The (Revised) Palestinian Account of Camp David

Introduction
The Palestinian account of Camp David and the reasons why Israel's proposals were rejected by Arafat, have recently undergone a transformation aimed at improving both the Palestinian image and the Palestinian public relations strategy. While Palestinian demands made at the summit have remained unchanged, the PA leadership and the PLO are beginning now to address the charge that the summit's failure rests on their shoulders.

The first shot of the revised Palestinian version of events was fired by Robert Malley, President Clinton's special assistant for Arab-Israeli affairs from 1998 to 2001 in a July article in the New York Times.(1) In a recent interview with the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, Yasser Arafat was asked about the charge that he had missed an opportunity at Camp David. He replied: "Rob Malley is good enough for me; [he] documented the Camp David talks in Clinton's presence, and published in the international press that I was not the reason for the [talks'] failure."(2)

The central motifs of the new Palestinian position also appeared in an interview with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), published in the Palestinian Authority daily Al-Ayyam(3), and in other statements by senior Palestinian leaders.

The new position has now been consolidated into a Palestinian Information Ministry document entitled "The Camp David Peace Proposal, July 2000 – Frequently Asked Questions." This document was published in Arabic and English on the ministry's Web site,(4) with the Hebrew version of the document published on the Web site of the PLO's Negotiation Affairs Department.(5) The quotes presented below are taken from the English version.

Many of the claims presented in the document are identical to those made by the Palestinians immediately after the conclusion of the Camp David summit. However, a comparison between the new narrative and statements made by senior Palestinian leaders a year ago shows different emphases on issues and some discrepancies between versions.

The Refugee Issue
The Palestinian Information Ministry document establishes that "the Palestinians seek to secure the right of Palestinian refugees to return to the homes they were forced to leave in 1948. Although Palestinian negotiators have been willing to accommodate legitimate Israeli needs [in the Hebrew version, the word "legitimate" does not appear] it is up to Israel to define these needs and to propose the narrowest possible means of addressing them."

Further down, the document raises a question of principle on the refugees issue: "Isn't it unreasonable for the Palestinians to demand the unlimited right of return to Israel of all Palestinian refugees?"

The answer the PA offered is as follows: "The refugees were never seriously discussed at Camp David, because Prime Minister Barak declared that Israel bore no responsibility for the refugee problem or its solution. Obviously, there can be no comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without resolving one of its key components: the plight of the Palestinian refugees. There is a clearly recognized right under international law that non-combatants who flee during a conflict have the right to return after the conflict is over. But an Israeli recognition of the right of return does not mean that all the refugees will exercise that right. What is needed in addition to recognition is the concept of choice [in Hebrew, ‘the consolidation of options'; in Arabic, ‘the freedom of choice']. Many refugees may opt for: 1) resettlement in third countries; 2) resettlement in a newly independent Palestinian state; 3) normalization of their legal status in their hosting countries. In addition, the right of return may be implemented in phases, so as to address Israel's demographic concerns."

Return to Israel or a Choice of Options
In the revised document, the Palestinians claim that at Camp David their position was that the refugees be given the right to choose between four options, one of which was to be resettled in the new Palestinian state.

However, in November 2000, Abu Mazen said that the Palestinians had opposed this at the Camp David summit and had demanded a return to Israel proper only. "It should be noted in this matter," he wrote in an article in the London daily Al-Hayyat, "and this is also what we clarified to the Israelis, that the right of return means a return to Israel, not to a Palestinian state, because the territory of the Palestinian Authority, which will in the future be the State of Palestine, was not a [body] that expelled refugees, but [a body] that absorbed them. Not a single refugee is from Gaza, Hebron, or Nablus. All the residents of these cities remained, and absorbed refugees from the neighbor[ing area]. Up to 70% of Gaza residents are refugees, as are 40% of West Bank residents. Therefore, when we talk of the right of return, we are referring to the return of refugees to Israel, because it is [Israel] that expelled them and because their property is there."(6)

The Right of Return: Principle Versus Implementation
The Palestinian Information Ministry account of Camp David states that while the principle of return must be absolute, there can be flexibility on the part of the Palestinians regarding the implementation of that right, both on the timeline "the right of return may be implemented in phases, so as to address Israel's demographic concerns" and geographically, since many refugees may prefer other options to a return to Israel.

