship through the naturalization process? It is really disturbing that the prosecutors are now conceding that they do not even know the true name of the translator who, in effect, engaged in espionage. There have been a number of naturalized United States citizens from a wide variety of countries who have engaged in espionage against our government, using their acquired citizenship as a means of embedding themselves within our nation so that they would be eligible to be granted high-level security clearances to enable them to have access to highly sensitive military information or knowledge about highly important technology with clear national security ramifications.
It is interesting that the unnamed Justice Department officials who were quoted in the article stated: "The translator obtained U.S. citizenship under a false identity before securing a job in August 2003 with Titan Corp., which supplied translators to the U.S. military to aid in fighting the war in Iraq. The man then used his false identity to get secret and top-secret clearances -- access to extremely sensitive material that is supposed to be given only after thorough background checks --..." This is the same sort of statement made when we hear about the way that applications for a wide variety of immigration benefits are vetted, through "background checks." What is interesting about that term is that a background check is not the same thing as a background investigation.
A background investigation is a labor-intensive task requiring that field agents knock on doors and interview relatives, neighbors, friends and employers. A background check generally just involves running fingerprints on a computer along with the name the applicant provides on his application for immigration benefits or for employment. When you are dealing with a large number of people and have a limited number of agents, you resort to background checks which, as we have seen time and time again, often fails to accomplish the purpose of the mission in the first place, to determine the trustworthiness of the applicant as well as to determine if he (she) lied on the application about a material fact, thereby committing fraud.
Next we need to consider the fact that when an alien applies for naturalization, he may legally change his name when he is sworn in as a new United States citizen and, for no extra charge! When he is granted a United States passport, the passport only reflects the name the alien assumed on the day he naturalized. In effect the newly minted citizen can put himself in his own quasi "witness protection program!" He can travel to countries that may be looking for him under his old name confident that his entry will go undetected. Imagine the implications for criminals and especially terrorists! I have raised this particular vulnerability when I have testified at Congressional hearings, yet, to my knowledge this huge hole in the system has not been addressed. This is a vulnerability that will not require an expensive fix, only a bit of ink, to record the previous names the naturalized citizen may have used before he naturalized.
Twisting this story a bit further discloses another worrying fact; he was hired as a translator with access to military secrets at a military base in Iraq. I know that we are living in the age of Political Correctness, and, as I have stated on many previous occasions, I am a strong supporter of being Politically Correct (PC) if the goal is to simply not embarrass or denigrate fellow human beings. However, when we permit being politically correct as a way of obfuscating the truth and the facts as when we refuse to use the term "alien" when we are talking about individuals who are present in our country but are not either citizens or nationals of the United States, then we have entered the land of George Orwell's "Newspeak" and this is simply not acceptable. Here we have an individual who was presumably a citizen of an Arabic country, although the article fails to state his original country of citizenship. He was hired roughly 2 years after the attacks of September 11, 2001 and yet it is obvious that the system failed in its mission to properly identify him. In all fairness, we have certainly seen native born citizens of the United States who have engaged in treasonous conduct. It is also true that the possibility exists that this guy was so thorough that there was no way for our officials to unravel his lies before he engaged in his treacherous activities. The problem is that I know how many reports I have read that made it clear that there is virtually no mechanism within the immigration bureaucracy that possesses real integrity.
The fact that this guy was given the "Keys to the kingdom" which United States citizenship represents, and then had access to an area of critical importance, namely the process by which individuals were questioned by the military will keep me awake tonight! As an INS special agent, I made ample use of translators because I dealt with so many people from so many parts of the world who spoke languages that I hade virtually no familiarity with. The translators who assisted me helped me to interview criminals I arrested. At times these criminals became cooperators and informants. The translators who assisted me became quite aware of what we doing and how we did it. They also became the "voice" of the person for whom they were translating. We depended on the accuracy and integrity of these translators to determine the trustworthiness of informants and potential informants. Many of our decisions were based on what the translators told us the guy we were interviewing was saying. Imagine how much damage a duplicitous translator can do in identifying informants to the bad guys! Imagine what damage a crooked translator can do by painting a misleading picture about a potential informant! The possibilities are endless! For this translator to become a United States citizen and then get himself hired as a translator in a military base in Iraq with access to sensitive information has to make you wonder who he may have been working for and what his agenda was.
