1.1 The Utility of Biological Weapons

It is a myth that BW have only a limited military application and utility. The quantities needed to cause casualties are much smaller than those needed for chemical weapons and the number of potential casualties are more akin to those resulting from nuclear use. BW can be used against civilian populations or military targets.

Certain characteristics will make a pathogen more attractive as an anti-personnel BW agent. It must be able to infect the target population (generally by inhalation although ingestion is an alternative), it must also have sufficient stability to be disseminated and to survive in the atmosphere until it reaches its target, and it must also be producible.

Examples of micro-organisms that can cause disease and which may be used as BW include bacteria (such as anthrax or plague), viruses (such as smallpox or Ebola) and rickettsia (such as Q-fever). Toxins, however produced, are also potential BW.

As with any disease, there will be an incubation period during which the micro-organism will multiply in the host, following which the disease will become apparent, resulting in incapacitation or death depending on the pathogen selected. This time to effect can be regarded as both a disadvantage and advantage. Although the absence of an immediate effect negates potential applications in a contact battle, the delayed effect can be used to advantage in attacking fixed targets such as airbases, ports and logistic concentrations. Additionally, the delayed effect means that attribution is difficult and, especially when an endemic disease is used for an attack, it is plausible both to hide and deny the BW attack.

The use of BW against crops has great intrinsic potential. Serious air-borne diseases such as mildews, rusts, smuts and blasts can affect most of the world's major crops. Wheat rust, sugar cane smut and rice blast disease are particular examples of such crop diseases.

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) of the US Congress in an evaluation of weapons of mass destruction showed that a single aircraft attack on Washington DC using anthrax could result in one to three million deaths. In the same scenario, a one megaton hydrogen bomb would only cause some 0.5 to 1.9 million deaths.

1.2 The Proliferation of Biological Weapons

The spread of ballistic missiles, and the greater range of some such missiles, increases the potential threat from BW. Moreover, BW are not dependent on complex means of delivery, - as already mentioned - they can be disseminated very easily using a simple portable spray system.

The actual and potential proliferation of BW to regions of instability and tension heightens the prospect of their use in the not too distant future.

Western states are already preparing for the possibility of confronting an adversary armed with BW, through defensive countermeasures and active defence. The latter might include pre-emptive attacks against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) production or storage targets. There is an increasing reluctance to rule out nuclear retaliation to BW use.

For many states, the main lesson of the Gulf War was that they could not afford to confront the West without recourse to WMD - of which BW is the most easily obtained. Unable to compete with the technologically superior and nuclear-armed Western Alliance, some states may turn to BW - the poor man's nuclear bomb - as a counter.

During the Gulf conflict there were very real concerns that Iraq might use BW against Coalition forces. US and UK forces were vaccinated against BW agents thought to be in Saddam Hussein's inventory and detection and identification capabilities were deployed.

After the conflict UN weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) discovered that Iraq had developed an extensive BW programme. 160 aircraft bombs and 25 missile warheads were filled with BW agent as well as rockets and artillery shells. Iraq was designing and developing missiles with ranges up to 3,000 km, thereby potentially bringing Paris and Bonn within range. These discoveries were only possible due to the highly intrusive inspection regime Iraq was obliged to accept as part of the post-conflict settlement. Even then it took many years for the full extent of its BW programme to come to light.

We are now seeing rapid advances in biotechnology, some of which is based on the manipulation of genes and on alterations to the genetic structure of cells. This revolution will offer many benefits to the world - for example, increased crop yields and improved resistance to drought - as well as medical benefits in terms of offering a better understanding and treatment of genetically-based illness and cancer.

However, it will also open up a whole new range of prohibited applications that could lead to the development of new and more efficient BW. For example, it might be possible to modify a micro-organism to change the way it interacts with the immune system, say, to dramatically increase the lethality of influenza. The USSR apparently developed a genetically engineered strain of plague that was resistant to antibiotics.

