Posted on 08/28/2017 10:21:40 PM PDT by Ace's Dad
Proceedings Magazine August 2017 Vol. 143/8/1,374
The discussion regarding the recent collisions of the USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and the John S. McCain (DDG-56) has moved beyond “how could this have happened” asked at a micro-level to the same question at a macro-level. Concerned perhaps with public perception, the Navy has leaped forward in drawing conclusions in a way that would, under other circumstances, be considered unseemly. Already a fleet commander has been relieved. Two investigations and two operational pauses have been ordered.
This furious activity is taking place while the investigation into what happened in the John S. McCain is barely started and before the Fitzgerald investigation has been released to the public. This suggests that key issues are already so evident there is no need to wait for the conclusions of unit-level investigations. It would appear the Navy’s leadership has decided these collisions were not simply two disconnected lightning bolts of bad luck striking Seventh Fleet.
The media is afire with experts, many of whom are former senior naval officers, all of whom are drawing conclusions. If they all know, then certainly current Navy leaders must also know the following:
► Training is (and has been) deficient for surface ships’ officers and crews for at least 15 years.
► The operational tempo (OpTempo) imposed on surface ships steadily is increasing, owing to a combination of declining fleet size; mission creep; diminishing average, unit-by-unit capability, as the littoral combat ships (LCS) come on line; increased tension in the Asian theater; and a relentless and steady demand for ships from combatant commanders.
► Ships home-ported in Japan are subject to a different standard from ships based in the United States.
Simply put, through no fault of their own, ships’ crews are stretched far too thin, and they are insufficiently trained, top to bottom. What has not been discussed, but which should be significantly more concerning, is the fact that if ships’ officers are not up to the fundamental task of safe navigation, how can they possibly be up to the task of complex warfighting?
While everyone suddenly seems familiar with these issues – at least enough to vault over process directly to the firing of a vice admiral – the element that has so far eluded discussion is the material condition of these ships. To understand the inexplicable fact that, every day, ships are operating in the most extraordinarily suboptimized ways, several factors need to be understood.
Individual-level training for both officers and enlisted personnel has been gutted. Testing and other performance-related standards were eliminated to improve throughput, reduce attrition, and make seniors happy. Follow-on training such as Communications and Engineer Officer of the Watch Schools were eliminated for new accession officers. B Double E and similar training were reduced for new accession enlisted personnel. As a result, new accessions showed up on ships not ready to be productive. Officer career paths were changed to the detriment of readiness, with long stretches ashore to meet other requirements like postgraduate degrees, joint credit, individual argumentations, Washington-time, etc…. At the same time, we combined executive officer (XO) and commanding officer (CO) training to the detriment of both, and Command Qualification Boards were pushed back for XO tours when officers already had been selected for command. Enlisted journeyman and master-level training (both formal schoolhouse training and informal in jobs such as shore intermediate maintenance activities [SIMAs]) was shredded. Senior officers and enlisted personnel no longer can make up for the shortfalls elsewhere because they increasingly don’t know their jobs either. General military training (GMT) and other similar requirements have exploded to the detriment of shipboard training programs.
Manning initiatives such as “perform to serve,” “top six rolldown,” and others decimated journeyman-level manning and expertise (and morale) across the force.
On the maintenance side, depot-level maintenance periods were decreased. Intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) periods were reduced; lifecycle maintenance requirements such as corrosion control, vibration monitoring, and other periodic and condition-based maintenance—were reduced or eliminated. SIMAs were eliminated or cut, to include ship-to-shop capabilities like valve barges. Level II (IMA) work was transferred to the ships’ crews, causing huge maintenance backlogs and untenable ship’s force worklists. Operational propulsion plant examinations, light-off assessments, and configuration status accountings were eliminated in favor of “death by a thousand cuts” from afloat training groups, with no forcing factors to ensure discrepancies were repaired in a timely manner.
Maintenance funding was taken from ships in maintenance and doled out to ships scheduled for inspection-and-surveys (InSurvs). The supply system and systems commands failed to plan for obsolescence and stopped paying for many replacement parts. At the same time, ships’ on-board stocks of replacement parts were reduced. As a result, casualty reports skyrocketed, and ships’ ability to be self-sufficient has disappeared. Funding for tech reps was curtailed or eliminated in favor of “distance support.”
The number one factor, though, is money. As a percentage of the Navy’s budget, funding for parts and repairs remains fairly static. Here’s the problem for the surface force: Neither naval aviation nor the submarine force will agree to operate without fully funded maintenance coffers. They—especially submariners—simply won’t. The reasons seem obvious. While a ship can be almost completely broken and still get under way, the cost of mechanical failure in a submarine can be catastrophic. Because the budget is flat and the fleet is aging, the community-by-community demand for maintenance funds rises against a fixed-size pie. The result is that if you hold the maintenance budget for submarines constant, or even increase it, the surface ships’ segment of the pie decreases.
All these things were pointedly discussed in the Balisle Report. This all begs the question of why nothing was done to remediate the problems. The problem is maintenance has no constituency. There are three agencies at work here: Congress, the defense industry, and the Navy. Congressman Tip O’Neil said, “All Politics is Local.” If military programs don’t provide local jobs, they are not of interest to our elected representatives in Washington. This is increasingly true in today’s charged, partisan environment. Maintenance has very little pay-off to elected officials. On the other hand, building new things, like submarines or aircraft carriers or new missiles or radars or aircraft, means jobs—i.e., votes. The net result is that Congress has no energy to increase funding for maintenance, especially if it comes at the cost of programs that provide local jobs.
