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Thank you so much for your post!

To help explain my position: Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind

materialism - The view that everything that actually exists is material, or physical. Many philosophers and scientists now use the terms `material' and `physical' interchangeably (for a version of physicalism distinct from materialism, see physicalism). Characterized in this way, as a doctrine about what exists, materialism is an ontological, or a metaphysical, view; it is not just an epistemological view about how we know or just a semantic view about the meaning of terms.

physicalism - The view that everything that is real is, in some sense, really physical. See also materialism, knowledge argument, non-reductive physicalism.

I'm with Phaedrus on this. Penrose is not a materialist, though he might be a physicalist. He never even addresses unconsciousness, which he says exists. And he asserts that consciousness cannot be simulated. He is not a computationalist.

I do take issue with Penrose in that he ties awareness to the body. I'm not convinced that is the case.

AG, I've often wondered. Suppose that our conciousness is truly a physical mechanism, and that we became concious as a result of our nervous system becoming complex enough (or God built nervous systems complex enough to house conciousness). If computers got sufficiently complex enough, would they have some sense of self-awareness?

Our first instinct is always to say it won't be done because of religion, but we said the same thing about a good many things before (e.g., organic molecules). If science truly discovers conciousness's mechanism, how would it affect our faith? Interesting and necessary questions to consider.

I'm with Phaedrus on this. Penrose is not a materialist, though he might be a physicalist.

materialism - The view that everything that actually exists is material, or physical.

physicalism - The view that everything that is real is, in some sense, really physical.

So spell out two things for me. First give me an example of something that is physical, but not material (don't bother with quantum effects, we've discussed that and you know my position). Then explain to me what part of Penrose's beliefs regarding consciousness (which in his words are summarized as "Appropriate physical action of the brain evokes awareness, but this physical action cannot even be properly simulated computationally.") are not attributable to the action of material, because I'm missing that completely.

And he asserts that consciousness cannot be simulated. He is not a computationalist.

That has nothing to do with materialism. Penrose, in fact, spent at least one chapter giving examples of fully deterministic systems that are not computable.

And he asserts that consciousness cannot be simulated

It is quite possible to have a physical process that cannot be simulated. In fact most complex processes (fluid behavior, for example) cannot be simulated unless we drop the need to know specific outcomes.

Simple example: try to simulate the behavior of Lotto balls. Easy, perhaps, to make a convincing visual animation, but impossible to simulate the important part -- the outcome.

Actually, I believe it will be possible to build electronic consciousness, but I do not expect to see it in my lifetime, and probably not in my children's lifetime. If it happens, the breakthrough concepts will occur as a side effect of trying to make something useful like a traffic light that knows how to maximize throughput.