The fact that this guy was caught after several years makes me wonder how much damage he may have done to the security of the base, its soldiers and the United States, as well.. There was another story of interest that ran in the Washington Times today about the fact that the United States government has stated that we will admit up to 7,000 Iraqi political refugees into the United States out of humanitarian concerns.
Generally, before refugees are interviewed and vetted before they are permitted to enter our country (or other countries) to make certain that they are not criminals or terrorists. They are also interviewed to try to make certain that they did not lie about material facts. As you might imagine translators are vital to this process. The potential exists that the translator who was prosecuted might have been involved in such interviews or would have been had he not been arrested. He would have been in the perfect position to lie about statements refugees made for a fee. Or he could have lied to conceal the fact that among the refugees seeking to enter the United States were members of terrorist organizations who wanted to enter the United States to conduct a terrorist attack!
This story has other implications. How many more employees of subcontractors working for our military have similarly concealed their true identities and intentions? There are only two good reasons for someone to lie about his true identity. Criminals lie to conceal their criminal histories and terrorists lie about their true names to make certain that their terrorist backgrounds are not discovered. Either way, such individuals represent a threat to our safety and to the security of our nation.
As you read the article and read my commentary I would ask you to remind yourself that the same flawed system that enabled this guy to become a resident alien and then a United States citizen under a false name so that he could steal secret material and possibly do other harm to our nation and our military is the same system that would be called upon to implement the Guest Worker Amnesty Program that the President continues to tout. I have made this point on many previous occasions and I believe it is important to state this again. A Guest Worker Amnesty Program that would provide official identity documents for millions of illegal aliens whose true identities are unknown and unknowable would represent nothing less than a major threat to our nation's security!
Our nation remains vulnerable to aliens who would game the immigration system to acquire a "Green Card" and possibly United States citizenship to embed themselves in our country and hide in plain sight as they prepare to carry out criminal and/or terrorist acts against our nation and our citizens!
By Michael Cutler on February 15, 2007 10:24 AM
[many hidden links in this one]
http://counterterrorismblog.org/
Who Brainwashed American Terror Suspect and Supported His Training in Somalia? (updated)
By Andrew Cochran
On February 14, I posted on statements by terrorist suspect Daniel Maldonado, who was arrested in Houston and charged for assisting Al Qaeda. Richard Miniter has done more digging and found Maldonado's personal blog, on which Maldonado described himself as a "Die Hard Wahabbi." The Maldonado case raises additional questions about the conversion and radicalization tactics used to breed "homegrown" Islamic terrorists like Maldonado in the U.S, and raises the following issues with respect to him (equally applicable to any prospective "homegrown"):
Which Islamic mosque, school, or website did Maldonado walk into to start his search for what he calls "true Islam?" Who was his Imam or spiritual director, what is that person's background, and how is that facility funded and supported? What is the level of membership or readership for that facility's teachings and publications? How extreme is that Imam and that facility and its teachings and publications?
Did Maldonado pay for his trips to Egypt and Somalia or did he have help and by whom? Are those supporters American-based and, if so, are they associated with another group based overseas? Did Maldonado have access to an account during his trip, in which financial institution is that account maintained, and how did he access the account?
Did Maldonado have a plan to re-enter the country? What would have been his stops along the way, and where was he planning to live and work upon his return from Somalia? Did he work at or near Houston-area oil or port facilities? Did he have regular contact with anybody at those facilities prior to his departure?
His blog indicates that his wife had their third child in July 2006. Where is she now and what was her role in his conversion and radicalization?
