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Posted on 11/12/2001 5:21:13 PM PST by Pokey78

ALTHOUGH the Taliban were prepared to retreat to their ethnic heartland in southern Afghanistan once the going got tough, they badly underestimated American bombing power, the determination of the opposition Northern Alliance and their vast unpopularity among the Afghan population. The result has been a rout rather than a tactical retreat.

Five years ago, the Taliban, mounted in their four-wheel pick-ups, captured Kabul in a three-day lightning strike.

Kabul's defender, Ahmad Shah Massoud, carried out a brilliant night-time retreat from the capital, evacuating the majority of his troops although losing much of his armour and heavy artillery in the process.

The Taliban calculated that they could do the same from Mazar-i-Sharif and other cities in the north once the alliance launched its offensive.

But they underestimated the withering bombardment carried out by American aircraft which first decimated their front lines, then prevented them from assembling at departure points for retreat, and finally harassed them relentlessly as they fled pell-mell.

In fixed positions dug into the mountains, the Taliban could sustain heavy US bombardment, but once in the open they were subject to attacks night and day as US drones with sensors and special forces on the ground marked out Taliban formations.

The Taliban had fought the alliance to a standstill over the past three years. They miscalculated the alliance's new energy and determination and the fact that, in the past two months, they had been bolstered by large quantities of arms and ammunition from their external supporters.

That determination can be judged by the fact that, with US air cover, the alliance sensed victory and their troops in Taloqan and Kunduz were willing to walk through minefields to reach Taliban defences. In some areas, mines rather than bullets appear to have created the largest number of casualties among alliance troops over the past four days.

But the Taliban's biggest fear was uprisings in the major cities from civilian populations who loathed their repressive government and viewed them as alien occupiers from the south who had no representation from their own minority ethnic groups.

Lacking all support from the population, the Taliban were unable to hide from the bombing by dispersing their troops among civilians, as they have done in the south.

Alliance commanders were able to receive intelligence reports from cities on Taliban positions given to them by friendly civilians. Taliban intelligence among the alliance troop deployments was virtually zero.

The means for the Taliban leaders to communicate in the field with their commanders around the country had become severely limited by the bombing which targeted emissions from satellite telephones or radios.

The lack of military co-ordination between the commanders and the inability of the leaders in Kandahar to communicate a strategy to their generals created confusion, panic and unease.

Thousands of Taliban troops have been trapped in the north due to the rapid advances by the alliance. Those who have escaped are making their way south to the Pathan heartland.

But along the way they face a totally hostile population and in some regions of the south they cannot now even trust their own Pathans.

Nevertheless, the Taliban still control southern and eastern Afghanistan and the long porous border with Pakistan where supplies of food and ammunition are still reaching them, while Pakistani fighters are still willing to cross over and fight for them.

The south is alien to the alliance and the domino effect of falling cities that took place in the north may not last long even if Kabul capitulates. Just a few miles out of the multi-ethnic capital, there are only the heavily armed Pathan tribes, among whom the alliance has no supporters.

The Taliban have many strengths to exploit. They have already dispersed their forces in southern Afghanistan in small towns and villages to avoid the bombing.

They will hold out in these positions awaiting what they expect will be a ground attack by American forces, even though that is highly unlikely due to the reluctance of Washington.

This means that America has to throw its weight behind anti-Taliban Pathan commanders in the south, such as Hamid Karzai. America also has to pressurise Pakistan to accept the new reality given that Islamabad has failed to deliver on its promise to create defections within the Taliban and bring out so-called moderates.

As fast as they have moved on the military front, the alliance have until now, just as swiftly, set up an administration in the cities that they have conquered to prevent revenge and inter-ethnic killings, and provide security so that UN-led humanitarian relief can reach the population. That is going to prove much more difficult than the military campaign.

Which way to Kandahar Danny? adapted from `The Man Who Would Be King'

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