This emphasis, on the "right" and the "principle" of return, as distinct from its practical implementation as per various models, has been a long-standing and recurrent theme in the statements of senior Palestinians, and even more so since the summit.

However, during the Camp David negotiations and afterwards at Taba, the principle went hand in hand with the implementation. Abu Mazen clarified that "the Palestinian delegation [to Camp David] refused to set a limit on the number of refugees that would be allowed to return even if they [the Israelis] were to offer us [to allow a return of] three million refugees. This is because we wanted them to recognize the principle, and then we will come to an agreement on a timetable for the refugees' return, or for compensation for those who do not wish to return."(7)

Saeb Ereqat said in interviews with the Palestinian dailies Al-Hayat Al-Jadida and Al-Ayyam that the proposal on the refugees was rejected because it "left the door open to implementation without time limit, an implementation that could take just about forever."(8)

Yet Nabil Sha'ath, who was also present at Camp David and later on conducted the negotiations on the refugee issue at Taba, said, "At Taba we did not change a single line of the position paper we presented at Camp David. We said that recognition of Resolution [194] was not enough for us and that even recognition of the absolute right of return is not enough for us without the inclusion of a mechanism of implementation and international guarantees for implementation, as set forth in the UN resolutions. That is, I can't be happy just because they say beautiful words to me, my worries must be addressed with a mechanism of implementation. For example, how would a refugee apply for return? How can I guarantee his return? If the refugee returns, how can we guarantee that he gets his house back? And if he returns, how can we guarantee that he will be able to bring his family? Will the entire clan return, and if so how? We are discussing these details in order to ensure their implementation."(9)

Endnotes:
(1) The New York Times, July 8, 2001.
(2) Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 2, 2001.
(3) Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), July 28, 2001 (Part I); July 29 2001 (Part II). Also see Special Dispatch 249 & 250 for more on Abu Mazen.
(4) English: www.minfo.gov.ps/issues/camp_david_II.HTM;
Arabic: www.minfo.gov.ps/issues/camp_david_II_arabic.htm
(5) www.nad-plo.org/eye/newsH40.html
(6) Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), November 23, and 24, 2000.
(7) Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), July 30, 2000.
(8) From: www.nad-plo.org/david/diaries/html
(9) Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), February 3, 2001.

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The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) is an independent, non-profit organization that translates and analyzes the media of the Middle East. Copies of articles and documents cited, as well as background information, are available on request.

Part II:
Inquiry and Analysis – PA
September 7, 2001

The (Revised) Palestinian Account of Camp David Part II:
Jerusalem and Territorial Withdrawal
By: Yotam Feldner*

Jerusalem
The Palestinian Information Ministry addressed the Israeli proposal on Jerusalem at Camp David as follows: "The [Israeli] proposals at Camp David demanded that the Palestinians relinquish every claim [in Arabic: 'all the rights'] to the occupied parts of Jerusalem. The proposal would require the Palestinians to recognize the Israeli annexation of all of Arab East Jerusalem."

The document further states: "In talks after Camp David, it was suggested that Israel was prepared to allow Palestinians sovereignty over isolated Palestinian neighborhoods in the heart of East Jerusalem, however such neighborhoods would remain surrounded by illegal Israeli colonies and separated not only from each other, but also from the rest of the Palestinian state. In effect, such a proposal would create Palestinian ghettos in the heart of Jerusalem."

The document's central claim, therefore, is that any sovereignty in East Jerusalem was proposed to the Palestinians only in talks held after the Camp David summit. While at the summit itself what was proposed was, in fact, the Israeli annexation of the entire eastern part of the city, which is why there is no wonder that the Palestinians rejected the proposal.

