Looks That Kill (Ditch the stormtroopers, bring back the Peelers.)

National Review ^ | 8/14/14 | Kevin Williamson

[schurmann]

” ‘In wars prior to Viet Nam, in all recorded history, only 15% of front line soldiers used lethal force, 85% shot over the enemy’s head, just postured and blustered to scare the enemy into retreating.’ [posted by CharlesOConnell, in Post 2, purporting to summarize conclusions reached by David Grossman, LTC USA]

I doubt this is true for the Civil War.

Just look at the numbers killed.

Overall his numbers may be right though, but not for the reasons he assumes.

Considering that 85% of any military force is recruited from cities, and few of them could shoot strait, that leaves 15% from the countryside to do all the accurate shooting, and thereby, killing.”

Again I caution the forum to be wary.

Nothing in the literature supports what LTC Grossman is supposed to be saying. US DoD is by law and its own regulatory apparatus to evaluate weapon system effectiveness. Each armed service has created its own organizations to do just that, but published results remain tough to find - even results that aren’t classified, even the simplest and least costly systems.

Mogger has posited an interesting hypothesis about who and what killed who. I offer apologies in advance, but must tell the unsavory truth: accurate shooting doesn’t mean killing.

Must confess to ignorance over exact numbers for the American Civil War. Not that we should trust any; wars were and remain poor venues from which to collect trustworthy data. ACW conflict marked a gigantic turning point in tactical employment: first use of rifled small arms in clashes of mass infantry formations. Troops were not trained in marksmanship until nearly its end, so the percentage killed in action needs much analysis to uncover what actually did happen.

Confidence did not improve. By WWII, SLA Marshall, journalist and wannabe US Army officer, promised he could revolutionize military understanding of men under fire. He gained unprecedented access to troops after infantry engagements, and put into practice highly innovative interview techniques. His startling conclusions were taken to heart by US Army brass, transforming Army firepower doctrine in the 1950s.

Here are his chief claims:

1. At most, 25 percent of troops fire their individual weapons in action.

2. Aimed fire has no impact on the enemy.

The Army thus decided that firepower had to be defined as rounds fired per minute. This led to the adoption of the M14, the M16, and various light machine guns.

Severe doubts have since been raised about the validity of Marshall’s conclusions, and even the feasibility of collecting data the way he claimed to have done. But the supporting concepts for individual weapons carried by the footsoldier have not changed since.

None of this begins to touch on individual psychology, nor group psychology of troops in action. Not yet ready to dismiss Grossman out of hand, but I can say I’m not convinced. And he addresses only a tiny part of the total picture when it comes to armed conflict: crew-served weapons proliferate, and systems that kill at ever-lengthening distance. Not the slightest assurance exists, that a building-block approach can remain valid, as we move up those scales.

[PghBaldy]

State Police had the helicopter.