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FOREIGN INFLUENCES
"Mr. Speaker, in 1992 a Russian spy who
defected to Congressman Traficant, March 16, 1999 1
According to the Department of Defense’s "Militarily Critical Technologies List," it has determined "that high-performance computing is an enabling technology for modern tactical and strategic warfare and is also important in the development, deployment, and use of weapons of mass destruction. High-performance computing has also played a major role in the ability of the United States to maintain and increase the technological superiority of its war-fighting support systems."2 "From fiscal years 1988 to 1992, over 1,500 licenses were approved for organizations in these countries involved in or suspected of being involved in developing nuclear explosives or special nuclear material. In a GAO report reviewing transfers within this time period, the following areas of concern were noted: "(1) inadequate criteria for selecting pre-license checks and post-shipment verifications, (2) ineffective methods used to perform these inspections, and (3) lack of verification of government-to-government assurances against nuclear end uses."3 Despite this, on October 6, 1993, "the Commerce Department published an interim rule further easing licensing requirements for computer exports. Under the new policy, only supercomputers would require an export license for nuclear proliferation reasons and only when exported to Special Country List destinations."4 "On October 6, 1995, the executive branch announced a new policy for exporting high-performance computers. For purposes of export controls, countries were organized into four ‘computer tiers,’ with each tier after tier 1 representing a successively higher level of concern to U.S. security interests."5 The revision of HPC (High Performance Computers) export control policy:
Placed no license requirements on tier 1 countries, primarily Western European countries and Japan.7 [Continued to require licenses] for exports of HPCs above 10,000 MTOPS to tier 2 countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Central and Eastern.8 [Established] a "dual-control" system for tier 3 countries, such as Russia and China. For these countries, HPCs up to 7,000 MTOPS could be exported to civilian end users without a license, while exports at and above 2,000 MTOPS to end-users of concern for military or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction reasons required a license. Exports of HPCs above 7,000 MTOPS to civilian end users also required a license.9 HPC exports to terrorist countries in tier 4 were essentially prohibited."10 Commerce offered the following reasons for these changes:
"A number of foreign manufacturers indigenously produce HPCs that compete with those of the United States." According to GAO, "our information does not support Commerce's position on all of these manufacturers." Further, GAO "asked Commerce to provide data to support its assertion on foreign manufacturers, but it cited studies that were conducted in 1995 and that did not address or use criteria related to ‘foreign availability.’" In addition, although requested, Commerce did not provide documentary evidence to confirm its asserted capabilities of India's HPCs and uses.13 "The worldwide availability of computers indicates that there is a large installed base of systems in the tens of thousands or even millions. Commerce further stated that license requirements will not prevent diversion of HPCs unless realistic control levels are set that can be enforced effectively." GAO reports that "a realistic assessment of when an item is ‘uncontrollable’ would require an analysis of (1) actual data, (2) estimated costs of enforcing controls, and (3) pros and cons of alternatives--such as revised regulatory procedures--that might be considered to extend controls. Commerce did not perform such an analysis before revising export controls in 1995. In addition, although we requested that Commerce provide documentary evidence for its statement that there is a large installed base of HPCs in the millions, it did not provide such evidence."14 "Most European governments do not enforce U.S. export control restrictions on re-export of U.S.-supplied HPCs." GAO "agree[d] that at least those European governments that we visited hold this position. However, although requested, Commerce provided no evidence to support its statement that the [European governments have] instructed [their] exporters to ignore U.S. re-export controls."15 GAO further noted that: "(1) the executive branch has identified high-performance computing as having applications in such national defense areas as nuclear weapons programs, cryptology, conventional weapons, and military operations; (2) however, except for nuclear weapons, the executive branch has not identified how and at what performance levels specific countries of concern may use HPCs for national defense applications."16 "In the roughly 18 months following President Clinton's decision to decontrol supercomputers capable making 2,000-7,000 million theoretical operations per second (MTOPS), such devices have wound up in several ominous locales."17 Russia requested the purchase of two (2) supercomputers to help control it’s nuclear stockpile. Congressional records suggest that these applications were returned "without decision."18 Nevertheless, in a June 17, 1997 floor statement made by Sen. Cochran, he advised that "based on statements from the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy and from United States Government officials, there are at least five American supercomputers in two of Russia's nuclear weapons labs: Chelyabinsk-70 and Arzamas-16. Minister Mikhailov of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has not been reluctant to proclaim what these high-performance computers will be used for, and he said in a speech in January [that] they will be used to simulate nuclear explosions. The computers are, in his words, '10 times faster than any previously available in Russia.’"19 "We also know at least 47 high-performance computers have been exported without licenses to the People's Republic of China. One of the computers sold also by Silicon Graphics is now operating in the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The Chinese Academy of Sciences is a key participant in military research and development, and works on everything from the DF-5 ICBM -- which, incidentally, is capable of reaching the United States -- to uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons. There can be no question about the Chinese Academy of Science's status as a military end-user."20 US Commerce Department officials working out of the Beijing embassy also failed to obtain a PLC (Pre-License Check) through the Chinese government. "US government officials sought permission to inspect Xian Jiatong University prior to the export of a high-performance computer. Commerce inspectors wanted to verify the Chinese site [complied with export regulations] but were denied access by the Chinese government."21 In a December 19, 1997 letter written to Liu Hu, Director General for Science and Technology of MOFTEC (Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation) U.S. Commerce Department officials noted that they were not given permission to perform the license check. According to the letter, U.S. officials performed the inspection without the assistance of the Chinese government and decided to allow the export.22 As an interesting side note, the Chief Legal Counsel for the Commerce Department Bureau of Export Affairs (BXA), Mr. Hoyt Zia, continued to approve licenses even after experiencing difficulty in confirming end-use. According to news reports, Mr. Zia made jaunts to China and also worked part-time at the DNC (Democratic National Committee) on the Clinton/Gore 1996 campaign.23 Further, Tony Podesta, another White House employee, is part of a lobbying firm for Silicon Valley.24 "Of computers not requiring licenses under the 1996 regulations, 23 HPCs in this performance range were exported in 1996 and 123 in 1997. An additional 434 HPCs were to be exported in the first three quarters of 1998."25 Commerce reported on November 17, 1998, no post-shipment verifications would be performed on HPCs that were exported to the PRC from November 18, 1997 through June 25, 1998 because the PRC/U.S. agreement applies only prospectively from June 26, 1998.26 To date, Commerce has only been able to confirm non-military end-use for one computer. In a GAO report dated, September 16, 1998, GAO advised that "because there is limited competition from foreign HPC manufacturers and U.S. manufacturers reported no lost sales to foreign competition in tier 3 countries, GAO concluded that foreign suppliers of HPCs had no impact on sales by U.S. exporters; in addition, Russia, China, and India have developed HPCs, but the capabilities of their HPCs are believed to be limited; thus, GAO's analysis suggests that HPCs over 2,000 MTOPS are not available to tier 3 countries without restriction from foreign sources."27 To summarize, the Government has known since 1988 that supercomputers have been diverted for military purposes, but still allows proliferating foreign countries to purchase them. The Government has known that its controls were ineffective, but has continued to ease restrictions. The Government knows that China proliferates WMD, has attempted to purchase influence, and has refused to cooperate with end-use verification checks, but still allows them to purchase supercomputers. Despite all this, on July 1, 1999, the President announced that he would once again ease restrictions on supercomputers.28
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