UPDATE: "Internet Haganah" has been digging into Maldonado's connections and posted important information on his friends and supporters before I posted, and they had this observation: "Attitudes like Daniel's don't develop in a vacuum. They develop and are nurtured in community with other Muslims, and that community is found online. Islamist forums function like little terrorist factories. Muslims enter at one end, and terrorists and their plots issue forth from the other end."
We've discussed issues such as these with respect to prior American "homegrowns" in Lodi, California and in northern Virginia - a sample:
What the FBI Needs Now
Lodi Imams Allegedly Planned to Open Radical School
Who Trained Kevin James, a Prison Inmate, to Be an Radical Islamist?
Lodi Imam Admits to Telling Pakistanis to Fight Americans
Lodi Terror Case Draws Attention to Alleged Al-Qaida Training Camps in Pakistan
Testimony: Intercepting Radicalization at the Indoctrination stage
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali Convicted in Northern Virginia
http://counterterrorismblog.org/
February 16, 2007
Treasury Hits Iran With Another Proliferation Freeze
By Jonathan Winer
Today, the U.S. Treasury designated three more Iranian companies as proliferators, prohibiting transactions by U.S. persons with the firms.
Each of the three firms -- the Kalaye Electric Company, Kavoshyar Company, and Pioneer Energy Industries Company -- were cited by Treasury as being Iranian state-owned entities that were directly supporting Iranian nuclear acquisition efforts.
Iran acknowledged in 2003 that a workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran had manufacturered centrifuge components, but denied they related to nuclear material. But the Iranians refused access to elements of the site during an IAEA inspection that year, which did not enhance Iran's credibility on the issue.
Kavoshyar Company has been characterized in the past as a front company for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and was identified by the British government in February 1998 as having procured goods and/or technology for weapons of mass destruction programs, in addition to non-proliferation related activities.
Pioneer Energy has in the past been cited as involved in building uranium processing plants for the AEOI.
February 16, 2007 03:30 PM Link TrackBack (0)
~~~~~
Palestinian Islamic Jihad threatens Secretary Rice and the US
By Olivier Guitta
After the 5 million dollars reward offered by the US State Department for the capture of Abdallah Ramadane Challah, secretary general of Palestinian Islamic Jihad , the radical movement threatens to attack some American leaders: “Rice for Challah”. In an interview to the site Elaph.com, Abu Dajana, one of the military commanders of the PIJ “Al-Quds Brigades”, affirmed that “orders were given to the active cells abroad, in particular in the Arab and Islamic countries, to put American personalities under surveillance and to be ready to respond to any hostile action from the US”. Abu Dajana affirms that “the answer of Islamic Jihad to the remarks of the State Department should occur in the next few days”. He denounced “the reward for the head of Abdallah Challah, and threatens to attack Americans and their interests, including on American soil”. He went on “if the Americans were to target Challah, the response will aim at Condoleezaa Rice, which is right now under surveillance”.
February 16, 2007 03:23 PM
~~~~~
Iranian hands all over armed rebellion in Yemen
By Olivier Guitta
The rebellion of Badreddine Al-Huthi, in the area of Saada, in the north of Sanaa, is reportedly supported and armed by Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been implicated in the destabilization of this border area with Saudi Arabia. According to daily newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi, the Yemeni authorities declared the area of Saada “closed military zone”. Violent fighting has erupted there in the past few days and killed at least 91 among the ranks of the Yemeni army, of which very many officers. Yemeni sources explain the fact that a majority of victims are officers by “the refusal of the soldiers to fight in light of the intensity of the confrontations”. The Al-Huthi militants, supported and armed by Iran, are also very mobile and resort to ambushes. According to sources of the Iranian opposition, the Al-Huthi rebels recently received modern weapons including anti-tank missiles which had been used by Hezbollah against Israel during the July war.
February 16, 2007 02:35 PM
http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2007Feb16/0,4670,BelarusAmericans,00.html
MINSK, Belarus — Ten Americans left Belarus on Friday after authorities ordered them deported for allegedly singing religious songs and reading spiritual literature, in violation of laws restricting religious activity in the former Soviet republic.