Novel agents could be developed by altering benign micro-organisms to make them toxic, resistant to antibiotics or vaccines, or more environmentally stable (and thus more militarily useful). It may also become possible to create weapons that are targeted at a specific group of human beings with common genetic characteristics, as may be the case with certain ethnic groups.

It seems probable today that a state wishing to initiate a BW programme would use well-known agents such as anthrax or botulinum toxin. To go beyond that - to novel agents - would require a strong background in biotechnology and aerobiology. For the next decade new applications are likely to be beyond the capabilities of non-Western states but this seems unlikely to remain so in 20 years time.

Although some members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) claim that the AG controls are discriminatory, there is little if any evidence to support this. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly apparent that more and more States, both developed and developing, are concerned about the possible dangers from hazardous chemicals and pathogenic or modified micro-organisms to public health and environmental safety.

This has led to the negotiation of a legally binding protocol for Prior Informed Consent (the PIC Convention) for transfers of hazardous chemicals (adopted in September 1998). Negotiations towards an Advanced Informed Agreement (the Biosafety Protocol) for transfers of living modified organisms are nearing completion.

In addition, the concern about the possible acquisition of such materials by terrorists has led to a strengthening of national controls. There are encouraging signs that dangerous chemicals and pathogens will increasingly be subject to national, regional and international controls to ensure public health and environmental safety. For example, in 1997, the US introduced new rules requiring the registration and inspection of all facilities holding, using or transferring 'select agents' - a list of biological agents and toxins. Such a framework of controls on the handling, use and transfer of such materials will, over time, build transparency and confidence that these materials are not being misused and thereby contribute to a stronger CBW security regime.

The enactment of legislation to make the misuse of biological materials a criminal act is a further crucial element (for some states this will already have been done in implementing the BTWC). In addition, the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings was opened for signature in January 1998. Consideration is also being given to a convention that would make certain activities involving chemical and biological weapons crimes under international law.^*

Passive defence - including detection, respiratory protection, medical countermeasures including vaccinations and treatment, and

Active defence - including capabilities to prevent and/or destroy incoming BW delivery means.

The importance of protective measures has been reinforced recently by the work of the NATO Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP). Its three year study set out a number of priorities to counter proliferation risks. NATO's greatest need is for capabilities for the detection (both point and stand-off) of biological (and chemical) agents, as well as attack identification and warning, together with individual protective equipment for deployed forces.

A similar recognition of the importance of chemical and biological defence has been shown in the US by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. It concluded that the threat or use of CBW was a 'likely condition of future warfare' and that as a consequence the US should 'encourage our friends and allies to train and equip their forces for effective operations in CBW environments'. It is clear that action is needed to improve these capabilities - and that particular priority needs to continue to be placed on biological defence.

There is little doubt that the lack of response by the international community to the proven use of CW during the Iraq-Iran war sent entirely the wrong message - that CW were apparently an acceptable form of warfare and their use would not incur significant penalties.

The united stand taken against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait and the strength of UN Security Council resolution 687 sent the clear message that the possession of WMD is unacceptable. However, the events of early 1999 when Iraq once again failed to comply with the Security Council resolutions demonstrated a disappointing lack of unanimity in the Security Council about the need to take determined action to force Iraq to comply. There is a real danger that if a firm line is not taken with Iraq, other would-be possessors of CBW may judge that such weapons can be obtained with impunity with disastrous consequences for international peace and security.

It needs to be recognised that determined responses to non-compliance are necessary to underpin the other elements of the web of deterrence. There is little point in establishing strong rules if these can be flouted with impunity. The consequences for the global economy and stability will be costly should states judge that the norm could be broken without incurring an unacceptable penalty. States need to recognise that deliberate and determined responses to non-compliance, ranging from diplomatic approaches through sanctions to the threat and ultimately the use of armed intervention, is a vital element of the web of deterrence.