Yet this claim contradicts statements by senior Palestinians after the end of the summit. Although the Jerusalem proposals at Camp David were obviously not satisfactory to the Palestinians, they did offer some Palestinian sovereignty in the eastern part of the city. Abu Mazen himself said that "once, they talked about [Palestinian] sovereignty over the villages surrounding Jerusalem, autonomy in the neighborhoods outside the [Old City] walls, and special status inside the walls; another time, they talked about [Palestinian] sovereignty over the neighborhoods outside the walls, autonomy in the surrounding villages, and special status for the neighborhoods within the walls."(1)

During the summit too, the Americans put forth a proposal to divide the Old City so that the Jewish and Armenian quarters would be under Israeli sovereignty and the Christian and Muslim quarters would be under Palestinian sovereignty. Barak did not reject this proposal. The Palestinians were unwilling to recognize any Israeli sovereignty whatsoever in the Old City area. Saeb Ereqat said about this proposal: "Clinton said that the Palestinians would have full sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters; as for the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, the [UN] Security Council will take a decision to hand it over to Palestine and Morocco, the chair of the Jerusalem Committee, while Israel maintains full sovereignty over it."(2)

President Clinton's advisor Robert Malley himself determined that "in Jerusalem, Palestine would have been given sovereignty over the many Arab neighborhoods of the eastern half [of the city], and over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City."(3) Malley stated that the Palestinians refused because of Israel's demand for sovereignty over Al-Haram Al-Sharif. Indeed, the disagreement at Camp David centered on the question of the Temple Mount and of what came to be called the "holy basin."

When the Palestinian leaders left the summit, they did not claim that they had been offered no sovereignty over East Jerusalem. They said they had rejected the proposal because of Israel's various claims to the Al-Aqsa compound, because of its uncompromising demand for sovereignty over the Western Wall, and because of its demand for sovereignty in the Armenian quarter. According to Saeb Ereqat, Arafat said: "I will not agree to Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, in the Armenian quarter, over the Al Aqsa Mosque, in the Via Dolorosa, or over the Church of the Holy Sepulcher."(4) Recently, Arafat also said that according to the Camp David proposal, the Israelis "would take over the churches and the Armenian quarter. I told them, 'My name is Arafatian,' to indicate my affiliation with the Armenian ethnic group and [my commitment] to the protection of their rights."(5)

Therefore, it can be said that the Israeli and American proposals at Camp David were not compatible with the minimum demands set out by the Palestinians. But it would be wrong to claim that at issue was Israel's annexation of "all Arab East Jerusalem," as the Palestinian Information Ministry claims.

A Change of Tact in Palestinian Public Relations The section on Jerusalem in the Palestinian Information Ministry account reflects the Palestinian leadership's attempt to retroactively change its image with regard to its position at the Camp David summit. The document makes no mention of the bone of contention – Al-Haram Al-Sharif, an issue that was discussed for many days.

When the Palestinian leadership left the Camp David summit, it enumerated three main reasons why it found the Israeli proposal unacceptable: its affront to the sanctity of Jerusalem, its impingement on the just rights of the refugees, and its insult to rights, honor, and justice with regard to the territorial issue. Obviously, all these claims were in the emotional and symbolic sphere.

The Western world found it difficult (and still does) to accept emotional and symbolic claims, especially when they are contrasted with what was viewed as Prime Minister Barak's slaughter of all Israel's sacred cows and his compromise on all Israel's symbols in favor of what he conceived as a realistic solution. The West found it even harder to comprehend the Palestinians' clinging to emotional and symbolic themes against the backdrop of the renewed bloodshed.

When Arafat returned from Camp David, a mass rally was held in Gaza City in his honor. "Jerusalem is all Jerusalem, not only the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, Al-Haram, or the Armenian quarter," he declared, adding that "anyone who doesn't like it should go drink from the Dead Sea."(6) The world refused to accept this attitude, and labeled him rejectionist.