The Americans "preferred to leave Belarus voluntarily" after authorities decided they should be deported, said Interior Ministry spokesman Oleg Slepchenko.
Slepchenko said police raided what was supposed to be a seminar in conversational English at an evangelical Protestant church in the eastern city of Mogilev. He said police found bibles on the tables, and participants were singing religious songs instead of talking.
continues...........
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,252358,00.html
Narration on Al Qaeda Video Believed to Be by American
Friday, February 16, 2007
CAIRO, Egypt — The narrator on the English version of a video posted on the Web that Al Qaeda says shows an attack on U.S. and Afghan forces in Afghanistan is believed to be American Adam Gadahn, a member of Usama bin Laden's terror network who is on the FBI's most wanted list, experts said Friday.
Gadahn has appeared as a spokesperson under the name Azzam the American in previous Al Qaeda videos.
SITE Institute, which tracks terrorist groups, claimed the narration on the video — which is clearly an American accent — was done by Gadahn. U.S. intelligence officials said they believed it was Gadahn's voice, but were waiting for further analysis of the video.
continues................
Court bars routine NYPD videotaping of political protests
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=18155
Court bars routine NYPD videotaping of political protests
By The Associated Press
02.16.07
NEW YORK — More than 20 years after a court settlement framed
guidelines
for police investigations of political activities, a federal judge
rapped
police for videotaping demonstrations.
U.S. District Judge Charles S. Haight said New York Police Department
videotaping of two recent protests was as egregious as police conduct
at
anti-Vietnam War demonstrations 35 years ago that led to permanent
court
oversight of police surveillance and intelligence collecting methods at
large gatherings.
The judge said yesterday that police cannot routinely videotape
demonstrations when they involve purely political activity. He said the
city had violated the Handschu guidelines, named for the lead plaintiff
in
a case that included 1960s radical activist Abbie Hoffman and others as
plaintiffs. The guidelines date to 1985.
"Solely politically based investigations are flatly prohibited by the
guidelines," the judge wrote. "In other words, there must always be a
legitimate law enforcement purpose — having a purpose of investigating
political activity exclusively for its own sake is never allowed."
The city was not punished for the videotaping of the two recent
protests,
but the judge said it would be held in contempt of court for future
violations and could be fined.
Donna Lieberman, New York Civil Liberties Union executive director,
said
the ruling "should restore the expectation that New Yorkers can
participate
in lawful demonstrations without fear of being placed in political
dossiers."
The judge said the city cannot be stopped from videotaping
demonstrators on
First Amendment grounds, despite the plaintiffs' contention that being
videotaped by police at peaceful protests is unpleasant and unsettling
and
inhibits their activities.
"These sentiments, while understandable in human terms, fall well
short" of
what is needed to assert a constitutional claim, the judge said.
City law department special counsel Gail Donoghue said it was
significant
that the judge rejected the plaintiffs' long-standing argument that the
videotaping violates the First Amendment.
The judge rejected the city's argument that it could not be found to
violate the Handschu guidelines unless it had also violated the
Constitution.
"If all the Handschu guidelines do is forbid NYPD conduct that the
Constitution forbids, those involved in the case have been wasting
their
time," the judge said. "I reject that interpretation. It is entirely
appropriate for a consent decree or guidelines such as these to
prohibit
police activity which the Constitution would allow."
He sided with lawyers for the class who complained that police
procedures
regarding videotaping that were implemented in September 2004 amounted
to
police deciding they can videotape political demonstrations whenever
they
want.
He said the police department acted improperly when it videotaped
demonstrators in December 2005 in a march organized by advocates for
the
homeless outside Mayor Michael Bloomberg's residence. He said the
department also erred when in March 2005 it videotaped participants in
a
Harlem rally.
Lawyers for the class had also protested the videotaping of monthly
Critical Mass bicycle demonstrations throughout the city, but the judge
said those demonstrations could be videotaped if police obtained
authorization for videotaping from the department's deputy commissioner
of
intelligence.
