Posted on 12/19/2014 4:36:39 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson
don’t be fatuous, George
Could be the Word of the Day post.
fatuous
[fach-oo-uh s]
adjective
1. foolish or inane, especially in an unconscious, complacent manner; silly.
2.unreal; illusory.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Typhoon_Cobra_%281944%29#Investigation
Bitterly remembered by some veterans as Halsey’s Typhoon.
Based on a briefing from his intelligence officer on Dec. 9, where the possibility of a German attack in the Ardennes was discussed, Patton had ordered his staff to do preliminary contingency planning. This allowed Patton to make the promises to Ike because he knew his staff was ready. Patton will spend the next day touring every divisional HQ involved and personally making sure each commander knows what he is supposed to do.
At the end of his long trip, he will write his wife “Today the Army got their money’s worth out of me.” Indeed.
I’m not surprised!
Good stuff. Thanks.
I meant to include in the post that’s from Cole’s official Army history of the battle.
Halsey’s Typhoon
Thanks, I’m a big fan of George.
Here is an audio by survivors. at the bottom is it doesn’t start automatically.
http://www.patriotwatch.com/typhoon.htm
Transcript here:
“The suddenness of the disaster is what surprised us. Before her final roll, the ship seemed to have gone over just as far as she did when she went over on her side. Before the final roll there were 40 or 50 of us in the after gun shelter. We stopped work and hung on. We began to get scared.
All of us were praying like we never prayed before, some of us out loud, too. The man next to me kept repeating on each roll “Don’t let us down now, Dear Lord. Bring it back, Oh God, bring it back.” We all felt the same way, and soon a few of the guys joined in. Then was when we came back we’d chant, “Thanks Dear Lord.” The next thing we knew we were on our side.
http://www.patriotwatch.com/Monaghan.htm
“The suddenness of the disaster is what surprised us. Before her final roll, the ship seemed to have gone over just as far as she did when she went over on her side. Before the final roll there were 40 or 50 of us in the after gun shelter. We stopped work and hung on. We began to get scared.
All of us were praying like we never prayed before, some of us out loud, too. The man next to me kept repeating on each roll “Don’t let us down now, Dear Lord. Bring it back, Oh God, bring it back.” We all felt the same way, and soon a few of the guys joined in. Then was when we came back we’d chant, “Thanks Dear Lord.” The next thing we knew we were on our side.
I did not know Patton was planning that early. What did his intel people base that Dec. 9 briefing on?
Is das du, Hinkle?
Here’s a repost of a summary I did back on Nov. 5:
Alpha6, thanks for pointing me back to MacDonald’s “Time For Trumpets.” Wow. I had forgotten how good that book is. Anyway, to sum up Chapter 3, What Did The Allies Know:
1. The Allies intercepted Hitler’s order in September to pull all the panzer and panzergenadier divisions out of the line for reconstitution
2. The allies in fact noted that most of the German panzer units had been pulled out of the line
3. The allies knew the Germans were concentrating the panzer reserves in the northern Eifel area across from American VIII Corps in the Ardennes
4. Until early December, the general consensus was that the Germans were most likely holding these divisions for a counter-attack, or in the less likely alternative, planning a limited spoiling attack in the Aachen area
5. The information contained above was known to all Allied intelligence officers at SHAEF, 12th Army Group, 1st Army and 3rd Army. And the consensus was held by all of them
6. It was only in the first week of December that it begn to dawn on allied intelligence offices that the Germans could lauch an offensive in the Ardennes
7. Bradley was sufficiently concerned that he got Ike’s consent to send the newly arrived 9th Armored Division to VIII Corps and engage in some deception to get the Germans to believe the 75th Infantry Division was in the area (it was still in England).
8. Patton first began to worry about the Ardennes on Nov. 24, but the real red alert was raised by Patton’s G2, Col. Koch, who held a briefing for Patton and his staff on December 9. Koch outlined the attack that was about to happen, although he thought it was meant to spoil Patton’s Saar offensive.
9. Patton was determined to proceed with the Saar offensive, but did order the preliminary planning for contingencies should the German attack take place. And this was what allowed Patton to start his counterattack so quickly.
10. The last guy to realize the danger was Middleton at VIII Corps, but when he did, he asked for reserves but Bradley had none to give.
11. Monk Dickson’s final intel report on the eve of the attack was not well written or focused. He was still not sure whether there would be an attack or a counterattack.
It appears that the Americans knew a good deal about German dispositions, but didn’t have a good grasp of their intentions. When they did start to figure it out, it wasn’t with a complete grasp of what was going to happen, there was no consensus among the intelligence officers, and it was too late to do anything anyway.
Actually, there are many similarities btween the intelligence failures in the Ardennes and Pearl Harbor.
Hodges wasn’t much help the first few days either.
From Atkinson’s The Guns at Last Light:
This was from Sunday, today is Tuesday, so we are 3 days into the Offensive.
Perhaps the prospect of a similar discomfited General Hodges, for at midday on Sunday he closed his office door in the Britannique, sat at his desk, and laid his head in his arms. He took no calls, and for the better part of two days showed symptoms of incapacitation. The precise combination of fatigue, illness, and despair would never be clarified; Major General Ernest N. Harmon, among the Army’s toughest combat commanders, later claimed that Hodges was ‘probably the most shaken man I have ever seen anywhere who pretends to have the carriage necessary for high command.” Eisenhower and Bradley apparently considered relieving Hodges, by one account, but chose to wait while General Ridgeway’s XVIII Airborne Corp rushed to reinforce the front. First Army’s capable if autocratic chief of staff, Major General Bill Kean, effectively took command until late Monday, December 18, when Hodges recovered his balance enough to order Spa evacuated.
This will bee seen again in my tomorrows post.
What I see in all of this, not only are our troops having a hard time with the campaign, but the top brass are feeling the strain of a prolonged campaign and how it affected them.
In this book, Atkinson talks about a time when Ike refused to have his blood pressure checked, knowing it was pretty high, in fear it would cause Marshall to relieve him and send him home.
Colorado may have mentioned this previously, but Hodges was the only high ranking American officer who didn’t get a rotation at some prestigious billet like Chief of Staff. It seems he wasn’t much of an inspired or inspiring leader. I think Joe Collins or Gerow would have been better suited for 1st Army command. He doesn’t come off well in the Battle of the Bulge. And really, neither does Bradley.
Very interesting post. I didn’t know those things. Thanks.
It is only the fire that reveals the quality of the metal.
There were lots of indicators of a German attack. Most notably, German railroad Enigma. The Wehrmacht (for once) maintained good operational and communications security prior to the Bulge, put even without ULTRA, there were indications that the Germans were up to something.
The First Army G2, Colonel Benjamin “Monk” Dickson was warning of a German offensive before Christmas, and on December 14, stated unambiguously, “It’s the Ardennes!”. He was sent to Paris to rest.
Eisenhower’s G2, Kenneth W. Strong, also believed that the Germans were likely to make a final gamble, most likely in the Ardennes or the area around Achen. Strong was sent to brief Bradley (who dismissed his warning) and Patton, who took it half seriously.
I had forgotten the specifics of Nos. 8 and 9. It is very interesting that Patton's G-2 put the pieces together such that preliminary planning was done for move to the Ardennes.
But, Hodges, Bradley and Ike didn't get that far.
I agree this has to go down as an intelligence failure.
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