Hanan Ashrawi, who was recently appointed Arab League spokeswoman, acknowledged that the Palestinians' handling of the international media was "shocking" and "catastrophic," and that this was why Barak had managed to convince the world that Arafat was to blame. "The Palestinian leaders spoke to the UN as if they were talking to a bunch of Palestinians on the street in Gaza,"(7) she said.

Me: This is a very revealing and important sentence in this report. She is acknowledging that the level to which her people can be talked to is in primitive terms that the civilized world would raise its hackles at.

The Palestinians' growing awareness of the damage to their image following the Camp David summit led to a change of tact in PR efforts, which now began to focus on realistic arguments.

Now, the Palestinians are claiming that the proposal at Camp David was rejected because it was not "viable" – not because it violated "just" and "sacred" rights, and not because it was an affront to the honor of the Palestinians. Al-Haram Al-Sharif, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, the Western Wall, the Wailing Wall, the Al-Burraq Wall, Arafat's denial that a Jewish Temple ever existed on the site, and the discussion of questions such as whether Jews would be permitted to blow the shofar at the Western Wall plaza or whether Arab donkey traffic would be allowed only before a certain hour in the morning – all these issues are not to be found in the Palestinian Information Ministry document. Instead, a single term appeared again and again:
viability.

The Camp David proposal, "denied the Palestinian state viability and independence"; "such a Palestinian state would have had less sovereignty and less viability than the Bantustans created by the South African apartheid regime." The Palestinians "seek to establish a viable and sovereign state on their own territory"; and "no people can be expected to compromise fundamental rights or the viability of their state."

This shift in image and PR is also evident in the question of the size of the area on which the Palestinian state is to be established. The Palestinians are now demanding 100% of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, seeing this as the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242. This is documented in countless statements, including one by Abu Mazen, who once said, "I will cut off my hand if it signs an agreement in which even one centimeter of Palestinian territory conquered in 1967 is missing."(8) As a conciliatory move, the Palestinians declared their willingness to accept a limited swap of territories equal in size and quality, so that the total area of their state would be equal to 100% of the area of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Such was their position at Camp David, and it remains their position today.

After the Camp David summit, it became accepted by the international community that the Palestinians had been offered a state on the territory of the Gaza Strip and 95% of the West Bank. This figure was mentioned also by a number of senior Palestinian leaders, among them Faisal Husseini who in March 2001 said: "Barak agreed to withdraw from 95% of the Palestinian lands occupied before 1967… If we undermine Sharon and his [promised] security, no one else will be able to conduct a dialogue with us that does not start where Barak left off – that is, our right to 95% of the territory."(9)

However, now there is a Palestinian consensus that the Camp David proposal concerned only over 91% of the West Bank being handed over to the Palestinians and an additional percentage be granted to Israel for a long-term lease, as Malley sets forth in his New York Times article. Yet the Palestinian Information Ministry does not present any figure for the size of the state offered to the Palestinians. Instead, it focuses on the parts that Israel seeks to keep for itself, i.e. the annexation of some 9% of the West Bank in exchange for 1% in a land swap.

"However," the Information Ministry emphasizes, "the question is not one of percentages. It is a question of the independence and viability of the state." According to the new Palestinian PR strategy, Israel's holding on to parts of the West Bank damages the viability of the Palestinian state, rather than impinges upon the just rights of the Palestinians according to the Palestinian interpretation of Resolution 242.

*Yotam Feldner is MEMRI's Director of Media Analysis.

Endnotes;

(1) Al-Hayat (London-Beirut), November 23, and 24, 2000.
(2) From: www.nad-plo.org/david/diaries/html.
(3) The New York Times, July 8, 2001.
(4) Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (Palestinian Authority), August 12, 2000.
(5) Al-Ahram (Egypt), August 2, 2000.
(6) Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, (Palestinian Authority), July 28, 2000.
(7) Al-Qahira (Egypt), August 21, 2001.
(8) Al-Quds (Palestinian Authority) November 11, 1998.
(9) Al-Safir (Lebanon), March 21, 2001.

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