"It is clear that some Critical Mass bikers thought the best way to get
their message across was to engage in the unlawful and dangerous
practices
of running red lights and impeding automobile traffic," the judge said.
The consent decree that created the Handschu guidelines settled a 1971
lawsuit brought by the Black Panther Party, alleging that police
engaged in
widespread surveillance of legitimate political activity and
distributed
the information to other law enforcement groups.
The Handschu guidelines were modified after the Sept. 11, 2001,
terrorist
attacks to help the police department investigate terrorism or
terrorism-related crimes.
The judge said a police statement of the importance of videotaping
large
well-advertised public gatherings, airports, bridges, tunnels and
subway
lines had the "unintended consequence of showing that more modest and
unheralded political gatherings, such as the Coalition for the Homeless
demonstration, are less likely to attract terrorists bent upon
destruction
or to deter terrorism by the open and public display of video recorders
and
cameras."
The Times
February 16, 2007
Russia says Litvinenko investigators 'not welcome' in UK
Moscow has criticised Britain for not allowing its agents to travel to
London to interview witnesses about the poisoning of the ex-spy
Richard Beeston Diplomatic Editor
Russia criticised Britain today for failing to allow its investigators
inquiring into the murder of Alexander Litvinenko to travel to London
and interview witnesses.
Yury Fedotov, the Russian Ambassador, said that three weeks after
relaying a request from Moscow to the Home Office for permission for
Russian detectives to visit London, he had still not received an
answer.
“The Russian side co-operated with Scotland Yard," he said. They expect
the same degree of co-operation.
“I’ve forwarded a letter from the office of the Prosecutor General (in
Moscow) to the Home Office three weeks ago and for the time being no
Russian investigators are in London,” Mr Fedotov said. “When British
investigators asked to go to Moscow they did it Saturday morning and
Monday morning they were in Moscow already.”
Part of the problem could be that the Prosecutor General’s letter
setting out how to proceed with its investigation runs to 105 pages,
all
in Russian.
The Russian investigation also poses a delicate diplomatic problem for
the British authorities. Scotland Yard detectives were allowed to
travel
to Moscow last year and interview witnesses in the case, including
figures suspected of involvement in the poisoning of the former Russian
intelligence officer with deadly polonium-210.
The Kremlin has denied any involvement in the murder. There are fears
that the Russian investigators will seek to shift the focus of the
inquiry away from Moscow and towards Mr Litvinenko’s contact in the
Russian exiled community in London.
Boris Berezovsky, a billionaire businessman and outspoken opponent of
President Putin, is expected to be high on the list of people the
Russian detectives will want to question. Today he said that he had “no
confidence in the integrity” of the Russian investigation, but was
willing to meet Russian officers if asked to by the British
authorities.
“My priority has always been to see the UK authorities be allowed to
take this case to a conclusion." he told The Times. "But I would meet
Russian investigators only if they met various conditions,.
“They would need to be searched for weapons and poisons. I would not
meet them at the Russian Embassy. UK authorities would need to be
present to ensure my protection. I would not agree to sign a
confidentiality agreement about my discussion with the Russian
investigators,” he said.
Akhmed Zakayev, the Chechen separatist leader, who was Litvinenko’s
friend and neighbour in North London, said that he too would co-operate
with the Russians if asked to by the British authorities. But he called
on Scotland Yard not to let the Russian investigation undermine the
hunt
for Litvinenko’s real killers.
“Alexander Litvinenko was an ally in the struggle for peace and
reconciliation in Chechnya. His death is a loss to our cause," he said.
"In Alexander’s name, the British Government must leave no stone
unturned in the search for his killer, and take whatever steps are
necessary to bring them to justice.
“The extent to which Putin’s political critics are at risk in Russia
and
abroad constitutes a complete violation of human rights and civil
liberties," he said.
The Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament, passed a law today
making it easier for the authorities to seek the extradition of
fugitives abroad.