The second element of this triad is industry. Anyone who imagines that the most important consideration in any publically traded company is not the stock price is laboring under a charming illusion. The profit margin for parts and labor associated with maintenance is trivial compared with while the margins for building big, new things. Just as Congress is not interested in fixing ships, neither is industry generally.
Finally, there is the Navy. Unfortunately, the needs of the fleet are many and varied. On the operational side of things, there is a cacophony of strident and competing voices, originating from a universe of different, competing interests. As it turns out, the various warfare communities of the Navy are set up in direct competition with one another in a mortal fight for funding. In this ugly competition, the surface community is the loser.
Whose fault is this? It’s mine and every other surface officer because we failed to say “no” we will not take these ships to sea until they are fixed and their crews are trained.
Captain Eyer served in seven cruisers, commanding three Aegis cruisers: the USS Thomas S. Gates (CG-51), Shiloh (CG-67), and Chancellorsville (CG-62).
Editor's Note: Part I of this feature was published Wednesday, August 23, on Proceedings Today . Part II of this feature was published on Thursday, August 24, on Proceedings Today.
"Training is (and has been) deficient for surface ships’ officers and crews for at least 15 years."
Last year our Admirals made a lot of important things happen. They introduced a new rank system and got rid of rates as old as the Navy. That will help sailors find better jobs after the leave the navy. Also, they made huge strides in making sure men who cut their penises off get threated like a lady.
Vague generalities based upon nothing specific to these two “accidents”.
WHO were the EXACT people who screwed up on each of these ships. Once that is known (it almost certainly already is) then attempt to figure out WHY they screwed up.
Somebody or something or some class of navy personnel is being protected, IMHO.
I wonder if sensitivity training gets fully funded? It sounds like collisions will be the new normal, until they fix the problems. The problems did not happen overnight, and won’t be fixed overnight either.
“Last year our Admirals made a lot of important things happen. They introduced a new rank system and got rid of rates as old as the Navy. That will help sailors find better jobs after the leave the navy. Also, they made huge strides in making sure men who cut their penises off get threated like a lady.”
So in the infamous words of that “stellar Black Pastor” Rev. Wright, “De chickens done come home to roost!” And right at a time when we need our Navy @ 110% just in case we need to deal militarily with the Norks. Obola, had his “butt boy” Admirals & Generals hollow out the services real good didn’t he!
Getting a submarine certed for URO was always a byzantine nightmare, but we were always glad it was. THRESHER still seems like it was just yesterday.
How do we know that the two ships were not deliberately rammed as they were presumably passing or being passed at close range?
Universities, including USNA are producing shit for degrees and officers. It’s not new, and has been on the decline for 20 yrs.
Accountability is dead
The massive year after year reduction in defense spending began under President Bush I, continued through all the rest. Working with fewer resources the military was asked to do more than win wars and keep the peace.
That said, the military was unprepared at other times in history when wars broke out. As a civilian, who doesn’t understand Navy Speak in this article, my only question is: can the Navy rebuild its lost programs under Donald Trump’s leadership?
Will Congress increase the budget for the Defense Dept over the years of a Trump Presidency?
The Navy ships are faster and more maneuverable. They have far better navigation systems. The bridge is manned 24/7 along with other watch stations. There is no way an oil tanker can ram one of our ships as long as our personnel carry out their responsibilities.
Back in the day I was the Unit Status Report (USR) Rep in several units. However, I understand that several units, especially those on combat status such as hot ADA batteries in Europe and Korea would falsely report to paint a rosy picture.
I wonder if the Navy has that issue.
Good article that covers most all of the reasons for the recent problems with USN surface ships.
I recall a posting here a week or two ago that also mentioned the Navy was no longer requiring the officers to go through the “driving school” before taking control of the surface ships. That was eliminated because of budget cuts to our military services by previous administrations.
Hopefully, the Trump administration will correct those budget problems.
...Former CVA-42, V-2 Cat
HA, I think you are missing the point of the article. While specific individuals will be relieved of their duties, the two accidents are symptoms of a larger problems.
1) The Navy is no longer properly training surface ship officers and enlisted. They show up on board not prepared to do thier jobs properly.
2) The surface ships are poorly maintained due to funding issues that the air warfare and submarine forces refused to accept.
They are both valid points, which contribute to the “why” you seek. Military and naval leaders have chosen to sacrifice training and readiness in favor of procurement of new systems. They same thing happened during the Carter years.
Both Bill Clinton and Barack Obama allowed our military to fester.
That's up to us, the voting, and politically engaged citizens. I volunteered about 400 hours last year. Not as much as some, but if everybody who believed in MAGA did that, we could eliminate unnecessary spending and build up the military.
Holy smokes.....I knew it was orobably bad but i had no idea it was this bad.
Tha ks lord I was in the Navy at the end if the cold war when we maintained our equipment and men.
These accidents make no sense to me - I’m wondering if an enemy is using electronic counter measures that are crippling or deceiving our radar and or nav systems. This article is just general boilerplate requests for more funding, which may or may not be needed....
Given no mention, is the possibility that too many unqualified people are in the navy, for reasons of political correctness.
Remember that Ray Mabus was Secy of the Navy for years. In my opinion, he was a total failure, as Obama wanted, and the Navy has suffered greatly because of it.
The U.S. Navy has gone from a fierce fighting machine to “The Queens’ Navy” in less than 8 years (unless Bush Jr. did something wrong).
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