The LeMay Bombing Leaflet
http://www.smv.org/blog/2011-01-12/lemay-bombing-leaflet
Here it says the leaflet was dropped over Hiroshima. It is not specific and couldn’t be but we did warn them...........
LeMays Combat Crew Manual Dec, 1944
https://archive.org/stream/B-29CombatCrewManual#page/n1/mode/2up
And yet another source regarding the bombing warnings.
http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/008604.html
Interesting aspects?
“What the CIA article reveals is that the leafleting of August 1 was the culmination of a months’-long campaign by the U.S. Office of War Information to give the Japanese people true information on the status of the war (which they were not getting from their own government) and to persuade them to surrender. “
Lemay was in charge of leaflets (at lease those dropped by his command)?
“Even today, members of the B-29 crews recall their fears that the warnings would make them easier targets for Japanese planes and antiaircraft artillery. However, they concurred with Gen. Curtis LeMay’s proposal at the time. Military newspapers featured the unprecedented action under such headlines as “B-29 Command Now Calling Its Shots” and “580 B-29s Follow Up Leaflet Warnings With 3800 Tons Of Fire And Explosives….”
“Postwar surveys showed that the Japanese people trusted the accuracy of the leaflets and many residents of the targeted cities prepared immediately to leave their homes. The Japanese government regarded the leaflets with such concern that it ordered the arrest of those who kept or even read the leaflets and did not turn them in to their local police stations. Outside Japan, leaflets promoting the surrender of individual Japanese soldiers and civilians were dropped near cave and tunnel hideouts on islands that had been captured by the Allies.5”
The specific warning issue was an early discussion by the scientific committee:
“No one at this time, or later in the conference, raised the question of whether the Japanese should be informed of the existence of the bomb. That question, it will be recalled, had been discussed by the Scientific Panel on 16 June and at the White House meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service Secretaries, and Mr. McCloy on 18 June. For a variety of reasons, including uncertainty as to whether the bomb would work, it had been decided that the Japanese should not be warned of the existence of the new weapon. The successful explosion of the first bomb on 17 July did not apparently outweigh the reasons advanced earlier for keeping the bomb a secret; and evidently none of the men involved thought the question needed to be reviewed. The Japanese would learn of the atomic bomb only when it was dropped on them. “