Boris Gryzlov, the Speaker, said that the legislation, which passed 377
to 0, could make it possible to pursue Mr Zakayev through international
law. The Chechen rebel leader was granted asylum in Britain in 2003.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1397225.ece
http://interblog.org/english/
Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy (Putin in Munich)
16 02 2007
Full text
VLADIMIR PUTIN: Thank you very much dear Madam Federal Chancellor, Mr Teltschik, ladies and gentlemen!
I am truly grateful to be invited to such a representative conference that has assembled politicians, military officials, entrepreneurs and experts from more than 40 nations.
This conference’s structure allows me to avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in roundabout, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. This conference’s format will allow me to say what I really think about international security problems. And if my comments seem unduly polemical, pointed or inexact to our colleagues, then I would ask you not to get angry with me. After all, this is only a conference. And I hope that after the first two or three minutes of my speech Mr Teltschik will not turn on the red light over there.
continues......
Blast, clashes in southern Iran
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21240800-1702,00.html
Blast, clashes in southern Iran
From correspondents in Tehran
February 17, 2007 08:52am
Article from: Reuters
CLASHES broke out between police and an armed group following a bomb
explosion in southeast Iran overnight, the Fars news agency has reported.
"The bandits were shooting at people after the bomb went off at a
school. Clashes are still going on between police and the armed bandits,"
Fars reported.
The agency said that after the explosion at abhout 6.30pm GMT (4.30am
AEDT) in the city of Zahedan, capital of Sistan-Baluchestan province,
electricity was cut off.
"Police have cordoned off the area and shooting can be heard in the
area," Fars said. A booby-trapped car blew up a bus owned by Iran's elite
Revolutionary Guards on Wednesday, killing at least 11 people.
Responsibility for the Wednesday attack was claimed by a shadowy Sunni
group, Jundallah (God's soldiers), which Iran has said is linked to
Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network.
Tehran has blamed Jundallah for past killings in the area, bordering
Pakistan.
Iran has accused Britain and the United States of supporting ethnic
minority rebels operating in the sensitive border areas in an attempt to
destabilise the country.
AP: Russia details charges against Khodorkovsky
Russia details charges against tycoon
Friday, February 16th, 2007
MOSCOW (AP) Prosecutors released more details Friday on new theft and
money laundering charges against a jailed former oil tycoon and
increased by $2 billion the amount of money they say he and his partner
stole from subsidiaries of OAS Yukos.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, once Russia's richest man, was arrested in 2003
in
a tax probe that eventually put Yukos into state hands. He is serving
an
eight-year prison sentence after being convicted of fraud and tax
evasion in a politically charged trial widely seen as a Kremlin-driven
punishment for challenging President Vladimir Putin.
A statement from the Prosecutor General's Office alleges that from 1998
to 2003, Khodorkovsky and his business partner Platon Lebedev stole
property worth nearly 900 billion rubles - the equivalent of $34.3
billion at the current exchange rate - from Yukos subsidiaries.
In a statement a week ago, prosecutors said that Khodorkovsky and
Lebedev had stolen oil worth more than $32.3 billion at the current
exchange rate from the subsidiaries. Lebedev is also serving an
eight-year sentence and was indicted this month on the same new
charges.
The latest account gave more precise details of the charges against
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, which center on allegations they organized
the
illegal acquisition of crude oil from Yukos subsidiaries as "well
fluid"
and then sold it at a higher price through a web of trading companies.
The prosecutors also said that Khodorkovsky and Lebedev organized the
theft in 1998 of shares belonging to the state in the Eastern Oil Co.,
which enabled them to cement their control of Yukos.
Khodorkovsky's legal team has long insisted that the company's business
structure was legal and had been meticulously audited by foreign
consultants to meet international standards.
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/chechnya-sl/
Three accused US informants hanged
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,10117,21240758-1702,00.html?from=public_rss
Three accused US informants hanged
From correspondents in Kandahar
February 17, 2007 02:34am
Article from: Agence France-Presse
TALIBAN militants hanged three Afghans after accusing them of informing
US and NATO military forces about rebel bases and hideouts.
The men hanged in the Gereshk area of the southern province of Helmand
on Thursday were two "ordinary villagers" and a former policeman who
had surrendered to the rebels, a police officer said on condition of
anonymity.
The officer rejected the charge that they had been spying.
A Taliban spokesman, Yousuf Ahmadi, claimed the men were executed after
documents were found on them that showed they informed foreign
militaries about hideouts and bases.
Early Wednesday planes from NATO's International Security Assistance
Force used precision munitions to destroy a Taliban compound near
Helmand's town of Musa Qala, which was captured by the rebels more than two
weeks ago.
Around 10 rebels and a commander called Mullah Manan, who was involved
in the capture of Musa Qala on February 2, were killed.
The same day the separate US-led coalition conducted a "precision
strike" on a compound housing a high-ranking Taliban commander near Gereshk.
It said it believed the man, "among the top militant commanders in
southern Afghanistan", was there at the time but did not say if he may have
been killed.
Another rebel commander was killed near Musa Qala in a precision strike
about 10 days ago. He was said to have been a key player in the
takeover of the town.
SAF has said it is targeting the leaders of the Taliban-led insurgency
believing many of their fighters can be persuaded to side with the
Government and its allies.
The Government said it is trying to find a peaceful solution to end the
occupation of Musa Qala. A village elder told said this week that the
rebels did not want to negotiate and were still in control.
The Taliban, who have been waging an insurgency since their ouster from
government in a US-led invasion in 2001, have executed several Afghans
whom they have accused of spying for foreign troops here to hunt the
rebels down.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-02-16-erie-bomb-investigation_x.htm?csp=34
Investigation nearing end in case of pizza man killed by bomb collar
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/31351.html
Iraqi forces detain 35 suspected members of extremist cult: ROUNDUP
Posted on : 2007-02-16 | Author : DPA
News Category : Middle East
Hillah (dpa) - Iraqi security forces detained in Hillah Friday 35 suspected terrorists of the "Soldiers of Heaven" cult, a security source reported.
The Iraqi forces stormed residential areas in Hillah, 100 kilometres south of Baghdad. The detentions came after the confessions of detainees seized during January operations.
The "Soldiers of Heaven" is a cult of Shiite extremists who were massing for a suspected attack on Shiite clerics in the central Iraqi holy city of Najaf during the holy day of Ashura.
Joint Iraqi-US forces clashed with the cult, killing 263 and arresting many others in a battle in Najaf on January 28.
The cult was preparing for the advent of the Mahdi (the "Guided One"), prophesied in Islam as the redeemer who would change the world into a perfect and just Islamic society alongside Jesus before
Judgment Day.
Meanwhile, two car bombs detonated Thursday south of Baghdad, killing four Iraqis and injuring 30, the US military reported Friday.
In other developments Iraqi army forces captured a suspected al-Qaeda terror cell leader during operations Thursday in Muqdadiyah, north of Baghdad, the US army reported Friday.
The suspect is believed to be responsible for coordinating and carrying out several improvised explosive device and rocket attacks targeting Iraqi civilians and security forces in the area, the
report added.
During the operation, several munitions caches were recovered by the Iraqi forces.
Also Thursday, the leader of the al-Qaeda terror network in Iraq was wounded in a clash with police, interior ministry sources said.
Abu Ayub al-Masri was injured in fighting somewhere between the Iraqi cities of Fallujah and Samarra. An aide to al-Masri was reportedly killed in the clash.
Al-Masri became al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq after the death of Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi in a US airstrike last June.
http://www.kxly.com/news/?sect_rank=2§ion_id=560&story_id=8567
Spokane teen accused of bomb plot pleads guilty on lesser charges
KXLY4 Staff
Last updated: Thursday, February 15th, 2007 08:39:05 PM
Spokane Federal Courthouse
KXLY4 Staff
Anthony Garver pled guilty to ammunition charges in a federal courtroom in Spokane on Thursday.
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Garver pleads guilty on lesser charges
SPOKANE -- A Spokane County teen accused of plotting to blow up a state building pleaded guilty on Thursday.
A federal indictment says Anthony Garver claimed he wanted to blow up the Department of Social and Health Services building on North Maple Street. Court documents say the 19-year old told fellow inmates at the Spokane County Jail that he wanted to build a fertilizer bomb and be like Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh.
An FBI search warrant says Garver told fellow inmates that he hated the government and intended to blow up a bomb at Spokane’s summer festival, Pig Out at the Park. Inmates also told FBI agents Garver said he wanted to attack the DSHS building in north Spokane with a truck bomb and detonate a second device when emergency personnel arrived.
Warrants say agents found bomb making recipes and an al-Qaida training manual on his laptop computer. The Joint Terrorism Task Force took the claims seriously and investigated.
“There’s serious concerns,” said Norm Brown of the FBI.
The FBI suspected Garver was collecting a cache of supplies. Sheriff’s deputies recovered ammunition for an AK-47 assault rifle, a GPS unit and a police scanner from his parents’ MT. Spokane property.
Court records show Garver has a mental disorder and was once committed to Sacred Heart Medical Center’s psychiatric unit.
On Thursday, Garver pleaded guilty to the little-known crime of possessing ammunition after being committed to a mental institution. His federal defender says Garver denies ever plotting the bombings. He is scheduled to be sentenced in May and Garver’s attorney will ask that he be given credit for the four months he has spent in jail since his arrest.
As part of his plea agreement, Garver can’t possess bomb making recipes or the al-Qaida training manual.
KXLY4's Erik Loney contributed to this story
http://www.kxly.com/news/?sect_rank=2§ion_id=560&story_id=8564
Family loses possessions taken by police in NorthTown evacuation investigation
Kjerstin Ramsing
Kjerstin Ramsing / KXLY4 Reporter
Last updated: Thursday, February 15th, 2007 06:45:55 PM
Helen Black
KXLY4 Staff
“I noticed a very strong odor, I never did sneeze, or itchy or watery, but all of us started coughing,” Helen Black said.
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Family loses all possessions to NorthTown evacuation investigation
SPOKANE -- The Black family was spending time shopping at NorthTown Mall last weekend when a chemical irritant prompted the evacuation of hundreds of shoppers. Now their personal items are being held in a crime lab waiting for processing and they now wonder if they might have some more shopping to do.
“I noticed a very strong odor, I never did sneeze, or itchy or watery, but all of us started coughing,” Helen Black said.
On Sunday, Helen and four of her nine children – including her 9-week-old baby – were shopping when like dozens of others they were exposed to an unknown irritant on the second floor near JC Penny’s.
“Everybody that was passing by there was coughing,” she said.
About an hour later, the family checked into Holy Family Hospital where all their belongings were taken.
“All of us, shoes, all of our clothing articles, for the baby, all of her blankets,” Helen said.
“I had my mp3 player in my pocket just got that with all my clothes was taken,” Helen’s daughter Alexandria said.
And with 9 kids, replacing it all is very costly for the Black family.
“I'm just hoping to get my stuff back stuff I got for my birthday,” Alexandria said.
The Spokane Police Department says it took the sealed bags from the hospital to be processed at a crime lab in Cheney.
Back at home, the Black family is still dealing with Sunday's shopping expedition gone wrong. The Blacks say they want their stuff back, but more importantly want to know what the irritant was.
“Frightening because we don't known you know, and if it truly is pepper gas, ok that's fine, we can deal with that,” Helen Black said.
http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/11025446/detail.html?rss=den&psp=news
Mail Bomb Was Meant For Janus Investment Firm
'The Bishop' Sent Pipe Bombs To Financial Institutions
POSTED: 2:02 pm MST February 15, 2007
[snipped]
The person responsible for the bombs has identified himself as "The Bishop." He may be linked to other threatening letters sent to financial institutions over the past 18 months, offiicials said.
"The letters were similarly themed, threatening actions against the recipient if he failed to move specific stocks to predetermined price targets," the Postal Service said in a release. "The letters also contained references to heaven, hell and the number 666."'
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